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Papua New Guinea came to independence with huge promise-the 
vast wealth of resources the country has at its disposal is the envy of 
many other developing economies. But this has often brought with it 
more problems than benefits. The much-touted 'minerals boom' appears 
to have dissipated, creating only fringe benefits relative to the value of 
these resources. This is also true of the forestry and fishing sectors. 
National disposable income has tripled over the last 20 years, but the 
standard of l iving for most Papua New Guineans has changed little, if 
at all . Employment opportunities lag behind the numbers entering the 
workforce each year. Government services and infrastructure, especially 
in rural areas, are in disrepair and Papua New Guinea's early record of 
a stable macroeconomic environment seems to have been abandoned. 
The conference 'Papua New Guinea: A 20 / 20 Vision' gathered 
together in Port Moresby policymakers, government officials and the 
business community and invited them to stop and think about Papua 
New Guinea's track record since independence. The results, gathered 
here in this volume are sometimes surprising, and always optimistic. 
I would like to thank the co-organisers of the conference and co­
publishers of this volume-the National Research Institute-for their 
assistance in bringing together the speakers and participants in the 
conference. The financial support of the Australian Agency for 
International Development (AusAID) for both the conference and 
production of this volume is gratefully acknowledged. My warmest 
thanks go to Vicki Veness for her good humour and dedication to 
ensuring the smooth running of the conference and, for their attention 
to detail in producing the final product, I am most grateful to Debra 
Grogan and Maree Tait. 
Ila Temu 
April 1997 
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Foreword 
A vis ion fo r Papua New Gu i nea 
The Hon. Chris Haiveta 
Given that Papua New Guinea culture and society has endured for 
many thousands of years I am not particularly taken by the view that 
just 20 years after independence we are suddenly at some form of 
critical crossroads. 
While we certainly have plenty of policy challenges to work through, 
I do not accept assertions that we are completely on the wrong policy 
path or that major deviations from the current path are necessary. We 
are but a small way along the path of what will be many further years 
of hard policy slog. 
There may not be a lot to be gained in the land of the unexpected by 
getting too carried away with 20-year visions and plans, both of which 
appear to be of decreasing relevance to businesses and governments in 
a rapidly changing and unpredictable world. 
While we in government are continually frustrated by negative 
external perceptions about Papua New Guinea there is no point denying 
that the negative stereotypes are very widely held abroad. Indeed I can 
give you four common examples of the negative Papua New Guinea 
stereotypes. 
First, it is claimed that previously stable macroeconomic policies have 
been abandoned since 1989. Yet on any scale of international comparison 
of fiscal, monetary and inflation policies and outcomes this statement is 
quite incorrect for the years 1989-92 and from mid-1994 onwards, with 
the exception of the adjustment-affected inflation outcome for 1995. 
It also conveniently neglects earlier difficult periods of macroeconomic 
management such as the early 1980s when deficits averaged 5.3 per 
cent of GDP in the four years 1980-83 and exceeded 6 per cent of GDP 
in 1981 and 1982. 
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Second, it is asserted that living standards have remained stable or 
worsened for most people since independence. While we all would like 
faster and more consistently-sustained change, the indicators suggest 
there have been significant advances since independence in average life 
spans, infant mortality rates and educational emolment and retention 
levels. 
Third, it is implied that government services and infrastructure have 
deteriorated in Papua New Guinea. While this statement may be correct 
in some locations it is by no means universally correct, nor does it 
recognise major efforts being made under recent reforms. 
Fourth, it is speculated that the resources boom has dissipated, with 
only minor benefits accruing from mining, petroleum, forestry and 
fishing. 
The concept of a transient boom has never been widely accepted in 
government circles and suggestions of a major impending decline in 
resource production are equally rejected. Recent administrative and 
policy reforms to capture significantly increased resource rentals from 
key mineral, petroleum and forestry resources are also not understood 
or recognised. 
While we complain about presentations which emphasise only the 
negative about our country, to date we have found the approach of both 
private and public complaining to be ineffective. 
Given considerable colonial neglect, followed by a rapid rush to 
independence, the 20-year post independence performance record still 
has very much to commend it. 
Nevertheless, it seems inevitable that we can only finally change 
external perceptions by dramatically improving our performance at 
home, not only in terms of economic and social indicators, but also in 
terms of political performance and standards of governance . One 
presumption of many commentators on Papua New Guinea is that all 
governments to date in Papua New Guinea have been unable to 
articulate and stick to a long-term planning vision. There is a related 
view that short to medium-term economic objectives and strategies 
have, as a result, been deficient. 
There has been no shortage of views on either Papua New Guinea's 
long-term vision or its shorter to medium term objectives and strategies. 
All governments since independence have consistently published these 
at least annually (and often more regularly) in annual Budget and 
planning documents. 
Perhaps at different times we have had the wrong set of visions, 
objectives and strategies. However, it is not correct to say that we have 
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had none at all. By international standards we have probably published 
far more on these areas than most other countries, and that particularly 
includes our developed neighbours, none of whom take very long-term 
visions and plans seriously. 
A useful starting point might be to review past and existing visions 
and strategies rather than commencing from the presumption that there 
are none at all . 
It may well be that previous visions have not taken sufficient account 
of Papua New Guinea's specific cultural features, though there is 
controversy as to the extent to which economic policies can be made 
culturally specific in an increasingly globalised world. 
Many aspects of Papua New Guinea's cultural practices do not sit 
easily with our oft-stated aim of embracing global-style market 
development. For example, many people are passionately tied to the 
maintenance of customary land tenure arrangements, even to the extent 
of opposing registration of land, a seemingly minor reform given the 
large extent of unemployment and underemployment of our human 
resources. 
Similarly the longstanding Bougainville confrontation makes no 
economic sense to any participating group, yet it continues. 
Finally, there is only limited emergence to date of a domestic business 
and managerial class, with cultural priorities frequently limiting the 
growth of the private sector, which under most visions is supposed to 
represent the key driving force for growth. 
It is also worth observing that the processes of vision and economic 
policy formulation and presentation have involved far less political 
involvement in Papua New Guinea than in many other countries, with 
most previous medium and even short-term plans having been written 
at the bureaucratic level . 
Frequently approaches have implanted standard global models 
without much consideration of local political and cultural imperatives, 
including the overwhelming political priority given in policy and 
planning matters to short-term management of budget expenditures. 
Most problems emerge in the implementation of plans. Part of the 
problem may have been a lack of political ownership of written plans, 
which have frequently been in conflict with oral plans worked out in 
the political backrooms based on much shorter time frames. 
The resolution of this ongoing tension between the political and the 
administrative arms of government will be of critical importance to 
the development of planning and expenditure approaches which are 
rational and sustainable. 
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In short, the problem is not mainly one of the capacity to articulate 
medium to longer-term plans, but rather of developing the systems and 
discipline to stay on course with longer-term plans when alternative 
short-term distractions arise. 
Let me now turn to briefly discuss some key shorter to medium­
term policy issues which fall under my ministerial control and which 
will have an important bearing on our longer-term economic future. 
Because we are confronted by very limited (and in all probability 
declining) resources, as well as limited skills availabilities, it is important 
that we prioritise and focus public spending efforts in a manageable 
number of sectors. 
The main areas that this government has identified as priority are 
agricultural development, infrastructure development, health and 
education. 
Despite continuing problems in raising growth in agricultural 
production it is still not possible to perceive of any short to medium­
term growth options for the economy that are not, at least initially, 
heavily based in raising agricultural production. 
Agricultural growth will be assisted by priorities being given to 
infrastructure, health and education. Although the latter two are social 
in nature they also have important economic implications. 
The agricultural sector in Papua New Guinea in large part remains 
backwards in terms of technology and farming practices. While 
production for the domestic market has seen reasonable recent growth 
this has not been the case for the export sector with per capita 
production of some key export commodities declining from peaks of 
the 1980s. 
Community lifestyles, attitudes and values, including continuing 
important tradeoffs between traditional and market activities remain 
of fundamental importance to raising agricultural growth. 
Agricultural extension efforts over 20 years have been disappointing. 
It is now government policy to downsize significantly the Port Moresby­
based Department of Agriculture and Livestock, which will concentrate 
mainly on policy-related matters and to decentralise extension activities, 
mainly through the individual commodity boards and, to a lesser 
extent, the provinces. 
Even with major policy reforms it will still take many years­
certainly considerably beyond 2020-before the agricultural revolution, 
which is necessary if there is to be sustained and significant long-term 
national growth, is achieved. But as the agricultural sector continues 
xvi I Papua New Guinea: a 20/20 vision 
to transform there is likely to be increasing scope to add value to 
primary production. 
Improving general education levels through improved enrolment and 
retention ratios will, over time, assist in the growth of both agriculture 
and value adding to primary produce and manufacturing growth more 
generally. 
Just as was the case 20 years ago, sectoral and microeconomic 
policies need to be managed within the external constraints of the small 
open economy. Floating the currency and providing a more flexible 
wage-setting system has certainly provided more policy instruments 
that can be brought into play. 
However, the path to international competitiveness remains a 
difficult one, along which Papua New Guinea cannot successfully walk 
without incurring some pain in one form or another. The pain from the 
large currency adjustment in 1994 has come from an extended period of 
high inflation, high domestic interest rates and heavy wage demands 
from the public sector unions. 
While we have now successfully come towards the end of that 
period of adjustment, with important real gains likely to be preserved, 
we are not necessarily in a hurry to achieve the next lot of gains in a 
similar dramatic and at times traumatic fashion. 
The wisdom of running a sustainable and balanced set of macro­
economic policies, including fiscal, monetary and wages policies is 
every bit as compelling today as it was under the hard kina policy. With 
movement to more flexible wage and exchange policies the application 
of monetary policy has taken on far more importance. 
The successful application of strong monetary policies for almost a 
two-year period now, has been an important element in stabilising the 
economy and facilitating a strong rebound in the country's external 
circumstances. Monetary policy for the past two years has been managed 
without political interference, though such a situation is still not 
guaranteed under the Central Banking Act. 
Because of the possibilities of political interference under some 
future government, serious thought will need to be given, over time, 
to introducing legislation to increase the independence of the Central 
Bank of Papua New Guinea along the lines of similar moves taken 
elsewhere in recent years. 
A strong and independent Central Bank is of critical concern for 
economic management under the set of more flexible policy instruments 
now available. 
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Issues relating to fiscal policy will arguably be of paramount policy 
importance in the coming years . 
Papua New Guinea's recent and imminent revenue situation is 
dominated by rapid relative declines in Australian budget aid. Whereas 
at independence budget grant aid represented about 50 per cent of 
total resources, this ratio had fallen to around 28 per cent by the mid-
1980s and in 1996 is around 8 per cent. 
By the year 2000 this will fall to zero . Australian project aid 
continues to have limited substitutability, and thus use, in the budgetary 
sense, so the declining budget aid continues to present very major 
challenges for budget adjustment. 
Another major factor affecting budget adjustment has been the 
Bougainville confrontation since 1989. Although volatile on the revenue 
side Bougainville Copper was providing around 6-8 per cent of budget 
revenues for much of the 1980s. However, the budgetary implications 
of closure have been much greater still because of the very high 
expenditures relating to the security operations. By the end of 1 996 we 
will have spent almost US$0.5  billion on the Bougainville troubles. 
These funds would have been adequate to implement universal 
education, to have finalised the Port Moresby to Lae highway and to 
have significantly upgraded health services throughout the country. 
Improving our economic circumstances depends heavily on resolving 
the Bougainville conflict in one form or another. 
Another major impact on resource availability since the early 1980s 
relates to decisions to borrow heavily to take State equity in all major 
mining and petroleum ventures since Ok Tedi. These investments have 
been a two-edged sword. Because the investments have been acquired 
at prices below market level they have generally been financially 
advantageous-net worth of all State resource investments is now 
over US$1 billion. 
On the other hand significant funds have been diverted to and 
locked away in these investments so, in the short term, diminishing 
resources available for physical and social infrastructure development. 
Public debt has also risen to higher levels than it otherwise would 
have, though much of the resources debt is now repaid. 
The proposed partial floating of State equity holdings aims to address 
such imbalances and to free some resources for debt reduction and 
developmental expenditure. It is critical that the proceeds of the sale 
are utilised in ways which will add meaningfully to our long-term 
development potential . 
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The main implication of our declining resource base is that we must, 
over time, significantly expand revenue collections unless we lower our 
expectations as to future levels of government expenditure .  
While there may be some scope for increasing our major core 
taxation rates this scope is not great, especially if we want to remain 
competitive in this region of the world. 
We have been working hard on two fronts to improve collections 
from natural resource-based taxes. We have endeavoured to strengthen 
significantly the administrative capacity of the Resource Tax Division of 
the Internal Revenue Commission. This is now starting to pay dividends. 
While it is not our intention to make major changes to the mining and 
petroleum tax regimes we continue to send strong messages to resource 
companies that they must pay their fair share of taxes legally due. 
Since 1993 we have progressively made major reforms to the 
forestry fiscal regime and have also introduced improved monitoring 
to the sector through the appointment of SGS (PNG) Pty Ltd. 
The government is serious about maintaining a forestry revenue 
system which gives a reasonable share of the gains to all participants, 
namely the developers, the landowners and all the people of Papua 
New Guinea, represented by the State. 
Finally, on the revenue side there is a commitment in place that a 
National Value Added Tax will be implemented by 1998 . While this will 
have revenue offsets relating to concurrent tariff reforms it is expected 
that the reform will be moderately positive in nature. 
For over a decade, management of the expenditure side of the 
budget has presented major difficulties and significant tension has 
arisen between the bureaucratic and political levels over expenditure. 
Difficulties have been driven by the narrow and slow-growing revenue 
base which has not provided as many resources as successive govern­
ments have wanted to spend. Further difficulties have arisen over the 
increasing centralisation of resources, mainly in Port Moresby, but also 
in many of the provincial capitals. 
The centralised public service has generally been high cost, initially 
through high levels of expatriate employment and more recently 
through a largely localised but high-cost public service which cannot 
easily be downsized without major industrial conflict. The provincial 
and national public sector reforms are of major importance to longer­
term efforts to improve service delivery. However, major policy adjust­
ments will be needed if the public sector and provincial reforms are to 
bear fruit. 
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We need to arrive at public sector wage levels which are consistent 
with our capacities, productivity and ability to pay. Current retrench­
ment and redeployment packages are more suited to the advanced 
world rather than to a developing country like Papua New Guinea. 
We must achieve organisational, management, accounting and 
auditing standards in both our national and provincial / local organis­
ations which will provide us with the confidence to truly decentralise 
resources and responsibilities away from centralised structures which 
are barely working. A revolution is needed in the way our organisations 
are structured and managed, broadly along the lines of the New 
Zealand model . 
There needs to be considerable rationalisation in the size and 
numbers of centrally located departments and agencies such that they 
become mainly policy focused . This will involve fewer political 
positions at the centre but with increased roles and status for politicians 
at the local level service delivery areas. 
The priority spending agencies need to be strengthened in terms of 
resource availabilities and skills so that they can make serious inroads 
in terms of the provision of priority services. While some strengthening 
is needed at the centralised policy level most resources need to flow to 
decentralised locations. 
Finally, on public sector restructuring there is scope for considerable 
further privatisation, not only in terms of whole organisations, but also 
in the delivery of particular services . For example in provinces where 
there are shortages of accounting and audit skills these services should 
be contracted out. 
The sorts of problems I have outlined are not abstract ones. They are 
very real problems we in the Department of Finance are grappling with 
in the formulation of the 1997 Budget and which the National Planning 
Office is addressing in their medium to longer-term plan formulation. 
It is likely that if we cannot come to grips with the structural problems 
confronting our Budget over the next few years, then governments will 
become increasingly tired of using 'hole plugging' and emergency 
approaches to keeping expenditures under control. The management 
of expenditures by emergency means such as limiting outlays to 
available cashflow is ultimately a debilitating process which greatly 
frustrates all concerned. 
As the implications of funding unsustainable deficits are very clear 
for Papua New Guinea, the failure to restructure will inevitably lead 
to a weakening of resolve, with resultant pressures on the exchange 
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rate, interest rates, inflation and ultimately if the Central Bank is not 
assured autonomy, on levels of foreign reserves. 
In terms of budget financing we have had reaffirmed in 1993 / 94 the 
high risks involved with excessive domestic borrowing. We also know 
from the experience of the early 1980s that excessive foreign borrowing 
is also no long-term palliative. This includes borrowing not only from 
the private sector but also the major multilaterals. 
By the end of the decade Papua New Guinea must continue to adjust 
its affairs to be able to l ive reasonably with less Australian aid and less 
foreign borrowing from all sources. 
While this further weaning from official sources will continue to be 
difficult it not only presents problems, but also increased opportunities 
which come with increasing economic independence. 
The weaning from official sources will become easier with the 
attraction of new foreign private investment. This will in turn depend 
on successes with broader economic reform and with the improvement 
of our external image and in part on reforms to our trade and industry 
policies. 
This government has already taken steps to change the nature of 
our trade and tariff policies. The days of special deals for industries 
seeking monopoly status and high tariff protection or outright trade 
bans are over. There will be no more special deals for cement, fish or 
sugar for example. 
Because tariffs form an important part of our revenue base we need 
to proceed with some caution before we dramatically reduce all our 
tariffs . It is for this reason that most tariff reform will occur in 1998 to 
coincide with the introduction of a National Value Added Tax. Never­
theless major tariff reform is definitely on the agenda. This will open 
our businesses up not only to international competition but also to 
international opportunities. 
Industry policy reforms will provide a more conducive climate to 
efficient operators while eliminating subsidies and protection from the 
inefficient, the costs of which are now borne by efficient members of the 
business community, especially exporters as well as domestic consumers. 
While we are following standard globalisation approaches to 
opening up the economy to facilitate faster private sector growth we 
need to keep in mind the problems posed by the limited stage of 
development of our indigenous business class. 
This matter warrants serious attention in the development of our 
long-term social infrastructure if we are to avoid the potential problems 
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of, on the one hand, underemployment of our resources and on the 
other, of subjugating our people to being workers forever under the 
control of foreign capital in their own land. 
The dilemma suggests the need for a delicate balance being achieved 
to ensure there is adequate scope for development of local owners and 
managers, particularly as educational and social infrastructure 
opportunities increase . 
Let me try and summarise some of my points. We should not be 
excessively negative about our post-independence performance, just as 
we should not view the periods just before and after independence with 
rose-coloured glasses. 
While we need to be able to look at our problems critically and 
objectively we should not become completely overwhelmed by them. 
If we are going to progress as a country then we need to have confidence 
in ourselves and our future. As part of this confidence we need to be 
wary of, even openly offend those from afar who would feign friend­
ship but do little but malign international perceptions of our leadership 
and nation. At times we can be too polite in the face of rudeness. 
All our future economic policies need to take account of our cultural 
traditions and our capacity for rapid social change. In particular we 
must place in a reasoned social and cultural context, models of change 
which rely solely on private sector development. 
There is no question that we must improve our international image 
and that such improvement will only come from getting real runs on 
the board. It is likely in the medium term that image improvement 
will come not from any social improvements to domestic standards of 
living but rather from improvements in macroeconomic management. 
Within the context of our rich and diverse cultural setting the general 
direction of economic policies remains reasonably clear. We have little 
choice but to adjust our economic policies in line with global trends, 
just as developing countries all over the world are doing. 
We now, thankfully have a lot more flexibility in place with our 
wages, exchange and monetary policies and we have started to move 
in the right direction with trade and industry policy. 
Much of  the adjustment which still remains relates to the Budget 
and particularly the expenditure side of the budget. These adjust­
ments are inextricably woven in with adjustments to public sector 
wage and retrenchment policy, public sector reform and to the 
provincial reforms. 
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In all of this we must keep in mind the need to manage delicately 
policies with regard to our non-renewable resources in ways that will 
get the correct balance between the interests of developers, landowners 
and, perhaps most importantly, the general populace of Papua New 
Guinea as represented by the State. 
Foreword I xxiii 

Macroeconom ic po l icy issues 

Growth with stabi l ity: monetary and 
fiscal pol icy in Papua New Guinea 
Rupa Mulina 
Papua New Guinea stands at the threshold of an era of unsurpassed 
economic opportunities. In the past decade the mineral sector has 
finally begun to fulfil its promise as a source of growth and budget 
revenue as several large projects have come on-stream. Moreover, the 
commencement of preparatory work for a number of new projects has 
reduced concerns that the mineral boom would be short-lived . At the 
same time the agricultural sector, which still accounts for the livelihood 
of the bulk of the people of this country, finally shows signs of pulling 
out of the sustained depression associated with the decline in inter­
national prices for the major crop exports during the 1980s. The decline 
in agricultural production has been more than offset by a dramatic rise 
in forestry output over the past decade as the sector has been opened 
up to new investment. 
These developments-supported by the government's successful 
efforts to initiate structural reform and to contain the domestic and 
external imbalances that emerged in the wake of the Bougainville mine 
in 1989-have generated heightened expectations for the growth 
prospects of the Papua New Guinea economy in the next century. 
The projected minerals sector-led regrowth not only opens up new 
vistas of opportunity, it carries with it new risks and challenges. Policy­
makers are faced with the prospect of making judgements on a number 
of critical choices and trade-offs. These include choices on the allocation 
of resources between sectors, where the need to invest in sectors which 
are likely to yield high rates of economic returns in the near-term must 
be balanced against the need to diversify the productive base of the 
economy and encourage the efficient expansion of those sectors likely 
to better absorb the rapidly growing labour force. 
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Policymakers also face difficult intertemporal trade-offs between 
funding current spending programs designed to improve the living 
conditions of the present generation and the need to set aside sufficient 
resources for the long-term investment needed to develop the economic 
and social infrastructure necessary to support faster economic growth. 
The government is fully cognisant of the importance of investing the 
revenues generated by non-renewable natural resources in a manner 
which will lay the foundations for sustainable broad-based growth in 
the future. A large part of the equity holdings and revenues from the 
mineral sector are, in a real sense, held in trust for future generations of 
Papua New Guineans, whose living standards and economic prospects 
will be determined by the quality of the investment decisions made 
today. This is a heavy responsibility. 
Financial pol icies for growth with stabi l ity 
In formulating our fiscal and monetary policies we need to take account 
of all the considerations and trade-offs described above, with the aim 
of achieving the elusive objective of growth with stability. The goal of 
faster and more broadly-based growth is central to the government's 
strategy for raising the incomes, living standards, and access to basic 
public services of the people. The Government of Papua New Guinea has 
also always attached the highest priority to maintaining stable macro­
economic conditions through prudent financial policies, recognising 
that such stability is a vital precondition for attracting the vast private 
capital inflows needed to develop this country. In this context it may be 
observed that in undertaking macroeconomic adjustment policies to 
deal with temporary internal and external imbalances stemming from 
external shocks, it is important that we keep our long-term social and 
economic development objectives clearly in view. 
As for our record of macroeconomic management since independence, 
it would be fair to say that we have been generally successful in 
cushioning the Papua New Guinea economy from the effects of several 
severe external shocks. As a relatively narrowly-based open economy 
dependent on primary commodity exports, Papua New Guinea has 
always been particularly vulnerable to changes in international 
economic conditions. 
The economic downturn associated with the umest in the North 
Solomons province, beginning in 1989, added a new dimension to the 
problem of macroeconomic management. Supported by donor assist-
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ance, financial policies were undertaken to contain emerging internal 
and external imbalances. At the same time a wide-ranging program of 
structural reform was initiated to tackle some of the deep-seated 
structural impediments to growth, notably with regard to the trade 
system, labour markets, domestic resource mobilisation, and the budget 
system and commercial operations of the central government. As a 
result of these measures the economy successfully weathered the 
disruptions associated with the closure of the Bougainville mine, and 
the government's success in maintaining domestic and foreign confidence 
was reflected in the uninterrupted development of major minerals 
sector projects in that period . 
In addition to the problem of unexpected shocks, fiscal and monetary 
policy must be formulated in the context of certain special characteristics 
of the Papua New Guinea economy which stem from its essentially 
dual nature. Recent developments in the economy have been dominated 
by an enclave minerals sector, which accounts for much of private 
investment and growth but only a small share of employment, while 
the rest of the economy, which includes a substantial cash-crop sector 
and a large rural subsistence sector, has registered only modest rates of 
expansion. As a consequence of the limited-albeit growing-linkages 
of the minerals sector with the rest of the economy, the indirect benefits 
of the minerals boom have bypassed large sections of our society. 
Moreover, revenues from the minerals sector are projected to be 
sustained over the medium-term as Lihir, Gobe and other projects 
enter into production. Policymakers must be prepared to meet the 
challenge of ensuring that the resultant build-up in external reserves 
and associated pressures on the exchange rate, combined with changes 
in the cost-structure of the economy do not prejudice the growth and 
employment-generation prospects of the non-mineral sector. This 
problem lies at the heart of the policymakers' dilemma in Papua New 
Guinea: how to reconcile the need to generate resources from the 
minerals sector for long-term investment without allowing these sudden 
massive resource inflows to swamp the economy and distort the 
structure of domestic prices, wages and costs. 
Fiscal pol icy 
Fiscal policy over the past couple of years has been largely successful in 
reversing the internal and external financial imbalances which emerged 
in 1 992-94. The budget deficit in 1992 / 93 averaged the equivalent of 
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5.75 per cent of GDP, well above recent historical norms. In the first 
half of 1994 the fiscal deficit rose to 11 per cent of GDP in annual terms 
and despite stringent expenditure controls which resulted in the 
narrowing of the overall 1994 deficit to 2.2 per cent of GDP in 1 994, 
the impact of this expansionary fiscal policy on the external accounts 
was severe. 
By September 1994 external reserves had fallen to unsustainably low 
levels. In that month the kina was devalued by 12 per cent and then, in 
October, as speculative pressures persisted, the kina was floated. These 
measures were supported by a significant tightening of fiscal and 
monetary policies. As a result of these policies the external crisis had 
abated by the end of 1995, and the willingness for the government to 
take the bold measures needed to restore financial stability led to the 
recovery of much domestic and external confidence in a relatively 
short period of time. However the after-effects of the expansionary 
fiscal policies of 1992-94 and the adjustment policies undertaken to 
restore macroeconomic stability have lingered: in 1995 GDP in the 
non-mineral sector contracted by 2.9 per cent, the annual inflation rate 
was about 16 per cent, as the kina devaluation raised the landed cost 
of imports (which comprise a large share in the CPI); and domestic 
and foreign debt service payments significantly increased . 
In part due to continuing tight budgetary controls during 1995, the 
overall deficit for the year was equivalent to 0.5 per cent of GDP. This 
was lower than the budgeted target of one per cent of GDP and Papua 
New Guinea's lowest fiscal deficit. Nevertheless final budget figures 
did differ from the preliminary estimates, which had indicated a virtual 
balance . We certainly would have liked a balanced or surplus budget. 
At least we got closer to achieving this than most countries in the region 
and than any country in the world in relation to the IMF Program. 
Fiscal policy for 1996 revolved around three main themes 
• consolidation of the macroeconomic stability restored the 
previous year 
• continued emphasis on the long-term economic reform 
program commenced in 1995 (in the direction of opening up 
the economy, restructuring taxation, tariffs and industry 
policies, improving delivery of public services and enhancing 
levels of public investment) 
• the implementation of the new Organic Law reforms on 
Provincial and Local Governments, which will involve a 
transfer of many functions from the Central Government. 
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The current outlook for 1996 indicates that the budget target of an 
overall deficit equivalent to 1 per cent of GDP is likely to be achieved. 
Although revenues are projected to be substantially above estimates 
due to higher receipts from asset sales and buoyant tax collections 
reflecting improved arrears collection and higher-than-expected 
company and personal income tax payments, these will be broadly 
offset by larger-than-budgeted outlays on a number of items, notably 
teachers' salaries and operations relating to the restoration of services 
in the North Solomons. 
Another factor in raising the total level of outlays has been an 
associated rise in domestic debt service cost-a side effect of the 1995 
effort to sterilise excess liquidity through the issuance of government 
securities. However, this burden is expected to moderate over the next 
year as a large proportion of these securities were short-term Treasury 
Bills, with the rates of interest falling sharply in recent weeks. 
In the near-term fiscal policy will be governed by the need to reduce 
inflationary pressures and free domestic receipts to support private 
non-mineral sector activities. The government has taken decisive steps 
to restrain overall expenditures, which had peaked at the equivalent of 
33 per cent of GDP in 1991 and 1992 but is expected to be contained at 
the equivalent of 27 per cent this year. The government remains firmly 
committed to restraining budgetary spending. 
Furthermore, the trend towards increased reliance on indirect as 
opposed to direct taxes is to continue. It is important that domestic 
resource mobilisation is strengthened to offset the phased decline of 
Australian budget aid . 
Efforts at fiscal consolidation will continue to be geared towards the 
objective of reducing the share of current spending in total budgetary 
outlays. An important factor will be plans to improve the coordination 
between agencies involved in budgetary planning and personal manage­
ment. It should be kept in mind that, barring retrenchments (which 
carry substantial immediate costs), any ad hoe expenditure reduction 
falls heavily on the goods and services component of expenditures, the 
growth of which has been restrained for a sustained period . 
Expenditure control and monitoring mechanisms are being 
strengthened, with recent experiences with budget overruns indicating 
that despite almost a decade of administrative tightening in this area, 
more needs to be done. Expenditure also needs to be streamlined and 
reoriented to support private sector growth, in part through rational­
isation and divestment of state enterprises. 
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Monetary pol icy 
The high inflation experienced in 1995 was essentially a one-off 
phenomenon associated with higher import costs, and as long as any 
attendant inflationary expectations could be checked by an appropriately 
tight stance of fiscal and monetary policy it was perceived that the 
inflation rate could be brought down fairly quickly. On current indic­
ations this view appears to have been justified and the inflation rate is 
expected to have come down substantially by the end of 1996. This 
would act as the basis for a concerted effort next year to bring inflation 
down further to a level in line with that of Papua New Guinea's major 
trading partners. 
Throughout 1995 the major problem of macroeconomic management 
was how to cope with the huge overhang of liquidity generated by the 
unsustainable levels of domestic budgetary financing that had taken 
place in 1992-94. The average level of the broad money base increased 
by 15 per cent in 1995, following a 44 per cent increase in 1994. Monetary 
policy was progressively tightened during 1995 with the minimum 
liquid asset ratio raised by 6 percentage points to 32 per cent by May 
1995-it stood at only 11 per cent in September 1994-and the discount 
facility suspended until the same month when it was abolished and 
replaced by a new monetary policy instrument the Kina Auction Facility, 
which could be used to absorb object liquidity on a weekly basis. 
Despite these measures liquidity in the banking system remained at 
very high levels throughout 1995, with the banks' weekly free reserves 
margin averaging 10.6 per cent even in the fourth quarter of 1995. During 
1996 the Bank of Papua New Guinea has relied more on open market 
operations to sterilise liquidity, with the banking system's excess reserves 
remaining at high levels in line with the improvement in the balance 
of payments and higher receipts for agricultural and forestry exports. 
Over the medium-term the development of the financial sector is seen 
as an important element of the government's strategy of supporting 
growth and investment in the non-mineral sector and enhancing the 
mobilisation of domestic savings. The increased range of financial 
services provided by the banking system and the non-bank financial 
institutions, together with ongoing programs to strengthen the financial 
position of the savings and loan societies and plans to introduce a stock 
exchange, are all expected to contribute to the success of this strategy. 
The challenge over the medium-term will be to integrate the 
currently non-monetised sectors of the economy into the financial 
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system and that appropriate savings instruments are available to take 
up at least part of the significant revenues accruing to landowners 
from mining and forestry. 
The chal lenges ahead 
Two sets of issues are likely to play an important part in financial 
policymaking in the years ahead. The first relates to the implications 
for fiscal and monetary policy formulation of the liberalisation of the 
exchange and financial system and the increasing integration of 
regional and global capital markets. The second relates to technological 
changes which highlight the need to shift budgetary allocations towards 
human resource development, a shift which would be facilitated by the 
success of the ongoing fiscal consolidation efforts of the government. 
The first set of issues arises from the policies of trade and exchange 
liberalisation pursued over the past decade and the increasingly closer 
links of the Papua New Guinea financial system with international 
capital markets. These two developments have had the following effects 
• the domestic financial system has become more susceptible 
to external shocks 
• the financial markets perception of the success or failure of 
macroeconomic management is reflected quickly in the 
external accounts. 
The liberalisation of the exchange system is likely to influence the 
volatile short-term capital movements on a still relatively small 
domestic financial market. The globalisation of financial markets will 
broaden the range and nature of financial instruments available, and 
provide access to innovative financial techniques and new opportunities 
-such as the possibility of hedging risk through the use of derivatives. 
However, these new opportunities also carry new and imperfectly­
understood risks, as the recent experience of Barings and Sumitomo 
have demonstrated. There is a need to build up the expertise to assess 
these risks properly and ensure that the possibilities opened up by 
these developments can be exploited. Monitoring capabilities need to be 
enhanced and the range of policy instruments available to policymakers 
further enhanced to respond to threats to the stability and long-term 
growth of the financial system. 
One of the most far-reaching ramifications of the easing of exchange 
controls in recent years was clearly demonstrated in the events of 1994: 
financial markets will be quick to respond to any real or perceived 
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shortcomings in macroeconomic management, with sharp changes in 
external reserves signalling the market's view. Under a floating exchange­
rate system the problem of reserve drawdown does not arise, although 
a depreciation for the currency would tend to provide the same signal 
as loss in external reserves. In general the increased vulnerability of the 
external account makes the pursuit of prudent fiscal and monetary 
policies a necessity in order to maintain a sustainable external position. 
In effect, the closer linkage of the domestic financial system to global 
markets has introduced an automatic disciplinary mechanism on 
domestic policymakers, deterring deviations from prudent fiscal and 
monetary policies. 
A second set of issues relates to current economic and technological 
trends which are likely to be sustained in the next century. How Papua 
New Guinea fares in the increasingly globalised financial and product 
markets of the future will depend on the policy decisions taken today. 
We have been fortunate in our tremendously rich natural-resource base. 
Used judiciously, the revenues from the exploitation of these natural 
resources can be used to build up our infrastructure and human resources 
so as to enable us to take advantage of the enormous technological 
changes engendered by the recent changes in the information-systems, 
micro-processor and communications industries. 
The key will be to ensure that we have invested sufficiently to 
develop our human resources so that we can, over time, move into 
high-technology, skill-intensive service sectors. Given the revolutionary 
changes in communications that have taken place in the past few years, 
our geographical isolation is likely to be much less of an obstacle than 
in the past. If we remain dependent on resource-extraction and primary 
industries we are likely to find that the secular trend in the terms of 
trade is not in our favour. 
'New Growth' theorists such as Paul Romer argue that the most 
dramatic increases in productivity and wealth in the future will emerge 
from investments and research in technology rather than increases in 
the stock of capital and labour-the emerging economy will be based on 
ideas rather than objects . It will be ownership and control of valuable 
intellectual property, and more importantly the capacity to create new 
intellectual property, that will be the determinants of the wealth of a 
nation. 
These new theories have important implications for the investment 
strategy of a nation such as ours. To make the transition to the new age 
of ideas, massive and sustained investments in human capital and 
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communications infrastructure will be needed. To this end the govern­
ment is firmly committed to improving access to education, health and 
other services, recognising that the future prosperity of our citizens in 
the next century will be determined by our willingness and capacity to 
invest in human resources, and, in particular, in the education and 
health of the younger generation of this country. 
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Rnandal sector developments, 1 980-96  
Kanitta Meesook 
Like many other developing countries, Papua New Guinea has reacted 
to the growing complexity of its economy and the need to respond more 
flexibly to external shocks by initiating financial reform measures, in a 
broader context of a restructuring of the economy designed to improve 
its performance-to accelerate growth with price stability and external 
viability. Consistent with an overall policy shift toward more reliance 
on market signals to direct resource allocation, an important feature of 
these measures has been to allow market forces to play a greater role . 
Considerable progress has been achieved since 1991 when this approach 
was adopted to strengthen the effectiveness of monetary control. Never­
theless, there remains scope for more concerted efforts to define a 
strategy for the development of an efficient financial system as a whole. 
The experience of recent years underscores the importance of different 
policy areas that can influence the macroeconomic outcome, especially 
fiscal discipline, and consistency and transparency in the regulatory 
framework that enhance market confidence. In respect to the efficiency 
of the financial system, although the general environment is relatively 
open and the monetary sector fairly well-developed, the sector has not 
functioned adequately to help promote economic growth. Furthermore, 
progress in financial intermediation appears to have been adversely 
affected by lax macroeconomic policies in the past few years: 
monetisation and financial deepening have slowed; the private sector 
has been crowded out by the government's financing needs; the spread 
between bank deposit and lending rates has widened; and capital 
outflows have intensified. 
To the extent that macroeconomic stability is a prerequisite for 
structural transformation toward sustained growth, monetary stance 
that supports fiscal consolidation is key. In regard to the choice of 
policy instruments, the flexible exchange rate regime recently adopted 
1 2  I Papua New Guinea: a 20/20 vision 
has increased potential control over domestic monetary conditions, but 
close coordination between monetary and exchange rate policy has also 
become critical .  As direct controls on financial markets are relaxed, 
interest rates need to play a greater role in transmitting monetary effects 
to all sectors of the economy. Furthermore, recent initiatives-while 
significant-have been limited to the development of more effective 
monetary instruments. In the period ahead, financial deregulation and 
other measures to improve competition and efficiency of the system 
need to be examined in a broader context, along with the development 
of infrastructure and human resource and structural reforms in areas 
such as the land tenure and wage determination systems, so as to 
achieve the desired degree of financial deepening and productive 
lending. At the same time, it is essential for further economic growth 
that the financial sector remains sound and that prudential regulations 
that are in place be implemented in a consistent manner. 
Institutional framework 
Papua New Guinea's financial system 
The financial system consists of the central bank (Bank of Papua New 
Guinea) and a number of commercial institutions. The six commercial 
banks dominate the commercial financial sector, accounting for about 
80 per cent of its total assets . 1  Each bank is either a subsidiary of, or at 
one time was owned by, a foreign bank. Consequently, the banks have 
access to modern technology, technical support and training, and are 
more sophisticated and efficient than one might expect in a small 
developing country. Consistent with the term structure of deposits, 
which are 24 months at the maximum, bank lending is typically short­
term, directed to large corporations in urban areas to support export or 
retail businesses. At end-1995, there were 74 commercial bank 
branches I sub-branches and 90 additional agencies-the majority of 
branches and agencies belong to the PNG Banking Corporation, whereas 
most foreign-owned bank offices are located in urban centres. Total 
commercial bank assets amounted to K2.3 billion (US$1 .7 billion), 
equivalent to about 36 per cent of GDP. 
In addition, the financial system consists of seven finance companies 
and merchant banks (accounting for about 8 per cent of total assets of 
the financial system), some of which are affiliated with the commercial 
banks, with focus on lease and hire purchase financing, and to a lesser 
degree, commercial lending and real estate; 125 savings and loan societies 
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(4 per cent), of which only about 20-those linked to large institutions 
of the formal sector-are active; the government-owned Rural Develop­
ment Bank (3 per cent), a development institution targeted at the rural 
sector; and insurance companies and pension funds, whose financial 
assets (5 per cent) are largely invested in government's inscribed stocks. 
The Bank of Papua New Guinea is empowered by legislation to 
regulate and supervise the operations of commercial banks and other 
financial institutions in order to ensure observance of appropriate 
prudential standards.3 Since 1992, its supervision capabilities have been 
strengthened through a reorganisation of the Banking Supervision 
Department. With regard to commercial banks, legal requirements 
presently consist of a minimum capital ratio (5 per cent), a minimum 
liquid assets ratio (27 per cent) and the maintenance of positive free 
capital . In addition, various guidelines for the management of banks' 
assets and liabilities are in effect; these include guidelines introduced 
in 1992 on capital adequacy in line with the Bank for International 
Settlements' requirements and definitions; guidelines limiting large 
exposures to single customers and groups of related customers, related 
parties or economic sectors, also introduced in 1992; and guidelines on 
foreign exchange exposures, implemented in 1993. Banks with foreign 
ownership are also subject to supervision by the parent companies. In 
general, it appears that these regulations and guidelines are adequate, the 
bad debt situation of commercial banks has improved, 4 and the banking 
system is sound overall .  A major risk lies in the largest-government­
owned PNG Banking Corporation-which has in the past carried a large 
proportion of non-performing loans without sufficient provisioning. 
Framework for implementing monetary policy5 
According to the Central Banking Act 1973, the goal of monetary policy 
is to promote monetary stability and a sound financial environment, and 
to support sustainable medium-term growth of economic activity in the 
non-mineral private sector (for example, excluding mining and 
petroleum). Monetary stability is defined to include stable levels of the 
exchange rate, interest rates and prices and credibility in the international 
financial markets and institutions. 
Consistent with this goal, monetary policy is determined annually 
by the Board of the Bank of Papua New Guinea and endorsed by the 
Minister of Finance before it is formally adopted by the central bank. 6 
Adopted once a year, the plan is reviewed throughout the period to 
determine whether any change is warranted . Thus, the policy for 1996 
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adopted in March entails regular reviews based on developments in 
exchange rates and interest rates, the level of CPI inflation, the fiscal 
operations, the external sector, and growth in activity in the non­
mineral private sector. Toward this objective, the Bank of Papua New 
Guinea monitors the key monetary aggregates, including the growth 
in broad money (M3), reserve money, and domestic credit. Further­
more, the 1996 policy envisages technical improvements in the open 
market instruments-to strengthen the effectiveness of monetary 
policy and encourage the deepening of the financial system-and the 
enhancement of the efficiency of the foreign exchange market. 
In the 1980s, the Bank of Papua New Guinea generally followed 
prudent monetary policies within the above institutional structure; the 
external position was comfortable and domestic inflation was relatively 
low. However, monetary stance began in 1991 to accommodate 
expansionary fiscal policy that culminated in a financial crisis in 1994, 
after which restrictive monetary policy was restored. To a large degree, 
the authorities have maintained an open and market-oriented financial 
system despite the periodic use of credit ceilings in containing monetary 
expansion. Determination of bank deposit and lending interest rates has 
in principle been left to the market,7 although in practice, the small 
number of banks and the thinness of the domestic money market has 
resulted in considerable stickiness in the rates. The external current 
account is fully convertible, and there are few restrictions on the capital 
account. 
Monetary instruments and operations 
The current instruments available to the Bank of Papua New Guinea to 
influence monetary conditions are treasury bill auctions, the kina auction 
facility, the minimum liquid asset ratio (MLAR), and the lender of last 
resort facility. 
Until mid-1991 and under the hard-kina policy,8 the Bank of Papua 
New Guinea relied to a large degree on direct monetary control, through 
either a statutory liquidity ratio or the level of overall credit to the 
non-mineral private sector (excluding lending to priority areas), 
supplemented at times by bank-specific targets. Since then, there has 
been a move toward indirect control. A base-money approach was 
adopted, and open market-type operations through treasury bill auctions 
have become a principal policy instrument. Following the relaxation of 
regulations on overseas borrowing by residents in late 1992, which 
weakened considerably the relationship between the level of credit and 
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Papua New Guinea: instruments for monetary control 
Treasury bi l l  auctions: Treasury b i l ls issued by the Government are 
ful ly subscribed by the Bank of Papua New Guinea, which holds weekly 
auctions of these bi l ls based on targeted l iquidity conditions; 
participation is presently dominated by commercial banks; very smal l ,  if 
any, secondary market exists.9 
Kina auctions: Designed to improve the Bank of Papua New Gu inea's 
abi l ity to infl uence market interest rates as wel l  as the system's l iqu idity 
at the marg in ;  operates on both sides of the market but, si nce its 
introduction in May 1995, commercial banks have most frequently 
deposited at, and rarely borrowed from the Bank of Papua New Guinea 
under this faci l ity; both the interest rate and volume offered at each 
weekly auction are presently set by the Bank. 
MLAR: Applied to all kina and foreign currency deposits held by residents 
and can be satisfied by cash , deposits at the Bank of Papua New Guinea, 
or government secu rities of maturities up to three years ; increased in 
steps from 11 to 32 per cent between October 1994 and May 1995, then 
reduced to 27 per cent in June 1996; there is no reserve requ i rement. 
Lender of last resort: A safeguard for commercial banks against 
unexpected changes in thei r  l iqu id ity positions; rate designed to be 
prohibitive (36.5 per cent at present) . 
non-mineral sector activity, targeting credit growth formally gave way 
to targeting money supply. However, in the context of a pegged exchange 
rate regime-which continued to act as a price anchor, the money 
supply was not entirely under the control of the monetary authorities. 
The relative effectiveness of the various instruments changed 
significantly when the pegged exchange rate regime was replaced by a 
floating system in October 1994, giving the authorities more autonomy 
in the conduct of monetary policy-with the exchange rate becoming 
an additional channel for transmitting the effects of monetary policy. 
In order to tighten financial conditions, the measure was accompanied 
by a large upward adjustment in the MLAR, which succeeded in 
absorbing excess liquidity. The restrictive policy has been in effect ever 
since through the maintenance of high interest rates in the context of 
open market-type operations combined with the kina auction scheme 
introduced in May 1995. The latter facility is intended for fine-tuning 
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liquidity management while the main instrument, namely, the yields on 
government securities, is being adjusted; in practice, however, the 
authorities fix the kina auction rate instead of allowing it to react quickly 
to market conditions. The authorities have indicated their intention to 
phase out the use of the MLAR as a monetary policy tool in preference to 
open market-type instruments, maintaining it for prudential purposes. 
The domestic interbank market is undeveloped. Banks in need of 
liquidity often borrow from the discount / kina auction facility even in 
times of excess liquidity in the system. Treasury bills are held only by 
institutions, and in practice there is virtually no secondary money 
market; however, measures have recently been taken to help address 
this situation, including the removal of the stamp duty for interbank 
financial transactions, more active sales to non-bank investors, and 
greater information on auction results. No capital market exists. There 
are no subsidised or preferential rediscount facilities. 1 0  
Regarding foreign exchange operations, the introduction of a floating 
exchange regime in the framework of restrictive financial policy 
contributed to easing the 1994 crisis. The subsequent adoption of the 
screen-based system has helped smooth the functioning of the foreign 
exchange market. The termination of the Bank of Papua New Guinea's 
role in providing foreign exchange cover has also helped support the 
market-determined system. 
Regional perspective 
While its floating exchange system is unique among South Pacific island 
countries that are also Fund members, Papua New Guinea shares many 
aspects of monetary control instruments and their developments with 
its smaller neighbours.1 1  Like Papua New Guinea, these economies have 
shifted toward indirect instruments since the late 1980s, and Western 
Samoa is now the only country still with direct controls on credit and 
interest rates. Open market-type operations have been introduced in the 
other countries except Vanuatu, although in the comparator countries, 
central bank securities are the main instrument. These operations are 
often supplemented by liquid asset ratio (which are also high in the 
Solomon Islands and Western Samoa) or reserve requirements. In all 
countries except the Solomon Islands, the banking system faces excess 
liquidity. Reflecting this feature, discount windows and lending facilities 
for commercial banks are infrequently used, and the development of 
an interbank market has been slow. 
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Papua New Guinea : recent developments in 
implementation of monetary pol icy12 
Up to 1 989 
Treasury bil l  Kina 
auctions auctions 
Used n.a.  
infrequently 
1 989: Bougainville crisis 
1 989 to mid-1 99 1  
n.a.  n.a.  
Lender of MLAR 
last resort 
Role is to Principal 
safeguard instrument 
n .a. n.a.  
Mid-1 991 : adoption of base money management 
From mid-1 99 1  
t o  late 1 994 Principal n.a.  n .a. Effectively 
instrument became 
for monetary prudential 
control guidel ine 
Late 1 994: financial crisis followed by flotation of kina 
From late Principal Introduced Role is to Actively 
1 994-present instrument May 1 995: safeguard used in  
Discount Credit 
facility targeting 
Used n .a. 
infrequently 
I m portant 




Role l im ited Not used, 
to bridging except as an 
short-term ind icator 
liquidiity 
Replaced Not used, 
by kina except as an 
for monetary important monetary auctions in indicator 
control supplementary 
instrument 
tightening, May 1 995 
not binding 
recently 
Recent f inancial  pol icies and performance 
Recent performance of the financial sector needs to be evaluated in the 
context of the overall development of the economy, which has in turn 
been influenced by exogenous factors and policy strategy. Importantly, 
during the past 15  years, Papua New Guinea experienced periodic 
surges in the income of the mining sector (and in recent years the forestry 
sector) associated with the development of new projects, subjecting the 
economy to the volatile and transient effects of the booming sector (the 
'Dutch disease' ) .  The impact of cycles and shocks of export incomes 
and government revenues was compounded by large swings in the 
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terms of trade, stemming from fluctuations in the prices of all major 
commodities, not only mineral products but also coffee, cocoa, copra 
and palm oil (Appendix table 2 .1 ) . Within this setting, an important 
component of macroeconomic management has been to prevent the 
transmission of an external shock into a fiscal shock. While the 
mechanism for the sterilisation of the mineral sector effect exists in the 
form of the Mineral Revenues Stabilisation Fund (MRSF), it broke down 
in 1992-94 as drawdowns from this fund helped finance large fiscal 
deficits. Exacerbated by an accommodating monetary stance overall, 
these fiscal imbalances led to the emergence of economic instability 
and a weakening of financial intermediation. 
Macroeconomic performance 
During the 1980s, monetary growth was well contained, net bank 
financing of the budget was modest, and macroeconomic stability as 
measured by inflation was reasonable (Table 2 .1 ). Nevertheless, reflecting 
the absence of instruments for fine-tuning the monetary expansion, 
broad money growth during boom periods ( for example, periods of 
rising terms of trade) tended to be relatively high with a consequence of 
rising price pressures. During 1991-93, monetary policy accommodated 
fiscal expansion, to the extent of transgressing significantly the statutory 
limits on Bank of Papua New Guinea lending to the government 
(Appendix table 2.2) .  Given the fixed exchange rate and the relative 
openness of the economy, this policy resulted in a sharp deterioration of 
the balance of payments and a loss of international reserves-rather 
than in high inflation. The tightening of monetary policy beginning in 
late 1994 served to halt this loss and, in fact, reserves were boosted by 
donor support, while the devaluation of the kina led to upward adjust­
ments in the price level and a realignment of the real exchange rate. 
In response to stagnant credit to the private sector in the face of a 
strengthening of the floating kina and further moderation in underlying 
inflationary pressures, the authorities began to ease monetary policy in 
June 1996 through lowering the interest rate in the kina auction market, 
complemented by a significant reduction in the MLAR as a signal to 
the market of the shift in monetary stance. 
The relationship between money stock and base money has fluctuated 
a great deal since 1980. The money multiplier (defined as the ratio of 
broad money excluding deposits of commodity stabilisation funds, or 
M3, to reserve money) increased steadily during the period of relative 
stability (1980-92), consistent with both a declining ratio of currency to 
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Table 2 . 1 . Papua New Guinea : overal l  monetary stance and macro­
economic stabi l ity (per cent) 
1980-89 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
average 
Broad money growth 8.6 5.4 18.5 12.9 17.6 -1.3 
Domestic bank financing 
of budget (per cent of GDP) 0.6 2.9 3.4 4.7 4.8 4.5 
Liquid asset requ i rement 14 11 11 11 11 26 
I nflation 5.9 7.0 7.0 4.3 4.9 2.9 
Gross reserves 
(US$ mi l l ion) 396 414 334 250 153 107 
Money mult ipl ier (ratio) 5.3 6.1 7.7 8.5 8.5 7.5 








bank deposits (as financial savings expanded) and the gradual lowering 
of the liquid asset requirement. 13 The increasing trend in the multiplier 
reversed in 1994-95 as demand for real money balances contracted 
and bank deposits slowed in response to macroeconomic imbalances, 
while the liquid asset requirement was raised sharply. The interpretation 
of monetary developments in the last few years is also complicated by 
the build-up of government arrears in late 1994 (brought on by the 
suspension by the Bank of Papua New Guinea of additional financing 
to the government, with the impact of sharply reducing broad money 
and increased private sector borrowing from both domestic banks and 
overseas) and subsequent repayments of these arrears at end-1994 and 
early 1995 (which only partially reversed the contraction of money 
demand to the extent that confidence had not been fully restored). 14  
Even abstracting from these special factors, short-term fluctuations in 
real money demand would seem to suggest a need for identifying the 
behaviour of the multiplier so that the Bank of Papua New Guinea can 
set the money supply at the level it desires with higher precision. 
Developments of key financial indicators 
As a result of slack monetary policy to accommodate fiscal expansion, 
there was a substantial shift beginning in 1990 in the pattern of bank 
financing toward funding the government sector. At end-1995, the share 
of credit to the government (net of deposits) in total bank credit was 
about 30 per cent compaEd with the average of less than 5 per cent in 
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Table 2.2. Papua New Guinea: shift between financing of public and 
private sectors, 1 980-95 (per cent) 
1980-89 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
average 
Ratio of net credit to 
government to total credit 4.4 13.1 20.1 25.3 31.0 27 .6 29.4 
Real growth in private 
cred it 7.6 -5.1 5.9 0.5 -5.4 10.2 -8.3 
Gross Domestic 
Investment/G DP 22 24 28 24 19 14 
Sources: See Appendix Table 1 .  
the 1980s (Table 2.2) .  Correspondingly, credit to the private sector 
declined in real terms between 1990 and 1995 compared with an annual 
expansion of about 7.5 per cent in the previous decade. 15 Thus, the 
ultimate effect of monetary policy during the past five years has been 
to crowd out the private sector at the time when the stated policy was to 
promote the development of the non-mineral sector. In the environment 
in which foreign investors' confidence was jolted by lack of fiscal 
discipline, overall investment appears to have fallen in relation to GDP.16 
The impact on economic growth, however, may not be felt for a few years. 
Savings mobilisation in Papua New Guinea is hampered by 
transport difficulties and the lack of banking facilities in rural areas. 
The number of bank branches and agencies declined over the past 10  




No. of bank branches/ 
agencies 413 357 
Degree of monetisation 23 35 
Narrow money/M3* 39 32 
Private credit/total bank 
assets 63 77 
Private cred it/GDP 20 31 
Sources: See Appendi x  Tables I and 3 .  
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
226 210 187 175 164 
35 35 34 30 30 
33 31 35 37 36 
72 66 58 61 60 
30 27 22 23 22 
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years, owing to low transaction volumes, law and order problems and 
difficulties stemming from mismanagement of the branches (Table 2.3). 
Closure of bank facilities undoubtedly has had a vicious circle effect as 
it would lead to a further decline in transactions. Nevertheless, the 
degree of financial intermediation as measured by the ratio of broad 
money (excluding deposits of commodity stabilisation funds, or M3) 
to nominal GDP rose significantly from 21 per cent in 1 980 to 35 per 
cent by 1 990. 17 During this period, the share of narrow money in M3 
declined (Appendix table 2.3), indicating inc:eased money demand as 
safe assets (in the absence of other forms of financial assets) in relation 
to transaction demand . Expansionary financial policy since then, 
however, has hampered further deepening of financial development. 
Monetisation slowed even as income continued to grow, and even 
reversed. An upturn in the share of narrow money to overall  money 
demand suggests a slowdown in total household savings domestically 
and I or reluctance to hold longer-term saving instruments. 
The role of commercial banks as a financing source for private invest­
ment followed a similar trend. The share of credit to the private sector 
in total bank assets, which grew during the 1980s, declined markedly in 
1991-93 as more bank resources were geared to financing government 
deficits. As a consequence of this decline, combined with a setback in the 
monetisation process, credit to the private sector in relation to GDP, 
which rose steadily during the 1 980s, fell in the next three years. 
From the early 1980s, the share of lending to the trade sector has 
declined, whereas lending to �griculture, forestry and fishing and to 
miscellaneous businesses has risen; at end-1995, outstanding credit to 
the above three sectors each accounted for about 21-24 per cent of the 
total .  The share of lending to the manufacturing sector was 7 per cent, 
half of which financed processing of food, beverages and tobacco . 
The behaviour of interest rates is examined here as an indicator of 
the efficiency of financial intermediation (Table 2.4). Bank average 
deposit rates (3-6 months) were positive in real terms except in 1980 
and 1995, and, to the extent that inflation in those years reflected one­
time adjustments, it might be said that financial repression has not been 
prevalent. 18 However, nominal interest rates, both deposit and lending, 
have been relatively stable and unresponsive to either inflation or 
foreign rates. The rates followed to a large degree movements in the 
discount and treasury bill rates (Appendix table 2.2), but the lowering of 
lending rates by the commercial banks in 1993-94 was also in response 
to directives from the Bank of Papua New Guinea in its effort to narrow 
the spread between lending and deposit rates. The spread had fallen 
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Table 2.4. Papua New Guinea: efficiency of financial intermediation, 
1 980-95 (per cent) 
Discount/kina auction rate 
Treasury b i l l  interest rate 
Deposit interest rate 
(real terms) 
1980-89 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
average 
5.9 9.3 9.3 7.1 6.3 6.6 18.0 
9.6 11.4 10.3 8.9 6 .3 6.9 17.3 
2.3 1.6 1.9 3.4 0.1 2.1 -7.2 
Deposit-lend ing point spread 2.6 6.9 5.1 6.7 6 .3 4.1 3.6 
Sources: See Appendix Table l .  
in the mid-1980s to very low levels but rose significantly (to almost 7 
percentage points) in the early 1 990s prior to the Bank of Papua New 
Guinea administrative action. Although the spread prevailing since 
then seems high compared with those in more developed countries, it 
is in l ine with the level in other countries in the region. The relatively 
high spread can be explained by undeveloped transportation and 
communication infrastructures, the high degree of risks involved in 
business undertakings in Papua New Guinea-exacerbated by the 
land tenure system that does not allow land to be easily used as loan 
collateral, and costly administrative expenses stemming from 
comparatively small loan sizes and short-term deposits. 
Tight monetary policy has been maintained since 1 994 through high 
interest rates and (until June 1996) substantial upward adjustments in 
the MLAR for commercial banks. To the extent that excess reserves 
prevailed well above the minimum ratio, the requirement in itself has 
contributed little to deterring lending to the private sector. However, 
the high interest rate policy has had the effect of raising the entire 
interest structure, although by a much smaller magnitude than the 
official guiding rates. Thus, whereas the treasury bill rates jumped by 
10 percentage points during the course of 1995, reaching 21 per cent 
by end 1995, the increase in deposit and loan rates was only about 5 
points, with the average loan rate just above 15 per cent. The absence 
of a retail treasury bill market has permitted the large margin between 
bank deposit rates for small depositors and treasury bill rates. 
Capital flows into Papua New Guinea appear to be primarily 
influenced by requirements of large, enclave projects and the perceived 
sustainability of the exchange rate, which in turn is a function of the 
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appropriateness of financial policies in the context of overall economic 
climate. In the 1980s, capital inflows appeared to be adequate, consistent 
with the broadly stable macroeconomic environment-even though 
yields on the treasury bills in Papua New Guinea were somewhat lower 
than those in Australia in the face of a steady appreciation of the kina 
(Table 2.5) .  Pressures for capital outflows were felt between 1990-94, 
consistent with the loss of financial control that led to successive 
devaluations of the currency. These flows were a lso in l ine with the 
decline in monetisation and financial savings during the same period . 
In AusAID (1995), it was estimated that capital flight had been relatively 
small (or even negative) in the 1 980s but was substantial during 1 990-
94, suggesting a significant deterioration in investors' perception of 
Papua New Guinea's creditworthiness. Fiscal consolidation in 1995 
was a positive step toward reversing this trend, and the pressures for 
capital outflows seem to have been halted in 1995. 
Regional comparison 
Prior to the 1994 financial crisis, Papua New Guinea's degree of financial 
intermediation was about average compared with other countries in 
the region, broadly similar to Vanuatu, behind Fij i  and Western Samoa, 
but clearly ahead of Solomon Islands and Tonga (Appendix table 2.4). 
The weakening of financial development stemming from lax financial 
policies since then has placed Papua New Guinea farther behind. 
Papua New Guinea's monetisation ratio in 1995 was among the lowest 
of the comparator group, and the ratio of narrow to broad money was 
Table 2.5. Papua New Guinea : capita l movements, 1 980-95 (per cent) 
1980-89 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
average 
I nterest rate differentials, poi nts 
(T B rate less Australian rate) 
Nominal effective exchange rate a 
Real effective exchange ratea 
Private net f lows to import ratiob 
a (+)=appreciation. 
b 1 980s average includes only 1 983-89. 
Sources: See Appendix tables I and 2. 
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-2.0 -2 .8 
1 .2 -3.6 
2 .3 1 .6 
1 0. 7  -2 .8 
0 .4 2.6 1 .3 1 .2 9 .7 
4 .4 3 .3  6 .4  1 .9 -24.0 
1 .9 3.4 0 . 1 2. 1 -7.2 
7.6 0.9 4.8 - 1 4 . 1  1 5.4 
relatively high. In respect to facilitating private activities, credit to the 
private sector was low in relation to GDP, although comparatively 
high in relation to total bank assets. The spread between deposit and 
lending rates in Papua New Guinea, a measure of the costs of financial 
intermediation, was in line with those in the comparator countries, 
which face similarly difficult environments. 
Prospects for further fi nancial system reform 
Monetary control instruments 
Much progress has been made to improve the effectiveness of instruments 
for monetary control. A number of areas could strengthen the process. 
• In order to better manage the system's liquidity (money stock), 
it will be important for the Bank of Papua New Guinea to 
improve its ability to analyse the performance of the money 
multiplier (namely, the relationship between reserve money 
and money stock) and the relationship between monetary 
aggregates, income, prices and interest rates. These parameters 
show short-term fluctuations, and are also likely to shift over 
time as institutional structure continues to change, with 
implications for the controllability of the broad aggregates. 
In this effort, it  is also necessary that data on real sector 
activity and price movements be available on a more timely 
and frequent basis than at present. 
• As direct controls are no longer used, interest rates will need 
to play a more active role in determining resource allocation. 
At kina auctions, the Bank of Papua New Guinea currently 
determines both the quantity and price of the kina it is willing 
to buy or sell .  This process has an aberrant consequence in that, 
at times of excess liquidity, the interest rate on bank deposits 
offered by the Bank of Papua New Guinea would tend to be 
higher than what commercial banks are willing to accept; con­
versely, at times of tight liquidity, the interest rate bank 
borrowing from the Bank of Papua New Guinea can be lower 
than what banks are willing to pay. Thus, interest rates deter­
mined in this market tend to have a bias toward disequilibrium. 
An early move to a system whereby the Bank of Papua New 
Guinea only establishes the quantity-leaving the interest rate 
to be determined by the auction process-will improve the 
operations of this market, with repercussions on the interest 
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rate structure and the more efficient use of financial resources. 
• There are at present too few players in the treasury bill market, 
with no secondary market. Further actions to broaden market 
participation and deepen market interactions would be 
desirable, including retail sales to individual customers (such 
as through commercial bank offices) and making the treasury 
bills negotiable. This would enhance savings mobilisation 
and create an atmosphere whereby commercial banks have 
to become more competitive in offering their own services. 
• At a more general level, for the Bank of Papua New Guinea 
to be able to influence the system's liquidity, it needs the 
flexibility to operate on both sides of the market. The present 
breach of the legal ceilings on Bank holdings of treasury bills 
may force the central bank to sell the bills more aggressively 
than the market conditions require, in order to limit the extent 
of the infraction. For this reason, a vigorous pursuit of the 
current policy to reduce the level of government domestic 
debt and financing requirement is needed not only to restore 
fiscal discipline but also to facilitate monetary management. 
• Finally, under a flexible exchange regime, domestic monetary 
policy has effects on both the interest and exchange rates. The 
exchange rate flexibility enhances the effectiveness of monetary 
control and allows greater scope for independent monetary 
policy. Monetary restraint, for example, will put upward 
pressures on domestic interest rates and induces capital 
inflows-resulting in an appreciation of the kina, reinforcing 
the effects of monetary contraction. This underscores the need 
to coordinate monetary with exchange rate policy, including 
taking adequate account of monetary conditions abroad .  
Foreign exchange operations 
The foreign exchange market has worked well since the adoption of the 
screen-based system. Regarding the foreign exchange regime itself, it is 
essential that the wage determination process be flexible; this will allow 
a nominal depreciation, for example, to translate into a real depreciation 
-thereby permitting market forces to shift relative prices between 
tradables and non-tradables-and prevent a persistent depreciation. 19 
Regarding the functioning of the market, the Bank of Papua New 
Guinea continues to review its operations to assist in its process of 
maturing. The following are among issues that might be examined 
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• The interbank market for foreign exchange is relatively thin, 
with participation of six commercial banks, the sole authorised 
foreign exchange dealers. In order to enhance competition, it 
will be necessary that entry into the market is not restricted . 
In addition, permitting more retail foreign exchange operators 
will provide better service to the tradable sector and strengthen 
market efficiency overall. In this effort, concurrent measures 
to enhance the framework for oversight will be required . 
• Given a strengthened foreign reserves position at present, there 
is room for further liberalisation of capital controls. This will 
both broaden and deepen the foreign exchange market, as 
well as permit the exchange rate to become a more effective 
channel for transmitting the effects of monetary policy. Freer 
capital movements will also induce capital flows to offset 
seasonal and other fluctuations in the current account. 
Financial intermediation 
Macroeconomic instability in recent years has evidently resulted in 
financial disintermediation. Restoring fiscal discipline and making 
room for lending to the private sector will be key to a reversal of this 
situation and the continued development and productive role of the 
financial sector. In addition, the process could be facilitated by 
institutional and structural changes in the following areas. 
• A wider range of financial instruments needs to be 
developed over time. In particular, a promotion of long-term 
saving instruments will help make funds available for long­
term lending as well as mobilise domestic savings. This 
could take the form of longer maturity bank deposits or 
certificates of deposits, and should be encouraged 
concurrent with the broadening of the treasury bill primary 
market and development of the secondary market. 
• Further expansion of financial services into the rural areas is 
necessary, and the current study by the Bank of Papua New 
Guinea on factors influencing the closure of bank offices will 
be important in this regard . Policy initiatives in a 
comprehensive range of areas are required to reduce 
impediments to banking activities such as transportation and 
communication difficulties, security problems outside of 
urban areas, the absence of assets readily available for 
collateral, and the shortage of qualified labour. 
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• Lessening structural barriers to the provision of financial 
services and to a generally favourable environment for 
investors will help reduce high costs of intermediation, in 
turn lowering the costs to private investment. In addition, 
better familiarity with accounting, investment analysis, and 
contractual procedures on the part of borrowers through 
general education upgrade will cut down administrative 
costs and riskiness associated with projects. 
Management and supervision 
The PNG Banking Corporation has been identified to need major capital 
restructuring and writing off of bad debts. It is essential for the integrity 
of the entire banking system that the operations of this government­
owned bank be based on commercial-not political-considerations, and 
that the Bank of Papua New Guinea subject it to the same high super­
vision standards as other banks. For non-bank financial institutions to 
become more active as intermediaries, including in the treasury bill and 
foreign exchange markets, the oversight framework will need to be 
enhanced so that these institutions are also subject to regular and 
rigorous supervision. 
Notes 
The PNG Banking Corporation, with a market share of about 45 per 
cent, is fully owned by the government; the remaining banks are 
privately owned. 
Agencies collect deposits but do not engage in lending activities . 
The relevant legislation is the Central Banking Act, the Banks and 
Financial Institutions Act, and the Savings and Loans Societies Act. 
At end-1994, specific provisions for known bad debt amounted to 
about 1 per cent of total credit to the private sector; the proportion 
has been reduced by about half. 
Summarised from Bank of Papua New Guinea, Quarterly Economic 
Bulletin, various issues. 
The Central Banking Act also limits Bank of Papua New Guinea 
holdings of treasury bills to 20 per cent of ordinary revenue (by 
order of Minister of Finance up to 25 per cent for six months) and 
the amount of Bank net financing provided to the government 
during any fiscal year to 10 per cent (12 .5 per cent) of the .evenue. 
However, from end-1993, these limits have generally been exceeded. 
In October 1994, the Bank of Papua New Guinea removed the guide­
lines for commercial banks to keep the spread between deposit and 
lending rates (on a weighted average basis) to within 5.5 percentage 
points; however, the Bank continues to monitor the spread with a 
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view to ensuring that it is not excessive. 
Prior to the adoption of the floating system in October 1994, the 
kina was pegged to a basket of currencies, with occasional 
adjustments. The currency was devalued by 10 per cent in early 
1 990, and another 12 per cent in September 1 994. 
In addition to the treasury bil ls, the government finances its deficit 
through issuing long-term bonds-inscribed stocks-to the Bank of 
Papua New Guinea, which sells them to the market by tap issue; 
and borrowing directly from the Bank using a temporary advance 
facility, for which any outstanding amount is converted into 
treasury bills each half year. 
1 0 With one exception of Bank of Papua New Guinea onlending of the 
European Investment Bank's global loan (at a low interest rate) to 
small and medium-sized businesses through commercial banks. 
11 A related instrument, the exchange settlement account, is used for 
the purpose of facilitating interbank transactions; since 1992, no 
interest has been paid on the account. 
1 2  In Fiji, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Vanuatu and Western Samoa, the 
exchange rate is pegged to a composite basket of currencies. 
Monetary control instruments in these five comparator countries 
are studied in Nagai (1996 ). 
1 3 As earlier noted, there is no reserve requirement. The above statement 
assumes that a portion of the minimum liquid asset ratio is satisfied 
through deposits at the Bank of Papua New Guinea. A 1993 internal 
study by IMF staff (using quarterly time series) on the behaviour of 
the multiplier between 1980-90, adjusted for changes in the MLAR, 
showed a reasonable degree of stability. 
14 The 1993 IMF study also identified real money demand to be directly 
related to real GDP (with long-run elasticity of 1 .2, broadly in line 
with estimates for other developing countries in the region), and 
inversely related to the rate of inflation and a proxy for the degree 
of financial deepening. 
15 If credit to the commodity stabilisation funds is classified under 
credit to the government, the recent decline in credit to the private 
sector would be even more pronounced. 
1 6 Investment data for Papua New Guinea are only estimated. Table 
2.2 includes public sector investment and private investment in the 
mining sector (which relies l ittle on domestic bank borrowing). The 
assessment in AusAID ( 1995) is that given the recent decline in 
total investment, private non-mining investment has held up well, 
attributable to the forestry and construction sectors. 
17 This observation contrasts that made in AusAID (1995) based on 
the ratio of unadjusted broad money to GDP. The exclusion of 
commodity stabilisation funds is equivalent to consolidating the 
funds with the government sector in the monetary account. 
1 8 Although it is l ikely that the presence of price controls has had dis­
tortionary effects on savings behaviour (as well as the price statistics). 
19 In principle, automatic indexation of wages was discontinued in 1992. 
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""U Appendix table 2.1 . Papua New Guinea: financial ind icators, 1 980-95 (per cent, un less otherwise indicated) Q) 
"C 1 980 1 98 1  1 982 1 983 1 984 1 985 1 98 6  1 987 1 988 1 989 1 990 1 99 1  1 992 1 993 1 994 1 99 5  c Q) External environ ment z 
CD Terms of trade change (appreciation +) -1 6.7 -23.3 6 .9  20.5 9 . 8  8 .9  8 . 1  3. 1 6 .4  - 1 9.3 0.2 -0.2 2.9 1 4 .4 1 5. 9  4 . 0  � 
G> General stance of monetary pol icy c Broad money (M3) growth -6.3 5 .2 4 . 8  1 9.9 1 3 . 1  1 1 .2 1 5 .8 9 . 1  1 3 . 3  7 . 4  5.4 1 8.5 1 2 . 9  1 7 .6 - 1 . 3  1 3.7 s ·  
CD Liqu id asset requirement 20.0 1 8 .0 1 6 . 0  1 4.0 1 8 . 0  1 2.0 1 2 .0 1 4. 0  1 4 .0 1 2.0 1 1 .0 1 1 .0 1 1 .0 1 1 .0 2 6 . 0  32.0 � 
Q) Macroeconomic stabil ity 
N I nflation (ave rage C P I )  1 2 . 0  8 . 1 5 . 5  7 . 9  7 .4 3.7 5.4 3 .4 5.4 4.5 7.0 7.0 4.3 4.9 2 . 9  1 7 .3 � Gross reserves ( U S$ mi l l ion) 438 4 1 2 4.67 453 447 454 437 448 405 395 4 1 4  334 250 1 53 1 07 257 0 
< ( I n  months of non-mineral imports) -7.7 -7.0 -7.8 -7.7 -6.6 -5.0 -5.3 -5 .9 -4 .2 -3. 1 - 1 .9  - 1 .2 -3.2 
c;;· 
6" Sh ift between public and private sector financing :J Ratio of net credit to govt to total credit 4 . 1 1 0 .0 1 5 .2 0.4 - 1 . 4 4.2 6.2 -0.9 6.3 6.9 1 3 . 1  20. 1  25.3 3 1 .0 27 . 6  29.4 
Real g rowth in private credit 1 9 .8 6.4 2 .7  1 0.5 3.8 8.5 1 2 .4 7 .0 5.3 8.9 -5. 1 5 . 9  0 . 5  -5.4 1 0 .2 -8.3 
Degree of financial i ntermediation 
No. of bank branches and agencies 497 502 493 485 467 446 4 1 8 357 226 20 1 87 1 75 1 64 
Degree of financial deepen inga 2 1  23 23 24 26 27 30 29 30 33 35 35 35 34 30 30 
Private sector credit/nominal GDP 1 6  1 9  20 21  22 24 26 26 26 31 3 1  30 27 22 23 22 
Private sector credit/total bank assets 56 70 74 69 68 70 74 75 73 78 77 72 66 58 6 1  60 
Efficiency of financial intermediation 
Discount/k ina auction rate (end period) 9.8 8 .8 9.8 1 1 .4 8.8 1 0 .8 9.6 9 .3  9 .3  7. 1 6 . 3  6 . 6  1 8.0 
Treasury bi l l  rate 7.2 1 1 .6 1 3 . 8  1 0.9 9 . 3  1 0 .4 1 2.3 1 0 . 4  1 0. 1  1 0 .5 1 1 .4 1 0 . 3  8.9 6 . 3  6 . 9  1 7.3 
Deposit rate (3-6 months) in real terms -4.6 1 .8 2 . 3  1 .5 0 .6  5 .6 5.8 6.0 3.7 3.6 1 .6 1 . 9 3.4 0 . 1  2 . 1  -8.5 
Spread between deposit and lending rates 4.3 4.4 4 .3  2 .0  2.5 2.0 0.8 2 . 3  3.4 6 .4  6 .9  5 . 1  6 .7 6 . 3  4 . 1  5 .9  
Pressures on capital flows 
TB rate d ifferential (from Austral ia) -3.5 - 1 .7 -0.8 -0. 1  - 1 .7 -4.9 -3. 1  -2.4 -2 .0 -6.3 -2 . 8  0 .4  2 .6 1 .3 1 .2 9 .7 
Nominal  effective exchange rate (app.  +) 8. 1 5. 1 1 . 5 -3.4 1 .8 -0.2 -5.0 2.0 2.3 1 0 .3 -3.6 4.4 3.3 6.4 1 . 9 24.0 
Overal l  economic performance 
Real GDP growth rate 1 .8 -0.5 0.3 1 2 . 5  -1 . 5  5 . 1  4.7 2.8 2 .9  - 1 .4 -3.0 9.5 1 1 .8 1 6 .6 5 . 6  -4.7 
Real  non-m ineral growth rate 1 .7 -0.2 -3.9 8.8 3.0 4.9 -5.7 5.2 3 .8 4 .2  9 . 0  -3.4 
I nvestment to GDP ratio 25.4 25.9 32.2 29.7 23.9 1 8 .4 2 1 .0 1 9 .3 23.3 26.0 24.4 28.0 23.8 1 8 .8 1 4.2 
aBroad money excluding deposits of commodity stabi l isation funds ( M 3 * )  in relation to nominal GDP 
Sources: Bank of Papua New Guinea, Quarterly Economic Bulletin, various issues; International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, I M F, 
Washington, DC, various issues; Browne, C. ,  1 989. Economic Development in Seven Pacific Island Countries, I M F, Washington DC; World Bank, 1 99 1 .  Papua 
New Guinea, Structural Adjustment, Growth and Human Resources Development, May, Report No. 9396-PNG, World Bank, Washington, DC;  World Bank, 
1 995.  Papua New Guinea, Delivering Public Services, Volume II, August, Report No. 1 44 1 4-PNG, World Bank, Washington, DC.  
Appendix table 2.2. Papua New Guinea: selected economic indicators, 1 980-95 (per cent, unless otherwise ind icated) 
1 980 1 98 1  1 982 1 983 1 984 1 985 1 986 1 987 1 988 1 989 1 990 1 991 1 992 1 993 1 994 1 995 
Growth and price performance 
Real GDP growth 1 .8 -0 .5 0 .3 1 2. 5  - 1 .5  5 . 1  4.7 2.8 2 . 9  - 1 .4 -3.0 9 .5 1 1 .8 1 6 .6 5.6 -4.7 
Real  non-mi neral growth 1 . 7 -0.2 -0.4 8.8 3.0 4 .9  -5 .7  5 .2 3.8 4 .2  9.0 -3 .4 
CPI  inflation (average) 1 2 . 0  8 . 1  5 .5 7 . 9  7 . 4  3.7 5.4 3 .4 5.4 4 .5  7 .0  7.0 4 . 3  4 . 9  2 . 9  1 7 . 3  
Fiscal performance 
Government balance to G D P  ratio - 1 . 8  -5.9 -5 . 1  -4.4 -0.9 -2 .3 -2.6 - 1 . 1  - 1 . 0  - 1 .2  -3 .3 - 1 .8 -5.6 -5.9 -2.3 0 . 2  
(of which : Domestic bank financing) -0.5 1 . 9 1 . 1 1 .0 1 .2 - 1 .7 0.3 0.6 1 .4 1 . 1 2 . 9  3 . 4  4.7 4.8 4 .5  0 .6  
Domestic debt to  GDP ratio 9 . 5  8 .5  8 .4  7 .7 8 . 0  8 .0 9 . 1  8 .7 9 .6  1 2 . 1  1 3 .2 1 5 .4 1 9.9 20.7 25.7 2 5 . 6  
Monetary developments 
Broad money (M3*) growth -3.2 0.3 2.4 1 4 . 5  1 5 . 1  9 .6  1 3.3 1 .5 4.4 5 . 3  4.3 1 7.6 1 2.5 1 7 .8 - 1 .3 1 3. 8  
Broad money (M3*) growth -6.3 5.2 4 .8 1 9 . 9  1 3 . 1  1 1 .2 1 5 .8 9 . 1  1 3 .3 7.4 5 .4  1 8 .5 1 2.9 1 7 .6 - 1 .3 1 3 .7 
Private sector credit growth 34.2 1 5 . 0  8.4 1 9 .2 1 1 .5 1 2 .5 1 8 .4 1 0 .7 1 1 .0 1 3 .7 1 .5 1 3 . 3  4.8 -0 .8 1 3 .4 7 . 6  
Deposit rate (3-6 months, average) 6 .9  1 0 .0 8.0 9.5 8. 1 9 . 5  1 1 .5 9.6 9.3 8.2 8 .7  9. 1 7 . 9  5.0 5 . 1  7 . 3  
Lending rate (average) 1 1 .2 1 4 .4 1 2 . 3  1 1 . 6 1 0 . 6  1 1 .5 1 2 .3 1 1 .9 1 2 .7 1 4 . 6  1 5 . 5  1 4 .2 1 4 . 5  1 1 .3 9 . 2  1 3 .2 
Treasury bi l l  rate 7.2 1 1 .6 1 3. 8  1 0 . 9  9.3 1 0 .4 1 2 .3 1 0 .4 1 0 . 1  1 0 . 5  1 1 . 4  1 0 .3 8.9 6.3 6 .9  1 7 . 3  
External sector developments 
Cu rrent account to GDP ratio - 1 0.4 - 1 7.8 - 1 7.3 -1 3 . 1  - 1 2 . 6  -7.0 -4 . 1  -6.0 -8.9 - 1 0.2 -2.9 -4.0 -0.9 1 0 .3 1 1 .3 8 .7  
"TI 
Private net capital inflows 
s· to import ratio 7.4 4 . 1 1 1 .8 2 . 9  1 5 . 0  1 2.5 1 6 . 8  -2.8 7.6 0 .9  4.8 - 1 4. 1  1 5.4 
Ill Exchange rate (average US$/kina) 1 .5 1 . 5 1 .4 1 .2 1 . 1 1 .0 1 .0 1 . 1 1 .2 1 .2 1 . 1 1 . 1 1 . 0 1 .0 1 .0 0 . 8  :::::J (') R E E R  (appreciation +) 7.3 2 .4 - 1 .6 -3.3 0.8 -4.2 -5.4 - 1 .2  - 1 . 1  3 . 5  - 1 0 .0 2 . 6  -0 . 6  1 .8 -6.0 - 1 6 . 8  � 
(/) Memorandum items CD (') Observance of central bank l imits on government financing Q Total debt to BPNG/revenuea 1 0 .0 5.7 1 0 . 3  6 . 6  2 . 5  8 . 4  9 . 1  1 2 .0 1 5 . 0  22 . 9  30.4 30.4 40.5 27.3 47 .7 43.4 a. 
CD BPNG net financing/reven u ea -0.5 -4 .9 4.6 -2 .6 -3. 1  6.0 1 .5 3.9 4 .0 9 . 9  5 .2 2 . 3  1 3. 9  -6 . 1  23.7 1 .5 < CD 
0 
3Gross debt is used for calculation, as Government deposits at Bank of Papua N ew Guinea other than for various trust accounts are smal l .  Revenue includes -0 3 
CD domestic tax and non-tax revenue. :::::J 
Jii Sources: Bank of Papua New Guinea, Quarterly Economic Bulletin, various issues; I nternational Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, I M F, 
� Washington, DC, various issues; Browne, C. ,  1 989. Economic Development in Seven Pacific Island Countries, I M F, Washington DC; World Bank, 1 99 1 .  Papua 





iJ Appendix table 2.3. Papua New Guinea: monetary survey, 1 980-95 Ill 
"'O 
c 
Ill 1 980 1 981 1 982 1 983 1 984 1 98 5  1 986 z 1 987 1 988 1 989 1 990 1 99 1  1 992 1 993 1 994 1 995 
CD In mi l l ions of kina; end of period :E 
(j) N et foreign assets 278 225 202 3 1 6 347 390 408 397 325 234 229 1 45 1 25 1 63 1 37 22 1 c 
s· Monetary authority 274 239 2 1 6 336 385 431 440 435 391 338 31 7 250 1 8 1 92 72 1 88 CD � Commercial banks 4 -1 4 - 1 5 -20 -38 -41 -32 -39 -66 - 1 04 -88 - 1 05 -56 71 65 33 Ill 
I\) N et domestic assets 276 330 366 334 401 430 52 1 547 660 803 853 1 , 1 27 1 ,307 1 ,524 1 , 528 1 , 674 
� Domestic credit 3 1 9 391 450 456 500 595 7 1 9 740 885 1 , 0 1 3 1 , 1 02 1 ,357 1 , 52 1 1 , 634 1 ,765 1 , 949 0 
< Government (net) 1 3  39 68 2 -7 2 5  44 -7 56 70 1 45 272 384 506 487 574 c;;· 
5· Private sectori 306 352 381 454 507 570 675 747 829 943 957 1 ,085 1 , 1 37 1 , 1 28 1 ,279 1 , 375 ::J 
Other items, net -43 -61 -84 - 1 22 -98 - 1 65 - 1 98 - 1 94 -225 -209 -249 -230 -2 1 4  - 1 1 0  -237 -276 
Broad money (M3) 553 555 568 650 748 820 929 943 985 1 , 038 1 ,082 1 ,272 1 ,432 1 ,686 1 ,665 1 , 895 
Narrow money 202 1 94 1 89 206 249 244 257 281 322 345 344 4 1 7 437 594 6 1 4 677 
Quasi-money 352 360 379 444 499 576 672 662 663 693 738 855 994 1 092 1 050 1 2 1 8  
Memorandum item 
Reserve money 99 89 90 1 38 1 28 1 3 1 1 26 1 34 1 42 1 52 1 76 1 65 1 69 1 99 222 258 
Broad money (M3*)(excluding 
deposits of stabi l isation funds) 397 4 1 8 437 524 593 660 763 833 944 1 , 0 1 4 1 ,069 1 ,267 1 ,431 1 ,684 1 , 662 1 ,890 
Annual percentage changes 
M3 -3.2 0.3 2.4 1 4.5 1 5 . 1  9 .6  1 3 .3 1 .5 4.4 5.3 4.3 1 7. 6  1 2 .5 1 7.8 - 1 . 3  1 3 . 8  
M3* -6.3 5.2 4.8 1 9 . 9  1 3. 1  1 1 .2 1 5 .8 9 .1  1 3 .3 7.4 5.4 1 8 . 5  1 2.9 1 7.6 - 1 . 3  1 3 .7 
Reserve money -57. 8  - 1 0.7 1 .8 52.6 -7. 1 1 .8 -3.8 6 .8 5.8 7.3 1 5 .6 -6.5 2.6 1 7. 9  1 1 . 3 1 6 . 5  
I n  p e r  cent 
Money mult ipl ier!> 4.0 4.7 4.8 3.8 4.6 5 . 1  6 . 1  6 .2  6 . 6  6.7 6.1  7 .7  8 .5  8 . 5  7 . 5  7 . 3  
Narrow money a s  p e r  cent o f  M3* 50.8 46.5 43. 1 39.3 42.0 37 .0 33.6 33.8 34. 1  34.0 32 .2 32 . 9  30.6 35.3 37. 0  35.8 
Excess l iqu id assets ratio 5.4 5.6 3.4 1 2.5 4.4 1 .9 5 . 9  1 .3 2 .3  1 .6 4 .0  2 .5  8 . 2  1 7 . 9  5 . 7  1 2.0 
a I ncluding credit to price stab i li sation funds 
b Ratio of M 3  * to reserve money 
Sources: Bank of Papua New G uinea Quarterly Economic Bulletin, various issues. 
Appendix table 2.4. Papua New Guinea financial intermediation : reg ional 
comparison (per cent) 
Papua New Fij i Solomon Tonga Vanuatu Western 
Gu inea I slands Samoa 
1 990 1 995 1 994 1 994 1 994/95 1 995 1 994 
Degree of intermediation 
Degree of monetisationa 35 30 52 34 28 35 40 
Narrow money 
(percent of broad money) 32 36 24 52 34 45 34 
Private sector credit/ 
nominal G D P  30 22 40 1 2  27 33 22 
Private sector credit/ 
total bank assets 72 60 65 38 57 30 42 
Efficiency of intermediation 
Spread between deposit 
and lending rates 6.9 5.9 8.0 6.7 5.0 8.9 6.5 
a Broad money in re lation to nominal GDP 
Sources: Bank of Papua New Guinea, Quarterly Economic Bulletin, various issues; 
International Monetary Fund, May I 996, International Financial Statistics, I M F, Washington, 
DC ; I M F  staff estimates. 
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Structural reform versus stabil isation 
T im King 
Papua New Guinea faces a major challenge in restructuring its economy 
in a way that will generate significant economic benefits for the bulk of 
the population over the medium term. Recent history has been dominated 
by periods of macroeconomic instability. Nevertheless these periods have 
been relatively short-lived and the economy could still be described as 
one that has achieved much in terms of securing a stable macroeconomic 
environment. However while macroeconomic stability, judged in terms 
of a stable and low inflation rate, a sustainable balance of payments 
position and a sustainable fiscal deficit, are important prerequisites for 
economic growth, they provide no guarantee that growth will occur. 
In Papua New Guinea it is clearly the case that structural reforms are 
necessary to improve the productivity of the economy. Issues such as 
the trade and tax system, public sector performance, the performance of 
government-owned enterprises, the efficiency and coverage of public 
sector infrastructure and the effectiveness and coverage of education, 
training and health services are vital determinants of medium-term 
growth prospects. 
In reviewing Papua New Guinea's experience with stabilisation and 
structural reform two features emerge from the recent past. First, the 
economy has proved fairly easy to stabilise in the face of large shocks. 
Second, implementing structural reforms has proved to be very 
difficult. This chapter briefly explores some of the reasons behind this. 
Successful  stabi l isation 
Five inter-related features of the PNG economy assist in the stabilisation 
process 
• an economy heavily dependent on imports. Between 1987-95 
non-mining imports averaged 30 per cent of non-mining 
non-petroleum GDP 
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• a high propensity to consume out of disposable income 
• a weak public investment program and a high proportion of 
government expenditure is directed at consumption 
• ongoing developments in the mining and petroleum sectors. 
• Papua New Guinea's ability to mobilise support rapidly 
from the international donor community. 
The first two features create significant automatic stabilisers. Any 
income-reducing shock quickly translates into a decline in consumption 
and falling imports. This is particularly apparent in the case of a decline 
in the terms of trade between agricultural exports and imported goods. 
In the absence of a price stabilisation scheme, a fall in agricultural 
export prices reduces incomes for growers, who reduce expenditure 
levels on consumption goods, many of which are imported . 
The consumption bias of government expenditure has been widely 
recognised . One consequence of this is that aggregate expenditure levels 
can be relatively quickly adjusted. A weak investment program means 
that it is both easy to delay investment projects and that a significant 
proportion of government expenditure is not committed into the future. 
Developments in the resource sector have done much to offset macro­
economic shocks. These projects provide large foreign exchange flows, 
producing substantial domestic economic activity in the construction 
stage and during production significantly boost government revenue. 
Finally the commitment of substantial external funding has played 
an important role in providing both a ready source of foreign exchange 
and an important boost to confidence. 
The chal lenge of structural reform 
Four features of the PNG economy make the implementation of 
structural reforms particularly difficult 
• the relative ease of achieving rapid stabilisation 
• highly decentralised systems of governance 
• bureaucracy's l imited technical capabil ities and weaknesses 
• the absence of an effective internal lobby group in favour of 
reforms. 
The fact that the economy can be stabilised relatively easily reduces 
the pressure for structural reforms which may take many years to 
complete. Governments commonly introduce unpopular adjustment 
measures only in a situation of crisis. In Papua New Guinea, short-term 
crises are potentially quickly ameliorated, lessening the sustained 
pressure for reform. 
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While structural reforms can gain their impetus from the onset of a 
crisis, it is always unlikely that a short-lived crisis will on its own provide 
sufficient impetus to implement fully longer-term structural reforms. 
In Papua New Guinea there are both political and administrative factors 
that make it difficult to create and sustain the necessary momentum. 
Within traditional Papua New Guinea society decision-making 
centres around 'big men' who acquire and maintain their status through 
the ability to distribute gifts and largess. As this ability is clearly contest­
able, positions of leadership are open to challenge . The importance of 
the ability to respond positively to requests for assistance is reinforced 
by the strong sense of mutual obligation and shared responsibility that 
exists within clan groupings. Naturally some of these informal traditional 
institutions have impacted on the operation of the Parliamentary 
democracy. Political coalitions are notoriously fragile in Papua New 
Guinea and loyalty to one particular political grouping is not commonly 
based on a shared set of ideals or policies. The absence of strong political 
parties and the presence of significant commitments of Parliamentarians 
to constituency issues can make it difficult to develop and sustain 
support for matters of national importance. It also favours the operation 
of a system based on the granting of special preferences and concessions 
to individuals and groups. Reforms that impose significant costs on 
particular groups of constituents can quickly undermine the position 
of individual politicians. 
Sustained political support is clearly essential to a prolonged program 
of structural reforms. However, support from influential sections of the 
bureaucracy is also of considerable importance. This is particularly the 
case if the media, business and the general public are not significantly 
involved in the public policy debate. In Papua New Guinea, where 80 
per cent of the population live in the subsistence sector, literacy rates 
are only 52 per cent and there is significant foreign involvement in the 
formal business sector, it is inevitable that the public policy debate will 
be limited . The public sector itself is almost always a prime target for 
structural reforms and measures such as significant retrenchment and 
wage restraint are unlikely to gain widespread support. A further 
complication is the apparent low level of morale in the public sector in 
general . An assessment by the Public Sector Rationalisation Task Force 
in 1 995 concluded that the public service suffered from 
• a deterioration in a sense of nationalism 
• compartmentalisation and fragmentation of departments 
• envy and rivalry between departments at both the provincial 
and national levels 
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• a politicisation of the public service to the point that advance­
ment was a political decision rather than a professional one, 
resulting in an undermining of the responsibility of managers 
• a lack of accountability in the financial management of 
departments 
• legislation which creates overlapping functions for various 
departments and agencies (Larmour 1 995). 
These conditions both underline the need for reform and suggest 
some of the difficulties that reform of the public service will involve. 
In order to sustain the reforms it is important to ensure that the public 
service receives the necessary technical support and that a significant 
group within bureaucracy becomes committed to their implementation. 
However technical inputs alone are not sufficient. The reforms must 
generate their own internal momentum and be supported, developed 
and implemented internally. 
The BCL mine closure 
The features that make the economy easy to stabilise and the difficulties 
inherent in the implementation of structural reforms, were well 
illustrated following the closure of the BCL mine in 1989. 
In its last ful l  year of operation the mine contributed 8 per cent of 
GDP, 35 per cent of export receipts and 12 per cent of government 
revenue. The closure of the mine was accompanied by a 15 per cent 
decline in Papua New Guinea's terms of trade in 1989. 
In early 1 990 the government announced a package of adjustment 
measures centred around a 7.5 per cent cut in government expenditure, 
to be achieved partly through a reduction in the public service; a 10  
per  cent devaluation of the kina; tight monetary policies; and a policy 
of wage restraint. 
The early announcement of these policies restored confidence in the 
economy. The cut in government expenditure had some impact, but the 
major factor contributing to the reduction in domestic demand was the 
automatic stabilisers that operated in reaction to the loss of production 
from the North Solomons and the large decline in the terms of trade. 
The measures introduced by the government and the impact of 
automatic stabilisers were together successful in reducing private and 
public sector demand which restored a sustainable balance of payments 
position. The availability of financial resources from the donor 
community helped to restore confidence, although with the exception 
of the IMF Standby Facility, financial assistance from the donors only 
Structural reform versus stabilisation I 37 
became available after the international reserve position had stabilised 
(Elek 1 991 ) .  The devaluation and wage restraint combined to produce 
a fall in real labour costs of between 3.5 and 4 per cent in 1990 (Elek 1991 ). 
The adjustment effort was widely perceived to have been successful . 
The experience of the 1 989-90 adjustment program demonstrated 
the feasibility with which the economy could be stabilised in the face 
of large external shocks. There was a significant degree of automatic 
adjustment apparent in private sector demand and new developments 
in the mineral and oil sectors (Porgera and Kutubu) quickly produced 
an improvement in the overall macroeconomic aggregates. 
However, while initial efforts were focused on stabilisation, efforts 
were subsequently initiated on a broader structural front. In July 1 991 
the National Executive Council approved a package of public enterprise 
reform measures and the government stated its commitment to a broad 
range of structural reforms. These included broadening the tax base 
through a redirection of indirect taxes toward consumption; improving 
the management of public investment and operation and maintenance 
expenditure; reducing administrative expenditure, with a focus on the 
wage and salary bill; the phasing out of commodity price support 
schemes; and substantial increases in investment expenditure .  
While these measures were encouraging signs of a commitment to a 
structural reform process, problems in the government's fiscal position 
were immediately apparent. The fiscal correction announced after the 
closure of the BCL mine was short-lived . The program to retrench 3,000 
public servants was largely reversed by unplanned recruitment later in 
the year and expenditure accelerated dramatically in the final quarter 
of 1990. In the event the actual budget deficit was KlOO million, compared 
to a targeted deficit of K3.5  million announced as a part of the adjust­
ment measures. Overruns in expenditure resulted from both overruns 
by the police and the armed forces (due to the situation on Bougainville) 
and as a result of the general perception that the crisis had been averted. 
Nevertheless the 1991 Budget included a range of measures that 
suggested significant progress could be achieved in moving forward 
with the reform agenda. Some import bans were replaced by tariffs and 
a schedule was announced to replace all import bans with tariffs by 1994. 
In addition the phased introduction of a general excise tax on domestic 
manufacturing was announced as a first step towards the introduction of 
a broad-based consumption tax. Expenditure on maintenance increased 
significantly in 1991 and public sector investment appeared to increase. 
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Despite these encouraging signs momentum was soon lost. The 
planned manufacturers' sales tax was never introduced, the announced 
schedule for the removal of import bans was not followed and new 
trade restrictions were subsequently introduced. The tax system 
narrowed significantly and moved more in favour of domestic producers. 
Maintenance expenditure dropped back from the 1990 levels and little 
was achieved in the area of civil service reform. Investment expenditure 
remained substantially below expectations. 
The political and economic factors behind this sequence of events 
were complex. Nevertheless the broad features outlined above played 
an important role. The combination of automatic stabilisers and the 
development of new resource projects in Porgera and Kutubu did 
much to produce a rapid stabilisation of the economy and to give the 
impression that any impending crisis had been averted . Confidence 
was boosted by the early commitment of substantial financial 
assistance by the donor community. 
However no real consensus had been achieved as to the importance 
of the program of structural reforms, despite the rhetoric to the contrary. 
With no effective internal lobby group supporting the reform process, 
the return of the s tatus quo in policymaking met with little resistance. 
The 1 994 cu rrency crisis 
Throughout much of the 1 970s and 1980s a sustainable overall balance 
of payments position was achieved in Papua New Guinea. Net foreign 
exchange earnings paid by the mining sector in taxes and royalties 
were effectively re-spent by the government with a high leakage into 
imports. The recycling of earnings from the mining sector through the 
fiscal accounts resulted in a minimal net impact on the balance of 
payments. Declines in the non-mining sector terms of trade were 
reflected in a fall in export revenue and hence household income, 
reducing imports and offsetting the adverse impact of the terms of 
trade decline on the balance of payments. Improvements in the non­
mining sector terms of trade were similarly offset by a rise in imports, 
such that terms of trade swings were largely absorbed through the 
automatic stabilisers inherent in the large import content of consumption. 
This picture changed dramatically in the early 1990s. Consumption 
incomes were supported by government borrowing from the domestic 
banking system. Expenditure on wages and salaries rose by over KlOO 
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million between 1991 and 1994, the government provided Kl 7 4 million 
to support agricultural incomes in 1993 and 1994 in the face of declining 
commodity prices and drawdowns of concessional loans fell dramatically 
from a net external financing position of positive K52 million in 1993 
to a negative net external financing position of K113 million in 1994. 
Domestic demand expanded without any increases in real output 
or export earnings. The excess of demand was satisfied by imports 
and as a result the balance of payments recorded a cumulative overall 
deficit of K271 million over the period 1 991-94. The delay in the start 
up of the Lihir project exacerbated the problem and as reserves declined 
to critical levels capital flight began. 
The balance of payments position was reversed in 1995. Fiscal 
policy tightened substantially, with real expenditure levels contracting. 
Commodity prices increased significantly with the result that levies 
were collected from agricultural commodities and extraordinary 
financing support was made available from the donor community. As 
the balance of payments moved into a surplus position, the valuation 
effects associated with the devaluation of the kina produced a further 
improvement in the overall balance of payments expressed in kina . 
A surplus of K244 million was recorded in the overall balance of 
payments in 1 995, producing an end of year level of foreign exchange 
reserves of K357 million, sufficient to provide 3.4 months of non­
mining import cover. Extraordinary financing of approximately K158 
million was drawn to support the government's structural adjustment 
program. The growth in general imports was subdued at only 1 1 .7 per 
cent, in the face of a depreciation of the kina of 7.4 per cent, 12 .5 per 
cent and 10.3 per cent against the Australian dollar, the US dollar and 
the yen respectively. 
Again this experience illustrates the relevance of the factors influenc­
ing stabilisation and structural reforms. During the period immediately 
preceding the crisis the automatic stabilisers in the economy were 
effectively undermined by large payments for agricultural price support 
and significant increases in public sector expenditure financed through 
an increase in borrowing from the domestic banking system. 
During the adjustment period there was a rapid reduction in govern­
ment expenditure which fell  in real terms by 14 per cent in 1993-95. 
The combination of a weak investment program and large consumption 
expenditures facilitated the dramatic fall in expenditures. Stabilisation 
was greatly assisted by ongoing developments in the mining and 
petroleum sectors, with the commencement of construction at Lihir 
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and higher than expected production and prices for Kutubu, Porgera 
and Ok Tedi. The availability of substantial donor resources also played 
an important role in the rapid recovery of the foreign exchange position 
of the Bank of Papua New Guinea. 
It is still too early to pass judgement on the success of the structural 
reforms initiated after the floating of the kina in October 1994, although 
the well-publicised disagreements with the World Bank are symptomatic 
of the problems involved. It is also the case that the process of reform 
has been considerably complicated by the parallel reform of the system 
of provincial and local government. 
To highlight the continued problems facing the development of key 
structural reforms it is worth considering the example of the Mineral 
Revenues Stabilisation Fund. 
M i neral  Reven ues Stabi l isation Fund 
The issue of  the appropriate use of  revenue from non-renewable resource 
developments has been discussed extensively in external reviews of 
the Papua New Guinea economy (see, for example, AusAID 1995), but 
as yet there is l ittle evidence of it being seen as an important policy 
issue within Papua New Guinea. 
At present most revenues from mining and petroleum projects 
accrue to the Mineral Revenues Stabilisation Fund (MRSF), a kina­
denominated account held at the Bank of Papua New Guinea. The Fund 
was originally intended to stabilise flows into consolidated revenue, 
however this objective has not been achieved. 
The Fund has confused the fiscal situation in Papua New Guinea 
by giving the misleading impression that balances held in the Fund 
represent government savings. From the point of view of the economy, 
what matters is the overall fiscal deficit of the government. The positive 
impact on government savings that can result from a rise in the MRSF 
balance can easily be cancelled out by government borrowing. In fact 
it makes no sense for the government to hold money on deposit at the 
Bank of Papua New Guinea (BPNG) in the form of the MRSF and at 
the same time borrow at a higher interest rate from the Bank of Papua 
New Guinea or commercial banks to finance its expenditure. This is 
exactly what occurred in 1995. 
Mining receipts are paid in  foreign currency. This foreign currency 
is changed into kina and credited to the MRSF account. This sterilises 
the money supply impact of the revenue flows. An impact on the 
domestic money supply is only realised when the government makes 
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drawdowns from the Fund . However because the Fund is held in kina 
balances, there is no sense in which the MRSF is backed by foreign 
exchange reserves. There is nothing to prevent a situation arising where 
the Fund has a significant kina balance but the BPNG holds no reserves. 
Prior to 1995 the government ran substantial fiscal deficits and the 
MRSF failed both in its stabilisation and savings role. Suggestions for 
the reform of the MRSF have sensibly proposed holding the balances 
as foreign exchange, using financial markets to hedge against price 
fluctuations and developing simple rules to govern drawdowns. 
However debate over these issues does not seem to have taken hold in 
Papua New Guinea . 
Developing appropriate and simple rules for drawdowns is not 
straightforward. Adopting a prudent fiscal policy based on, for example, 
a balanced budget rule, sti l l  begs the questions of how much of the 
resource revenues should be spent and what types of expenditure 
should be permitted . 
Several reports have pointed to the fact that in recent years Papua 
New Guinea has effectively been consuming its natural resource 
assets when it should have been saving or investing these assets to 
maintain the country's aggregate wealth. However it needs to be 
recognised that the purpose of investment is to generate future 
consumption. The decision over whether to invest or consume the 
returns from the resource sector depends on the relative value attached 
to current and future consumption and the returns that can be gained 
from the investment. 
The size of the stock of assets is also relevant. The mineral, gas and 
petroleum base available to Papua New Guinea is unknown, but there 
are indications that it could be very substantial. Given the prospective 
stock of assets, some consumption of the income generated from these 
assets is probably justified in these circumstances. Pointing to uncertain 
prospects in the resource sector is not a very forceful argument for 
reducing expenditure of resource revenues. 
A more powerful argument relates to the distortions in economic 
growth that can be produced by spending ' too much' of these revenue 
flows. Successive governments have pointed to the need to pursue 
growth in the non-mining private sector and to pursue policies that 
promote employment growth. However spending money beyond the 
absorptive capacity of the economy is contrary to these policies. Any 
expenditure level that contributes more to demand than supply can 
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potentially damage the objective of generating broad-based growth, 
by undermining the incentives for domestic production. There is no 
doubt that it is important to promote the growth of the non-resource 
sectors, as economic activity and wealth generation that is 
concentrated in only a small part of the community can cause serious 
social tensions. 
The greatest problem with the recent policy approach to resource 
revenues is the extent to which growth of the non-mining sector has 
been hindered and the extent to which the consumption benefits have 
been captured by the public sector. This suggests that a reform of the 
MRSF should focus on basing drawdowns on the absorptive capacity 
of the economy. 
There could also be a restriction that drawdowns be limited to invest­
ment, with investment projects required to show a rate of return higher 
than that earned on the foreign assets held by the Fund. However, the 
latter condition could be difficult to apply meaningfully, given the 
potential to reduce general budget funds allocated to investment. This 
would counter the intention of using MRSF drawdowns to increase 
government investment. 
Given that the majority of the returns from the non-renewable 
resource sector accrue to the government, a key objective could be to 
keep the size of the government (including all transfers and subsidies) 
to a reasonable level relative to the non-mining economy. Fiscal 
responsibility legislation could be used to achieve this objective. For 
example, legislation could limit the overall fiscal deficit to 1 per cent of 
non-mining GDP and expenditure to say 20 per cent of non-mining 
GDP. Such rules could avoid the need to design limits for the drawdown 
of mineral and petroleum revenues. The government would then have 
to trade off lower domestic taxes with lower offshore savings of 
resource revenues. 
This is only one simple, illustrative example and it is clear that a 
significant amount of work would be required both to develop realistic 
rules and to phase in the application of these rules. However it is 
equally clear that establishing a binding medium-term framework for 
fiscal policy encompassing the issue of the expenditure of revenues 
from non-renewable resources is a major challenge, but one which 
could make a very important difference to Papua New Guinea's 
development prospects. 
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Microeconomic pol icy issues 

The investment pol icy framework 
in Papua New Gu inea 
Pirouz Hamidian-Rad 
Papua New Guinea has great potential for economic development. Few 
countries are endowed with similar abundant natural resources. It is 
located in a geographic area which, from the point of view of economic 
development, is considered to be the most dynamic region in the world.  
Despite the sharply rising level of average income and the high level of 
public spending in the past decade, Papua New Guinea has some of 
the worst social indicators in the world, and they are now deteriorating 
(Figure 4.1 ) .  Eighty per cent of the population earn less than US$350 
per annum. 
Papua New Guinea is emerging from a financial crisis which 
brought government operations in late 1994 to a halt, substantially 
eroded public confidence in the government and the economy, and 
encouraged massive capital flight. The crisis was a result of deep­
rooted structural problems, a lax fiscal stance in the late 1 980s and 
early 1990s, and an inconsistent and unstable policy environment. 
Past policies to promote investment in Papua New Guinea have 
been restrictive and inward looking, aimed at localisation, import 
substitution and reservation of economic activities in the non-mining 
sector for PNG nationals. The results have not been encouraging. 
Despite rising levels of public expenditures in the early 1990s (both in 
absolute terms and as a share of GDP) public investment and mainten­
ance outlays as well as non-mining private investment have continued 
to fall, resulting in a steady depletion of the stock of capital .  This has 
contributed to the falling employment and income in the non-mining 
sector. 
However, in the past couple of years, with the increasing integration 
of Papua New Guinea in the global economy-membership in the 
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Figure 4.1 . The paradox of Papua New Guinea 
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Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum and pending membership 
in the World Trade Organisation-as well as its efforts to address 
structural bottlenecks in the economy, the government has taken steps 
towards promoting a transparent and predictable trade and investment 
regime not only for the mining sector but also for the non-resource 
based economy. 
48 I Papua New Guinea:  a 20/20 vision 
These policies have to be maintained and deepened and the 
institutions responsible for enforcement of policies and promotion of 
investment nurtured consistently over a long period of time, if Papua 
New Guinea is to reap the benefits of the reforms and emerge as a 
competitive investment destination in the Pacific region. 
This chapter addresses three key questions 
• what are the key ingredients of an appropriate investment 
policy framework? 
• what have been the key characteristics of investment policy 
in Papua New Guinea? 
• what can and should the government do to make Papua 
New Guinea attractive for foreign and domestic investment? 
An appropriate investment pol icy framework 
The objective of investment policy can be described as achievement of 
sustained economic growth with relative price stability. Stagnation or 
growth of the economy is a function of a range of factors. Recent 
empirical work on economic growth in various countries points to the 
primacy of government choices. Countries that have pursued policies 
conducive to a broadly free-market economy (particularly trade liberal­
isation and the maintenance of secure property rights), characterised by 
smaller government, lower government spending, and the promotion 
of the development of human capital, have enjoyed higher rates of 
growth than countries that have pursued inward-oriented, non-market 
based arrangements. 
Investment promotion depends first and foremost on the existence 
of an effective political leadership and credible government dedicated 
to economic growth and national welfare. Government's contribution 
to a successful investment policy requires intervention in three inter­
related areas: macroeconomic stabilisation, development of infra­
structure and human resources and, lastly, creation of an efficient 
administration. 
Macroeconomic stability, a precondition of economic dynamism, can 
only be achieved through government determination and continuation 
of appropriate policies . This has already been initiated by the govern­
ment of Papua New Guinea. The improvement of infrastructure and 
development of human capital depend on the availability of funds 
and their judicious utilisation. Administrative reform should result in 
a leaner and more liberal-minded bureaucracy capable of creating the 
right chemistry between the public and private sectors. 
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Figure 4.2. Dualistic growth:  a min ing and oil  boom, but non-extractive 
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The choice of development strategy does not always work out to be 
an optimisation of returns on investment. The objective of sustainable 
growth is often tempered by such other notions as 'balanced growth' 
or 'social welfare', however defined. For example, popular pressure 
demands that the largest possible percentage of the present population 
share in the benefits of mineral receipts. However, excessive attention to 
welfare via transfer payments may often result in the too-familiar 
stifling of work incentives, and in the reduction of industrial competitive­
ness. Similarly, the concentration of mineral export income in the 
government's hands may result in crowding out the private sector in 
the areas which by their nature are better managed by the latter. 
A sudden increase in the prices of minerals and subsequent 'revenue 
boom' may result in hasty allocation of revenues to politically popular 
activities, 'prestige' projects, or projects with inadequate feasibility 
studies. Such investments often fail the tests of competitive productivity. 
The democratic regime and particular geographic configuration of 
Papua New Guinea has led to a large degree of decentralisation of 
economic management and revenue sharing. 
Democratisation and decentralised management are usually 
accompanied by significant social pressures in favour of income 
redistribution and rising consumption. The requirements of capital 
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formation, by contrast, call for certain constraints on consumption and 
some initial tolerance of growing income gaps among major social 
groups. Reconciliation of these opposing forces is not easy. Though local 
governments should have a high degree of autonomy vis-a-vis the 
central government, they should have a shared sense of purpose. 
Although local governments need to maintain a degree of autonomy, 
institutional mechanisms should be found to prevent their capture by 
special interest groups. Otherwise the state will be unable to act 
coherently and the unique character of the contribution of decentral­
isation would be lost. The success of decentralisation requires a strong 
central administration capable of ensuring compliance with central 
government objectives of investment promotion and economic growth. 
Within this context, an appropriate investment policy framework 
should focus on creating productive employment and diversification 
of the production base. It should specifically be recognised that mineral 
reserves are depletable and the prices of a limited number of renewable 
resources are subject to sharp fluctuations in the international market. 
Transparency and non-discriminatory rules and regulations are key 
for promoting a healthy environment for investment. Rules and 
regulations should be applicable to all enterprises without any 
exception. This calls for 
• privatisation, divestiture and liquidation-at national as well 
as provincial level of public sector activities that compete 
unfairly with the private sector 
• repealing special privileges granted to some enterprises. The 
discrimination in favour of these enterprises can be terminated 
on the basis of some arrangements to be mutually agreed by 
the government and private investor. For instance the 
government, while remaining firm on its principle, might 
extend these privileges for a given period (in the form of a 1-
2 year time-bound 'grandfather clause' ) .  
In countries overwhelmingly reliant on resource extraction activities 
the objective of investment policy should be to expand the export base 
through product diversification in order to make up for dwindling earn­
ings from minerals and unexpected changes in agricultural commodities 
prices. Mineral revenue cannot be considered a continuous stream of 
future income flow, but rather a 'cashed' value of a given stock of 
capital that is transformed from one form (mineral deposit) to another 
(financial assets) .  Unless these assets are further transformed through 
appropriate investment to a sustainable revenue base, economic 
development cannot be ensured . This situation calls for an appropriate 
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model of development and adoption of an investment policy based on 
product diversification. 
The availability of foreign exchange is only one requisite for viable 
domestic capital formation. Other complementary factors, such as raw 
materials, skilled labour, entrepreneurship, project implementation 
capacity, and adequate infrastructure are as important and often in 
short supply. As the economy grows, these shortages will be eliminated, 
Figure 4.3. Investment performance and public consumption, 1 984-95 
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or reduced. But this process is gradual and effective only in proper 
sequence. For instance importation of machines and equipment should 
be undertaken when port and road facilities are in place; and effective 
university training requires adequate elementary and secondary 
education. 
If investment is too rapid, the benefits may be considerably 
diminished as a result of inflation, a deteriorating trade balance, 
incorrect relative price signals for tradable goods production, and 
shortages leading to waste. A further problem arises when the 
investment that is undertaken is of poor quality-something that is 
more likely in an environment of inadequate planning, inflation, and 
shortage of factors of production. Even where investment is in the 
traded goods sectors, the future output from present investments may 
prove hard to market-a particular danger if the size of the domestic 
market is not large enough to absorb this output. 
Investment pol icy in  Papua New Gui nea 
Papua New Guinea's economy has suffered over the years from many 
weaknesses. The weaknesses in the policy path followed by successive 
governments of Papua New Guinea, have had serious consequences. 
To a large extent, the prevailing image investors have of Papua New 
Guinea as having a difficult investment climate arose from its weak 
investment policy environment, high risks, infrastructure bottlenecks, 
lack of skilled labour and lack of internally consistent incentive systems. 
Total investment in Papua New Guinea has fluctuated over time 
and is relatively low by low to middle-income country standards. 
While gross domestic investment in Papua New Guinea was comparable 
to that in sub-Saharan Africa, it has been falling relative to GDP-from 
a high of 27 per cent of GDP in 1991 to an estimated 24.5 per cent in 
1995 (Figure 4.3). Net investment has also declined sharply from a 
peak of 1 5  per cent to beyond replacement value (if one takes into 
account the depletion of the country's natural resource base and the 
poor productivity of investment). 
With a high capital-output ratio (over seven) compared to an 
average of about three in most developing countries, and a low and 
declining output-labour ratio, particularly in agriculture where the 
labour force is growing at 3 per cent per year, it would be difficult to 
identify attractive proposals in the non-minerals sector. Furthermore, 
public investment relative to GDP has been declining steadily since 
the mid-1980s to inadequate levels with a large unmet need for physical 
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and social infrastructure. This is in spite of increased government 
spending on public construction projects . 
In Papua New Guinea, as in most developing countries, the 
relationship between private and public investment is functional .  For 
private investment to occur, public investment in infrastructure 
development and education must pave the way. With respect to private 
investment in mining however, the functional relationship between 
the public and private sector is not binding. The sector relies mostly 
on foreign experts and builds the additional infrastructure it needs for 
the purpose of exploiting and exporting minerals and oil products. 
Unfortunately, especially in the non-resource sector, the importance of 
this functional relationship between public and private sector investment 
has not been fully appreciated . As a result, adequate and appropriate 
public investment has not been undertaken ahead of time to attract 
private sector investment, such as in infrastructure and human resource 
development. Furthermore, lack of proper maintenance of existing 
investment has adversely affected the private sector 's ability to expand. 
The resource-based sector (primarily mineral) has dominated the 
sectoral composition of investment. However, investment in this sector 
is relatively lumpy, and accounts for much of the variabili ty in the size 
of total investment. The sector has no significant linkages to the rest of 
the economy. Despite its significant fiscal contribution (about 27 per 
cent of total government revenue) and foreign exchange earnings (about 
70 per cent of export earnings), it is highly capital intensive and unable 
to generate more than 0.3 per cent of total formal sector employment, 
and even this has been declining since the closure of the Panguna 
Copper Mine in 1989. 
Moreover, mining activity is highly capital intensive and skill 
intensive with input requirements vastly different from the country's 
domestic factor availabilities. The local economy is not in a position to 
take advantage of mining activity, except for the provision of unskilled 
labour and only for a limited time. This has led to a dual economy 
with isolated centres of capital-intensive, advanced technology without 
any relation to the surrounding environment. 
Nowhere is the failure of past policies as transparent as in the non­
resource based sector of the economy. Investment in the main labour 
absorbing sector of the economy, primarily agriculture, has shown no 
significant growth relative to GDP over the years. Agriculture, where 
85 per cent of the population earn their livelihood, and with the 
potential for absorbing most of the labour force, has long suffered 
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from low productivity and high domestic costs . These problems arise 
from policy rigidities in the labour market, exchange rate and 
infrastructure bottlenecks. The manufacturing sector (mainly food 
processing, beverages, tobacco and timber processing for small local 
markets) has stagnated over the past two decades and its contribution 
to GDP remains just under 10 per cent, while it has become heavily 
dependent on government support through tariffs and other 
protective measures. 
Land is one of the major factors of production. In Papua New Guinea, 
nearly 97 per cent of the land is held under customary ownership 
arrangements. Entitlements are often undocumented and frequently 
disputed. Past policy reforms have not devoted the attention needed to 
address this issue. As a result, administrative problems are experienced 
in mobilising and transferring land rights. Three per cent of the land 
belongs to the government and can be used for development purposes. 
This land is partially utilised under short-term leaseholds (averaging 
five years) with relatively high rent. The government is trying to ease 
the problem through the promotion of industrial estates. The weakness 
of this approach is to concentrate activities in few centres, while the 
fragmented market of Papua New Guinea requires these activities to 
be decentralised and spread all over the country. 
Gross private investment, both foreign and domestic, in the non­
mineral economy has not shown any increase over the years relative to 
GDP, averaging under 10 per cent of GDP in recent years. A large segment 
of the economy is considered reserved-open only to domestic investors 
-although there has been little or no activity in these reserved sectors, 
since these regulations were implemented almost a decade ago. 
Lack of savings has not been generally the cause of the weak 
performance of the non-resource based investment. The national 
savings rate has been averaging 18 per cent of GDP over the decade 
ending 1993. Public savings have been modest in the 1980s but have 
declined sharply in the 1990s due to expenditure overruns. 
Timeliness in policy adjustment, sustainability and consistency are 
crucial elements for winning investor confidence. The long delay in 
the adjustment of Papua New Guinea's three main economic policies 
-exchange rate, wage, and fiscal policies-has undermined both 
growth and employment. The 'hard kina' policy pursued from 1975 to 
the early 1990s discouraged local food production, import substitution, 
and growth of existing and potential exports. The fiscal policy that had 
been pursued in support of the hard kina policy and resultant high 
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Figure 4.4. Comparative social indicators: Papua New Guinea and 
selected countries, 1 965-95 
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Figure 4.5. Central government expenditure on social sectors (education, 
health, other): Papua New Guinea and selected countries, 1 965-95 
1 2  
1 0 L_ ____________________________ _ 
8 
6 




1 980 1 994 
--PNG -- I ndonesia - - - - Phil ippines - - - - - - Thailand 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, World Bank, Washington, DC, various issues. 
real wages, left little margin for government expenditure on goods 
and services, and on public investment. 
The wage structure inherited from the pre-independence 
administration was recognised to be far out of line with the country's 
labour productivity and real wages in competing countries. The almost 
complete linkage of wages to the cost of living index in place until 1992 
prevented the government from using exchange rate adjustment as a 
means of increasing Papua New Guinea's international competitiveness. 
Papua New Guinea's minimum wage legislation runs counter to the 
requirements for labour market flexibility and competitiveness that 
characterise an open-market economy. Various surveys indicate that 
the level of official minimum wage makes PNG workers the most 
expensive in East Asia while their productivity is far below the regional 
average. Minimum wage legislation is not an efficient tool for pursuing 
employment growth. 
While Papua New Guinea's trade policy involved a relatively simple 
tariff structure, and only modest trade restrictions, it nevertheless 
suffered from three key defects 
• high and variable effective rates of protection for manufacturing, 
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construction, and distribution services, and negative effective 
rates of protection for most agricultural commodities 
• lack of responsiveness of some trade tax revenues to growth 
• increasing recourse to negotiated trade arrangements, 
involving import restrictions and domestic market 
guarantees for large, new projects. 
The willingness to strike special deals for individual projects imposes 
costs on the community and allows the use of resources in uncompetitive 
activities thereby effectively transferring resources from consumers 
and users to privileged entrepreneurs. Perhaps most damaging are the 
signals sent to lobbyists and investors that it is profitable to devote 
financial and other resources to pursue similar deals.  
Although difficult to quantify, fear of crime has come to represent a 
major barrier to the country's economic growth. It disheartens local 
entrepreneurs, deters serious foreign investors, frightens off tourists, 
drives up significantly the cost of doing legitimate business, and 
diminishes the quality of life, especially in the urban areas. For existing 
businesses, by damaging productive capital and increasing the private 
security cost, it has reduced the competitiveness and profitability of 
domestic investment. 
Infrastructure bottlenecks, especially in road infrastructure, 
continues to represent a major constraint to the development of the 
non-resource sector. In Papua New Guinea, the road networks have 
been developed mostly as local hub-and-spoke systems, with hubs 
connected either by air or more often, via sea ports. Road maintenance 
has been insufficient and road conditions have deteriorated since the 
early 1980s. The condition of most roads is poor and new construction 
has added little to the road network in recent years. More than 85 per 
cent of main, and most feeder, roads are earth-surfaced. Much-needed 
bridges are often missing, further localising the small national market. 
The supply of unreliable and affordable water and electric power has 
also become a serious bottleneck in recent years and has added 
substantially to the cost of production. The electric utility's monopoly 
on the generation and sale of power, poses legal impediments to 
private sector efforts to generate for own consumption, also 
exacerbating the situation. 
The supply of an educated and skilled labour force is one of the 
main factors necessary to improve the investment climate. However, 
the national literacy rate in Papua New Guinea is only around 45 per 
cent. Primary enrolment is less than 75 per cent, and for the 13-16 year 
old population, only one in six persons is enrolled at secondary level . 
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Enrolment in upper secondary school and higher education has 
remained virtually stagnant in recent years. The composition of the 
modern sector labour force reflects these shortfalls in education 
development. Half of all workers have not completed primary 
education, and only 5 per cent have completed secondary or higher 
education. The shortage of educated nationals has led to broad 
reliance on expatriates to fil l  managerial and technical positions. At 
the same time, the number of school leavers without skills and quality 
education is increasing the ranks of the unemployed. 
Govern ment pol icy for i nvestment 
Investment policy should adopt a pragmatic approach and consider 
with objectivity the sociopolitical reality as well as the actual 
capability and resources of the country. Most developing countries are 
tempted to imitate more advanced countries in the selection of their 
investment projects. This has led some countries to equate economic 
growth with large and visible projects which are usually inappropriate 
to the needs of the country. The temptation is greater for those 
countries which are fortunate to possess substantial income derived 
from extraction of mineral resources. This has led, in some countries, 
such as Algeria, to investment in large infrastructure and industrial 
projects (particularly steel mills and petrochemicals) with 
disappointing outcomes. If the same financial and human resources 
had been applied to investments with more modest projects, but 
greater marginal productivity, the concerned countries may have by 
now achieved the same economic outcomes as the high performing 
East Asian countries which have also relied on innovation and 
increased access to world markets. 
Although Papua New Guinea has made similar investment choices 
in the past, the structural reforms which the government has been 
implementing since late 1994 have contributed to the creation of an 
enabling environment for private sector led growth through 
• price stability by adopting a responsible medium-term fiscal 
strategy 
• improved factor costs by adjusting the real exchange rate 
and wage rate. 
The government has also initiated supporting policies to promote 
productive investment. It has moved towards a more liberalised trade 
policy, including lower and more uniform protection, removing 
quantitative restrictions and bans as well as duty exemptions; a 
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Effects of minimum wages on employment, investment and welfare 
There is considerable evidence from both developed and develop­
ing cou ntries that shows the adve rse effects of m i n i m u m  wage 
legislation on employment.  Recent work in I ndonesia is i l lustrative 
of the issues involved . 
Following the introduction of minimum wage legislation in 1 989 , 
min imum wages on average tripled in nomi nal terms and doubled 
i n  real terms between 1 989-95. P roductivity g rowth , howeve r, 
was rapid enough to keep pace with the large increases in the 
min imum wage, at least u nt i l  1 993. Between 1 993-94 m i n i m u m  
wages grew about 1 0  p e r  cent faster than productivity. T h e  recent 
sharp increases during the 1 990s are estimated to have �ncreased 
labour  costs in  I ndonesia and redu ced wage employment and 
investment. The 1 00 pe r cent increase in min imum wages are 
estimated to have pushed up average wages by about 1 0  per cent. 
The doubling of minimum wages was estimated to have led to a 
2-3 per cent reduction in wage employment. Since minimum wages 
are more binding for young workers and women, the employment 
reduction effect is greater for these two groups-estimated at 7 per 
cent for the former. Moreover, the loss in employment is l ikely to 
become greater, the closer the minimum wage approaches the 
average. This work also indicated that a doubling of the minimum 
wage has a strong negative im pact on i nvestment,  wh ich was 
estimated to have decl i ned by about 5-7 per cent of G D P. This 
decl ine i n  i nvestment would i n  tu rn lead to further decreases in 
employment. 
Final ly, the min imum wage is not an approp riate instru ment 
fo r pove rty al leviat ion . It on ly cove rs wage emp loyees,  and of 
those , only formal sector employees . The poor in  I ndonesia, as in 
Papua New Guin ea are,  by and large,  not wage earners but the 
self-employed and ru ral peop le .  Since most of the poor are self­
emp loyed , the di rect role of labor markets in the welfare of the 
poor is smal l .  Labou r market pol icies, such as the min imum wage 
pol icy, that slow down the rate of wage employment, especial ly 
wage employme nt i n  the h igh ly p roductive fo rmal sector, are 
therefore l ike ly to have an adverse im pact on poverty al leviation 
in  I ndonesia. 
Source: World Bank 1 996. Indonesia: Dimensions of Growth, Report No. 1 5 383-ID, 
World Bank, Washington, DC . 
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progressive tax regime (including in forestry); promoting competition 
through expediting the privatisation program; increasing efforts to 
promote private investment through the Investment Promotion Authority 
(IPA); and increasing expenditures on infrastructure maintenance. The 
government has also initiated civil service reforms, public financial 
management reform (allocation of budgetary expenditure), and legal 
and regulatory reforms. 
In the medium term, Papua New Guinea's policymakers need to 
focus on the following key elements of investment policy if the 
progress made to date under the structural adjustment reforms is to 
contribute to the resolution of the fundamental problems 
• strengthen the return to macroeconomic stability 
• deepen the ongoing tax and trade reforms and address other 
outstanding issues 
• ensure that the market determines factor prices and access to 
adequate credit 
• avoid inconsistency and reversal of policies which will undermine 
investor confidence 
• refrain from entering into special deals, taking equity interest or 
guaranteeing investments, loans, or any financing arrangements 
for privately funded commercially based investments 
• expedite the divestiture program and support the role of IPA 
as promoting, and not regulating investments 
• limit the role of the public sector to what it can best do 
• continue the development of the capital market. 
On the structural policy front, further reform of the wage policy 
and the labour market are imperative to lower the cost of labour. 
Government wage setting and intervention in labour market conditions 
has caused an imbalance between supply and demand, represented by 
unemployment. Moreover piece rates, the most common form of 
incentive payment relating wages to productivity, are prohibited. The 
urban economy is therefore characterised by widening wage differentials 
between formal and residual sectors with a declining proportion of the 
urban labour force employed in the former. To reduce unemployment 
and the cost of labour, the minimum wage legislation should be 
repealed, while ensuring that the status of the present industrial work 
force is not altered . 
Such restrictive legislation might, in the most optimistic case, give 
some protection to those who have a secured job. But it hampers 
economic growth and is against the best interests of the vast majority 
The investment policy framework in Papua New Guinea I 61 
of the unemployed. The labour leaders (and politicians) should be 
persuaded that they have a stake in promotion of investment and 
subsequent economic growth. The achievement of this goal, in a market 
economy, requires recognition of the role of private entrepreneurs and 
their contribution to job creation and, ultimately, the welfare of the 
working class. On the other hand, entrepreneurs should realise that 
workers are assets. The need for greater flexibility in labour legislation 
does not mean disregard for the well-being of workers, but rather the 
fact that such legislation should contribute to economic growth and 
expansion of employment opportunities . 
On the institutional front, the apparent lack of long-term financing 
has led existing enterprises to use short-term credit for medium and 
long-term investments. This is, however, not the proximate source of 
credit failure, as in most countries with well-functioning credit markets, 
such financing arrangements are the norm with short-term credit being 
rolled over regularly on the basis of low risk. Rather, the underlying 
problem is an insufficiency of credit relative to the large unmet demand 
combined with a high risk environment. Thus the government needs 
to address these underlying problems as part of its broader financial 
sector strategy and planning. Once the fundamentals are in place, the 
term structure of credit should adjust to the needs of the market. 
Papua New Guinea should invest more in developing its human 
capital and skilled labour. The advantage of this investment is that it 
provides relatively high adaptability and flexibility in development 
strategy. It is an investment with a rate of return that is typically little 
affected by external decisions and policies . Over the long run, 
investment in human capital offers the prospect that the state's 
initially indispensable role in investment could be replaced by skilled 
private entrepreneurs who would assess the economy's comparative 
advantage . The backbone of the present economic success of some 
East Asian countries is attributed to the quality of their labour. For 
instance in Korea, about 10 per cent of the population aged 25 and 
above has had some post-secondary school education. The disadvantage 
of human capital investment is that the return on this investment 
usually occurs over a long period of time, the education infrastructure 
may take time to construct, and the disciplines typically offered may 
not correspond to the country's immediate and long-term technical 
and professional needs. 
Equal and non-discriminatory treatment of all investors is the most 
important element of an investment policy. Otherwise the field will be 
dominated by monopoly-seekers and there would be no room for 
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growth of a healthy and dynamic private sector. In countries blessed 
with substantial income from natural resources, the temptation is great 
for the government to get involved in various industrial, agricultural, 
or service projects. This tendency, if not resisted, diverts financial 
resources from their optimal use and distorts the rules of the game of a 
market economy. In such cases, private investors are always interested 
to have the government as their partner. It allows them to ask for, and 
eventually obtain, advantages that are not accessible to their competitors. 
There are presently a number of enterprises in Papua New Guinea 
where national or provincial governments have equity participation. 
The government should elaborate a program for divestiture of these 
assets and divest its interests (at both national and provincial levels) in 
commercially-oriented enterprises and encourage and promote the 
private sector. The government cannot be at the same time a neutral 
arbiter and an interested party. The policy framework should focus on 
setting up a level playing field and reducing factor costs. 
The gradual development of modern agriculture shall require less 
and less labour. Lack of economic opportunity is partly responsible for 
migration of an increasing number of people from rural to urban areas. 
Investment policy should encourage enterprises which, by their nature, 
are labour intensive. In many activities, particularly manufacturing, 
there is a range of possibilities of substituting labour for capital. The 
choice of appropriate technology is determined by technical knowledge 
and labour legislation. The greater the flexibility allowed in the use of 
labour, the more entrepreneurs tend to substitute it for capital. 
Summary and conclusion 
There is no short-cut in economic development. The condition for 
achieving sustained economic growth is objectivity in the assessment of 
options, consistency in policy and perseverance in its implementation. 
It requires an open debate by all organised political and social forces 
on principal issues and objectives . Securing consensus on investment 
policy can and should transform it into a non-partisan issue. This will 
enable it to follow a steady course in spite of the normal vicissitude of 
political life .  
A successful policy reform needs to be simple, realistic and within 
government's administrative ability to implement. Investment policy in 
Papua New Guinea has suffered from untimely adjustment, inconsist­
ency and lack of sustainability. As a result the policy environment in 
Papua New Guinea has failed to win investor confidence, especially in 
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the non-resource based sector. Therefore, the investment path taken 
aggravated the economic difficulties instead of contributing to their 
solution. 
The structural reforms undertaken to date have helped to bring 
about a shift in policy paradigm and in getting the fundamentals right. 
Good progress has been made in the past couple of years, yet much 
more remains to be done. The country should take advantage of its 
present favourable position and set the foundations for sustained and 
more stable economic development. 
Notes 
This chapter presents the results of a country analysis undertaken by 
World Bank staff. Some sources cited in this paper may be informal 
documents that are not readily available. This paper reflects only the 
views of the author and should be used and cited accordingly. The 
findings, interpretations and conclusions are the author 's own. They 
should not be attributed to the World Bank, its Board of Directors, its 
management, or any of its member countries. 
The author is grateful for helpful comments and inputs from many 
colleagues at the World Bank. Thanks especially to Cyrus Talati, Ephrem 
Asebe, Ali Alikhani and Arvind Gupta for their valuable comments and 
suggestions. 
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Labourabsorptioo in Papua New Guinea 
P. A. McGavin 
The most important resource of any nation is its people and the effective 
development and use of labour resources is the most crucial issue in 
national development. The most typical measure of labour absorption is 
the growth of wage employment-and for Melanesian economies, labour 
absorption on this measure has been diminishing as a proportion of the 
population, rather than increasing. For Papua New Guinea, for example, 
between 1980 and 1 990 annual population growth was around 2.3 per 
cent, while the average annual growth in wage jobs was only about 1 per 
cent. For Solomon Islands, average annual employment growth of 1 .9 
per cent occurred between 1 986 and 1 992 and negative average annual 
employment growth of 1 .2 per cent occurred between 1 992 and 1995, 
while average annual population growth of around 3.3 per cent is 
projected. The scenario facing Melanesian nations is one of increasing 
populations and stagnating, or even contracting, growth in wage employ­
ment. The Papua New Guinea population is projected as increasing by 
2 .1  per cent between 1990 and 1995, while wage employment for this 
period shows negligible growth. 
A common single-cause explanation for poor wage employment 
performance focuses on the poor international price competitiveness of 
wages in Melanesian nations, especially in comparison with Asian 
nations. Employment outcomes are, however, influenced by other factors 
-such as effective control over government budgetary deficits; the level 
and direction of government spending for the development and maint­
enance of physical and human infrastructural capital; export commodity 
prices, and so on. Uncontrolled growth in deficit budgeting and run­
down of public infrastructural capital as a result of increased government 
consumption expenditures can offset the positive effects of improvements 
in international price competitiveness of wages-and reductions in real 
wages may not be accompanied by growth in wage employment. 
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The single most important consideration for growth in wage employ­
ment is productivity growth. Growth in labour productivity essentially 
involves improvements in value-adding outcomes for labour. This is a 
multi-dimensional concept-lower wages and given product prices 
may result in improvement in labour productivity; while constant wages 
and increases in product prices may also result in improvement in 
labour productivity; and better quality products, that attract higher 
prices and that allow increases in wages, may also result in improvement 
in labour productivity. Increasing labour productivity thus involves 
focusing on improving the relationship between input values and 
output values as these are attributable to labour resources. Informed 
discussion of labour market outcomes focuses not just on prices, but 
on productivity-with productivity understood in value-added terms. 
For marketed products such as tropical export crops, increases in 
commodity prices lead to increases in labour value-added and 
movements in agricultural sector wage employment generally reflect 
commodity price movements. 
The same generalisation is nevertheless true of non-marketed 
products and deterioration in public service product delivery eventually 
leads to stagnation and decline in public service employment as the 
unfavourable relationship between labour input and product value 
becomes more evident. Where the value-adding is negative, then 
'employment' becomes a form of consumption-such as occurs where 
those holding public offices are paid for services that are not delivered 
or that are poor in quality. 
There is a general public dissatisfaction with the performance of 
public officers, in nations such as Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, 
Vanuatu and Fiji, and unfavourable value-adding relationships are 
identified across a wide range of public office holders-from politicians 
to public servants. There however seems to be limited momentum for 
the effective reform of public institutions in Melanesian nations and the 
dysfunctionality of much of the public sector continues as a ' tax' on 
performance in other sectors. Growth in wage employment mainly 
occurs in the private or market sector and for the 10 years to 1995 most 
growth in wage jobs occurred in the private sector. For example, of the 
1 .09 per cent growth in Papua New Guinea wage employment over that 
decade, 72.4 per cent of these wage jobs occurred in the private sector. 
While there is scope for increasing the growth of wage jobs in 
Melanesian economies, examination of these economies reveals that the 
greatest scope for improved use of labour resources is in the growth of 
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rural-based self-employment. Taken as a whole, the chief comparative 
ad vantage of these economies is in land and labour resources and the 
chief means for economic and social development is in the development 
and use of these resources. But this development must be understood 
differently than has typically been the case. The very title of this 
chapter implies an understanding of resources use that is mainly 
influenced by demand. That is, the language implies a 'demand side' 
perspective. My general perspective is one that focuses on interactions 
of demand and supply influences. But, partly to sharpen a 'correcting' 
perspective, I wish in this chapter to raise the profile of ' supply side' 
perspectives. 
From a supply side perspective, the problem of the development 
and use of labour resources chiefly focuses on the quantity and quality 
of labour services that are forthcoming. Although the label 'supply side' 
perhaps has a certain newness, the perspective is far from new in the 
study of Melanesian economies. With the first entry of Melanesian 
societies into the international economic order during the nineteenth 
century, the over-riding 'problem' was the attraction of local labour 
resources to plantation employment for the production of tropical crop 
commodities for the international market. This difficulty led to the 
early regulation of labour (the ' indenture system' ) by the Australian 
administration in what is now Papua New Guinea; it was the need to 
regulate unacceptable labour recruitment practices that led to Solomon 
Islands being declared a British Protectorate; similar needs were 
prominent in the formation of a Condominion in the New Hebrides 
(now, Vanuatu); and the inadequacy of Melanesian supply side responses 
led to the drawing-in of mainly Indian labour for the development of 
a tropical commodity export economy under the British in Fij i .  
Early economic research of Melanesian economies and societies, 
drawing on the foundation work of the then new discipline of cultural 
anthropology, led to the coining of the phrase 'primitive affluence' to 
typify the economic and social order of indigenous Melanesian pop­
ulations. And these insights from early economic analysis of Melanesian 
societies need again to be emphasised in understanding the contemporary 
scene. In using the term 'primitive affluence', two things need to be 
clarified. First, 'primitive' is not used in a pejorative sense it is used, 
rather, to describe an economic and social order that has been insulated 
from the technological developments occurring in the international 
economic and social order. Second, the term 'affluence' is not used to 
imply a local society that has abundance of the goods and services 
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produced and distributed in the international economy; it is used, 
rather, to describe an economic and social order that meets customary 
wants with less than full  utilisation of local land and labour resources. 
Even in the closing years of the twentieth century, a 'supply side 
problem' perspective remains the most illuminating one for under­
standing economic performance in Melanesian nations. For the raising 
of economic performance in Melanesian nations chiefly depends on 
fuller and more effective use of land and labour resources and achieving 
this importantly focuses on calling forth and enabling the supply-side 
responses of Melanesian populations. 
The international community is now coming to a better understanding 
that international development assistance ('aid' ) that is unwisely 
directed may in fact cultivate a '  cargo cult' mentality and, in fact, may 
'cause' consumption expenditures to outrun revenues generated 
domestically and thereby act as a contributing factor to the generally 
poor performance of Melanesian economies. What remains under­
identified in international analysis of Melanesian economic performance 
is that the focus for improved economic performance must be rural­
based development and that this development is dependent on calling 
forth and enabling supply-side responses from indigenous populations. 
In brief, while demand side-issues remain significant and while viable 
analysis must involve interaction of demand-side and supply-side 
considerations, the development of a clearer supply-side perspective is 
crucial to an adequate understanding of and response to the problem 
of labour absorption in Melanesian economies. Moreover, more broad­
based development of formal sector employment outside enclaves 
such as mining and tourist sector developments depends on rural­
based development providing domestic markets for formal sector goods 
and services-with rural development becoming the leading sector for 
growth in principally urban formal sector employment (Table 5 . 1  ). 
Indicators of resource use and efficiency in Papua New Guinea 
Census results-1 980 and 1 990 
Even a brief comparison between 1 980 and 1 990 national Census data 
(both excluding North Solomons province) shows some alarming 
developments in the labour market. The population has increased from 
3 million to 3.6 million-a compound annual percentage growth rate of 
2.33 (Table 5.2). The citizen population aged 10 years and over has 
increased from 2.0 million to 2.5 million-a compound average annual 




Table 5.1 . Papua New Guinea indices of formal market sector wage employment, by selected industries, 1 978-95 Q) c 
·s 
Year Retai l  Wholesale Manufacturing Bui lding Transport Financial Agriculture/ Total Mining CJ := 
( Dec.) and construction and business Forestry/Fisheries (excl . mining) Q) z 
ct1 
::I 1 978 89 .4 1 2 1 .2 77.3 75.0 74.5 74.7  76. 1 79 . 1  1 22.7 a. ct1 
a.. 1 979 92.4 1 24.3 81 .5 76.5 77.3 78.2 78.6 82. 1  1 26.5 . �  
1 980 1 01 .2 1 30.4 88.9 84.4 83.8 85.7 85.4 89.5 1 29.7 c 0 
1 981 1 03.6 1 42.5 96.3 84.4 88.3 88.6 84. 2  92. 1  1 50.5 li 0 
1 982 90 .7  1 25.2 85.6  80.6 78.7 82 .6 77. 5  83. 1  208.8 CJ) .0 ct1 
1 983 88.6 1 2 1 .4 83.8 76.3 78. 1  81 .5  75. 1 8 1 .0 241 .2 :; 0 
1 984 89.2 1 1 6.9  82.9  73.3 80.5  84. 1  78.3 82.3 1 84.6 ..0 ct1 _J 
1 985 88.6 1 1 6.4 86.4 82.0 81 .4 91 .4 80.4 85.0 1 53.7 
1 986 88.6 1 1 2.3 86.0 82.8 87.0 92.2 84. 6  87. 1 1 66.0 
1 987 94.9 92.7 86.4 75.6 1 05.7 87.4 84. 9  89. 1 1 95.3 
1 988 98.2 92.6 92.6  76. 1  94.4 92.8 91 . 9  92.4 1 59.7 
1 989 1 0 1 .2 95.7 98 .5 1 06.2 1 05.6 1 03.5 95.7 99.3 1 0 1 .0 
1 990 87.8 87.3 94 .8 1 06.8 1 1 1 .5 1 09.2 89.0 94.6 1 00.7 
1 991 86.2 81 .4 95.2 81 . 1  1 04.4 1 03.3 89.2 9 1 . 1  99.8 
1 992 85.4 86.2 1 01 .9 76.6 94. 1  1 04.6 97.4 94.0 1 07.3 
1 993 83.9 83.9 1 03.7 73.6 90.7 1 04.3 95. 1 9 1 .4 1 06.4 
1 994 88.4 90.6 1 20 . 1  78.8 95.2 1 02.3 1 0 1 .0 98. 1 1 04.9 
1 995 90.7  81 .9 1 09.3 67.8 89. 1 1 1 1 .0 90.4 92 .5 1 1 2 .3  
N otes: These data are B ank of Papua N e w  Guinea revised series; o l d  series, data are reproduced in McGavin ( 1 99 1 a:75f). Data fo r  North Solomons province are 
not included since 1 989. 
Sources: McGavin ( 1 99 1 a: 76, 1 45 ) ;  updated Bank of Papua New Guinea, Quarterly Economic Bulletin, March 1 996, Port Moresby. 



























Notes: 1 990 observation and subsequent proj ections exclude North Solomons province. The 
comparable 1 980 figure was 2,85 3 .  Data since 1 990 are provisional and proj ections. 
Sources: National Statistical Office, 1 994. Report on the 1 990 National Population and 
Housing Census in Papua New Guinea, Port Moresby:48;  National Statistical Office, 1 996. 
Preliminary population and labour force projections, Waigani ;  and computat ions on these data 
growth rate of 2.35 per cent (National Statistical Office 1991c:69; 1993b ). 
On census data, citizen wage employment increased from about 
184,000 persons to about 232,000 persons (Table 5.3 )-a compound 
average annual growth rate of 2.34 per cent. These comparisons suggest 
that growth in wage employment has kept pace with growth in the 
economically active population. But this confuses the impact of events 
on Bougainville on overall intercensal job growth. Comparing 1980 
Census results including North Solomons province with 1990 Census 
results excluding North Solomons province shows wage employment 
of about 200,000 persons in 1980 and about 232,000 persons in 1 990-a 
compound average annual growth rate of 1 .49 per cent. This rate is 
more accurate because, for the most part, jobs lost as a result of conflict 
at the Panguna mine remain lost in 1990 and largely remain lost in 1 996. 
Taking the data benchmarks used in this chapter (Table 5 .4), wage 
employment increased from about 213,000 in 1980 to about 235,000 in 
1990-giving a compound average annual growth rate of about 1 per 
cent. The tragedy of the Panguna conflict is also noticed in the change 
for North Solomons province from having the lowest provincial rate of 
measured wage unemployment to having the highest unemployment 
rate, albeit an unmeasured one (Table 5.5) .  
Census results by province 
Wage jobs growth has mainly occurred in the National Capital District 
(NCD); in Enga and Western provinces (respectively affected by Porgera 
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Table 5.3. Papua New Guinea wage employment of citizens by province, 
1 980 and 1 990 
Persons Per cent of total 
1980 1990 1980 1990 
National Capital District 34 309 46 387 18.7 20.0 
North Solomons 16 651 
East New Britain 16 568 20 601 9.0 8.9 
West New Britain 8 976 13 575 4.9 5.8 
New I reland 6 957 7 685 3.8 3.3 
Manus 2 153 2 270 1.2 1.0 
Moro be 24 867 27 578 13.5 11.9 
Western High lands 19 742 21 418 10.7 9.2 
Central 8 287 8 599 4.5 3.7 
Oro 4 980 5 807 2.7 2.5 
Mandang 11 173 14 413 6.1 6.2 
Western 3 223 6 389 1.8 2.8 
Gu lf 2 572 2 478 1.4 1.1 
Eastern Highlands 10 491 15 693 5.7 6.8 
Mi lne Bay 4 421 7 870 2.4 3.4 
East Sepik 7 359 7 078 4.0 3.0 
Sandaun 3 472 3 886 1.9 1.7 
Southern High lands 6 259 7 317 3.4 3.1 
Enga 3 796 8 362 2.1 3.6 
Simbu 4 136 4 756 2.2 2.0 
Papua New Gu inea 200 393 
Papua New Gu inea 
(excluding NSP) 183 741 232 162 100.0 100.0 
Notes: The above data incl ude those recorded as on leave or temporarily absent from work. Non­
citizens in wage employment at the 1 980 Census were 1 5 ,4 1 4  persons (National Stat istical 
Office 1 988:67)  and at the 1 990 census 8,60 1 persons (National Statistical Office 1 993b ). 
Sources: National Statistical Office, 1 988. 1 980 National Population Census-Final Figures: 
National Summary, Port Moresby :69; National Statistical Office, 1 993 . Prel iminary tabu lations 
for the 1 990 Census of economic act ivity, nation and by province, Office of the Director of the 
National Census Boroko; National Statistical Office, 1 994. Report on the 1 990 National 
Population and Housing Census in Papua New Guinea, Port Moresby: 1 4 1 ;  and computations 
on these data. 
and Ok Tedi mining developments); in Milne Bay, West New Britain and 
East New Britain provinces (Milne Bay reflecting mining development 
on Misima island and palm oil developments and West New Britain 
reflecting palm oil developments); and in Eastern Highlands province 
(a growth probably lost with low coffee prices during the early 1 990s 
and possibly recovered with the recent strong recovery in coffee prices). 
As noted, employment has collapsed in North Solomons province; 
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Table 5.4. Papua New Guinea wage employment by major sector, 1 968-95 
(persons) 
Year Publ ic Elcom Private or market M in ing Wage 
(Dec.) service plus PTC ( excl. min ing) employment 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
1968 28 093 918 130 878 1 651 161 540 
1969 32 763 1 411 138 245 2 229 174 648 
1970 33 804 1 556 144 589 2 693 182 642 
1971 36 335 1 588 142 245 3 465 183 633 
1972 37 452 1 716 134 263 5 163 178 594 
1973 40 516 1 612 130 138 4 468 176 734 
1974 43 389 1 599 125 838 5 182 176 008 
1975 46 465 1 760 122 081 5 153 175 429 
1976 49 759 1 833 118 710 4 523 174 825 
1977 49 700 1 913 128 893 4 654 185 160 
1978 49 742 2 288 130 053 4 860 186 943 
1979 50 936 2 189 136 111 4 893 194 129 
1980 52 862 2 744 152 351 5 043 213 OOO 
1981 54 728 2 659 144 673 6 101 208 161 
1982 52 858 4 724 132 692 8 742 199 016 
1983 49 493 4 746 136 696 9 496 200 431 
1984 51 460 5 001 143 356 6 387 206 204 
1985 51 682 4 672 149 518 5 867 211 739 
1986 49 926 5 072 154 664 7 040 216 702 
1987 50 099 5 363 159 755 8 019 223 236 
1988 49 076 5 288 166 820 9 247 230 431 
1989 49 274 5 199 181 091 6 084 243 648 
1990 50 309 5 143 174 123 5 331 234 906 
1991 50 823 4 879 167 681 5 283 228 666 
1992 47 778 4 805 173 019 5 680 231 282 
1993 55 860 4 582 168 233 5 632 234 307 
1994 56 868 4 534 180 565 5 553 247 520 
1995 56 250 4 278 170 258 5 945 236 731 
Notes: 1 .  For detai ls on the preparation of this table, see McGavin ( 1 986: 1 5 , 1 99 1 a :63 and 
1 993 :82) .  This table revises and extends data from McGavin ( 1 993 : 82 )  by benchmarki ng 1 980-
90 movements against 1 990 Census results. National Statistical Office ( 1 988:67)  gives 
employment at 1 980 as 2 1 6, 256 persons. McGavin ( 1 99 l a : 68, n. 3 . 1 )  impl icitly attributes 
3 ,256 persons to public authorities employment exc l usive of Elcom and PTC at 1 980. (Thus, 
2 1 3 ,000 plus 3,256 gives 2 1 6,256 as found in National Statistical Office 1 988:67 . )  I n  the 
absence of a convenient I 990 ' benchmark ' for publ ic authori ties employment as provided for 
l 980 by DFP ( 1 986:44 )  I have taken the percentage growth in combined Elcom/PTC 
employment over the period 1 980 to 1 990 ( of 1 87 percent) and appl ied this to the previou ly-
adopted benchmark ( 6,000 t imes 1 .87 = 1 1 ,220) and rounded to the nearest thousand, giving 
1 1 ,000 for publ ic authorities employment. The difference between this benchmark and 
combined 1 990 Elcom/PTC employment ( 1 1 ,000 - 5, 1 43 = 5,857)  gives a 1 990 figure of 5,857 
for public authorities employment other than Elcom/PTC . Deriving a 1 990 employment 
observation that is consistent with procedures adopted for 1 980 thus involves taking the 1 990 
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Notes to Table 5 .4, continued from page 72 
Cen us figure from National Stat istical Office ( 1 994: 1 4 1 ) of 232, 1 62 plus 8,60 1 non-citizen 
empl oyment ( National Statistical Office l 993b), l ess 5 857 described above, to obtain 234,906 
as shown in the table. Note that National Statistical Office ( 1 994: 1 4 1 )  adj usted the 1 980 figure 
to remove North Solomons province employment. This procedure has not been fol lowed, as the 
purpo e is to track national employment that reflects the impact and aftermath of events in the 
North Solomons province. 
The method for 're-benchmark ing' these data at the 1 990 Census is as fol lows: the estimate of 
private or market sector employment (excluding mining) as consistent with the 1 980 Census 
data provides a base for appl ication of the BPNG empl oyment index ( excluding mining).  For the 
resultant series, the cumulative average annual rate of change in the series was calculated and a 
trend 1 980-90 series is derived. The ratio of the first to the second ( trend) series was then 
calculated. The cumulative annual rate of change in estimated private or market sector 
empl oyment (excluding mining) as consistent with 1 980 and 1 990 Census data was calculated 
and a revised trend 1 980-90 series was derived. The ratio between the fust and the second of 
the above-described series was then appl ied to the l ast trend series to derive an adj usted series 
for non-mining market sector employment that is consistent with both BPN G  indices and the 
1 980 and 1 990 Census benchmarks. The 1 990 Census benchmark estimate is then used with the 
BPNG index series to derive 1 990-95 estimates of employment. 
2 .  The term wage employment is used to distingu ish wage-jobs from the productive act ivity of 
most of the population in non-cash and cash self-employment. This table revises data for 1 988 
and subsequent sub-total ( excluding mining) from McGavin ( 1 99 1 a:63), fol lowing Quarterly 
Economic Bulletin revisions as at March 1 996. These data do not include government day 
labour at 9,956 persons as found in the 1 990 budget and uni formed mil i tary personnel estimated 
in DPM working fi les as 3,300 for 1 990 ( McGavin 1 99 l a:67).  Data for 1 99 1  for Electric i ty 
Commission ( Eleam) and Posts and Telegraph Commission ( PTCffel ikom) employment were 
obtained from these authorities. 1 99 1  Public Service estimates are derived by deducting Eleam 
and PTC employment from the 1 99 1  Public sector employment estimate in DFP ( 1 992 ). Publ ic  
Service employment estimates for 1 968- 1 990 from McGavin ( 1 99 1 a) were obtained from DPM 
work ing fi les and are preferred to National Statistical Office ( 1 99 1  a :2)  estimates of 49 ,600 for 
1 987 ( but note that the difference between these sources at 1 987 is smal l ) .  Disaggregation of 
market sector employment (excluding mini ng) appears in Table 5 . 1 2 . Mining 1 990 estimate is 
for June ( M cGavin 1 99 l a :77f).  Employment indices used in revisions from 1 986 onward are 
found in Table 5 . 1 .  
3 .  McGavin ( 1 99 1 a: 64)  shows non-cit izen work permit holders between 1 984 and 1 990. 
Department of Labour and Employment report 1 2 ,333 work permits at 3 1 December 1 99 1 ,  
which is more than the 1 1 ,300 taxpayers earning more than K l 5,000 p.a.  shown i n  the 1 993 
Budget Papers ( thus suggesting failure to record work permit cancel lations) .  Results from a 
1 99 1  Taxation Office survey show 7,799 expatriate taxpayers for 1 99 1  (but the wi ld  movement 
in this result from 1 6,9 1 6  for the 1 988 survey cautions against confident use of these Taxation 
Office data ) .  Prel imi nary results for the 1 990 Census show 8,6 1 0  non-citizens in wage ( National 
Stat istical Office 1 993b).  At least no growth in emp l oyment of overseas persons seems a 
reasonable conclusion. 
Sources: McGavin, P. A., 1 99 1  a. Wages, Incomes and Productivity in Papua New Guinea, 
I nstitute of National Affairs, Port Moresby.63;  Papua New Guinea, Department of F inance and 
Planning ( DFP),  1 992. Government of Papua New Guinea Subm ission to the 1 99 1 -92 
Minimum Wages Board: Table 1 9; National Statistical Office, 1 993 . Preliminary tabulations for 
the 1 990 Census of economic activity, nation and by province, Office of the Director of the 
National Census, Boroko; National Statistical Office, 1 994. Report on the 1 990 National 
Population and Housing Census in Papua New Guinea, Port Moresby; Bank of Papua New 
Guinea 1 996. Quarterly Economic Bulletin, Port Moresby, March; E leam and Tel ikom . 
Labour absorption in Papua New G uinea I 73 
Table 5.5. Papua New Guinea measured wage unemployment, al l  sectors, 
by province, 1 980 and 1 990 (per cent) 
National Capital District 
North Solomons 
East New Britain 
West New Britain 









Eastern High lands 
M i lne Bay 
East Sepik 
Sandau n 
Southern High lands 
Enga 
Simbu 
Papua New Gu inea 
Recorded wage unemployment 












































a Population is of cit izens aged 1 0  year and over. The 1 990 national total does not include North 
Solomons Province. U nemployed persons are not engaged in other act ivities and recorded as 
actively seeking wage employment and are expressed as a proportion of the market labour force 
(that is, those in wage employment plus those recorded as actively seeking wage employment) .  
b National Statistical Office ( 1 994: 1 46 )  states that the number of unemployed persons was 
grossly under-reported in 1 980. 
Sources: National Stat istical Office, 1 988. 1 980 National Population Census-Final Figures: 
National Summary, Port Moresby: 69; National Stati stical Office, 1 993 . Prel iminary tabulations 
for the 1 990 Census of econom ic activi ty, nat ion and by province, Office of the Director of the 
National Census, Boroko· and computations on these data. 
employment has declined in East Sepik, Sandaun and Gulf provinces 
and has generally been stagnant in the remaining provinces (Table 5.3). 
These data show a marked lack of broad-based jobs growth for the 
recent intercensal period. 
Wage job participation rates 
These patterns of job growth are highlighted when census data are 
examined as percentages of the population in wage employment ('market 
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work-force participation rates') .  Persons holding wage jobs as a percent­
age of the citizen population aged 10 years and over decreased from 9.6 
per cent in 1980 to 9.2 per cent in 1990 (Table 5.6). Only for Enga, Western 
Highlands and Eastern Highlands provinces did job growth exceed 
population growth in the intercensal period (Table 5.6) .  Job growth in 
coffee producing areas probably reversed and then recently recovered. 
The Bank of Papua New Guinea index for Highlands employment includes 
Enga province (Porgera) and Southern Highlands province (Kutubu) 
(Table 5 .7) .  
Table 5 .6 .  Papua New Guinea market work force and labour force 
participation, a l l  sectors, by province, 1 980 and 1 990 (per cent) 
Market work force Market labour force 
as percentage as percentage 
of popu lationa of populationa 
1980 1990 1980 1990 
National Capital District 44.3 34.2 48.5 52.8 
North Solomons 19.4 20.7 
East New Britain 18.2 16.1 21.0 21.2 
West New Britain 15.2 15.3 16 .4 21.9 
New I reland 15.0 12.7 17.3 15.8 
Manus 12.0 9.8 15.0 13.8 
Moro be 11.8 10.3 13.5 17.9 
Western High lands 10.5 8.8 12.7 12.3 
Central 10.3 8.8 11.2 13.5 
Oro 9.6 8.8 11.3 14.6 
Mandang 7.8 8.4 9.2 13.0 
Western 6.1 9.1 8.6 15.7 
Gu lf 5.9 5.3 7.3 8.2 
Eastern High lands 5.4 7.6 7.2 12.2 
Mi lne Bay 5.0 7.1 5.7 9.7 
East Sepik 4.8 4.0 7.1 8.1 
Sandaun 4.4 4.1 5.6 7.4 
Southern Highlands 3.9 3.3 5.4 6.6 
Enga 3.2 4.8 4.6 9.0 
Simbu 3.1 3 .5 4.8 6.7 
Papua New Guinea 9.6 9.2 11.5 14.5 
a Population is of citizens aged 1 0  years and over. Work force includes those in wage employment; 
labour force inc ludes those in wage employment p lus those actively seeking wage employment. 
The 1 990 national total does not incl ude North Solomons Province. 
Sources: National Stat istical Office, 1 988. 1 980 National Population Census-Final Figures: 
National Summary, Port Moresby: 69; National Statistical Office, 1 993. Pre l iminary tabulations 
for the 1 990 Census of economic activity, nation and by province, Office of the Director of the 
National Census, Boroko; and computations on these data. 
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O> 
-u Table 5.7. Papua New Guinea indices of private sector wage employment, selected regions, 1 978-95 tu -0 c:: 
tu 
Year NCO Madang /Wewak Is lands North Other Total z High lands Lae 
et> 
� (Dec.) Solomons reg ions 
G) 
c:: 1978 79.6 88.1 78.0 100.7 100.9 127.2 44.5 79.1 ::;· 
et> 1979 83.4 86.6 85.9 98.4 104.7 126.5 46.2 82.1 � 
tu 1980 89.8 94.3 92.6 r\J 112.7 113.4 150.5 50.7 89.5 
� 1981 97.1 89.2 92.0 113.5 108.3 146.6 60.9 92.1 
0 1982 94.3 81.8 85.0 97.6 69.5 117.4 65.2 83.1 < 
u;· 
5· 1983 96.6 78.9 77.6 91.2 67.1 106.5 64.3 81.0 ::l 
1 984 93.4 82.9 79.9 95.1 72.0 118.1 65.0 82.3 
1 985 97.2 80.1 82.6 92.8 78.4 108.6 70.5 85.0 
1986 93.3 83.5 86.0 93.2 89.5 104.4 74.8 87.1 
1987 92.2 84.2 89.6 90.1 99.0 103.7 77.8 89.1 
1988 94.3 89.2 92.1 94.7 97.1 107.7 85.4 92.4 
1989 103.0 96.0 95.6 98.1 101.1 90.3 99.1 99.3 
1990 101.9 83.4 104.3 107.0 84.8 .. 86.7 94.6 
1991 94.9 91.8 98.7 108.5 77.8 .. 83.3 91.1 
1992 91.5 114.7 98.9 117.0 76.2 .. 81.8 94.0 
1993 88.7 113.1 96.4 109.4 72.3 .. 92.4 91.4 
1994 96.8 125.0 107.6 102.1 71.1 .. 106.0 98.1 
1995 98.0 124.01 103.2 98.6 61.8 .. 88.0 92.5 
Source: Bank of Papua New Guinea, Quarterly Economic Bulletin, revised indices, Port Moresby, various issues. 
Rural-urban changes 
Poor and uneven growth in wage jobs is more marked when variations 
in population growth are noticed. The 2.35 per cent overall average 
compound annual growth in population aged 10 years and over was 
divided unevenly between rural and urban areas-1 .75 per cent for 
rural areas and 3.7 per cent for urban areas (National Statistical Office 
199l c:3). From census results for the provinces, increases in market 
work force as a proportion of the population are recorded only for 
Enga, Western Highlands and Eastern Highlands provinces. All other 
provinces show declines in the proportion of populations having a wage 
job-with the National Capital District (NCD) showing the largest 
decline, from 44.3 to 34.2 per cent (Table 5.6) .  
Widespread poor job growth matters less where populations face 
viable alternatives in subsistence, cash-cropping and self-employment 
activities. But poor job growth has been associated with increased 
proportions of populations seeking wage employment, both nationally 
and by province. As a result, increases are found in participation rates 
in the market labour force (persons having wage jobs plus persons 
actively seeking wage jobs )-national estimates increasing from 11 .5 
per cent in 1980 to 14.5 per cent in 1 990 (Table 5.6). 
Measured wage unemployment 
Combining poor wage job growth with increases in persons seeking 
wage jobs makes for large increases in measured wage unemployment 
-national estimates increasing from 15 .9 per cent in 1980 to 36.4 per 
cent in 1 990 (Table 5.5). For provinces such as Enga and Western, where 
wage job growth has focused on Porgera and Ok Tedi mining develop­
ments, there has stil l  been an even higher growth in persons seeking 
wage jobs-with the result that measured wage unemployment in 
Western province increased from 29.3 per cent in 1980 to 41 .7 per cent 
in 1 990 and in Enga province from 30.8 per cent in 1980 to 46.6 per 
cent in 1990. Perhaps, however, persons seeking wage employment in 
largely rural provinces are still close to the alternatives of subsistence 
production. For urban areas in Papua New Guinea, this is often not 
the case. And the increase in measured wage unemployment for the 
NCD from 8.6 per cent in 1980 to 35.3 per cent in 1990 highlights the 
' flash point' significance of urban wage unemployment (Table 5 .5) .  
Whereas in 1980, urban measured wage unemployment was 
significantly less than rural measured wage unemployment, dramatic 
changes have occurred between censuses. For both rural and urban 
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Table 5.8. Papua New Guinea market work force, labour force 
participation and measured unemployment rate-urban and rural citizen 
populations by sex, 1 980 and 1 990 (per cent) 
Market work Market labour Measured unemploy-
force (per cent force (per cent ment (per cent 
of population) of population) of labour force) 
1980 1990 1980 1990 1980 1990 
Males 
Urban 54.7 44.5 60 .1 65.1 9 .0 31.7 
Rural 9.6 8.4 11.7 12.5 17.6 33.0 
Females 
Urban 13.9 14.5 15.7 26.5 11.6 44.9 
Rural 1.3 1.7 2.3 3.9 41.6 56.0 
Persons 
Urban 38.5 31.6 42.5 48.5 9.4 34.8 
Rural 5.6 5.2 7.1 8.4 21.3 38.2 
Notes: Market labour force comprises persons in wage j obs (the market work force) and persons 
searching for wage jobs. The measured unemployment rate is persons searching for wage jobs as 
a proportions of the market labour force. A better measure is 'market and subsistence labour 
force' ( see McGavin l 99 l a:23 7 )  but the conventional measure is used, as it highl ights the 
relative significance of persons in wage employment and/or searching for wage emp loyment. 
Rural results for 1 980 Census involve conflating of ' rural vi l lage' and ' rural non-vi l lage ' for 
comparison with the ' rural '  category of the 1 990 Census. 
Sources: McGavin, PA. ,  1 99 l a. Wages, Incomes and Productivity in Papua New Guinea, 
Institute of National Affairs, Port Moresby:23 5-37 ; National Statistical Office, 1 988.  1 980 
National Population Cen us-Final Figures: National Summary, Port Moresby:79-8 l ;  
Nat ional Statistical Office 1 993 . Pre l iminary tabu lations for the 1 990 Census of economic 
activity, nation and by province, Office of the Director of the National Census, Boroko; and 
computations on these data. 
areas, measured wage unemployment has grown rapidly. But the 
growth has been more rapid for urban areas-so that urban and rural 
measured wage unemployment are now generally at levels of or greater 
than one person seeking a wage job for every two persons holding a 
wage job (Table 5.8) .  
Wage regulation changes 
This analysis of census data reinforces the perception stated in the 1992 
Minimum Wages Board (MWB) Determination about high rural-urban 
migration. A key argument in the Opening Statement of the Government 
of Papua New Guinea Submission to the MWB was ' . . .  that the 
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appropriate benchmark for setting minimum wages is the capacity of 
the weakest sector of the economy to pay, not [the capacity to pay of] 
the strongest [sectors]' (DFP 1991 :24). Although not prominent in 
explanations found in the Reasons for Determination, it seems that 
understanding of these critical labour market developments was 
significant for the determination of a single national adult minimum 
wage for new job entrants that is set at the previous rural adult 
minimum wage-thereby collapsing the rural-urban minimum wage 
differential that contributed to high rural-urban migration (MWB 
1992:44) (Table 5 .9) .  The data urge the conclusion of the 1992 Board 
that 'There is now the need to change d irection in wages policy 
because the current economic situation calls for this change' (MWB 
1992:32) .  Nevertheless, this change does not focus on the growth of 
low-wage jobs, but on productivity improvement (MWB 1992:47-61 ).  
Productivity trends 
Weak productivity performance has accompanied weak growth in wage 
employment. Productivity measured as a rate of change in product per 
person employed over the period 1973-77 to 1 985-89 shows almost zero 
labour productivity growth for the formal economy-a yearly compound 
average increase of about zero is reported in McGavin (1991a :100) .  
Estimates of total factor productivity (of capital and labour) show recent 
deterioration in two-factor productivity growth for the formal economy 
from a yearly compound average increase of 1 .5 per cent for 1981-83 
to 1984-86 to 0.9 per cent for 1984-86 to 1 987-89 (McGavin 1 991a : l05) .  
These indications of deterioration in productivity performance may not 
be marked in comparison with many countries and it may be questioned 
whether the newly industrialised economies of Asia are an appropriate 
comparison for assessing Papua New Guinea results. But the high rates 
of labour and multi-factor productivity increases achieved in Asian 
newly industrialised countries show what gains are possible (World 
Bank 1992a:138) and recent performance of Indian Ocean and Carribean 
economies suggests that improved performance is possible in cultural 
settings quite different from Asian newly industrialised countries. 
Secondary industries show declines in real value-added per person 
-and declines that exceed declines in real wages per person (Table 5 .10; 
McGavin and Millett 1993:11 ). Recent estimates show real value-added 
per employee between 1983 and 1 990 declining overall and de-dining 
for manufacturing, construction and service sectors (while rising for 
mining and utilities and constant for agriculture) (UNDP / ILO 1992:47). 
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Table 5.9. Minimum legal wages for Papua New Guinea since October 1 992 
(kina per week) 















C lass 5 
Class 6 

















































"This column shows the wage minima that appl ied under the 1 989 Determination adj ustment 
formula at August 1 992, when the Board formally formed i ts decision. Dates for adjustment of 
minima are various ( see McGavin 1 99 l a: Table A39 Notes) .  The rural minima at M W B  
decision date were announced in March 1 992 and backdated t o  1 January 1 992. Rural standard 
hours are 44 per week. Since a 1 975 Industrial Tribunal ' common rul ing ' ,  urban standard hours 
have been 42 per week ( McGavin 1 99 1  a used 44 hours per week for both rural and urban 
sectors) .  Youths are persons aged 1 6-2 1 years. 
b The Determination of the Board was formal ly  publ ished in the National Gazette No. G73 dated 
1 5  September 1 992 . The Gazette does not appear to have been immediately distributed and 
implementation of the ' adj ustment of 2 per cent for minimum wage earners as part of the 
transition process . . .  ' ( M W B  1 992 :66) did not occur unt i l  early December 1 992, backdated to 1 
October 1 992 ( M W B  1 992:4).  The rates for new employees are appl icable from the date of the 
gazettal ( MW B  1 992:67) .  Previous level- I urban centres i ncl ude: Alotau, Arawa, Goroka, 
Kavieng, Kieta, Lae, Madang, Mt Hagen, Popondetta, Port Moresby, Rabaul and Wewak; 
previous level-2 urban centres inc lude: Bulolo, Bwagaoia, Daru, Kainantu, Kerema, Kimbe, 
Kundiawa, Lorengau, M endi, Samarai, Vanimo, Wabag and Wau. Class 1 incl udes persons 
occupying semi-skil led occupations but without work experience; class 2, sem i-ski l led 
occupations undertaken with minimal supervision; c lass 3 ,  semi-sk i l led occupations undertaken 
without supervision; c lass 4, incl udes tradesmen without experience; c lass 5 ,  tradesmen with 
some experience; class 6, experienced tradesmen. 
Source: Employers' Federation of Papua New Guinea, Special Industrial News Bulletin 4 
December 1 992. 
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Table 5.1 0. Papua New Guinea value-added, employment and per 
employee product, by sector, 1 983 and 1 990 
Value-added Wage employment Value-added 
(1983 kina mi l l ion) ('OOO) per employee 
(1983 kina) 
1983 1990 1983 1990 1983 1990 
Ag ricu ltu re 700.0 782.1 1142.7 1278.8 600 600 
Min ing 225.1 250.1 9.5 5.3 23700 46900 
Manufacturing 217.3 213.9 16.7 18.2 13000 11800 
Uti l it ies 31.4 35.9 4.7 5.1 6600 7000 
Construction 123.7 111.8 16.4 30.4 7500 3700 
Services 758 .5 808.2 179.4 184.9 4200 4400 
Total 2056.0 2210.9 1369.5 1522.9 1500 1400 
Notes: Employment data for agriculture and the total economy are from 1 980 and 1 990 census 
data and 1 983 data are derived by interpolation. Obviously, the agriculture employment data are 
not for wage employment only (as is the case in Table 5 . 1 2 ). Employment data for mining, 
manufacturing, construction and util ities are from McGavin ( l 99 J a : 74-8 5 ) . Data for services 
were estimated as a residual .  
Sources: United Nations Development Programme and the International Labour Organ isation 
( UN DP/I LO), 1 992. Papua New Guinea: challenges for employment and human resources 
development, I nternational Labour Organisation, Asian Regional Team for Employment 
Promotion, New Delhi :47; using National Statistical Office, 1 988. 1 980 National Population 
Census-Final Figures: National Summary, Port Moresby; National Statistical Office, 1 992. 
Prel iminary tabulations for the 1 990 Census as reported in UNDP/ILO ( 1 992); McGavin, P. A. , 
1 99 l a. Wages, Incomes and Productivity in Papua New Guinea, Inst i tute of National Affairs, 
Port Moresby. 
Capital productivity 
World Bank (1988) found for Papua New Guinea that the ratio of 
increments in capital investment to increments in output (that is, the 
' incremental capital output ratio' (ICOR)) to be high. This has been 
attributed to the lumpiness and long gestation periods of mineral 
resources investments that have accounted for a sizeable proportion of 
total investment. In addition, it is suggested that much of the public 
investment in physical and social infrastructure may be expected to 
yield low returns at the present state of economic development 
(UNDP / ILO 1992:41, citing World Bank 1988:39f). Recent estimates 
show high ICORs against a norm value of about 5 for comparable 
nations (UNDP / ILO 1992:41,n.6) and show ICORs to be higher for the 
non-mining sector than for the mining sector (UNDP / ILO 1 992:42). 
This implies a low rate of return on investments, especially on 
investments in non-mining activities. 
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Relative wages 
For the last decade at least, international comparisons of wages and 
productivity have been central to policy analyses of poor economic 
performance in Papua New Guinea as undertaken by scholars and 
international agencies. These comparisons form the analytical core of 
the government submissions to the 1992 Board (DFP 1 992:60-64). 
Recent international wage comparisons show average agricultural 
wages in Asia and in Southeast Asia of 19-20 per cent and 30-65 per 
cent respectively of Papua New Guinean average agricultural wages. 
Comparison of non-agricultural wages show yet sharper contrasts of 
8-15 per cent and 1 6-71 per cent, respectively (DFP 1992:62). The 1992 
Board noted that these comparisons involve wages as costs and not as 
incomes (MWB 1992:36, McGavin 1991a:l3lf). The 1992 Board concluded 
There is a common view that minimum urban wages are so much 
higher relative to productivity [compared with levels in comparable 
nations and that] . . .  high wages and the centralised wage system in 
Papua New Guinea [are] major factors constraining private investment, 
production and employment growth (MWB 1 992:36 ). 
Until recently, declines in rural commodity export prices and 
deterioration in the terms of trade (McGavin 1 993a: 103) contributed to 
increases in the proportion of wages to product value, the 'product wage' 
(McGavin 1991a : l3lf) .  The seriousness of these cost pressures has led 
to widespread recourse to the 'capacity to pay' provisions of the 1989 
Minumum Wages Board determination (McGavin 1991a:43). Recent 
changes in export prices suggest that the terms of trade for Papua 
New Guinea have now stabilised or are even improving (DCI 1994; 
DFP 1 993:166). 
GDP performance 
These trends are reflected in falling real GDP per capita (UNDP / ILO 
1992:38).  Reversing these trends and moving Papua New Guinea from 
membership of the 'negative growth' group to membership of the 
'positive growth' group of nations (UNDP 1 994:12) involves the 
implementation of productivity improvement. This brief survey of 
indicators of resources use and efficiency underscores the task to be 
undertaken. 
Recent developments 
Since 1990, Papua New Guinea has been set back by fiscal mismanage­
ment and employment gains have not been sustained . There has also 
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been a fall-off in mineral exploration and in mineral resources develop­
ment until the recent construction activity at the Lihir gold development 
in New Ireland province. Employment at the Lihir project only gathered 
pace in the closing months of 1995 and it is the annualised Bank of 
Papua New Guinea employment indices that are used in constructing 
Tables 5.4 and 5.12 (while the periodicity of the Employment Federation 
of Papua New Guinea (EFPNG) employment indices, June and 
December and the six-monthly reportage mean that changes occurring 
late in the year are more captured in the EFPNG series (Table 5 .11 )) .  
On first examination, it seems as though the effects of recent buoyancy 
of tropical export commodity prices appears not to be reflected in the 
Bank of Papua New Guinea employment indices. However, agricultural 
Table 5. 1 1 .  Papua New Guinea percentage annual change in employment, 
1 989-95 
Year Agricu ltu re M in ing Constr- Manu- Other Al l  Al l  sectors 
(Dec.) uction facturing sectors (excl. 
min ing and 
agricu lture) 
1989 5.7 -20.1 -20.2 7.8 -4.4 -1.7 -3.0 
1990 -11.3 -32.1 -0.8 -4.8 -6.9 -11.2 -5.7 
1991 -10.0 13.9 2.3 -3.6 -6.5 -4.8 -3.9 
1992 0.3 -0.7 -15.8 -5.2 -1.0 -2.0 -2.6 
1993 - 4.9 3.3 -14.0 0.2 -2.7 -3.0 -2.8 
1994 - 1.1 1.0 2.5 3.2 0.8 0.8 1.0 
1995 7.8 5.8 63.8 -5.0 -0.8 3.4 0.7 
Notes: Procedures for adj usting reported results for changes in survey response rates have 
improved in recent years. 
Differences between EFPNG and B PNG employment indicators have been a matter of 
comment and contention in recent years. The most recent observation shows employment 
moving in different directions. I t  is possible that this anomaly arises from differences in 
reporting. For both series now, absence of response in the current period leads to inclusion of 
previous period data ( until the respondent is removed from the sample file) .  BPNG data between 
1 994 and 1 995 show a decrease of 14 percent in construction employment, while EFPNG data 
show a massive increase in construction employment. BPNG data by region show a 1 3  percent 
dec l ine in I lands employment which does not seem plausible given the present Lihir proj ect 
construction activity. I t  is  possible that this activity is being undertaken by firms not captured in 
the B PNG sample (although this is a larger sample than the EFPNG sample).  The other marked 
difference is in agricultural employment (which B PN G  shows as declin ing by 1 0. 5  percent). See 
the text of this paper for a ful ler discussion. 
Despite these reservations, BPNG data have been used in the preparat ion of Tables 5 .4 and 
5 . 1 2 , in recognition of their larger sample and longer track record in producing these data. 
Sources: Employers' Federation of Papua New Guinea, Newsletter 21 1 995 and direct 
communication. 
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employment is affected by seasons, as well as by commodity prices 
(that is, there are both volume and price considerations) and a 
prolongation of wet weather was experienced during 1 995 that has 
influenced the slow upturn in agricultural employment as measured 
by the Bank's employment index and the resultant absence of upturn 
in 1995 annualised agricultural employment as measured by the Bank's 
index that was used in the construction of Table 5 .12 data (while, as 
noted here, the different periodicity of the EFPNG series sheds some 
light on the different growth indications that the EFPNG series suggest). 
Overall, the last 5 years have been characterised by losses in wage 
jobs, with recent gains occurring with the development of the Lihir gold 
deposit in New Ireland province and Gobe hydrocarbon resources in 
Southern Highlands and Gulf provinces and with improvements in 
agricultural employment led by recent increases in tropical export 
commodity prices. Data from the Department of Personnel Management 
show no indications of implementation of announced government 
policies for the reduction of public service employment (PNG 1 995:27) 
and government employment growth resulting from recent uncontrolled 
growth in government consumption expenditures had not been cut 
back at mid-1996. This contrasts with the performance of the two largest 
government enterprises, Elcom and PTC (now Telikom) where expansion 
of services has been combined with reductions in staffing levels in recent 
years, implying modest improvements in overall labour productivity in 
these public authorities (Table 5 .4). 
The crisis in market sector confidence provoked by government 
mismanagement and consequent losses in wage employment, have 
been moderated by the wage deregulation achieved through the 1992 
Minimum Wages Board decision (Table 5.9) .  A Minimum Wages Board 
has not been convened since 1992 and the government has indicated 
that a convening of a Board is not intended (PNG 1995:50). Although 
no wage earnings surveys have been conducted since 1990 (McGavin 
1 991a :l57-74), I have during several fieldwork visits since 1 992 found 
no evidence of payment of wages in Port Moresby below the previously­
regulated minima (Table 5.9) . During 1994, evidence was found in one 
urban centre (previously ranked ' level 2') of wages at the new national 
minima-but this centre was one where there was easy movement 
between urban and village localities. The increasing stress on urban 
incomes in Port Moresby can be noticed in a visible 'supply response' -
with the expanded use of vacant urban plots and hillsides for the 
cultivation of staple food crops. 
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Table 5.1 2. Papua New Guinea wage employment for formal market sector, by industry, persons, 1 976-95 C13 <ll c:: 
·5 
Year Retail Whole- Manu- Bui ld ing and Transport Financial Other Su b-total Agriculture Sub-total M i n ing Total (9 
(Dec.) sale factur ing construction and business s: <ll 
z 
C13 ::i 
1 976 80 244 38 466 1 1 8 7 1 0 4 523 1 23 233 a. . .  C13 
1 977 82 743 46 1 50 1 28 893 4 654 1 33 547 
a.. 
.S 
1 978 1 9  247 1 5  4 1 5 20 905 1 2  636 6 966 1 1  1 54 86 323 43 730 1 30 053 4 860 1 34 9 1 3 c:: 0 
1 979 20 725 1 6  253 22 042 1 3  54 1 7 8 1 4  1 0  704 91 079 45 032 1 36 1 1 1  4 893 1 4 1  004 ·g_ 0 1 980 22 053 17 729 25 97 1 1 4  667 8 469 1 5  403 1 04 292 48 059 1 52 351 5 043 1 57 394 en .0 
1 98 1  2 1  960 1 9  205 22 586 1 2  1 6 1 9 324 8 537 93 773 50 900 1 44 673 6 1 0 1  1 50 774 C13 :; 
1 982 21 343 17 07 1 1 5  OOO 1 1  1 28 9 800 1 0  850 85 1 92 47 500 1 32 692 8 742 1 41 434 0 .0 
1 983 23 649 1 6  71 2 1 6  433 1 1  290 9 752 7 1 69 85 005 51 691 1 36 696 9 496 1 46 1 92 C13 _J 
1 984 6 665 1 6  622 1 6  533 14 0 1 1 1 1  429 1 0  097 1 4  1 1 9 89 476 53 880 1 43 356 6 387 1 49 743 
1 985 6 620 1 6  551 1 7  231  23 722 1 1  452 9 808 7 872 93 356 56 1 62 1 49 5 1 8 5 867 1 55 385 
1 986 6 620 1 5  968 1 7  1 5 1 23 953 1 2  240 9 894 9 742 95 568 59 096 1 54 664 7 040 1 6 1 704 
1 987 7 091 13 1 8 1 1 7  231 2 1  870 14 871 9 379 1 6  826 1 00 449 59 306 1 59 755 8 0 1 9 1 67 774 
1 988 7 338 1 3  1 67 1 8  467 22 0 1 5 1 3  281 9 958 1 8  398 1 02 624 64 1 96 1 66 820 9 247 1 76 067 
1 98 9  7 562 1 3  608 1 9  643 30 723 14 857 1 1  1 06 1 6  742 1 1 4 241 66 850 1 8 1 091 8 084 1 89 1 75 
1 99 0  6 5 6 1  1 2  41 4 1 8  905 30 897 1 5  687 1 1  71 8 1 5  77 1 1 1 1  953 62 1 70 1 74 1 23 5 331 1 79 454 
1 99 1  6 441 1 1  575 18 985 23 462 14 688 1 1  085 1 9  1 35 1 05 371 62 3 1 0 1 67 681 5 283 1 72 964 
1 992 6 381 12 258 20 32 1 22 1 60 1 3  239 1 1  225 1 9  397 1 04 981 68 038 1 73 0 1 9 5 680 1 78 699 
1 99 3  6 269 1 1  931 20 680 21 292 1 2  76 1 1 1  1 93 1 7  676 1 0 1 802 66 431 1 68 233 5 632 1 73 865 
1 994 6 605 1 2  884 23 95 1 22 507 1 3  394 1 0  978 1 9  624 1 09 943 70 622 1 80 565 5 553 1 86 1 1 8 
1 99 5  6 777 1 3  069 21 797 1 9  6 1 4  1 2  536 1 1  9 1 2 21 405 1 07 1 1 0 63 1 48 1 70 258 5 945 1 76 203 
N otes: Readers are referred to notes i n  McGavin ( 1 993a:84). 
Sources: McGavin, P.A., 1 99 1 a . Wages, Incomes and Productivity in Papua New Guinea, I nstitute of National Affairs, Port Moresby :Annex 2A; McGavin, P.A., 
1 993a. Connections: the process of enhancing productivity change, I nstitute of National Affairs, Port Moresby:84; Bank of Papua New Guinea, 1 996. Quarterly 
Economic Bulletin, March, Port Moresby. 
Supply-side responses 
This last observation is consistent with important changes highlighted 
by data comparisons between the 1 980 and 1990 Censuses. While the 
proportion of the citizen population aged 10 years and over in wage 
employment did not change between censuses, there was nationally a 
14.3 per cent growth in self-employment and a 1 7.6 per cent growth in 
the proportion of the population aged 10  years and over engaged in 
cash-cropping activity (National Statistical Office 1 994:136).  Among 
urban populations, this supply side response was more marked, with 
a 66.7 per cent growth in the proportion of the population aged 10 years 
and over engaged in self-employment and a 214.3 per cent increase in 
the proportion engaged in cash cropping activities (National Statistical 
Office 1 994:139). While in rural areas the proportion engaged in self­
employment increased between censuses by only 10  per cent, the 
proportion engaged in cash-cropping increased by 20.6 per cent 
(National Statistical Office 1 994: 140). It is notable that these changes, 
while generally true for both males and females, show the largest 
increases in population proportion engaged in cash cropping as being 
males (200 per cent, from a low base, in urban areas and 29.7  per cent 
in rural areas) (National Statistical Office 1994:139f). This is a highly 
significant development, indicating a weakening in the gender divide 
in garden work-previously predominantly a female domain in Papua 
New Guinea societies. 
These census data reveal a significant intercensal shift in response 
in Papua New Guinea . In the face of weak 'demand led' absorption for 
market labour services, there has occurred a significant 'supply led' 
response and the proportion of citizen population aged 10 years and 
over for the nation as a whole engaged in market activity other than 
wage employment has increased by 17  per cent from 25.5 per cent to 
29.9 per cent (compared with a static 9.2 per cent in wage employment). 
(Actually, allowing for the employment loss in North Solomon province, 
the proportion in wage employment is not static, but declined from 9 .6 
to 9.2 per cent-see Table 5.6. ) In rural areas, these changes have 
involved a 27.3 per cent increase in agricultural employment and in 
urban areas a 40 .9 per cent increase in non-agricultural employment 
(National Statistical Office 1 994: 1 62). 
These data reinforce the need for a different perception of ' labour 
absorption' in Papua New Guinea (and other Pacific nations) and a re­
focusing of attention from the growth of wage jobs which does not offer 
significant prospect of absorbing population growth to the calling-
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forth and enabling of supply side responses for the development and 
use of labour resources. 
This change has been accompanied by an important change in 
terminology. I have in the past had to argue against editors who wished 
to reduce my apparently cumbersome phrase 'wage employment' to 
'employment', by emphasising that in ordinary English usage (as 
distinct from usage by labour economists) 'employment' means any 
productive activity and does not necessarily imply activity governed 
by wage employment relations. National Statistical Office (1994) uses 
the term 'employed' in this generic sense and considers persons 
engaged in economic activities falling under National Statistical Office 
categories 01-05 as 'employed' (National Statistical Office 1 994:148). 
Unfortunately, category 07, 'housework', is not so included-although 
it may clearly be a value-adding activity. Why household processing of 
sago or kaukau for domestic consumption should be so vastly 
distinguished from growing and harvesting of food crops is not clear 
to me. Such activities are clearly supply side substitutes to cooking rice 
that is factory processed and are clearly 'economically active' 
engagements. Although progress evidently has been made in the 
presentation of census data to reflect Papua New Guinea realities, the 
transition from inappropriate classification groupings derived from 
different social orders is incomplete. A more complete transition to 
economic analysis that is appropriate to the indigenous social setting 
remains desirable. 
Even so, such changes as have occurred have given rise to welcome 
changes in analysis of economic data. For over a decade now, I have 
been using the apparently cumbersome phrases 'market work force' 
and 'market labour force' to describe persons captured by statistics of 
the formal labour market (rather than the more customary 'work force' I 
' labour force' ). National Statistical Office(1994: 148) identifies persons 
grouped in National Statistical Office categories 01-06 as the ' labour 
force' and thus identifies a national labour force participation rate for 
the citizen population aged 10  years and over of 68.2 per cent (76.0 per 
cent for males, remembering that house-based production for domestic 
consumption by females falls outside National Statistical Office 
reckoning) (National Statistical Office 1 994:1 55) .  Thus-rather than 
showing declining labour absorption-the 1980-1990 intercensal data 
show increased absorption of labour resources, with the national citizen 
labour force participation rate increasing by 7.2 per cent from 63.6 in 
1980 to 68.3 per cent in 1 990. Increases are reported for every province 
except Milne Bay (and North Solomons, which is unreported). The largest 
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increase, of 21 .1  per cent, occurred in Gulf province and the highest 
labour force participation rate, 75.4 per cent, occurred in Southern 
Highlands province (National Statistical Office 1994:159) .  These 
responses are remarkable in the face of widespread collapse in the 
delivery of government services (especially outside Port Moresby) and 
in the face of widespread deterioration of social infrastructure . Clearly, 
the adoption of government strategies that actively promote and 
facilitate supply side labour market developments have the potential 
to further increase labour absorption and to enhance its productivity. 
Looking ahead 
At the time of undertaking fieldwork, no recent projections of the 
population or the labour force for Papua New Guinea were available. 
The National Statistical Office kindly undertook for this study the 
estimation of population projections based on the 1 990 (Tables 5.2 and 
5. 13). These show the 'central' projections for population growth at a 
cumulative annual rate of 2 .13 per cent to 1995 and at decreasing rates 
to 1 .85 per cent by 2010, when national citizen population is projected at 
5.3 million persons. Using the labour force participation definitions 
described above and taking ages 1 5-60 years as the economically active 
population, 'central' projections for labour force growth are estimated 
at a cumulative annual rate of 2 .79 to 1995 and at decreasing rates to 
2.31 per cent by 2010, when the national citizen labour force is 
projected at 2.7 million persons. The projected slowing of population 
increase, combined with the movement of persons under 15 years of 

























Notes: Labour force projections are based on population proj ections from the 1 990 Census and 
use the proportion of the population aged 1 5-60 years reported as economical ly active at the 
1 990 Census ( National Stat istical 1 994: 1 48 ) .  Note that the last column shows the proportion of 
total population (that is, all age groups) .  The data are provisional .  
Sources: National Stat istical Office, 1 996. Prel iminary population and labour force projections, 
Waigani and computations on these data. 
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Table 5.1 4. Papua New Guinea wage employment, 1 968-95 
'OOO persons Percentage of popu lation 
1968 161 7.5 
1971 184 7.6 
1980 213 7.2 
1990 235 6.6 
1995 237 6.0 
Source: Tables 5 .2 and 5.4 and computations on these data. 
age into the economically active age group indicates some easing of 
the 'dependency ratio' of non-economically active to the economically 
active population and a projected increase to 1995 of 46 per cent of the 
population in the labour force and to 50.4 per cent by 2010  (Table 5 .13) .  
Against this, however, the indications are of continued decrease in the 
proportion of the population in wage employment to about 6 per cent 
at 1995-the lowest since records are available (Table 5 .14) .  The prospect 
of the formal sector, through expansion of wage employment, making 
significant contributions to improvements in labour absorption in 
Papua New Guinea seems slight. With the removal of wage regulation 
and wages and conditions of employment being more determined by 
the interaction of demand and supply conditions, the tendency to urban 
drift may be lessened. But the big policy challenge for the future is for 
government to pursue policies that facilitate supply side responses in 
labour absorption in Papua New Guinea. 
Pol icy changes for improving employment prospects 
The policy changes necessary to improve employment prospects cover 
the whole range of government policies and it is practicable only to 
comment on certain of these policies . 
Wage flexibi l ity 
The 1995 Budget states that the government intends to uphold the 1 992 
deregulation of wages and there are no counter-indications to this 
sensible policy (PNG 1 996:50). 
Promotion of productivity 
The promotion of productivity improvement was central to the 1 992 
Minimum Wages Board decision and there has been little progress in 
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the implementation of this crucial aspect of the decision. The processes 
for enterprise-level responses for productivity improvement are treated 
in McGavin ( 1993a, 1994d), but there is little evidence of their being 
taken up. The focus has instead tended to be on price competitiveness, 
with inadequate attention to means for improving value-adding so that 
values for factor units and product units are raised. During the year 
following the 1 992 decision, significant progress was made in laying 
the groundwork for developing a productivity culture in the public 
service (McGavin 1995, 1997). With the collapse of fiscal control and the 
blow-out of government consumption expenditure, the potential of 
these reforms has been lost. There is little evidence of political momentum 
to implement the most recently-announced public service reforms. 
Budgetary control and expenditure redirection 
The recovery of widely-based formal sector performance and employ­
ment is dependent on demonstration of government budgetary 
responsibility and the redirection of government spending from 
consumption to effective service delivery activities . Restoration of 
service delivery calls for substantial redirection of government spending 
to the replacement of deteriorated infrastructural capital and for the 
expansion of infrastructural capital to meet the needs of growing 
populations. The substantial government revenues from Porgera gold 
and Kutubu oil developments have been largely wasted, instead of 
being channelled to the resourcing of physical and human capital 
infrastructural development as argued in McGavin (1993b, 1994a, 1994b, 
1994c). The long-term decline in public sector capital maintenance and 
formation has been most marked in rural Papua New Guinea and the 
shift in government outlays to consumption expenditures has been 
focused on the national capital where increasing proportions of 
government outlays are directed.  There is clearly a need for a major 
policy shift to focus on rural-based physical and human infrastructural 
capital development. 
Pol icies impacting on supply-side responses 
One of the less remarked on measures of urban deterioration in Papua 
New Guinea is the ageing and non-replacement of trees along urban 
streets. In the last year, there has been a remarkable turnaround in the 
urban environment in Port Moresby, with significant redirection of 
resources into day labour engaged in cleaning-up, maintenance and 
tree-planting. Against this low-cost job creation, however, the highly 
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capital-intensive and wasteful construction of the Poreporena Highway 
looms to broadcast government failures to pursue projects that pass 
adequate cost-benefit analysis scrutiny. There is still no downtown 
Port Moresby market for local produce; the traffic lights still do not 
work at Badili markets; there is still no provision for footpath traffic 
along key roads in the city; key PMV-station areas remain seriously 
congested, potholed and unlit and so on. 
Specific protection provisions for the supposed creation of urban 
wage jobs continue to occur, despite contrary public policy statements 
(for example, PNG 1991 :13) .  The proposition argued in Manning 
(1993 :116) (1994:137) that a rural job can be created for about one-tenth 
of the capital investment required to create an urban job seems to have 
gained l ittle currency. When one considers the underutilisation rate of 
social infrastructure often occuring in rural areas and the over-
utilisa tion of social infrastructure occuring in urban areas in Papua 
New Guinea and allows for the costs of job creation in terms of both 
private and social capital, it is likely that the comparison is even more 
favourable for direction of resources toward creation of rural, rather 
than urban, wage jobs. The restoration of rural infrastructure in roads 
and wharves and the restoration of policing services is crucial for the 
widespread continued development of cash-cropping activities. Further, 
as argued in Millett ( 1994 ), the development of cash-cropping in rural 
areas slows the rate of rural migration to urban centres that offer few 
employment opportunities and where social infrastructures are under 
increasing stress. 
Human resources development 
Much of the problem of urban drift in nations such as Papua New 
Guinea arises from 'perception problems', in that schooling explicitly 
and implicitly prepares young people for 'modern urban sector ' 
living-a preparation that is strongly reinforced by access to modern 
media. The push for 'vocational education' has been a reaction to this. 
While not a proponent of vocational education, there is a great need for 
transformation of the culture of schooling in nations such as Papua New 
Guinea, so that the skills learned are identified as having applications 
in village settings and so that villages are identified as places that can 
be transformed by the expansion of productive activity and the adoption 
of new productive activities that give access to the amenities of modern 
life. I am convinced that the drift to urban centres of young people who 
are ill-equipped to contribute to urban-based productive activities is 
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exacerbated by schooling that fails to cultivate an understanding of how 
access to market goods and services is achieved and of the possibilities 
for access to market products through rural productive activities and 
the possibilities for quality of life improvements in village settings. The 
possibilities for improved standards of living for the mass of Papua 
New Guineans for the foreseeable future overwhelmingly depends on 
increased application of labour resources and improvements of labour 
skills in rural Papua New Guinea. 
This calls not only for substantial increases in resources for education, 
but also for major curriculum reforms so that schooling generally 
prepares young people to identify and to implement possibilities for 
rural-based development. Post-primary schooling is already becoming 
more elitist in Papua New Guinea (with the market for secondary and 
post-secondary education apparently flourishing) and means for 
increasing non-government funding sources for education and for 
providing user-control in quality delivery in educational services 
probably provide the best means for addressing the skills shortage that 
so restrict market sector development in Papua New Guinea (INA 1994). 
Economic reform of education policies in Papua New Guinea is treated 
in McGavin (1991b, 1 991c, 1992, 1995) and policies for the promotion 
of workplace skills formation in formal sector employment are argued 
in McGavin ( 1990). 
Nucleus estates development 
Although the repudiation at independence of plantation freeholdings 
of customary land was never rigorously implemented, the general 
decline of plantation agriculture has reduced the national capacity for 
labour absorption. In societies where land property rights are not 
transferable, estate agriculture on long-duration leaseholds allows for 
inter-provincial movement of labour that increases labour absorption. 
Palm oil estates in West New Britain are one of the few areas where 
significant rural relocation of surplus labour occurs. There are, however, 
substantial areas that were previously under plantation agriculture­
such as inactive copra plantation areas in East New Britain and failed 
20 hectare blocks planted to coffee in the Eastern Highlands and 
Western Highlands. Failure in the 20 hectare block projects seems to 
have arisen from inadequate appreciation by customary landowners 
of the working requirements for developing and maintaining these 
blocks and the inexpertise and lack of commitment of the management 
agencies who were supposed to deliver management and agriculture 
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expertise to customary landowners. In the Western Highlands province, 
one of the few remaining large plantation firms has been instrumental 
in a joint venture with the Western Highlands provincial government 
and the business arm of Hagen District Local Government Councils in 
reactivating abandoned 20 hectare blocks for a flourishing fresh 
vegetable production and marketing that is spearheading a recovery 
in agricultural production and wage employment in the Waghi Valley. 
This is proving an effective means for bringing into use underutilised 
land and labour resources and for providing effective agricultural 
extension and marketing where these had collapsed. 
The combined effects of kina devaluation and high prices for copra 
and copra oil have led to the reactivation of East New Britain copra 
estates, to new plantings and to plans to expand the crushing capacity 
at the Rabaul mill .  With the reconstitution of the Copra Marketing 
Board as an industry association, there is increased potential for increased 
utilisation of land and labour resources and for the reactivation of copra 
research, extension and marketing with development of old freehold 
plantations on a joint-venture basis. 
The current success of the palm oil nucleus estate industry in Papua 
New Guinea is associated with success in surrounding smallholder 
development and smallholder blocks are reported in 1996 around 
palm oil estates in Milne Bay, Oro, West New Britain and New Ireland 
provinces (see supplement in Post-Cou rier 29 April 1 996). 
These developments show that nucleus estate firms with long-term 
local investments and commitments can provide foci for the development 
of new organisations that successfully combine customary property 
rights with contemporary business requirements, leading to growth in 
wage employment and self employment and the provision of research, 
extension, management and marketing services. Nucleus estate 
developments directly increase labour absorption through wage 
employment and act as catalysts for self-employment through associated 
cash cropping development. Government facilitation that reduces the 
transaction costs in setting-up such arrangements could contribute to 
more widespread development of these catalysts for rural development 
and employment. 
Mining development 
Prior to the tragic events on Bougainville in 1989, the Panguna mine 
and extensive plantation development made North Solomons province 
the most prosperous in Papua New Guinea. Ok Tedi, Porgera and 
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Kutubu are having similar effects on their surrounding areas. A more 
enlightened use of unearned incomes accruing from the projects so 
that these are directed to the construction of alternative systems of 
production that provide a future after these non-renewable resources 
are exhausted is argued in McGavin (1993b, 1 994a, 1 994b, 1 994c). Even 
so, these mineral and hydrocarbon resource developments are acting 
as significant providers of skills development for indigenous peoples; 
through provisions such as the 1 990 tax offsets are contributing to the 
maintenance and development of provincial infrastructural capital; 
through provisions such as the Fly River Development Trust are 
contributing to development in areas distant from the mining operations; 
and through local provisioning of food, transport and other services to 
mining enclaves, are acting as catalysts for transformative supply side 
responses in the surrounding areas. Thus, although wage jobs directly 
resulting from mining are small in national terms and in the case of 
Kutubu may be short-l ived, these projects act as catalysts for trans­
formative supply side responses that have significant positive labour 
absorption impacts. Government policies that increase the direction of 
surpluses arising from mining activities to the creation of alternative 
production systems (rather than to the support of ephemeral government 
consumption activities) have the potential to support broad-based 
increases in labour absorption and to enhance the quality of national 
labour resources. 
Summing up 
The problem of  inadequate ' labour absorption' in  Papua New Guinea 
is best addressed by policies that focus on calling-forth and enabling 
widespread supply side responses. Demand-led policies of undisciplined 
government spending are ultimately counter-productive. Wage 
deregulation policies need to be combined with policies for productivity 
improvement. Widespread and effective delivery of public infrastructural 
services (transport and communications, education and public order 
and so on) provide the conditions for supply side responses. These 
particularly need to target the delivery of government services to rural 
Papua New Guinea, as it is rural-based development that offers the 
most potential for increased absorption and more effective development 
and use of national labour resources. 
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Note 
I am grateful to several people for assistance with this project, 
particularly Mr Arthur J orari of the National Statistical Office for 
Papua New Guinea population and labour force projections; Mrs Rose 
Hare and Mr Joe Narop of the DPM; Mr G Waiut of Eleam; Ms U Samali 
of Telikom; and Mr Ellison Pidik of the Bank of Papua New Guinea. 
Mr John Millett, Director of Research, Institute of National Affairs, has 
challenged me with several important insights that I have developed 
in this paper. 
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Commercial and industrial development 
John Cole 
This chapter breaks no new ground. It will, I believe, underline the 
policy consensus that exists among economists and analysts on PNG 
industrial development matters. More importantly, it will, I hope, 
support the government's resolve to proceed with its Economic 
Recovery Program, particularly as it affects industrialisation. This 
chapter reviews the current situation of the commercial and in more 
detail the industrial sectors. My message is that commercial and 
industrial development requires the same ingredients for success as 
private sector development generally. My assessment will be that, 
given Papua New Guinea's small and scattered population, its rugged 
terrain and its low levels of work-force skills, it is unrealistic to expect 
major industrialisation to take place over the medium term, and that 
an employment strategy founded primarily on incentives for industrial 
development is unlikely to succeed . I will sound a note of hope, 
however, for there are specific opportunities to seize, mostly founded on 
Papua New Guinea's excellent resource base. And, more fundamentally, 
a better outcome is possible with the adoption and implementation of 
good policies, buttressed by steadfastness and resolution by the 
government in the face of the inevitable setbacks to success. 
The Asian Development Bank and Papua New Guinea 
The Asian Development Bank has been a development partner of 
Papua New Guinea since 1 971 when Papua New Guinea joined the 
Bank's family of developing member countries. Since then the Bank 
has provided loans totalling US$570 mill ion for 42 projects, of which 
the amount disbursed by end of 1 995 was US$413 million. The Bank 
has also made 82 technical assistance grants to Papua New Guinea 
totalling some US$23 million. Thirty-three of these grants were for 
project preparation and 49 for advisory purposes. 
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The Bank's broad ambition in its Papua New Guinea operations has 
long been to help create employment and improve productive capacity. 
To do so, it has, in particular, always sought to foster entrepreneurship 
especially in agriculture. Interest in fostering business has increased 
over the years. 
The Bank's strategy for operations in Papua New Guinea is to 
provide loans and technical assistance for projects which can generate 
employment and increase productive capacity. Its interests are 
increasingly rural rather than urban, basic rather than fancy, female 
rather than male-oriented and capacity-strengthening rather than 
bureaucracy-enlarging. A review is now under way of how the Bank 
can best help Papua New Guinea over the medium term. Some 
narrowing of the focus of operations can be expected, but the broad 
ambitions are unlikely to change . Commerce and industry have 
traditionally been of secondary importance in the Bank's program in 
Papua New Guinea-agriculture, transportation, water supply and 
health have commanded most of the Bank's resources and energies. 
Papua New Guinea's commerce and ind ustry sector 
Enterprises in the private sector of Papua New Guinea are informal 
and mostly are located in rural areas. There is a comparatively small 
formal component of the economy, which is predominantly urban. In 
terms of size, the private sector in Papua New Guinea comprises micro­
enterprises, 100,000-150,000; small enterprises, about 10,000; medium­
size enterprises, about 3,000; and large enterprises, 500-1000. In the 
Papua New Guinea context, we may for practical purposes read 
'commerce' as 'business' . While definitions of commerce may vary, we 
can certainly say that in Papua New Guinea commerce is under­
developed and contributes only a small part of GDP for a country of 
Papua New Guinea's per capita income. 
' Industry' may be defined as 'manufacturing' . Most of the analysis 
in this chapter relates to industrial development and how the govern­
ment can best facilitate it. Output is fairly stable; typically manufacturing 
contributes about 10 per cent of GDP, representing a very low level of 
industrialisation. The sector 's growth in the 1980s and 1990s has been 
much lower than in the 1 970s. Newcomers in the 1970s took advantage 
of import-replacement opportunities and these enterprises grew quite 
rapidly (especially in the food and textile subsectors ), but by the 1 980s 
had largely satisfied local demand. With most of the firms not cost­
competitive enough to export, there was little room for growth. Also, 
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because of the rising costs of labour, power, telecommunications and 
transport, Papua New Guinea made few efficiency gains during the 
1980s. Output per worker was about the same in 1990 as it was in 1980 
and it is unlikely to have improved since . (Many of Papua New 
Guinea's competitors, however, realised significant improvements in 
output per worker. ) 
The sector is dominated by capital-intensive firms that are heavily 
oriented to the local market. Industrial firms rely heavily on imported 
raw and intermediate goods for their inputs, in spite of the fact that 
Papua New Guinea is rich in natural resources. Industrial exports are 
negligible, representing only about 5 per cent of Papua New Guinea's 
total exports. About half the output is in three sub-sectors: food, 
beverages and tobacco. Medium and large-scale firms are predominantly 
foreign owned and managed, while small firms are mainly nationally 
owned and operated. 
There may be around 450 factories operating in the Papua New 
Guinea manufacturing sector, down from about 500 in 1980. The sector 
provides only about 5 per cent of the jobs in the formal economy. The 
total number of employees is about 22,000 and has changed little over 
the last decade. Manufacturing companies are heavily concentrated (55 
per cent) in Port Moresby and Lae. Over 90 per cent of the labour force 
is male. In Southeast Asia and the Caribbean it averages 50-70 per cent. 
The govern ment's view of industrial  development 
Until the early 1980s, taxes on international trade were low by 
international standards. Then Papua New Guinea began to shift to 
higher rates of protection through tariffs and import quotas, mainly in 
the food subsector. The events of 1 989 and 1990 caused policymakers 
to reconsider Papua New Guinea's  development strategy. The shocks 
included the closing of the Bougainville mine and a sharp deterioration 
in Papua New Guinea's terms of trade, as world markets collapsed for 
agricultural exports. These events, combined with continuing high 
urban unemployment, caused policymakers to look to non-mining 
sectors, particularly industry, for solutions. The government was 
conscious then as now that more than 50,000 people are entering the 
job market each year but less than 10,000 jobs are being created in the 
formal economy. One outcome was the Medium-Term Industry and 
Trade Development Action Plan released in 1990. The Plan outlined 
strategies, programs and policies needed to encourage growth and 
employment generation in the industrial sector. It offered prescriptions 
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for reorientation towards exports. Importantly, it recognised the 
importance of maintaining a sound macroeconomic enabling 
environment, keeping the economy open and reducing production 
costs . In the 1990s, despite some notable backslides, Papua New 
Guinea has begun to liberalise its trade regime. 
The government recognised that a more comprehensive approach 
to industrial policy would be needed. Its assessment acknowledged 
that many of the obstacles to industrial growth were actually reflections 
of economy-wide constraints. It quite rightly saw its primary role in 
industrialisation as one of supporting and facilitating market-oriented 
activities. Industrial investments were to be left primarily to the 
private sector. The Plan acknowledged the limitations of the domestic 
market and placed emphasis on exports. Overall, the Plan, while 
ambitious, presented a fairly rational approach to industrial development 
from the policy perspective. However, back in 1990 further work 
needed to be done on the analysis of constraints and of ways for 
overcoming them, especially with regard to reducing production costs. 
Similarly, further work was required in translating policy objectives 
into specific programs and in identifying subsectors with the most 
promise for development. The Asian Development Bank's 1992 technical 
assistance study, Industrial Growth S trategy (ADB 1991 ), provided some 
of the answers and contributed to the paper Beyond the Minerals Boom 
(Papua New Guinea, Department of Trade and Industry 1993) 
Beyond the Minerals Boom presented particular strategies and 
programs and identified resource requirements and institutional needs 
which could bring about economic ' self-sufficiency' by the year 2000. 
The document contains the customary rhetoric, but is refreshingly 
candid. In opting for diversification of the economy through develop­
ment of other industries, the then Minister of Trade and Industry wrote 
' this option is most challenging and involves taking bold pioneering 
efforts to building new industries' . The expanded set of industrial 
activities will lead to a more dynamic economy that provides greater 
employment opportunities, higher value-added from resources, higher 
incomes and increasingly higher standards of living. This option is 
more difficult. It requires addressing the specific problems facing 
various sectors of the economy as well as the political determination 
and action to undertake solutions. Its reward is prosperity for all .  
The 1993 policy statement mostly follows the mainstream 
prescription for industrial development, though with several worrisome 
references to 'direct government participation in business' . (As an aside, 
Commercial and i ndustrial development I 1 01 
it may be noted that the Philippines is explicitly cited as an example of 
'bad government' with 'grim future prospects' . Anyone visiting Manila 
and Port Moresby just three years later would smile to read this. ) 
The targets for industry are described as follows 
• the industrial sector to provide at least 80,000 jobs or 20 per 
cent of formal employment 
• the industrial sector to contribute at least 35 per cent of GDP 
• manufactured exports to double at least 
• a strong Papua New Guinea entrepreneurial sector to come 
into being 
• downstream processing to increase 
• infrastructure support facilities to industry to improve 
• regional dispersal of industry to increase 
• equal opportunity for women in the labour force to be 
promoted 
• investments in industry at least to double. 
These are commendable but ambitious targets and beg the question: 
what is the institutional framework for delivering industrial development? 
The institutional framework for industrial development 
The Department of Commerce and Industry is responsible for the 
formulation, coordination and monitoring of industrial development 
policies and relevant program implementation. It aims to be the catalyst 
for development and the private sector's partner by 
• assisting with the provision of a conducive economic 
environment 
• promoting international competitiveness 
• providing an effective and coordinated infrastructure and 
service support system 
• mobilising and organising people, institutions and resources 
to achieve the Government's goals for industrialisation. 
Its program initiatives include, among others, the development of 
the garment, textile, wood and marine-based industries. Generally, the 
department is responsible for policy formulation while program 
development and implementation is carried out by statutory authorities 
within the department. The strategy, according to Beyond the Minerals 
Boom, was to be a catalyst for development and a partner in progress. 
Presumably the Department of Commerce and Industry has inherited 
the same strategy. The document went on to explain that the Department 
of Trade and Industry was dedicated to developing an enabling 
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environment, promoting international cost-effectiveness, providing 
effective coordinated infrastructure and service support and mobilising 
and organising people, institutions and resources. 
Regarding industry sector development, the Department of 
Commerce and Industry sees its role as promotion of import substitution, 
downstream processing, export initiatives, as well as basic and labour­
intensive activities. Its major initiatives are to 
• prepare subsector development plans 
• assist industry to improve productivity and efficiency 
• provide extension services 
• promote appropriate technology for industrial development 
• help to identify and develop viable industrial projects 
through feasibility studies and appropriate financing and 
technical arrangements 
• support development of key projects through technical 
cooperation agreements and establish a manufacturing 
company as the Government's vehicle for joint ventures with 
foreign enterprises. 
The Investment Promotion Authority (IPA) was established by an 
Act of Parliament in 1992 replacing the National Investment and 
Development Authority. It also took over the functions of the Registrar 
General's Office. It is an agency of Department of Commerce and 
Industry. Its primary role is to promote and facilitate investments in 
Papua New Guinea . The IPA corporate plan outlines its long-term and 
short-term objectives. Essentially its aim is to increase annual investment, 
especially in manufacturing. Donor-assisted programs include 
• Trade and Investment Promotion Services, a targeted 
bilateral program, funded by AusAID 
• Integrated Investment Promotion Program, supported by 
UNIDO 
• South Pacific Project Facility, which assists the IPA in the 
work of project identification and appraisal, by providing 
assistance with the preparation of feasibility studies 
• Company Registry and Investment Information Database, 
assisted by AusAID. 
The IPA is tackling its task well, and is efficiently promoting the 
cause of private sector development in Papua New Guinea. Its corporate 
plan and associated operating plan are competently prepared with 
clear delineation of goals and activities. It has developed good links 
with provincial governments. 
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The Small Business Development Corporation (SBDC) is responsible 
for the implementation of the national business development program, 
which is designed to encourage, promote and support Papua New 
Guinea entrepreneurs in management and ownership of business. 
SBDC' s goals are to create a national cost-effective and efficient 
mechanism for the delivery of development assistance to the small 
business sector, maximise small enterprise development through 
development and implementation of policies and programs, and direct 
support and assistance to small businesses. These are worthy challenges 
and SBDC has several support schemes in place to meet them. The 
Start Your Business I Improve Your Business scheme is particularly 
effective. However, bad debts have long circumscribed the 
effectiveness of government-financed financial incentive schemes. 
Care will have to be taken to improve SBDC's performance in this 
regard, especially during implementation of the new guarantee facility. 
The Industrial Centres Development Corporation (ICDC) was 
established by Act of Parliament in 1990 to implement the National 
Industrial Centres Development Program. The aim, very optimistically, 
is to establish industrial centres in four regions by 2000. The Malahang 
Industrial Centre (MIC) in Lae is the first such centre and the Islands 
Industrial Centre at Kokopo is now being developed. MIC has been 
successfully constructed and associated training programs competently 
implemented. However, the economic return on the investment has 
still to be realised because much of the space at MIC is unoccupied . By 
the end of 1 996 MIC is expected to be breaking even as far as its 
recurrent income and expenditure is concerned.  As to Kokopo, a 
needs-assessment study has been undertaken. Continual appraisal 
will be necessary to ensure that the government's outlays on ICDC 
bring measurable gains to the economy. Particular care must be taken 
to avoid hidden subsidies. It is better to provide a subsidy in !CDC's 
budget than to provide tax breaks or cheap utilities. 
The government's pol icy and infrastructu re framework 
To be a worthy contender in the search for foreign investment, a 
country needs to be able to offer a stable business environment that is 
transparent and simple in compliance. 
By concentrating on the promotion of value-added industries, everyone 
can win. 
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These two sentences are not taken from a standard primer on 
investment, they are from the Prime Minister 's foreword to the 1996 
edition of A Business Gu ide to Papua New Guinea (Papua New Guinea 
1996). They are deceptively plain words .  They actually embrace a 
multitude of complex considerations including the macroeconomic 
framework, governance, the tax regime, business regulations, property 
rights and labour agreements. 
In recent years, the government has set up the IPA SBDC and 
ICDC. It  has liberalised foreign exchange controls, begun replacing 
import quotas with tariffs and removed most price controls.  More 
fundamentally, though it has yet to deliver, it has made human 
resource development a priority, recognising the very poor standard of 
basic education of the work force and its weak skill levels. The IPA has 
begun to promote Papua New Guinea as a place for international 
investment. ICDC has opened the MIC. SBDC has started a range of 
small business development initiatives . The tax regime has been made 
more advantageous for business. 
The Investment Promotion Authority's Business Guide notes that the 
government is 
• broadening the tax base 
• strengthening physical infrastructure 
• maintaining public assets 
• reducing law-and-order problems 
• improving health and education standards 
• providing an attractive tax regime with low tariffs on 
business inputs 
• replacing quantitative restrictions by tariffs 
• removing price controls on domestically traded goods 
• applying a market-based, non-interventionist monetary 
policy 
• liberalising exchange control regulations to facilitate capital 
flows 
• deregulating the labour market and allowing wage setting 
flexibility 
• establishing a stock exchange and a securities market 
• privatising public corporations, so creating room for private 
business 
• improving investor security. 
This is an ambitious but sensible program, much of which is being 
implemented in the framework of the Economic Recovery Program. 
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What can Papua New Guinea offer the industrial entrepreneur? 
By reference to the IPA's literature, we can assemble the assets side of 
a qualitative balance sheet. Here, without qualification, is their list. 
• Political stability. The country is politically stable with a 
well-entrenched democratic system of government and set of 
institutions. 
• Positive attitude to foreign investment. The government 
recognises the importance of the private sector for 
development. 
• Investment incentives. Generous incentives are available. 
Impediments to development of new businesses are being 
removed. 
• Joint venture flexibility. The level of foreign ownership in 
joint ventures is left to mutual agreement between the 
investor and the local counterpart. 
• Preferential market access. Many products originating in 
Papua New Guinea are allowed duty-free or preferential 
entry into important markets. 
• No language barriers. English is widely spoken and understood. 
• Uncrowded business sector. There are many opportunities 
for profitable investments. 
• Resource-driven potential .  Large-scale mining and 
petroleum projects create flow-on in business opportunities. 
• Abundant natural renewable resources. Forest and marine 
resources present downstream manufacturing opportunities. 
• Agricultural opportunities. The climate favours agricultural 
activities and associated manufacturing activities. 
• Investment security. The government guarantees the security 
of foreign investment. 
• Macroeconomic policy setting. The government realises the 
importance of policies specifically aimed at improving the 
country's competitiveness. 
It is worth looking further at some of these points . Take first 
investment security. The government is fully aware of the risk 
perceptions of investors. It has undertaken to minimise risks 
(including expropriation, repudiation of contracts and discrimination) 
through the granting of most-favoured-nation treatment to investors. 
International agreements have been concluded with Germany, 
Malaysia, Australia and Belgium. Negotiations are being conducted 
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with others, including the United States. Papua New Guinea joined 
the World Bank's Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency in 1990 
demonstrating commitment to ensuring that, if  nationalisation did 
occur, the investor would be compensated. In addition, the Investment 
Promotion Act 1992 provides for protection against expropriation, 
cancellation of contracts and discrimination. But perceptions count 
and the government still has work to do. 
Consider next human resource development. Most factory personnel 
in Papua New Guinea require further skills training. ADB itself plans 
to finance a skills development project. The National Training Council 
(NTC) is the government organisation charged with administering 
training policy. Part of its brief is to develop and promote high standards 
of training and to coordinate and distribute information on training. 
One of the main NTC thrusts is on-the-job upgrading of skills; another 
is its trade testing and certification scheme. A major, long-term 
vocational training program is a joint initiative of the Papua New 
Guinea Council of Manufacturers and the Australian Chamber of 
Manufacturers. The governments of both countries are supporting this. 
Turning now to wages, we may first note the role of the Minimum 
Wages Board. The wage setting process in Papua New Guinea has 
changed substantially in recent years. In 1992 the Board abolished the 
setting of wages by automatic indexation of the minimum wage. It set 
a legal minimum rate of K23 per week (for unskilled adult workers) 
and introduced a minimum wage for youths aged 16 to 21 years. Youths 
were given special attention in order to address unemployment. The 
National Minimum Wage applies irrespective of location of employment. 
Typically urban wages are far higher than this. 
Next consider the regulatory guidelines. Foreign enterprises 
wishing to carry on business in Papua New Guinea must be certified 
by the IP A. There are three categories of business enterprises under the 
Investment Promotion Act-citizen, national and foreign. A citizen 
enterprise is one wholly owned by a citizen, a national enterprise is 
one more than 50 per cent-owned by a citizen and a foreign enterprise 
is one 50 per cent or more owned or controlled by non-citizens. Foreign 
investors usually establish a company. Before commencing business, a 
company has to register under the Companies Act. A foreign company 
registered in Papua New Guinea but incorporated in a foreign 
jurisdiction is still subject to the laws of Papua New Guinea. Registration 
requirements are standard in nearly all jurisdictions; whether this 
particular regime is onerous I leave others to comment on. 
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The tax regime appears regrettably complex. The worldwide income 
of resident companies and the Papua New Guinea-sourced income of 
non-residents are taxed. Investors have to contend with a dividend with­
holding tax, a sales tax, a training levy, a natural resources tax, export 
duties, an income reporting system, a management fee (withholding) 
tax, a foreign contractor (withholding) tax, land tax, stamp duties and 
import duties. The virtues of a simple, even if somewhat regressive, 
tax system for developing countries with limited administrative depth 
I need not extol. 
Tariff reforms will take place over the next three years. Until the 
introduction of a value-added tax in the near future, reforms emphasise 
the duty drawback system for exporters. There will be phased reductions in 
tariffs from 11 per cent to 8 per cent in 1 996 and 5 per cent in 1997 for a 
range of business inputs. The 40 per cent protective rate for viable infant 
industries is being maintained and there is a move too from non-tariff 
protection to the 40 per cent rate. Liberalising the border regime is a key 
commitment under the government's Structural Adjustment Program. 
Next, let us look at incentives. To promote the development of new 
industries outside of the minerals sector, the government offers 
investment inducements. Most are in the form of exemptions from 
company income tax or deferment of income tax liabilities. There is a 
long list of schemes relating to export income exemption, development 
cost allowances, pioneer industry exemptions, wage subsidies, initial­
year accelerated depreciation, industrial plant depreciation, rural 
development benefit, Bougainville incentive, Rabaul incentive, primary 
production investment deduction, staff training deduction, solar 
heating incentive, interest income incentive, import duty drawback, 
project start-up assistance, capital equipment import duty rel ief, etc. 
While each scheme has some merit, one suspects there are overlaps 
and contradictions. Rationalisation seems called for. 
Finally, mention may be made of a good recent innovation. The 
industry sector has established a close working relationship with the 
government. A strong representative body exists in the Papua New 
Guinea Chamber of Manufacturers and there is regular consultation 
between its members and government departments and statutory bodies. 
Constrai nts to industrial development 
Now we need to catalogue the l iabilities side of the qualitative balance 
sheet. Fundamentally, Papua New Guinea is a high-cost producer with 
wages far higher than those in competing countries. Because of the high 
1 08 I Papua New Guinea: a 20120 vision 
wages for unskilled labour, industrial development is capital intensive. 
The local market is small and fragmented with a maximum of 15 per 
cent of the nation's population located in any one province. Business 
operating costs (for example, electricity-' wages, factory space, transport) 
are among the world's highest. There are difficulties in acquiring 
registered land and high costs for available real estate. Law-and-order 
problems deter new investment; crime and the threat of violence add 
to both direct and indirect costs . Despite the recent devaluation, the 
strong exchange rate makes local manufacturers uncompetitive. The 
policy framework, though improving, still constrains wage adjustment. 
There is a dearth of technical and managerial skills. Heavy dependence 
on expatriate ownership and management can lead to unfavourable 
attitudes towards foreign investment. And approval procedures for 
new investments are still slow and somewhat cumbersome. These 
liabilities should form a checklist for action for policymakers. In the 
short term, the objective should be to minimise their impact. In the 
long term, the objective should be to transform liabilities into assets. 
I have already elaborated on some of these constraints. Let me 
mention two more . There can be little doubt that gaining and retaining 
access to land is a really fundamental constraint to industrial develop­
ment. Legitimate land ownership and the right to exploit most natural 
resources are vested with the people of Papua New Guinea. Ownership 
is mainly governed by traditional law. About 3 per cent of the land in 
Papua New Guinea, or about 600,000 hectares, is outside of this system 
and this is almost entirely owned by the government. Most alienated 
land is in urban areas. Only 300,000 hectares of alienated land is 
freehold and 60,000 hectares is used for public purposes. About 
200,000 hectares is leased to the private sector. No foreign investor or 
non-citizen is allowed to own freehold land. Leasehold land for 
specified purposes available for long-term tenure (usually 99 years) .  
Financing investment is another problem. Fundraising in Papua 
New Guinea is limited by the small domestic market. While some 
finance is available from the banking system, overseas investors are 
unlikely to secure substantial funds locally. A new operation would 
normally need to bring funds from overseas to establish a project, in 
which case the central bank generally requires a debt to equity ratio of 5:1 .  
Prospects for industrial isation 
Papua New Guinea has many assets on which to build.  There is a 
relatively stable macroeconomic framework with some certainty 
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Papua New Guinea's balance sheet 
Assets 
• Market-oriented gove rnment pol icies 
• M i neral and oi l  deposits which contrib ute su bstantial tax 
revenue 
• Rich soi l  and h igh ly favo u rable c l i matic conditions for 
ag ricultu ral activities 
• Abu ndant t imbe r  and fishery resou rces 
• U nuti l ised land avai lable for development but constrai ned by 
complex customary land ten u re systems 
• Nearness to some of the world's fastest g rowing economies 
• U nderuti l ised labour  force 
Liabilities 
• H igh operating costs (for examp le ,  electricity, telephone , 
factory space , transport) 
• Difficu lties in acq u i ring registe red land 
• Strong exch ange rate 
• H i gh wag e costs 
• Dearth of techn ical and managerial ski l ls  
• Smal l ,  frag mented dom estic market 
• Com place ncy about developing non-reso u rce sectors 
• Heavy dependence on expatriate ownership and 
management 
• Law and order problems 
• Cumbe rsome and d iscretionary approval process for new 
investments 
• U ncoord inated system of i ncentives 
regarding taxes and exchange rates. Government policies are market­
oriented, providing a generally flat playing field for the private sector 
with few state-owned enterprises. Papua New Guinea is rich in natural 
resources. The land and climate are highly favourable for agriculture .  
Papua New Guinea i s  close to some of the world's fastest growing 
economies. The urban work force is underutilised. Such assets need to 
be emphasised as a source of competitive advantage. 
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Although Papua New Guinea has an excellent resource base, 
medium-term prospects for industrial development must nevertheless 
be regarded as limited. Despite the efforts to date, little progress is likely 
to be made until the government manages to more comprehensively 
address and overcome some of the substantial constraints to perform­
ance of the industrial sector alluded to here. The sector accounts for 
only a small part of overall production and employment. It is dominated 
by capital-intensive larger enterprises. In my view, it has only limited 
potential to absorb labour in the current decade. It can and should 
grow, but it is unlikely ever to become the driving force in the economy. 
But there is scope for further industrial development through 
import substitution, exploitation of market niches and through exports 
based upon natural resources. In the short term the main potential 
appears to be in downstream processing and packaging of primary 
agricultural products. Coffee, cocoa, coconut, oil palm and rubber are 
all crops which grow well in Papua New Guinea and offer potential 
for commodity-related manufacturing activity. Perhaps the best such 
potential, however, lies in the processing of Papua New Guinea's rich 
fisheries and forestry resources. The processing of tuna is an obvious 
example. Another is the manufacture of furniture taking advantage 
not only of the availability of high-quality hardwood but also of the 
indigenous skills in carving. The government should continue to strive 
to develop Papua New Guinea's industrial base in areas where Papua 
New Guinea may have a competitive position. 
Small-scale manufacturing offers some limited potential for labour 
absorption. The creation and expansion of small enterprises in the 
manufacturing sector will require support programs, including better 
access to micro-credit and small loans from non-bank mutual loan 
funds and business skills training and planning advice. For existing 
larger manufacturing enterprises to provide any more jobs they will 
have to become more cost-competitive. Devaluation may have helped 
a little but most need to improve productivity substantially before 
they could compete internationally. 
Improving the outlook for ind ustrial  development 
Effective and achievable industrial development may require new 
policy and institutional approaches. It would require also shifts in 
attitude both in the government and private manufacturers. Changes 
are needed in four basic areas 
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• improvements in basic infrastructure 
• strengthening of the enabling policy environment for 
industrial growth led by the private sector 
• reductions in the prices of land, labour, electricity and 
communications 
• strengthening the institutional framework to support 
industrial development 
Manufacturing needs the same framework for success as other 
private sector activity and these areas are essentially those envisaged 
under the Structural Adjustment Program. 
Lessons for Papua New G u i nea 
Successful industrialising countries such as Korea and the Asian ' tigers', 
Malaysia and the Dominican Republic are useful models for Papua New 
Guinea. Adoption of best practices from these countries (adjusted to 
local conditions) can result in improved manufacturing performance 
in Papua New Guinea. The key ingredients of their success serve as a 
useful checklist. Although different regimes and strategies have been 
applied, a number of policy attributes and institutional approaches are 
common. 
• Initial emphasis was placed on import substitution. When 
local markets were largely satisfied by local industry, they 
turned to manufacturing for export. They eventually relied 
on export-fuelled growth to drive their manufacturing 
sectors. 
• They maintained a competitive real effective exchange rate. 
They initially entered export markets with competitive wages. 
• Much of the initial export focus was on labour-intensive 
products. As labour rates rose, they shifted to higher 
technology, more capital-intensive industries. 
• Industrial estates and other specialised infrastructure were 
important incentive measures. 
• Foreign direct investment played a key catalytic role. 
• In the development of institutions for export promotion 
there was close coordination between the public and private 
sectors. These institutions were critical in implementing 
export policy and administration and in engaging the 
interest of local manufacturers in export production. 
• They provided a virtual free trade environment for exporters. 
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• Export credit guarantee and insurance schemes provided 
exporters with effective access to pre-shipment and post­
shipment export working capital credit at preferential rates 
and conditions. 
• Exporters were provided with tax incentives as well as duty­
free access to imported inputs. 
• Support and technical assistance activities, including direct 
export I investment promotion programs, assistance in quality 
control, product design, training and other related programs. 
Whether this plethora of support to manufacturing would survive 
rigorous cost-benefit analysis, I will leave to others to assess. The fact 
is that is what was done . 
What can donors do to help? 
Donors can first and foremost emphasise the benefits that can flow from 
consistent public policies and reliable behaviour on the part of govern­
ment. In some respects the policy regime is less important than the 
stability and predicability of its implementation. Donors can in 
particular foster industrial development by providing support to 
agencies involved in policy development, program implementation 
and training. There is a need for donor-supported training in a wide 
range of work-force skills. It can be useful too for donors to provide 
financial support in limited circumstances, for example, the encourage­
ment of local entrepreneurship, the procurement of technical assistance 
for policy development, legal drafting, marketing, promotion, and so on. 
There is a good case in Papua New Guinea for donor support for 
the development of the private sector. The job creation challenge is 
massive . Each year thousands of micro-enterprises need to be created. 
Many of these have to be encouraged to participate in the formal 
economy. Likewise small enterprises need to be helped to develop 
managerial and technical capabilities. Assisting the development of the 
private sector is creating new challenges for donors. New approaches 
are needed in the design and implementation of programs. 
This means ongoing dialogue on measures to reinforce the big 
messages: liberalise the economy, improve the efficiency of the public 
sector and foster private initiative and risk taking. It means project and 
program intervention to support enterprise development, privatisation, 
export promotion and financial sector reform. It entails technical 
assistance to develop business vocational skills, investment promotion 
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activities and related professional services. And finally it requires 
institutional strengthening in policy formulation and implementation. 
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Sectora l deve lopment issues 

Mining and petroleum 
R .  B .  Moaina 
The mining and petroleum industry is currently the most significant 
contributor to Papua New Guinea' s economy. The mining industry has 
a relatively short history due to the relatively recent geographical 
exploration of the country. Gold was first discovered on Sudest Island 
in 1880 and since this time mining has been an integral part of the 
economy. The early discoveries led to an ongoing exploration and 
development effort for both mineral and petroleum resources which 
continues to the present day. Initially, attention was focused on alluvial 
and high-grade hard rock gold targets on a small scale and the first 
major investment in mining came with the development of alluvial gold 
dredging operations at Wau and Bulolo in the 1930s. Apart from a short 
break during the World War II the dredging operations continued until 
1965 when they closed down due to a combination of depressed gold 
prices and exhaustion of the available resources. 
The first major hard rock discovery to be developed was the Panguna 
copper deposit on Bougainville Island. It was first discovered in 1964 
during a worldwide exploration effort targeted at the identification of 
copper resources. This period saw not only the discovery of Panguna 
but also the Ok Tedi, Frieda River and Yanderra copper deposits. With 
the development of the Bougainville copper mine in 1972 Papua New 
Guinea entered an era of large-scale hard rock metalliferous mining. The 
development of the Ok Tedi copper mine and the Misima and Porgera 
gold mines have resulted in a further extension of both the scale and 
scope of mining operations in Papua New Guinea . 
Parallelling the exploration for mineral resources has been the search 
for oil and gas. This has progressed sporadically since the early 1 900s 
with the majority of exploration focused in the Gulf, Sepik and Western 
and Southern Highlands provinces. The first oil seeps were discovered 
at the mouth of the Vailala River in 1911 .  These exploration efforts 
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have resulted in the discovery of several oil and gas accumulations 
culminating in the recent developments of both the Kutubu oil export 
project and the Hides gas project. The Gobe project is also on the verge 
of development. Large resources of gas and condensate have also been 
discovered in a number of fields throughout Gulf, Southern Highlands 
and Western provinces. These are currently the subject of a review for 
the possible future development of a Liquefied Natural Gas industry 
and for export of gas to Australia. 
The contribution of the mining and petroleum industry to the 
economy is significant and multi-faceted .  The government receives 
significant taxation, royalty, duty and dividend revenues from the 
industry. Mineral and petroleum exports account for the vast majority 
of total exports and therefore the majority of foreign exchange earnings. 
Employment is generated both directly by mining companies and also 
indirectly through service companies . The non-mining private sector 
also benefits from spin-off business activity. The industry has significantly 
contributed to infrastructure development in areas of otherwise track­
less jungle and the early exploration of many of the remote areas of 
Papua New Guinea has to a large extent been fuelled by the search for 
minerals and oil . 
In addition to the mineral deposits and petroleum accumulations 
currently being exploited there are a number of other identified resources 
which are l ikely to be developed at some time in the future. The 
contribution currently made by the mining and petroleum industry to 
Papua New Guinea's economy is likely to continue well into the future. 
The industry today 
The mining and petroleum industry in Papua New Guinea revolves 
around a small number of large projects. There are three large-scale 
mines in production-Ok Tedi, Porgera and Misima-as well as one 
mine with operations suspended at Bougainville and one major mine 
under development at Lihir. Production rates are large by world 
standards. Ok Tedi is the eighth largest copper producer in the world 
and Porgera rates in the top five gold producers in the world.  At the 
time of its closure Bougainville Copper also rated in the top five copper 
mines in the world. Misima mine is currently the smallest of Papua 
New Guinea's major developments and produces 300,000 ounces of 
gold per year, comparable with Australia's larger gold producers. In 
the last year two smaller-scale gold mines also came into production. 
These are the Tolukuma Mine in Central Province (50,000 ounces per 
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Table 7.1 . World gold mine production, 1 991-94 (tonnes) 
1991 1992 1993 1994 
South Africa 601.1 61 4.1 619.5 583.9 
USA 296.0 329.1 336.0 331.0 
Australia 236.2 243.5 247.2 256.2 
Commonwealth of 
I ndependent States 252.0 237.0 175.5 164.7 
Canada 176.5 160.4 150.9 146.1 
China 110.0 11 8.0 127.0 130.0 
Brazi l  78.6 76.5 75.7 75.4 
Uzbekistan 66.6 64.4 
Papua New Guinea 60.8 71.2 61.8 60.6 
I ndonesia 18.4 40.4 46.3 55.3 
All Others 338.4 360.8 402.5 428.4 
Total 2168 2251 2309 2296 
Source: Gold Fields M ineral Services Ltd 1 995 
year) and the Wapolu Mine in Milne Bay Province (34,000 ounces per 
year). 
Gold production from all Papua New Guinea mines averages close 
to 60 tonnes per year and copper over 200 ,OOO tonnes per year. This 
places Papua New Guinea as the ninth largest gold producer in the 
world .  If the Bougainville copper mine was still in production gold 
credits from that operation (15 tonnes per year) would place Papua New 
Guinea seventh in the world (Table 7. 1 ). Commencement of production 
from Lihir in 1997 at 21-31 tonnes per year should also push Papua 
New Guinea into seventh place above Brazil .  Combined production 
from all l ikely sources in the next 10 years could result in production 
rates in excess of 90 tonnes per year. 
There are two petroleum developments in production-the Kutubu 
Oil Project and the Hides Gas Project. Oil production averages at 
100,000 barrels of oil per day and Hides produces 15 million cubic feet 
of gas per day. 
The m i nes 
Ok Tedi 
Ok Tedi mine is a large porphyry copper deposit in a very remote area 
of the Star Mountains of the Western Province of Papua New Guinea, 
some 18 kilometres east of the Irian J aya border. The mine is at an 
altitude of 2000 metres in an area of high rainfall (between 8.5 and 
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10.5m per year). Ok Tedi produces approximately 210,000 tonnes of 
copper and 450,000 ounces of gold per year in concentrate. The value of 
production in 1995 exceeded K950 million (US$765 million) contributing 
close to 30 per cent of total Papua New Guinea export earnings. 
Mine production rates total around 85,000 tonnes of ore and 110,000 
tonnes of waste per day. Grades average 0.7 per cent Cu and 0.6 g/ t Au. 
Reserves at the end of 1994 stood at 459.4 Mt at 0.72 per cent Cu and 
0.7 g / t Au.  
Porgera 
The Porgera gold mine lies in Enga Province in the Highlands of Papua 
New Guinea. The mine commenced production as an underground 
mine and has subsequently developed an open pit. Currently ore is 
derived from both open pit and underground operations. The under­
ground mine is scheduled to cease operations in the second quarter of 
1 998 with the open pit currently scheduled to complete mining in 2005 . 
Gold production will continue until at least 2007 from low grade 
stockpiles. The mine has produced over 6 million ounces of gold since 
commissioning in 1990 with a peak annual production in 1992 of 46.2 
tonnes (1 .48 million ounces). Production rates for the remainder of the 
mines life are expected to be in the range 650,000 to 900,000 ounces per 
year. Gold production is from a refractory gold ore body where gold is 
locked away within pyrite grains. The gold recovery circuit includes 
flotation of sulphide ore minerals followed by pressure oxidation 
leaching and conventional CIP gold extraction. Ore reserves as at June 
1 995 were 65.4 Mt grading 4.5 g / t  Au . 
Misima 
Misima mine is located on Misima Island in the Milne Bay Province in 
eastern Papua New Guinea. The mine is an open pit gold mine 
producing 330,000 ounces of gold per year. The mine commenced 
operations in 1989 and has, to date, produced over 2.2 million ounces. 
The mine works a low grade ore body but is able to maintain low 
operating costs due to its strategic location adjacent to the coast. Gold 
and silver production are from a conventional CIP gold plant. Reserves 
as at December 1994 stood at 35 .6 Mt at 1 . 1  g /  t Au and 9.7 g /  t Ag. 
Lihir 
The Lihir mine is currently under construction on Lihir Island in New 
Ireland Province, 590 kilometres northeast of the Papua New Guinea 
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mainland . Gold production is scheduled to commence in July 1997 with 
completion of the mine expected in December 1997. Gold production 
will initially be from oxide ore but will rapidly change to the refractory 
sulphide resource requiring whole ore pressure oxidation to liberate 
the gold. Production rates are expected to average over 600,000 ounces 
of gold per year for the first 12 years. Total life of the project is expected 
to be close to forty years. Ore reserves are 1 04 Mt grading 4.4 g I t  with 
contained gold totalling in excess of 14.6 million ounces. 
The Lihir project presents the developers with some unique 
challenges, with the reserve lying within an active geothermal area and 
immediately adjacent to the ocean. Rock temperatures in some of the 
ore exceed 100 degrees Celsius. 
Bougainvi l le Copper Mine 
The Bougainville Copper Project commenced operations in 1972 and 
was producing at a rate of 1 66,000 tonnes of copper 450,000 ounces of 
gold per year when it forced to close in 1989 after an armed rebellion 
by secessionists wanting independence from Papua New Guinea . This 
is as yet unresolved. Over its operating life it produced 3 million tonnes 
of copper and 305 tonnes (9.7 million ounces) of gold in concentrate. 
Remaining ore reserves stand at 691 Mt at 0.4 per cent Cu and 0.47 g/ t 
Au. Estimated costs of restarting the operation range from US$400-
600 million. 
Tolukuma 
The Tolukuma resource was discovered in 1986 by Newmont Exploration 
and ultimately developed by Dome Resources in 1995 with first gold 
production in December 1995. The mine lies in the Central Province 
100 kilometres north of Port Moresby in the Owen Stanley Mountains. 
Production is 50,000 to 60,000 ounces of gold per year initially from an 
open pit operation. Later in the mine life the mine will go underground 
and the open pit will cease operations. 
The mine life is estimated at 5 years although significant potential 
exists to extend this life by exploration of other known gold occurrences 
in the vicinity of the mine. Ore reserves stand at 430,000 tonnes at 18.2 
g / t  Au and 77 g / t  Ag (Silver 1994, MACMIN 1994). 
Wapol u 
Wapolu Mine lies on the north coast of Fergusson Island in Milne Bay 
Province . The resource was d iscovered in 1985 and finally developed 
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in 1995 with full production expected in the fourth quarter of 1996. 
Production is planned to be at a rate of 34,000 ounces per year (Murdoch 
1994). Ore reserves stand at 1 .6 Mt grading 2.4 g /  t Au. 
Mt Si newit (Wild Dog) 
The Mt Sinewit mine lies in East New Britain Province some 75 km 
from Rabaul .  This is a small-scale open pit mine and is expected to 
produce 10,000 ounces of gold per year. This mine is currently under 
development with production expected in the third quarter of 1997. 
Kutubu 
The Kutubu Oil Project was the first large-scale oil development in 
Papua New Guinea commissioned in 1992. Production rates have been 
sustained at rates of over 100,000 barrels per day since commissioning. 
Production flows have begun to attenuate from the field and total 
production is expected to fall away progressively over its remaining life. 
The value of exported production in 1995 reached over K827 million. 
Hides Gas 
The Hides Gas Project is a small project specific gas development for a 
gas fired power station providing electricity to the Porgera Gold Project. 
Production rates are small at 15 million cubic feet per day, sufficient to 
fuel a 20 megawatt gas turbine power station. 
Contri bution to the national economy 
The mining and petroleum industry in Papua New Guinea has played 
a pivotal role in the development of the economy, and will continue to 
do so. Since the 1880s mining and exploration efforts have led to the 
establishment of basic contact and infrastructure development in many 
remote areas. With the development of larger-scale operations this 
contribution to the economy has dramatically increased. Mining and 
petroleum have today emerged as the primary contributors to GDP and 
exports. According to the Bank of Papua New Guinea and the National 
Statistics Office, mineral and petroleum exports accounted for 71 .6 per 
cent of total exports in 1995 and was the single largest contributor to 
GDP in 1991 (21 .2 per cent). These percentages are expected to increase 
with the commencement of gold production from Lihir, and oil 
production from the Gobe Oil Project. 
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Table 7.2. Sectoral contributions to economic activity (per cent) 
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Between 1985 and 1995 there has been a doubling in the value of both 
gold and copper production (Table 7.3). Copper production reached its 
first peak in 1988 when Ok Tedi and Bougainville were in simultaneous 
production, only to fall in 1989 with the closure of the Bougainville 
mine. The high export value in 1995 resulted from a combination of 
high copper prices and devaluation of the kina. The general upward 
trend in both gold and copper production is expected for at least the 
next 10 years as new mines are developed. The commencement of oil 
exports in 1992 significantly boosted export figures for 1992 to 1995. 
The contribution of mineral and petroleum products to total exports 
has increased from 53 per cent of total exports in 1985 to around 72 per 
cent in 1995 (Table 7.4, Figure 7. 1 ) . 
Investment in the mining and petroleum industry 
The mining and petroleum industry in Papua New Guinea is highly 
capital intensive with current investments totalling approximately 
K5,680 million (including Bougainville). Of this total, the majority 
(approximately 80 per cent) is foreign capital .  The Papua New Guinea 
Government stake in this capital, through its ownership of shares in 
mining operations, amounts to some K900 million (at cost), including 
the total value of investment in the operations including essential 
infrastructure constructed specifically for the operations. With the 
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Table 7.3. Mineral exports by value, 1 985-95 (mi l l ion kina f.o.b.) 
Copper Gold Si lver Crude Oi l  Total 
minerals 
1985 164.2 318.8 6.9 489.9 
1986 156.0 398.5 6.7 561.2 
1987 281.9 422.9 10.1 714.9 
1988 446.9 405.1 9.5 861.5 
1989 344.9 316.9 14.3 676.1 
1990 349.2 393.2 15.1 757.5 
1991 323.8 666.9 14.6 1005.3 
1992 313.5 745.9 10.7 301.4 1371.5 
1993 256.3 681.6 12.1 817.8 1767.8 
1994 367.4 702.3 10.3 702.7 1782.7 
1995 754.5 840.1 13.1 827.7 2435.4 
Source: Bank of Papua New Guinea and National Stat istics Office. 
completion of the Lihir Mine the total capital investment in the minerals 
sector is expected to be close to K6,400 million. 
In contrast to this high intensity of capital investment, the industry 
has a low labour intensity. A survey undertaken by the PNG Chamber 
of Mines and Petroleum in 1992 showed some 10,000 people were 
directly employed in the mining and petroleum sector in 1992-
approximately 3.9 per cent of the total work force in formal employ-
Table 7.4. Total exports by value, 1 985-95 (mi l l ion kina f .o.b.) 
Total Ag riculture Forest Marine Other Total Mineral 
minerals products products exports share 
(per cent) 
1985 489.9 330.2 67.3 12.1 26.7 926.2 52.9 
1986 561.2 331.9 74.7 7.9 25.1 1000.8 56.1 
1987 714.9 268.9 110.9 11.0 17.5 1123.2 63.6 
1988 861.5 255.2 97.5 7.5 34.4 1256.1 68.6 
1989 676.1 270.1 96.2 8.1 61.1 1111.6 60.8 
1990 757.5 204.6 79.6 8.2 72.5 1122.4 67.5 
1991 1005.3 180.9 90.2 10.4 80.0 1 390.5 72.3 
1992 1371.5 203.1 148 .2 9.3 110.0 1862.6 73.6 
1993 1767.8 270.1 410.4 7.8 71.2 2527.3 69.9 
1994 1782.7 374.6 494.4 10.3 0 2662.0 67.0 
1995 2435.4 498.0 449.7 16.7 0 3399.8 71.6 
Source: B ank of Papua New Guinea and National Stat istics Office. 
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Figure 7.1 . Exports by commodity group, 1 985-95 3500 3000 
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Source: Bank of Papua New Guinea and National Statistics Office. 
ment. This is nearly double the official 1990 figures which were 
compiled following the closure of the Bougainville Copper Mine 
(Table 7.2) .  This amounts to an investment of close to K450,000 per job 
created directly in the mining industry (PNG Chamber of Mines 1993). 
Exploration expenditure in the economy 
During the period 1 988 to 1990 exploration expenditures reached a 
peak of K281 million per year, and averaged K225 million per year. 
Since this time exploration expenditures have progressively fallen due 
to both the global recession and a loss of investor confidence in the 
economic and political stability of Papua New Guinea. The drastic 
decline in mineral exploration expenditures to approximately K36 .2 
million per year in 1995 and an expected K25 million in 1996 has been 
a significant loss to the economy. Petroleum exploration continues at a 
high level, in part fuelled by the recent successes and a clarification of 
Papua New Guinea's new gas policy. 
Exploration is essential to the future well-being of the economy. 
Without exploration there can be no new discoveries and the mining 
and petroleum industry would be a short to medium-term industry. 
The time period from discovery to production is variable but often 
quite long. From discovery to the commencement of production at 
Panguna was 8 years which, for a mine of that scale, is very short. By 
contrast Ok Tedi was discovered in 1968 and did not reach development 
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until 1984. Likewise the Frieda River deposit was discovered in 1967 
and has still yet to be developed . This long gestation period suggests 
that the mineral and petroleum projects of the next decade should be 
in the process of discovery now. 
The immediate future 
Papua New Guinea is still considered to be under-explored and highly 
prospective for the discovery of both mineral deposits and petroleum 
accumulations (McNeil 1994). There are a significant number of deposits 
which have already been discovered but not yet developed (Table 7.5). 
These include both large and small-scale deposits which are likely to be 
exploited in the years to come as infrastructure development and 
commodity values enhance their economic viability. The following is 
an outline of some of these potential future developments. 
Frieda/Nena copper deposit 
The Frieda River copper deposit was discovered in 1967. It was 
subsequently drilled identifying resources of over 886 million tonnes 
grading 0.56 per cent copper and 0.3lg /  t gold spread over three distinct 
mineralised zones. Within this total resource is a high grade zone called 
the Nena deposit which on last published estimates contains a copper 
resource of 51 million tonnes at 2.2 per cent copper and 0.6g I t  gold 
(Highlands Gold Ltd 1996). In addition there is a surficial oxidised gold 
resource at Nena totalling 18 million tonnes at l .4g / t  gold. The deposit 
is currently undergoing rigorous metallurgical, infrastructure, environ­
mental and economic studies. Commencement of construction may 
begin in 1998 or 1999 with initial production unlikely before 2002. 
Production is expected at a rate of between 160,000 and 220,000 tonnes 
of copper and 225,000 to 365,000 ounces of gold per year from the 
combined Nena and Frieda resources over a mine life of up to 30 years. 
Capital costs are expected to be in the range of US$1 .2 to US$1 .6 billion. 
Ramu Nickel 
The Ramu nickel cobalt resource was initially discovered in the early 
1960s. At that time it was found to be uneconomic due to technical and 
metallurgical difficulties and its remote location (Nord Pacific Ltd 1996). 
Recent metallurgical advances have made the deposit once again 
potentially viable. A total resource of approximately 162 million tonnes 
containing 1 .4 million tonnes of nickel and 14,000 tonnes of cobalt has 
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Table 7.5. Current and future mineral production estimatesa 
Commodity Rate Value Start Mine l i fe 
(mi l l ion year (years) 
kina/year) 
Currently producing m ines 
Porgera Gold (ounces) 900,000 450 1989 18 
Ok Tedi Copper (t) 210,000 460 1984 25 
Gold (ounces) 365,000 180 
Misima Gold (ounces) 300,000 150 1988 14 
Tolukuma Gold (ounces) 50,000 25 1995 5 
Wapolu  Gold (ounces) 34,000 17 1996 5 
All uvial gold Gold (ounces) 60-100,000 35-50 1880 
Currently developing m ines 
Lih i r  Go ld  (ounces) 600,000 300 1997 40 
Future developments 
H idden Val ley 
Upper Watut Gold (ounces) 200,000 100 2000 10-15 
Nena Frieda Copper (t) 160-220, OOO 350 2002 12 
Gold (ounces) 225-375,000 110 
Ramu Nickel (t) 33,000 325 2001 10-12 
Cobalt (t) 2,800 65 
Wafi Copper (t) 100,000 220 2002 20 
Gold (ounces) 200,000 100 
Simberi Gold (ounces) 30,000 15 1997 5 
Wood lark Gold (ounces) 50,000 25 1998 7 
Laloki Copper (t) 4000 8 2000 4 
Zinc (t) 1300 1.5 
Gold (ounces) 15,000 7 
Possible futu re restoration 
Bougainvi l le  Copper (t) 160,000 350 2000 12 
Gold (ounces) 350,000 175 
a These are estimates only and may not reflect current company policy. 
Note : Price assumpt ions: Gold = K500 /ounces Copper = K2200 I tonne. 
Source: Papua New Guinea Department of Min ing and Petroleum. 
been identified. Recent exploration activities have focused on better 
defining the higher grade areas of the resource as well as progressing 
metallurgical and infrastructure studies. Based on recently completed 
prefeasibility study results this mine could be in production by the 
year 2001 at estimated production rates of 33,000 tonnes of nickel and 
2,800 tonnes of cobalt per year. Capital costs for the project have been 
estimated at around US$750 million. 
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Upper Watut Val ley gold deposits 
The upper Watut valley in the Wau area of Morobe Province contains 
several gold deposits including Hidden Valley held by CRA Exploration, 
Hamata, and Kerimenge held by RGC Exploration. These three deposits 
lie in relatively close proximity. Exploration and feasibility studies to 
date have concluded that in isolation, each of the three deposits may 
not be economically viable . There is potential however that the three 
deposits combined may be large enough and of sufficient grade to 
support development. It is possible that development of one or all of 
these resources could occur before the end of the century at a production 
level of between 100,000 and 200,000 ounces per year. 
Wafi Copper I Gold Deposit 
The Wafi deposit was initially explored as a gold prospect and later 
became recognised as a significant copper resource. The deposit is still 
in the early stages of exploration. The resource is a disseminated 
porphyry copper style deposit with gold credits being present in both 
the copper resource and separately within adjacent epithermal vein 
systems. The total resource and its grade are as yet undefined and 
production is unlikely before the end of this century. Recent exploration 
has focused on better identifying the surficial gold resource. 
Small to med iu m-scale future mines 
Other mines likely to start production at rates of 50,000 ounces per year 
or less are the Simberi deposit in the Tabar Islands group adjacent to 
Lihir held by Nord Pacific Ltd, a gold deposit on Woodlark Island, and 
the Bilimoia prospect near Kainantu. 
In addition to the gold mines is a small-scale copper, zinc and gold 
mine proposal at Laloki, near Port Moresby. Exploration, metallurgical 
and economic studies are under way to determine its viability. If feasible 
this operation could be producing up to 4,000 tonnes of copper, 1,300 
tonnes of zinc, 1 5,000 ounces of gold and 60,000 ounces of silver per 
year for a period of four to five years. 
Small-scale alluvial miners also make a significant contribution to 
the economy. Current production rates are in excess of  50,000 ounces 
( 1 .6 tonnes) per year, valued at over K20 million. The majority of this 
revenue directly enters the village-level economy and is the main source 
of cash for many rural communities. In addition to hand-held mining 
methods are a number of new mechanised alluvial mining systems 
which are likely to significantly boost production and perhaps double 
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it over the next decade. Each of these small-scale mechanised operations 
can produce from 25 to 100 kilograms of gold per year. 
Oil  and Gas Prospects 
Oil prospects 
Future oil and gas projects include the Gobe Project scheduled for 
production by the end of 1997 at a rate of 50,000 barrels of oil per day 
utilising the existing Kutubu pipeline and Kumul oil export terminal 
(Table 7.6). 
The recent discovery known as the Moran Field also appears likely 
to be developed in the near future, although at this stage it is not 
sufficiently delineated to estimate total reserves or possible production 
rates. Strong indications of liquid hydrocarbons have also been 
identified on the Paua structure, adjacent to the Moran discovery. 
LNG 
The potential for gas development is great with total identified resources 
estimated to total in the order of 15 TCF spread over several distinct 
fields. This quantity of gas is sufficient to support at least two LNG 
projects. The remote location of many of the gas fields and their isolation 
from one another may be factors which could delay development of 
Table 7.6. Oi l  and gas developments and prospects 
Commod ity Production Value 
rate per year (mi l l ion kina 
per year) 
Kutubu Oi l  40 mil l ion barrelsa 1 000 
SE Gobe Oi l  1 8.5  mil l ion barrels 490 
Hides Natural Gas 5,500 mil l ion standard 1 1  
cubic feet 
Moran Oil  
Kutubu and Pandora Gas to Old 54.7-73 bi l l ion 1 80-240 
standard cubic feet 
Combined Gas LNG 4.5 MM t /yr 81 5-840 
a These are estimates only and may not reflect current company policy. 
Note: Price assumptions: Oi l  = U S$20 per barrel 
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these resources. Pre-feasibility studies into the establishment of a single 
train LNG production facility to produce 4.5 million tonnes of LNG per 
year are being carried out. Capital costs for such a facility could be in 
the order of US$5 billion (K6.7 billion).  
Gas to Queensland 
Another project under consideration at present is a proposal to establish 
a pipeline to North Queensland to supply gas for electricity generation 
and for major mineral projects. The project would require a market of 
150 to 200 million cubic feet of gas per day to be viable. The proposal 
is for gas from the Kutubu field to be piped to Queensland with gas 
from the offshore Pandora Field at a capital cost of around Kl .2 billion. 
Through utilisation of the gas the recovery of oil from the Kutubu 
project oilfields would also be enhanced. 
Undiscovered resources 
Papua New Guinea is considered to be geologically highly prospective 
for new mineral and petroleum discoveries. Its geological setting on the 
'Pacific Ring of Fire' make it highly favourable for further discoveries 
of large-scale porphyry copper and epithermal gold deposits (PNG 
Chamber of Mines and Petroleum 1993 ) .  The large area of folded 
sedimentary strata in the southern part of the country is also highly 
prospective for further petroleum discoveries. It remains relatively 
unexplored compared to Australia and holds promise of more 
discoveries in the future. The major limiting factor to future discoveries 
remain the difficult logistics of working in remote and rugged country 
as well as difficulties with land access resulting from the customary 
land tenure system. 
Potential future contri butions from m i n i ng and petroleum 
With production from currently operating mines and expected 
production from new mines in the medium term, some preliminary 
estimates of the future value of mineral production can be made. 
Gold 
Gold production is expected to increase significantly over the next 
decade with new production coming from the Lihir gold mine and 
from a number of small to medium-scale mines such as Tolukuma, 
Wapolu, Woodlark and Simberi . Production from these new mines will 
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more than offset the expected slight decline in gold production from 
Porgera over the next five years and the closure of Misima mine 
around 2002. In addition to these mines, production of gold as a by­
product of copper mining from the Nena / Frieda deposit is also 
expected to contribute to gold exports . A possible production schedule 
is presented in Figure 7.2. 
The Wafi copper gold prospect also has potential for development 
as a gold resource. The gold zones of the deposit are currently the focus 
of exploration efforts. There is potential to define a resource in excess 
of 60Mt at 2g / t  Au. Such a resource could sustain production at a rate 
of 375,000 ounces per year for 10 years. 
A large unknown with respect to future gold production levels is 
whether operations are re-established at the suspended Panguna mine 
on Bougainville Island. Bougainville Copper Ltd was not only a major 
copper producer but also exported a large quantity of gold each year in 
the copper concentrate. The average gold production from Bougainville 
Copper Ltd over the last five years of operations was close to 15 tonnes 
per year (Bougainville Copper Ltd 1993). 
The small-scale alluvial gold mining sector is also set to make 
significant contributions to gold production from both hand and 
mechanised alluvial gold mines around the country. Total gold 





- 1 000000 
500000 
1 995 1 996 1 997 1 998 1 999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 201 0  
l!I Porgera o Ok Tedi Iii Lihir • Misima D Nena/Frieda 
• Upper Watut l!I Wafi • Tolukuma Wapolu • Simberi 
• Woodlark o Small Scale Cl! Bougainvill 
Source: Papua New Guinea Department of Mining and Petroleum. 
Min ing and petroleum I 1 3 1 
production from this sector is expected to increase in excess of 3 tonnes 
per year by the year 2000. 
Copper 
Copper production is expected to rise over the next three to five years 
with the commissioning of a new mine at Frieda River in the West Sepik 
Province (Highlands Gold Ltd 1994) .  Copper production is currently 
estimated to commence at a rate of 1 60,000 to 225,000 tonnes per year. 
Production from Ok Tedi is expected to continue at current levels 
through to at least 2010 .  In the event that the Bougainville mine is 
recommissioned a significant increase in copper production would 
occur. Production from the mine is likely to be re-established at a rate 
of 150,000 to 1 75,000 tonnes per year. The development of the Wafi 
copper-gold resource is also possible in the medium term. This is a 
potentially large resource which could be mined on a scale similar to 
Ok Tedi, but production is unlikely before the year 2000. Additional 
copper production is also possible from a small to medium-scale mine 
at Laloki near Port Moresby. This mine would also produce zinc and 
some gold and silver (Figure 7.3). 
Nickel and cobalt 
Nickel production from the Marum deposit in the Ramu Valley is 
potentially a new commodity for Papua New Guinea, diversifying the 
industry base away from the current strong copper and gold bias. In 
addition to nickel the Marum deposit has by-product cobalt and 
chromite which would add to the value of production. Estimates of 
production rates and mine commencement dates are at this stage very 
preliminary with first nickel and cobalt production scheduled for 2001 
at a rate of 33,000 tonnes and 2,800 tonnes per year respectively. 
Oil  and gas 
The Gobe Project is scheduled for production by the end of 1997 at a 
rate of 50,000 barrels of oil per day. This production rate would be 
valued in excess of K500 million per year at today's prices. 
Potential LNG developments could contribute significantly to the 
economy. LNG is currently valued at US$3.40 to US$3.50 per million 
Btu .  This equates to approximately US$140 per tonne of LNG output 
from a plant. The proposed 4.5 million tonne LNG plant currently 
under review would therefore contribute to exports in the range of 
US$612 to US$630 million (K81 5-840 million) per year. 
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Figure 7.3. Projected copper production, 1 995-201 0 (tonnes) 
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The value of gas exports to North Queensland in Australia would 
ultimately depend on the size of the market. Current estimates rate 
market opportunities in the range of 1 50-200 million cubic feet of gas 
per day. This would equate to an export value in the order of K180-240 
million per year. 
Implications for government revenue 
As a result of an increase in the number of mining and petroleum 
developments, government revenues from the sector are also expected 
to increase over the next decade (Parsons and Vincent 1991 ). All tax 
and dividend revenues from the mining industry have in the past been 
directed to the Mineral Revenues Stabilisation Fund which is a fund 
administered by the Bank of Papua New Guinea in order to smooth 
the effects of mining related revenue collection on the economy. 
Non-fiscal benefits to the Papua New Guinea economy 
All mining projects require the establishment of basic infrastructure in 
the area of the mine development. This is often a cost carried by the 
mine developer in order to ensure the effective operation of the mine . 
This is especially so in the remote areas of Papua New Guinea where 
basic infrastructure is generally non-existent. The infrastructure develop­
ments usually last well beyond the life of the mine and provide centres 
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for economic development into the future . In addition, the provisions 
of the Special Mining Lease allow mining companies to develop non­
mine related infrastructure under a tax credit scheme. This is currently 
seen as an effective way of delivering infrastructure in remote areas 
which the government finds difficult to service (PNG Chamber of Mines 
and Petroleum 1993). 
Employment opportunities will also increase significantly with the 
proposed future mine developments. Direct employment in the mining 
industry is likely to double over the next decade and employment in 
mining-related service industries will follow suit. 
Conclusions 
The mining and petroleum sector is currently the driving force behind 
the Papua New Guinea economy. This high level of economic support 
is expected to continue in the medium to long term with the expected 
establishment of several new mineral and petroleum developments over 
the next five to ten years as outlined above. The direct effect of these 
new developments on the economy will be significant both in terms of 
increases in GDP, exports and foreign exchange as well government 
revenue. 
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Agricu ltu re ,  forestry and fisheries 
lla Temu 
Contribution to the economy 
The importance of the agriculture, forestry and fisheries sectors cannot 
be overstated within the context of the overall Papua New Guinea 
economy. An overwhelming majority of the population depend on these 
sectors for income, livelihood and well-being. The entire rural population 
is totally and directly dependent on these sectors. According to the 1990 
National Census, 85 per cent of the population reside in rural areas. 
The fact that a large proportion of Papua New Guinea's population 
is dependent on these sectors means that government policy targeted 
at the sectors is likely to have significant welfare impacts. The same is 
also true for policy not directed at these sectors, but the impacts are 
felt nevertheless. Where the direct and indirect impacts are negative, 
welfare can be reduced for a significant number of Papua New Guineans. 
It is crucial that the magnitude of this impact is borne in mind in overall 
policy development. 
Gross domestic product 
The Papua New Guinea economy has expanded four-fold since 
independence, with two distinct growth phases apparent over this 
period . Nominal GDP increased steadily prior to 1990, with annual 
growth rates close to zero or negative real per capita (Figure 8.1 ) .  More 
rapid growth in nominal GDP occurs after 1990, with significant 
positive annual growth rates. The peak annual growth reached during 
this period was about 17 per cent (Figure 8.2) . Expansionary budgets 
and mining and petroleum developments, such as Porgera, Misima and 
Kutubu, were the major influencing factors on this trend, although non­
mining I petroleum sectors also had a significant impact (Figure 8 . 1  ). 
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Figure 8.1 . Agriculture, forestry and fishing share of non-mining GDP, 
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While total GDP growth has been impressive, real GDP growth has 
been less with stagnant growth dominating except for the period 1991-93 
(Figure 8.2) .  Similarly, per capita GDP has increased only marginally 
over the period prior to 1990. Per capita GDP is now estimated to be 
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Figure 8.3. Gross domestic product by sector 1 978-97 (p rojected) 
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about K800. The question remains as to how representative this figure 
really is, given the skewed income distribution in Papua New Guinea. 
The two dominant sectors contributing to GDP are services and 
agriculture, forestry and fishing (Figure 8.3) . There has been a steady 
decline in the share of agriculture, forestry and fishing up to 1992 but 
much of it appears to have been regained in the last two years. The 
price guarantee scheme introduced in 1993 for agriculture and high log 
prices in the same year were probably the two major factors responsible 
for this change. Agriculture, forestry and fisheries now account for 
some 32 per cent of total GDP. 
The overall level of commercial activity within each of these sectors 
also increased rapidly after 1990. This is reflected in the increasing 
market share of GDP from agriculture, forestry and fisheries (Figure 
8.4). Increased cash cropping, logging and commercial fishing has 
occurred during this period and could well explain this trend. Estimates 
for the non-market component of GDP from these sectors shows a 
steady growth since independence. This estimates the value of subsist­
ence production and activities within these sectors. 
Employment 
The contribution of agriculture, forestry and fisheries to overall employ­
ment is difficult to measure precisely, although given the dependence 
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Figure 8.4. Agricu lture, forestry, fishing-total ,  market and non-market 
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on this sector by the bulk of the rural population the contribution is 
significant. The best available means to gauge this is the use of 
occupational data from national censuses (Table 8 .1  ) .  
The national census results suggest that self-employment accounts 
for almost 70 per cent of the monetised labour force in Papua New 
Guinea. If we assume that the majority of those self-employed are in 
agriculture, forestry and fisheries, then these results suggest that 67 per 
cent of total employment occurs in these sectors . This is a significant 
contribution. 
Table 8.1 . Citizen occupation, 1 971 -90 
1971 
Wage employed 193 ,482 
Unemployed 8,291 
Self-employed 286 ,533 
Monetised labour forces 488,306 













Source: M i l lett, J . ,  (ed . ), 1 993. Seminar on Employment, Agriculture and Industrialisation, INA 
Discussion Paper No. 60, Institute of National Affairs, Port M oresby. 
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Figure 8.5. Formal private sector employment index, 1 978-95 (1989=100) 
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These sectors also contribute to formal wage employment. Data 
compiled by McGavin (1996) suggests that these sectors have provided 
about 30 per cent of the jobs in the formal wage sector. Applying this 
proportion to the 1990 census data would increase the share of 
employment for these sectors to 73 per cent. The index of formal wage 
employment in these sectors has an increasing trend although it has 
varied since 1978 (Figure 8.5). 
Exports 
The share of export revenue from the agriculture, forestry and fisheries 
sectors shows a steady decline from about 49 per cent in 1980 to 28 per 
cent in 1995 (Figure 8.6 ). Mining exports have dominated for the most 
part with petroleum exports having a significant influence after 1992. 
Mining and petroleum now account for about 70 per cent of the 
country's export revenue. 
Within agriculture, forestry and fisheries, while agriculture was dom­
inant in the 1980s, its share of export revenue has declined substantially 
from 36 per cent in 1980 to about 15 per cent in 1995. On the other hand, 
the share of export value from forestry resources increased from 7 per 
cent in 1980 to 13 per cent in 1995, almost equalling that of agriculture. 
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Figure 8.6. Share of export value by major commodity, 1 980-97 (projected) 
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Agricu ltu re 
Agricultural resources 
The agricultural sector is the single most important sector in the Papua 
New Guinea economy. The country has been blessed with an abundant 
land resource which supports a wide range of agricultural production 
activities. Of the total land area of 460,000 square kilometres, it is 
estimated that about 30 per cent is suitable for agriculture and of this, 
only half the area is currently utilised. Soils are generally fertile and 
rainfall sufficient and evenly distributed to support the cultivation of a 
wide range of commodities. There are areas where high population 
densities have resulted in more intensive land use. 
Papua New Guinea's advantage in agriculture comes not only from 
its abundant land resources but also from its labour resources. Rural 
communities throughout the country use these resources in subsistence 
production to provide livelihood and cash crop production is becoming 
widespread as these communities become more monetised and new 
consumer items and services demanded. General agricultural production 
skil l s and knowledge are well entrenched. 
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Resource use 
Subsistence production has been the dominant form of agricultural 
production where staple crops such as sweet potatoes, yams, banana 
and taro are grown largely for family consumption. An increasing part 
of subsistence production is now sold in domestic markets. This is 
expected to grow as urban populations grow and rural incomes increase. 
Perishability and high weight to value ratios limit the development of 
trade in domestic staples. It is estimated that about half the value of 
agricultural output comes from subsistence production-market and 
non-market GDP are almost equal for much of the early period since 
1978 when forestry and fishing activities were quite limited (Figure 8.4). 
Subsistence production is said to be efficient in its use of land and 
labour resources. The rural population in Papua New Guinea is fairly 
sel f-sufficient in terms of food, however, this is changing as rural 
communities become dependent on introduced food items such as 
tinned fish and rice. The increasing demand for introduced goods and 
services has provided much of the impetus for cash-oriented production. 
Cash crop production has dominated agricultural development 
effort with the realisation of these opportunities since the 1950s. Crops 
such as coffee, cocoa, rubber, tea, oil palm and copra have been 
produced mainly for exports. Various modes of production have been 
employed for each of the different crops.  Coffee and cocoa were 
introduced initially as plantation crops but became dominated by 
smallholders as knowledge and information spread. Oil palm and 
rubber were promoted as estate crops under resettlement scheme 
arrangements where smallholder farms were established around a 
central processing facility and provided with all necessary infrastructure 
and support services. Copra developed largely as a smallholder crop 
and tea was developed and has remained essentially a plantation crop. 
The relative share of agricultural exports in total export value has 
declined from 36 per cent in 1980 to 14 per cent in 1995 (Figure 8.6) .  
Coffee is still the dominant agricultural export both in terms of export 
earnings and the number of producers. The volatility of the major 
agricultural exports is quite characteristic and is caused largely by 
international price variabi lity. On average, agricultural exports 
generate about K250 million in export earnings per annum. The bulk 
of these earnings are received at the rural level . This has significant 
welfare implications and the government therefore continues to support 
commodity prices through stabilisation and more recently through 
price guarantee schemes . 
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Figure 8.7. Agricu ltural exports classified by commodity and value, 
1 980-97 (projected) 
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Agricu ltu re infrastructure 
The availability of infrastructure and services is a crucial component 
of efforts aimed at promoting agricultural development in Papua New 
Guinea . Road and transport services provide the means by which agri­
cultural produce can reach markets. In general, agricultural development 
has been constrained by the general lack of such infrastructure, 
particularly for remote locations. The priority has been to provide these 
services in areas with significant levels of cash crop production . The 
establishment of the Highlands Highway, for example, has been a major 
influence in the expansion of coffee production, processing and market­
ing. All these activities are currently in the hands of the private sector. 
Government involvement in marketing has always been an 
important characteristic of cash crop production in Papua New Guinea. 
Marketing Boards were established for the major crops, performing 
both marketing and regulatory functions. Under new institutional 
arrangements, much of the marketing function has been taken over by 
the private sector with the Boards transformed into what are now 
known as Industry Corporations, which are also responsible for 
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extension and research. The only exception to this is the Copra Marketing 
Board which has continued to retain its monopoly on the marketing of 
Papua New Guinea's copra. 
Agricultural research infrastructure in Papua New Guinea is wel l 
established. Funded by government and carried out by the Department 
of Agriculture and Livestock, an extensive and often quite specialised 
network of research activities has been established. Priority in agri­
cultural research has been placed on tree crops, in accordance with 
their importance in generating government revenues. The establishment 
of Industry Corporations has seen a shift in the establishment of auto­
nomous research institutes for coffee, cocoa, oil-palm and coconuts. 
Commodity levies are imposed to fund such research, although 
government grants are still available. 
This new setup should see the Department of Agriculture and 
Livestock devoting more resources to research on staple food crops, 
livestock, alternative crops and resource management. The emphasis 
will be on productivity improvements and sustainable farming systems. 
A National Agricultural Research Institute (NARI) has been proposed 
and endorsed by government. The Department currently operates nine 
research stations, strategically located to carry out experimentation 
under various climatic conditions. These are supported by specialist 
laboratories in Port Moresby. 
The agricultural sector in Papua New Guinea has lacked effective 
extension services for much of the last twenty years. A whole host of 
factors are responsible for this, of which the most critical have been 
inadequate funding and poor motivation and lack of skills .  The intro­
duction of the provincial government system was largely responsible 
for the deterioration in extension services. The transfer of extension 
functions to provinces was often not accompanied by the appropriate 
funding levels .  Even if adequate funds were transferred, provincial 
priorities often meant that funds were allocated to other activities. 
Extension activities took on very low priority in many provinces, 
affecting morale and motivation. 
Agricultural credit services are currently available from both 
commercial banks and an agriculture bank, now called the Rural 
Development Bank. The availability of these facilities is likely to have 
enhanced agricultural development effort. Agriculture, forestry and 
fishing sector lending has dominated total lending by the Bank, 
particularly over the period prior to 1989 (Figure 8.8) . Well over 60 per 
cent of lending was targeted at this sector and the bulk of this would 
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Figure 8.8. Proportion of Rural Development Bank lending by sector, 
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Figure 8.9. Proportion of lending by commercial banks by sector, 1 979-93 
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have gone to agriculture . Lending by commercial banks to agriculture, 
forestry and fishing has also been proportionately significant (Figure 
8.9). In 1993, over 40 per cent of total commercial lending was to these 
sectors, although this has been quite variable over the period shown, 
suggesting that credit availability is not a significant constraint. While 
it is true that much of the lending is dominated by few large borrowers, 
the real difficulty for the small borrower is more one of access.  Access 
is difficult because of the riskiness of lending to many small borrowers 
and the high transaction costs involved. 
Another important agricultural infrastructure is training colleges 
which provide general and specialised skills in all agriculture related 
fields. Currently there are four colleges, located to service the four major 
regions in the country. These colleges have been recently transferred to 
the Education Department with an upgrade in their status to university 
levels. This should improve the quality of overall training. 
Government pol icy 
Government policy recognises the important role of agriculture in 
overall economic development. Agricultural development is a priority 
because all Papua New Guineans depend on this sector for livelihood .  
The overall policy objective i s  to  ' to ensure the viability of  agricultural 
production, sustain growth, increase income earning opportunities 
and to improve rural standards of living' (Papua New Guinea 
1996:84). Creating employment opportunities and promoting self­
sufficiency are also important components of current government 
policy. 
Within this broad policy framework, a number of specific policy 
components are stated in the various government policy documents 
(Papua New Guinea 1989, 1994, 1995). These relate to food production, 
cash crop production, agro-industrial development and agro-forestry 
and agricultural services and support programs. 
Food production 
Food production has been largely neglected with past emphasis 
focusing more on cash crop production. The need for greater food 
security and self-sufficiency has redirected interest towards domestic 
food production. The focus is on improving productivity and the 
sustainability of production, encouraging diversification, improving 
market access and promoting production for exports . 
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Cash crop production 
Cash crop production has proved to be an effective means of achieving 
the broader objectives of providing employment and income earning 
opportunities for much of rural Papua New Guinea. Greater private 
sector involvement is to be encouraged and improvements in product­
ivi ty, quality and efficiency are a priority. Crop diversification is to be 
pursued through research and development. This is seen to be important 
in reducing the risk exposure of small farmers. 
Agro-industrial development 
While recent policy documents do not explicitly state this, there has 
always been government support to encourage further downstream 
processing of agricultural products. Various incentive schemes have 
been devised to attract private sector investment into downstream 
processing. Protective measures such as import bans, tariffs and quotas 
have been used at various times to promote agro-industrial development. 
Products such as meat, fish, fruit and vegetables and animal feed have 
been identified as possible candidates . 
Agro-forestry development 
Government policy on agro-forestry development has in the past 
focused on the introduction of trees into the farming system, in part a 
response to shortage of wood fuel in some areas. Other agronomic 
benefits are also gained under such systems. The current focus appears 
to be the complete opposite, where forest areas cleared for logging are 
to be used for agricul tural production. 
Agricultural services and support programs 
Important elements here are training and human resource development, 
research and extension, quarantine and inspection, marketing and price 
support and credit. The general policy objective in these areas is to 
improve the effectiveness and delivery of these services and programs. 
Price support programs are perceived as having an important 
welfare component in that they support rural incomes. The lack of 
alternative income earning opportunities in many rural communities 
makes such support critical. Price stabilisation schemes established 
with commodity boards were abandoned in the late 1980s following 
the depletion of these funds because of continued low prices. A price 
guarantee scheme was introduced in the 1993 Budget, offering 
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guaranteed prices for the four major cash crops. While this did commit 
significant public resources to agriculture, price improvements in the 
last three years have relieved much of this pressure. This improvement has 
persisted because of the government decision to float the kina in 1994. 
Future pol icy issues 
Domestic food production 
While current policy to promote food production appears to be driven 
by food security needs, the greatest benefit is actually the high social 
returns it can generate. Because production is dominated by rural 
communities (representing the bulk of the population), the welfare 
implications are enormous. It is also not likely to be constrained by land 
ownership issues because it builds on an existing production activity. 
The future challenge in efforts to promote domestic food production 
rests not on producers but on the ability of government to address 
effectively those problems that constrain this subsector. The major 
problems are variable quality, high post-harvest losses, limited extension 
and research, inadequate transportation, and distribution networks. 
Public investment in research I extension and infrastructure development 
to allow market access would make a significant difference. 
Past efforts to promote domestic production of rice, grain and flour 
have not paid off for the simple reason that Papua New Guinea does 
not have any comparative advantage in the production of these grains. 
Export marketing of domestic foods is something which has not 
been explored at all . Local fruits and vegetables have some potential, 
particularly in the emerging South East and North East Asian markets . 
Vanuatu, Tonga and Fiji have had some success in the development of 
niche markets with squash and ginger. These high-valued markets 
provide unique opportunities to take advantage of location and climate. 
The greatest challenge in the development of food production is 
sustainability and environmental degradation. By nature, subsistence 
agriculture requires continuous clearing of forest lands. If this goes 
unchecked, the sustainability of agriculture in these areas can be quite 
doubtful-environmental laws governing agricultural activities must 
be applied to subsistence agriculture. 
Cash crop production 
The major future policy issue in cash crop production relates to the 
price support program and whether this represents the best strategy to 
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promote the development of this sub-sector. Those in favour of such a 
policy have supported it on the grounds that it plays a social welfare 
role in supporting rural incomes. Supporting grower prices during 
resource booms is considered by some to be an efficient method of 
distributing resource rents . The arguments against price support are 
its selective characteristic in targeting specific producers and that it 
discourages diversification and efficiency by distorting relative prices. 
The challenge for the development of cash crop agriculture in 
Papua New Guinea is the need to improve productivity and to reduce 
costs . Appropriate research and effective extension are compulsory 
components of this effort. It is doubtful that price support can generate 
productivity improvements, let alone reduce costs. These resources are 
better spent in improving research and extension. These efforts need to 
be targeted at smallholders because they have the greatest scope for 
improvement over the medium term. 
Longer-term development of cash crop agriculture in Papua New 
Guinea hinges very much on the issue of land tenure . Gains from 
productivity and economies of scale are not possible if the land tenure 
system does not provide the opportunity to expand. Cultural factors 
play an important role in these systems and caution has to be taken in 
any effort to introduce change. 
In view of this situation and the need to maintain balance, a system 
which can generate productivity improvements and achieve some 
economies of scale while utilising existing land tenure arrangements 
would be desirable. Estate and resettlement schemes organised around 
villages present some scope for achieving these. However, management 
problems associated with past schemes must be overcome before such 
a system can be effective. 
Forestry 
Forest resources 
Of the total land area of 46 million hectares about 36 million hectares 
is in forest, composed mostly of hard woods. Of this, some 15 million 
hectares is productive with only 1 million hectares actually logged. The 
remaining 21 million hectares of the forested land is either protected 
or used for other purposes (Figure 8 .10) .  
Of the 14 million hectares of forest area available for forest develop­
ment, a massive 36 per cent or 5 million hectares is located in Western 
province. The next largest forest area is found in Sandaun province, 
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representing some 12 per cent of the national resource . These are 
followed by Gulf (7 per cent), West New Britain and Madang (6 per 
cent each), Central, Southern Highlands and Oro (5 per cent each), 
East Sepik (4 per cent) and New Ireland, Morobe and Milne Bay (3 per 
cent each). 
It is estimated that the area allocated to forest production is more 
than half the total potential area available for provinces such as West 
New Britain and East New Britain, New Ireland, Gulf and Western 
Highlands. However, at the national level, only about 27 per cent of the 
total potential area has been allocated to date for forest development. 
This potential is greatest for Western and Sandaun Provinces. 
Allowing for areas designated for agriculture, conservation, gardens, 
villages and buffer zones, the net forest area available for sustainable 
management is about 11 .7  million hectares (Table 8.2) .  This converts to 
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Table 8.2. Estimate of sustained yield for the forest resources of Papua 
New Guinea 
Gross forest area su itable for sustained 
yield management 
Less areas set aside for agricu ltural conversion , 
conservation areas, gardens, vi l lages, 
buffer zones 
Net area su itable for sustainable management 
Total volume 
Sustainable yield 
14.6 mi l l ion hectares 
2.92 mi l l ion hectares 
11 .68 mi l l ion hectares 
140.2 mi l l ion m3 
4.0 mi l l ion m3 
Source: Government of Papua New Guinea, 1 996. National Forest Plan (Draft), Papua New 
Gu inea Forest Authority, Port Moresby. 
a cut volume of about 140 million cubic metres assuming an average 
volume of 12 cubic metres per hectare. The estimated sustainable yield, 
assuming a rotation length of 35 years, is 4 million cubic metres. This 
is slightly higher than the actual harvest level quoted by Duncan (1994) 
at 3.5 mill ion cubic metres for 1993 due to differences in the length of 
rotation. 
Resource use 
It is estimated that 90 per cent of the total harvest from Papua New 
Guinea's forests is exported as logs (PNGFA 1996). The major markets 
are Ja pan, South Korea, Taiwan, India and China. There has been a 
steady growth in export volumes since independence, reaching 1 
million cubic metres in 1982. Growth continued until 1987 when exports 
peaked at about 1 .4 million cubic metres then declined to a low of 0.9 
million cubic metres in 1990. Significant price increases since 1991 saw 
log exports tripled to almost 3 million cubic metres in 1994. Log exports 
currently stand at 2.5 million cubic metres in 1995. 
The export-oriented nature of forestry has meant that domestic 
processing utilises only a small proportion of total harvest. The 
domestic processing industry is currently made up of 49 registered 
sawmills, 27 furniture and joinery operations, one woodchip mill and 
one plywood plant (PNGFA 1996). In addition, it is estimated that 
there are about 700 small mobile sawmills. The capacity of the 49 
registered sawmills is estimated to be about 207,000 cubic metres of 
sawn timber. In 1994, only 350,000 cubic metres of the total harvest 
was processed domestically. Of this, 85 per cent was used in domestic 
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The Austral ian National Universi ty, Canberra. 
industries and the balance exported as woodchips, sawn timber and 
plywood . The forest sector currently employs about 7,500 people 
which is 4 per cent of total formal sector employment. 
Within the context of a subsistence economy, the total use of forest 
resources is much more than is indicated by national harvest figures. The 
total natural forest resource in Papua New Guinea is under customary 
ownership allowing rights to harvest for all subsistence needs including 
house-making, canoe-making and clearing for subsistence gardening. 
Thistlethwaite and Davis (1996) argue that much more forest area has 
been cleared in the Melanesian countries for subsistence gardening than 
for commercial forestry. The environmental and forest area management 
implications are enormous and cannot be ignored. 
The allocation of areas for forest resource use is governed by 
legislation as stated in the Forestry Act 1991 and in the National Forest 
Policy (1991 ). These provided the legal basis for the establishment of 
the National Forestry Development Guidelines (1993) and the National 
Forestry Plan (Draft 1996). The Guidelines are an interpretation of 
government policy, specifying exactly how the forestry resource is to 
be developed and managed . It also specifies the process to be followed 
before actual harvesting commences. 
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• Landowners within the resource area must organise themselves 
into Incorporated Land Groups and the Provincial Forest 
Management Committee must certify authenticity of land 
ownership . 
• The Papua New Guinea Forest Authority must undertake a 
Development Options Study providing details such as a 
resource inventory, means of landowner participation, 
environmental and social impact assessments and feasibility 
of local processing and marketing. 
• The Development Options Study is used by the Papua New 
Guinea Forest Authority in preparing draft development 
guidelines for approval by the National Forestry Board . At 
the same time, a Forest Management Agreement is 
negotiated by the Forest Authority with landowners. 
• The project is then advertised and proposals called. The 
Provincial Forest Management Committee does the initial 
screening and recommends a developer to the National 
Forestry Board which then makes a final selection. The 
selected developer is required to lodge a deposit of KS0,000 
plus K2 per cubic metre of the proposed annual harvest. 
• The selected developer is invited by the Provincial Forest 
Management Committee to conduct a detailed feasibility 
study outlining the true extent of the resource, a 
development plan, financial projections and the proposed 
corporate arrangement. This is submitted as a draft Project 
Agreement to the National Forestry Board for approval as 
the Project Agreement. 
• When approved, the National Forestry Board recommends 
to the Minister the issuance of a Timber Permit. Wide 
consultations are required by the Act before the 
recommendation is made. 
• The developer is then invited by the Minister to make an 
application for a Timber Permit. This must be accompanied 
by an environmental plan which has been approved as 
required under the Environmental Planning Act. In the event 
that the Minister does not accept the recommendation of the 
National Forestry Board, he is required to justify and the 
Board is then required to make a formal recommendation. 
The National Executive Council then intervenes if the matter 
is still unresolved. 
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• When granted, the Timber Permit allows the developer to 
harvest logs in the project area based on approved terms and 
conditions and for a specified period of time. A performance 
bond, equivalent to the stumpage fee for one month's 
harvest volume is lodged with the Forest Authority. 
Forestry infrastructure 
The export-oriented nature of the forest industry in Papua New Guinea 
means that there has been very limited scope for infrastructure develop­
ment. Much of the logging equipment is imported and is quite mobile. 
Existing transport infrastructure facilities are utilised, although in some 
instances temporary roads and wharf facilities have been constructed 
for short-term use. These are usually abandoned when operations shift 
to new sites. 
An important aspect of granting timber permits has always been 
the requirement to construct infrastructure such as roads, bridges, 
schools and aid posts within the permit areas. However, inadequate 
inspection and monitoring capacity has meant that these requirements 
have not been fulfilled . In the few cases where they have been fulfilled, 
quality control has often been lacking so that facilities deteriorate 
sooner than expected. The current guidelines transfer this responsibility, 
including those relating to reafforestation, to the landowner groups 
themselves. These guidelines also specify that landowners receive the 
largest share of the resource rent. 
The other major forestry infrastructure is the Papua New Guinea 
Forest Research Institute located just outside Lae in Morobe province. 
Its research program focuses on forest biological research, species 
screening and development and forestry management issues. 
Government pol icy 
Governments in Papua New Guinea have always recognised the 
importance and potential of the country's forest resources. Government 
policy, even prior to independence, has always sought to promote the 
development of this vast resource. The original Forestry Act 1971 (also 
known as the Private Dealings Act) allowed landowners to negotiate 
directly with private companies. The only requirement was to have 
their land declared as a Local Forest Area . 
The absence of direct government involvement and the lack of 
development and management procedures made this original system 
vulnerable to abuse . Landowners, who were then quite ignorant of 
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their rights, were open to exploitation. Forest areas were also abused 
with widespread environmental damage. The management and 
implementation of the early policy also hit a snag with the introduction 
of the provincial government system when provincial and national 
functions and responsibilities were separated . Duncan claims that this 
led to ' loss of control over forestry harvesting, resulting in corruption 
and environmental damage' ( 1994). 
The results of the Barnett Commission of Inquiry in 1987 confirmed 
the general perception that the forest sector was fraught with corruption 
and malpractice. Immediately fol lowing the report from this inquiry, 
the government initiated a detailed review of the sector with the 
assistance of the World Bank, resulting in the drafting of the amended 
Forestry Act 1991 and an endorsement of a National Forest Policy in 1991 .  
Current government policy on forest sector development acknow­
ledges the need to maximise the benefits of such development to Papua 
New Guinea, but requires that this must be done in ways that promote 
sustainable development. The specific objectives of the forestry sector 
are 
• to use forest resources on a sustainable basis to provide long­
term development opportunities for landowners and the 
general community 
• to pursue the protection and conservation of ecologically 
and culturally important forest areas and to maintain sound 
environmental and management practices 
• to maximise employment and income opportunities for 
Papua New Guinea citizens 
• to develop an internationally competitive value-added 
processing activity (Papua New Guinea 1996:89). 
A sustainable forestry strategy was adopted in 1995. Under this 
strategy, the annual cut rate is limited to about 3 per cent of the permit 
area. This is consistent with Papua New Guinea's membership into the 
International Tropical Timber Organisation (ITTO) where it has made a 
commitment to produce timber only from sustainably managed forests 
by the year 2000 . This will require a deliberate phasing out of permits 
where management is known to be unsustainable. The recently 
finalised Forestry Code of Conduct is an additional commitment to 
sustainable forestry. 
The National Forestry Development Guidelines also specify the 
fiscal arrangements for forestry revenues. A stumpage fee system was 
devised to replace fixed royalty payments, export duties on logs and 
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all other miscellaneous charges. Concerns that a large part of the 
economic surplus was being retained by operators motivated the new 
system. This was apparent in 1993 when log prices peaked. The new 
stumpage system allows resource owners and the government to 
retain a larger part of the surplus. 
Under the proposed stumpage system, a minimum or base 
stumpage fee of K20 per cubic metre is added to an appraised logging 
cost plus a minimum profit allowance specified at 20 per cent of 
logging costs. The sum of these subtracted from the f.o.b. price defines 
the total surplus, 85 per cent of which must be paid to a representative 
body appointed by resource owners. A 25 per cent forestry withholding 
tax is payable on this additional stumpage . As of July 1996, the 
approved revenue system requires a KlO per cubic metre royalty 
payment and a variable Project Development Levy, ranging from K2 to 
K13 per cubic metre, depending on the f.o.b. price of logs. Of the total 
Project Development Levy, 40 per cent will be paid directly to resource 
owners and 60 per cent retained in a project area development fund. 
The stumpage system is a vast improvement compared to the fixed 
royalty arrangement and is also quite considerate of operators' needs 
to maintain profitability. This is achieved by allowing for normal 
profits and appropriating a small part of the surplus to them. A point 
of contention, which has caused the long delay in implementing this 
new system, has been the cost estimates used in determining a cost. 
allowance . The National Forestry Development Guidelines specify 
that these will be based on efficient production scenarios and are 
expected to vary between locations. 
Duncan (1994) points out that there are two undesirable features of 
this new system. First, there is little incentive for the developer to 
actively seek out maximum log prices. This incentive can be introduced 
by setting two different rates for allocating the surplus. The maximum 
rate could be applied at lower prices and a minimum rate at higher 
prices. Second, landowners and governments have greater exposure to 
price risk than before. Duncan (1994) proposes an auction system 
which could eliminate this risk and at the same time address other 
problems such as price under-reporting. 
A number of other important initiatives are also proposed in the 
National Forestry Development Guidelines. At the national level, it is 
proposed that forest resources must be utilised to achieve economic 
growth, to provide employment and to foster greater local participation. 
Viable domestic processing will help achieve these objectives. 
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It is proposed that, by the year 2000, at least 30 per cent of the total 
harvest must be processed domestically. This is to be achieved by 
allowing domestic log sales on a quota basis by giving preference to 
those with processing facilities, scaling down log exports, providing 
fiscal incentives such as duty exemptions and tax relief through the 
establishment of necessary infrastructure and by granting first-right 
purchase options at export prices to domestic processors. 
Current government policy emphasises the importance of sustain­
able harvesting while at the same time ensuring that environmental 
controls are in place and adhered to and forest conservation needs are 
protected. Landowner participation in both resource use and conservation 
is considered to be crucial, although their capacity is limited. The 
strengthening of their capacity through training and public awareness 
programs is a priority. 
Future pol icy issues 
While forest sector development may have had some early problems, 
a drastic turn of events following the Barnett Inquiry gave rise to a 
much improved environment. A tightening of the Forestry Act in 1991 
and endorsement of the National Forestry Development Guidelines in 
1993 has enabled the government to regain control over the sector. 
There is little disagreement that the overall policy thrust is in the right 
direction. The real challenge, however, is the ability, willingness and 
commitment to implementing initiatives put in place to achieve the 
desired policy objectives. Implementation capacity is a general constraint 
throughout the bureaucracy and nationwide efforts will be necessary 
to build capacity. Capacity in resource sectors should be given some 
priority along with health and education. 
An important constraint on capacity has been the inadequate levels 
of government funding. The establishment of the Papua New Guinea 
Forest Authourity is a step in the right direction, but adequate funding 
is vital if the new set-up is to function effectively. The partial funding 
of the Surveillance Project in 1995 is a case in point. 
A number of more specific policy issues need to be raised. The 
Guidelines address most of these quite adequately. These include the 
need for a detailed forestry inventory, the importance of biodiversity, 
redirection of forestry research to address national priority issues and 
institutional support and coordination. Two issues which raise some 
concern for future forestry development are the Revenue System and 
the current emphasis on downstream processing. 
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Revenue system 
The new stumpage fee system has been designed to increase the 
proportion of resource rent accruing to resource owners. Given the 
experiences of the early 1990s, this is perceived to be highly desirable. 
Furthermore, given Papua New Guinea's general experience with 
resource ownership issues, more so in mining than any other sector, 
this is a deliberate policy choice. It is the government' s responsibility 
to ensure that the benefits of any resource development are equitably 
distributed . 
The new system is a drastic improvement compared to the old 
royalty system because it allocates a large part of the economic surplus 
to forest owners. While this ensures that landowners are guaranteed a 
part of all windfall gains, it also means that the incentives for corrupt 
behaviour are very much reduced. Any reduction in the incidence of 
corrupt behaviour is a significant gain, particularly in resource sectors 
where corruption can often be associated with unsustainable resource 
development. In view of these improvements, the new system is quite 
commendable. However, delays in implementation after their 
announcement in the 1996 Budget does raise some concern. Vested 
interests have developed within the industry and further delays could 
easily shift opinion and more importantly, allow political support for 
opposing views. 
The two undesirable aspects of the stumpage system are its 
disincentive effects on maximising log prices and the extent of price 
risk exposure. The incentive to maximise log prices is important because 
it means that forest resources attract a higher value and economic 
surplus or rent is maximised . A system which avoids the disincentive 
effects and eliminates risk exposure while maximising economic rent 
would be highly desirable. Duncan (1994) suggests an auction system 
whereby logging rights are auctioned on a regular basis. Logging 
contractors are forced to compete with each other and the one who 
bids the highest is granted the logging right for a specified period of 
time. This right is paid for in advance through a guarantee so that the 
full price risk exposure is borne by the contractor who is in a much 
better posi tion to hedge against this risk than landowners and govern­
ment. The contractor is then in a position to maximise log prices and the 
guaranteed surplus is likely to be maximised through competition. 
There is concern that the level of competition may not be sufficient 
to ensure that maximum bids are tendered . The high level of 
concentration that currently exists in the country could easily result in 
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collusive behaviour, thus reducing competition. Collusion can be detect­
ed by independent or in-house assessments of logging costs and expected 
prices. Other firms could be invited to tender if collusion is suspected. 
An auction system as suggested here could be easily incorporated 
into the current process given the existence already of a tendering 
process. The only additional requirement would then be that of holding 
an open auction. All other requirements as stated in the National 
Forestry Development Guidelines would remain. 
Downstream processing 
Current government policy gives tremendous emphasis to the need to 
develop downstream processing. The rationale is that because log 
production for exports creates very little else by way of infrastructure, 
services and employment, downstream processing is perceived to be a 
means by which these benefits can be generated and captured within 
local economies. This is also seen as a form of compensation to local 
areas for adverse environmental impacts. On the surface, such a policy 
makes a lot of sense and could easily attract a lot of popular support, 
even from resource owners themselves. Despite these good intentions, 
existing economic conditions are likely to prevent the attainment of 
the full array of benefits. 
Important elements of this strategy to promote downstream 
processing are limitations on log exports to promote a domestic log 
market and the provision of fiscal incentives to support a domestic 
industry. The question then is whether a viable downstream processing 
in Papua New Guinea is possible under existing conditions. Clearly, 
the proposed intervention by the government to limit log exports and to 
provide incentives demonstrates that viability is doubtful. This suggests 
that domestic processing is likely to involve a high opportunity cost. 
In the absence of detailed analysis, the economics of the industry 
would suggest that the promotion of downstream processing will reduce 
landowner rents. This will occur because it is quite unlikely that 
domestic processors will pay world prices in the domestic log market. 
In the absence of subsidies, this is essentially an income transfer from 
resource owners to processors. Where processing is dominated by 
foreign ownership, as is likely to be the case, these incomes could easily 
be repatriated so that they are then totally lost from the domestic 
economy. 
Because landowner rents are likely to be reduced, this policy is in 
direct conflict with that of maximising I increasing rents to resource 
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owners. This is a drastic contradiction in policy. The best strategy to 
maximise rents is to continue log exports rather than to limit or ban them. 
Given the capital-intensive nature of timber processing and the 
subsequent loss of income to resource owners, there is doubt as to 
whether the net employment effects are really significant. An inter­
nationally competitive processing industry would have to be capital 
intensive. It is likely that greater employment could be generated by 
maximising rents to resource owners than through the promotion of 
downstream processing. 
The benefits of downstream processing to government revenues are 
also uncertain. The high level of subsidies required to make downstream 
processing viable could well outweigh any benefits to government. If 
funds are available to subsidise downstream processing so that jobs can 
be created, it would make more sense to use them to create jobs directly. 
Investing in public infrastructure development, for example, would 
provide the jobs and at the same time put in place much-needed 
infrastructure. 
It could be argued that one of the indirect benefits of promoting 
domestic processing is the development of skills which contribute to 
human capital formation. However, given that the impact on employ­
ment is quite limited, such a benefit is not likely to be significant. Skills 
development has to be approached at the national level rather than 
through selected industries. 
These arguments against downstream processing should also raise 
some concern about current policy requirement that links downstream 
processing to Forest Management Agreements. This would reduce the 
attractiveness of logging activities and result in forced cross-subsidisation. 
Duncan also argues that this would increase ' the likelihood of timber 
being priced well below its market value' ( 1994:6) .  
Fi sheries 
Resource base 
The Exclusive Economic Zone of 2.3 million square kilometres is the 
third-largest marine jurisdiction in the South Pacific. The most important 
resource within this Exclusive Economic Zone is tuna, although other 
pelagic species of commercial importance are also present in these waters. 
Papua New Guinea's long shoreline (approximately 17,000 kilo­
metres), with its numerous reefs and lagoons, provides an ideal habitat 
for a large and diverse inshore fisheries industry. A multitude of fish, 
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shellfish and sedentary species are found in these waters. It is estimated 
that a total of 1,762 fish species have been found in Papua New Guinea 
waters. Papua New Guinea's large land mass and extensive river 
systems also mean that there is a significant inland fishery, although it 
is less productive because of limited dependence on this resource. 
Current production levels for all marine resources are well below their 
estimated potential yield (Table 8.3). 
Resource use 
Papua New Guinea does not have a strong fishing tradition, although 
there are a few exceptions to this. The 1990 population census estimated 
a coastal rural population of about 500,000. Of these, only 120,000 were 
reported to have engaged in regular fishing activities. The freshwater 
fishing population was estimated to be about 125,000 in 1990 (7 per cent 
of the population). The rapid growth of urban centres and increased 
domestic fish marketing in both urban and rural markets would suggest 
that the total population dependent on fish consumption is increasing 
Subsistence and artisanal fisheries are the most common form of 
fishing in Papua New Guinea. It is an important source of livelihood 
Table 8.3. Current and potential production of fisheries resources (tonnes) 
Resou rce Current production Estimated potential 
(per year) yield 
Skipjack tuna 100,000-150,000 180, 000-200, OOO 
Other tuna species 15,000-45,000 60,000 
Coastal pelagics <2,0001 100,000-150,000 
Reef and lagoon fish <10,0001 150, 000-350, OOO 
Deepwater snappers 1,500-2,000 
Prawns 1 ,000-1 ,300 1 ,400-1 , 600 
Lobster tai ls 70-100 400-500 
Barramundi 200-400 400-600 
Estuarine resource 1,500-2,000 4,000 
Freshwater finfish 4,  000-6, OOO 12,000-14,000b 
Shel l  500-550 800-1,000 
Beche-de-mer (dry weight) 300-450 600-1,000 
· Predominant ly subsistence catch. 
b Subject to tocking and enhancement programs. 
Source: Waugh, G . H . ,  1 993. ' Strategies for the development of fisheries ' ,  in PNC Economy: 
prospects for sectoral development and broad based growth, International Development I ssues 
30, A I DAB, Canberra. 
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for most coastal communities. Production beyond subsistence needs is 
becoming common, particularly near urban centres where the urban 
population provides an important market outlet. For these communities, 
fishing is an important source of income. The potential available in the 
wider domestic market has not been fully exploited because of limit­
ations relating to transport, refrigeration and other service constraints . 
Limited commercial fisheries development, particularly in those 
fisheries which have sufficient stocks such as tuna, coastal pelagics and 
reef and lagoon fish, has also meant that potential production levels 
have not been realised. Domestic commercial tuna fishing was established 
prior to independence in 1975 and continued at a slow pace until the 
early 1980s when a depressed international market forced most of the 
remaining operations to close down, so commercial tuna fishing in 
Papua New Guinea has been largely in the hands of foreign fishing 
companies. 
The bulk of the tuna caught in Papua New Guinea since 1981 has 
been by foreign-owned purse seiners, fishing under Distant Water 
Fishing Nations licencing arrangements (Table 8.4). The bulk of this tuna 
has been targeted at the tuna canning industry in foreign countries . 
Licensing is essentially an access right that al lows foreign fishing 
vessels to fish in a country's Exclusive Economic Zone. Licensing fees 
are charged for such access and are usually based on estimated catch 
value. Much of the early fishing effort in Papua New Guinea was based 
on bilateral agreements, which at that time were dominated by the 
Japanese . In the early 1980s, there were about 600 Japanese long-line 
vessels operating under these arrangements in the Papua New Guinea 
Exclusive Economic Zone. The license fee was based on 5 per cent of 
the f.o.b. value of the catch. Under-reporting of both the catch and the 
price was a common problem under these arrangements. Attempts to 
increase the licensing fee rate was met with great opposition from the 
Japanese . This had resulted in a drastic decline in the number of 
Japanese vessels operating in the Papua New Guinea Exclusive Economic 
Zone . This opportunity has since been seized by other countries such 
as Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines. 
A mul tilateral agreement is also in place between the United States 
and the 16 Forum Fisheries Agency member countries which includes 
Papua New Guinea . This is known as the US Multilateral Fisheries 
Treaty and came into force in 1988. Under this treaty, a fixed sum of 
US$18 million is paid for access, of which US$13.6 million is distributed 
among the 16 with Foreign Fisheries Agency member countries 
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Table 8.4. Tuna catch by vessel type, 1 972-92 ('OOO tonnes) 
Pole and l ine Purse seine Long l i ne Total 
1972 8.3 0.2 6.5 15.0 
1973 18.0 1.5 11.4 30.9 
1974 45.3 1.2 6.3 52.7 
1975 16.3 2.3 5.3 24.0 
1976 7.1 10.7 7.1 24.8 
1977 17.0 13.5 15.0 45.5 
1978 2.3 14.6 19.5 36.5 
1979 0.2 1.2 1.6 3.0 
1980 0.1 11.5 12.4 24.0 
1981 38.7 12.8 51.5 
1982 0.1 95.2 10.9 106.2 
1983 1.8 110.2 12.0 124.0 
1984 0.1 132.1 7.2 139.4 
1985 0.4 126.9 9.8 137.1 
1986 0.2 97.2 6.4 103.8 
1987 0.0 78.3 0.4 78.7 
1988 78.3 78.3 
1989 235.0 235.0 
1990 148.3 0.1 148.4 (219.5)a 
1991 182 .7 0.1 182.8 (344.o)a 
1992 (260.1 )a 
• South Pacific Comm ission estimate of ' true' catch levels ( i ncluding a correction for 
under-recording) 
Source: Forum Fisheries Agency, 1 995.  Tuna Industry Development Study Country Profiles: 
Papua New Guinea, Forum Fi sheries Agency, Honiara. 
according to the catch in each Exclusive Economic Zone (Duncan and 
Temu 1996 ). Again the bulk of the tuna caught under this treaty is 
targeted at the US Tuna Cannery. The Japanese sashimi market is fast 
becoming a major target. 
The only marine resource for which current production levels are 
near estimated potential yields is prawns. The Papua New Guinea 
prawn fishery is centred in the Gulf of Papua, near Gulf and Western 
Provinces. A total of 1,200 metric tonnes of prawn tails are produced 
each year, the bulk of which is exported earning about K9 million 
(Papua New Guinea 1993). This represents well over 50 per cent of 
total fisheries exports . About 12-16 vessels operate this trawl fishery 
every year. A detailed management plan is currently in place to allow 
sustainable harvesting (Vonole 1989). 
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Fisheries infrastructure 
The nature of the commercial fishing industry is such that the major 
asset is the vessel itself. For tuna, little or no onshore facilities have 
been developed, except for some processing facility just off Kavieng in 
New Ireland to service the industry in the 1970s. Because the bulk of the 
tuna has been caught under Distant Water Fishing Nation arrangements, 
there has been no need to develop domestic infrastructure. Current 
policy aimed at increased domestication will change this because it 
will be necessary to have onshore infrastructure. Expansion of wharf 
capacity and handling services, storage and refrigeration, transport and 
freight services will all be necessary to support increased domestication. 
To date, much of the infrastructure needs of the fishing industry has 
been provided for by private initiatives within the industry itself. 
For the subsistence and artisanal fisheries, infrastructural needs are 
quite limited as these fisheries tend to utilise more traditional methods 
of processing and storage . Public roads and transport are utilised to 
access markets, particularly urban markets . Increased monetisation of 
rural Papua New Guinea means that 'cash fishing' is becoming wide­
spread, so demands on fishing infrastructure and services are likely to 
increase. 
Much of the early effort in providing fisheries-specific infrastructure 
in the rural areas was the development of marketing infrastructure. A 
series of government-operated coastal fisheries stations were established 
in selected locations throughout the country. A total of 20 coastal 
fisheries stations were established and financed by a grant from 
International Food and Agriculture Development (IFAD) with some 
counterpart funding from the government. These stations became 
centres for extension advice and were equipped with freezer zone 
facilities which allowed them to buy and sell fresh and frozen fish. The 
Fish Marketing Cooperative was also established to provide central 
marketing facilities for these stations. Assessment by the Department 
of Fisheries and Marine Resources is that these facilities have not been 
effective at all in promoting commercial fishing. It is argued that they 
suffered from scale and inappropriate technology problems (Papua 
New Guinea 1993). 
It is fair to conclude that fisheries-specific support infrastructure 
such as landings with berthing and fuel facilities, storage and 
refrigeration, power and water supply has not been well developed in 
Papua New Guinea. The little that had been established prior to the 
1990s has been privately funded and operated. 
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Government policy 
Despite the large resource base, the fisheries sector currently accounts 
for only 1 per cent of GDP, reflecting the dominance of agriculture, 
mining and services in the Papua New Guinea economy (see Figure 
8. 1 ) . Given such a low level of contribution to GDP, it is no surprise 
that there has been no real urgency in formulating and implementing 
fisheries policy. A 'hands off' approach appears to have been adopted 
following the lack of success of the coastal fisheries stations project 
and direct involvement in marketing. The strategy now is to 'withdraw 
from trading activities and to focus on the delivery of ancillary support, 
such as fisheries extension and the dissemination of market information' 
(Papua New Guinea 1994:73). Government policy has emphasised the 
need to promote the commercialisation of subsistence and artisanal 
fisheries. While recognising that most coastal communities engage in 
fishing for subsistence, very few are fully dependent on cash fishing. 
This appears to be more widespread among the few communities which 
have access to urban markets, particularly near Port Moresby and Lae. 
Government policy of promoting cash fishing at the subsistence 
level is targeted at increasing cash earning opportunities, expanding 
the domestic trade of fish and increasing protein supply particularly to 
inland areas. Transport and market access constraints appear to have 
prevented the spread of cash fishing. Early efforts to promote marketing 
of fish and other marine products through coastal fisheries stations 
and the government's Fish Market Cooperation had to be abandoned 
because of their lack of effectiveness. 
The rapid expansion of cash fishing among communities near urban 
centres suggests that market availability and access are important stimul­
ants. Even if fishing requires more capital than say subsistence cash 
cropping, the existence of a viable market in close proximity has had a 
significant impact. The absence of such markets in many coastal locations 
has meant that people are not prepared to make such investments. 
The fact that fishing requires more capital than subsistence 
agriculture also means that credit facilities are probably necessary to 
move beyond subsistence fishing. While such facilities may have been 
available through the Rural Development Bank, the familiar story of 
' limited access to credit' is probably true in this case. Fernando (1991 ) 
argues that high transaction costs have been a major factor in limiting 
access to credit in Papua New Guinea . 
The objective of promoting domestic fish trade has not been 
achieved with any degree of success because of infrastructure and 
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service constraints. Reliable and consistent supply, good market and 
transport networks and storage are all necessary for the promotion of 
the domestic fish trade. The lack of private sector involvement reflects 
both these and other economy-wide constraints such as law and order 
and the high cost of services such as freight and communication. 
Current government policy recognises the importance of supporting 
the development of an artisanal fisheries sector in Papua New Guinea. 
It is estimated that 12,000-1 5,000 metric tonnes of marine products are 
produced annually by fishing communities in Papua New Guinea. Of 
this, only 15 per cent is sold in local markets . This presents enormous 
opportunities and challenges for the development of this important 
subsector. 
Currently policy emphasises the need for 'medium to long-term 
credit for larger private investors and special financing arrangements 
for economically viable investments for smallholders' (Papua New 
Guinea 1996:94). The development of fishing craft, gear, methods and 
training will be encouraged and supported . It is anticipated that these 
will take care of supply-side constraints. Demand-side constraints are 
addressed through assistance provided to the private sector on market 
information and promotional programs. 
Apart from the special credit arrangements that target larger private 
investors and smallholders, very little else is available by way of fiscal 
incentives.  In fact the 1996 Budget reduced the duty on fishing reels 
and tackle to 11 per cent and increased the duty on fishing nets to 40 
per cent. While the duty on fishing nets is consistent with efforts to 
develop fishing gear, it fails to address the more immediate problem of 
supply-side constraints: to encourage more people to engage in cash 
fishing. Most artisanal fisherpeople do not use reels and tackle. 
The other important component of the fishing industry in Papua 
New Guinea is coastal commercial operations targeting prawns, lobster 
and barramundi as well as sedentary fisheries resources such as beche­
de-mer, trochus shells, pearl shells and green snail . For prawns and 
barramundi, small to medium-scale commercial fishing operations are 
involved with similar operations involved in processing and marketing. 
For lobster and the other sedentary resources, harvesting is done by 
village people who then sell to processing and marketing agents . The 
bulk of the product under coastal commercial fishing is exported . 
As with artisanal fisheries, direct government involvement, 
particularly in marketing through the Fish Marketing Coorporation, 
had to be abandoned in favour of greater domestic private sector 
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involvement. While domestic private sector investment in commercial 
fisheries is still small, this subsector has been quite successfully 
privatised. All harvesting, processing and marketing is now in the 
hands of the private sector. Government involvement is limited to 
regulatory functions. 
Government's coastal commercial fisheries policy has been to 
encourage domestic private sector investment. Licensing arrangements 
restricted this fishery to Papua New Guinea owned companies and 
Papua New Guinea-registered vessels. These restrictions are likely to 
be relaxed as part of current government policy to phase out the 
'Reserved Activities List' . Nevertheless, the scope for further investment 
in these fisheries is limited by the current low levels of stocks. Sustainable 
harvesting of this resource has to be a high policy priority for these 
fisheries . 
The third important policy issue is the question of offshore fisheries 
and, in particular, the development of the vast tuna resource that Papua 
New Guinea has within its Exclusive Economic Zone. The government 
recognises the importance of developing this vast resource, but the lack 
of success with early attempts in 1972 and in 1984 to develop a domestic 
tuna industry has meant that no serious effort has been made to revive 
the industry. The resource has been harvested mainly by foreign fishing 
vessels operating under Distant Water Fishing Nation arrangements. 
Current government policy is 'to revive the domestic tuna fishery and 
to develop land-based processing facilities' (Papua New Guinea 1994:72). 
The private sector is expected to take the lead in this revival . The 
objective is to 'establish a viable domestic industry, comprising fishing 
fleets, processing and holding facilities such as canneries, cold storage 
and onshore support infrastructure' (Papua New Guinea 1994:93). 
The development of the domestic tuna industry is expected to lead 
to an eventual phasing out of distant water fishing activities. This is 
the government's medium-term strategy. Meanwhile, all licensed 
domestic foreign fishing vessels are required to conduct transhipment 
in designated ports . This policy is designed to create additional 
economic benefit to the local economy. Port fees, increased business 
for goods and services, employment and tax revenue are expected to 
increase under compulsory transhipment. There is also the benefit that 
the total catch is verified before it is taken out of the Exclusive Economic 
Zone. Under-reporting of total catches under Distant Water Fishing 
Nation arrangements has been a major problem within the region 
(Maxwell and Owen 1994) .  
Agriculture, forestry and fisheries I 1 67 
While current government policy is quite clear in its objective to 
develop a 'viable domestic tuna industry', it is quite uncertain whether 
viability can be guaranteed under current economic conditions. This 
raises the question of whether existing fishing specific infrastructure 
and services are sufficient to support the development of this industry. 
If not, who is expected to finance such investments? The absence of 
infrastructure and services could easily affect the viability of the 
industry. In this case, the government could be expected to provide 
significant subsidies to entice the private sector. The Tuna Investment 
Guidelines set out the range of existing incentives. 
Tuna fishing is highly capital intensive and very risky. The level of 
risk is expected to vary with the technology used. It is highly question­
able whether a viable purse-seining activity can actually be undertaken 
as a domestically-based operation. Current policy appears not to 
differentiate between these. In addition, the phasing out of under Distant 
Water Fishing Nation arrangements suggests that the government is 
prepared to take on the risk of highly uncertain returns. 
A viable domestic tuna industry can generate large potential gains 
to the country, however, the realisation of these gains will require 
substantial investments. Even then, these gains are not guaranteed 
because of the high risk nature of the activity. The choice then, is 
between large potential gains which are highly uncertain and smaller 
-but more certain gains in the form of license fees. Current policy 
appears to prefer the high risk option. 
Future pol icy options 
There is little doubt that Papua New Guinea's total fisheries resource 
is at present underutilised. Fisheries policy has aimed at developing 
this vast resource but the degree of success has so far been limited . A 
number of issues must be resolved before fisheries development can 
proceed. As highlighted, fisheries development must be approached at 
three levels: the subsistence and artisanal fisheries, coastal commercial 
fisheries and offshore fisheries. 
Subsistence and artisanal fisheries 
As with agriculture, the development of subsistence and artisanal 
fisheries can have the largest impact on rural communities. The 
transformation of such a fishery into one which is more commercial 
creates opportunities for employment and cash incomes. It contributes 
to the development of a more dynamic rural economy. The challenge 
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then is one of how best to foster this transition. It is argued here that 
such a transition cannot be forced. The early experience with coastal 
fisheries stations is evidence of this. Supply and demand-side constraints 
must be dealt with adequately before progress is possible. Public 
investment in infrastructure is vital if rural fishing communities are to 
have access to urban markets. Better marketing and storage I refrigerat­
ion facilities will enhance transportation and distribution. Fuel supply 
and outlets for fishing gear and basic repair and maintenance facilities 
are important supply-side factors . 
The lack of credit has also been identified as an important supply-side 
constraint. Credit is often needed to finance fishing equipment, outboard 
motors and small fishing boats or dinghies. Credit has traditionally 
been provided by the Rural Development Bank but the perceived high 
risk associated with fisheries lending has limited the scope for expansion. 
Fisheries lending has also been accorded low priority. 
A number of recent developments offer opportunities which could 
assist with the process of commercialisation of this sector. The commit­
ment for greater public investment expenditure by government should 
see the development of new infrastructure which could open up urban 
markets for more rural communities. In addition, the recently-adopted 
Provincial Government reforms should see more public servants 
working at the district level. This would become a ready market for 
much of the surplus production from rural communities, including 
fisheries products. 
In addition, mining and forestry activities are now more widespread 
and all are located in rural areas. Significant incomes are being 
channeled into rural communities from these activities, in turn boosting 
demand for rural goods and services. 
Conditions to promote commercialisation are now more favourable 
than ever before. A 'hands off' approach on the part of government 
policy could waste this opportunity. It is suggested that coastal fisheries 
stations be revived to take advantage of this opportunity. Production 
should be organised along the l ines of nucleus estates with a central 
processing facility which can function as a wholesale outlet. Fishing 
families are contracted to sell their produce to this central facility 
which should be equipped with all necessary facilities. Credit and 
extension training are also provided through this arrangement. 
The total investment necessary to establish such a production 
arrangement is expected to be much less than those spent on 
establishing resettlement schemes such as Gavien and Cape Rodney. 
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The Cape Rodney Smallholder Development Project was established at 
a cost of about K30 million (Temu 1995). For this amount of money, all 
coastal fisheries stations could be equipped with the most modern 
equipment and all necessary infrastructure established. The impact is 
likely to be more beneficial than the rubber schemes. For one thing, 
people are not displaced as they are able to operate from within their 
communities. They are also doing something with which they are 
already familiar. 
A central processing I storage facility would ensure that supply is 
more regular and is guaranteed and that quality control is more 
effective. These improvements could also present opportunities to 
explore more distant domestic markets as well as export markets. The 
existence of 20 such facilities throughout the country would greatly 
improve market access and foster the development of a domestic trade 
in fisheries products . 
The development of subsistence and artisanal fisheries along more 
commercial lines is likely to introduce new problems and challenges. 
The question of harvesting rights and the boundaries of these rights will 
have to be addressed as these resources attract greater commercial 
interest. These rights have to be defined between communities that 
share common fishing grounds. Complications are expected to arise, 
particularly with those coastal communities with little or no fishing 
tradition. 
The issue of rights is also complicated by the common-property 
nature of the resource. This makes such a resource vulnerable to over­
use and unsustainable harvesting. The breakdown of traditional systems 
of control means that resource management must have priority to 
ensure that there is a sustainable resource. Communities have to be 
directly involved in the management of their resources. This effort 
should be enhanced by scientific research and management techniques. 
Coastal commercial fisheries 
This is the one fishery which has had some success in its development 
as it is now totally operated by the private sector. The fact that the 
products (prawns, lobster and barramundi) are high value has helped. 
However, the three fisheries are somewhat location specific. Sufficient 
commercial quantities are found to exist only in the Gulf and Western 
shorelines. This limits the scope for expansion into new areas. 
Given the limited scope for expansion, resource management is 
crucial if the fishery is to be sustainable. Policy priority then is to develop 
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a detailed management plan. This should be developed in full  
consultation with the communities concerned and the private operators. 
Detailed scientific research is also necessary to determine minimum 
sustainable yields. The exposure of this fishery to mining waste from 
Ok Tedi is a concern which has to be taken seriously. The impact on 
this fishery has to be regularly monitored because any significant level 
of contamination could easily wipe out this fishery. Some compensation 
arrangement must be in place in case this happens. 
Offshore fisheries 
Current government policy to develop a viable domestic tuna industry 
is based on the premise that all potential benefits to developing this 
resource are internalised. Under the current licensing arrangements, the 
perception is that a large part of the resource rent accrues to the foreign 
fishing company. Domestication is therefore perceived as a means by 
which Papua New Guinea can maximise the benefits available from 
the development of its tuna resource. 
The policy issue is one of a choice, between developing a domestic 
tuna industry and / or using Distant Water Fishing Nation arrangements 
to harvest the resource for a negotiated fee. The current policy choice 
is to develop a viable domestic tuna industry and to phase out these 
arrangements as domestic capacity develops. 
A number of questions need to be answered if domestic tuna 
development is to succeed. The first is the question of whether there 
can really be a viable tuna industry in Papua New Guinea. Then there 
is the issue of the high levels of public investment needed to set up 
necessary infrastructure such as wharves, transport, storage and 
processing. Related to the question of viability is the extent to which 
the government is prepared to offer incentives and subsidies to make 
domestication viable. The absence of basic infrastructure means that 
substantial incentives and subsidies will have to be offered to attract 
private investment into the domestic tuna industry. 
It is argued that the high cost structure of the Papua New Guinea 
economy is likely to erode much of the viability of a domestic tuna 
industry. Purse seining is out of the question because it would be 
impossible to guarantee viability. The prospects for long-lining and 
pole and line are much better. However, the high cost of the public 
subsidies available under the Tuna Investment Guidelines could well 
reduce or even negate such viability. In this case, the subsidies amount 
to an income transfer to fishing operators, the majority of whom will 
Agriculture, forestry and fisheries I 1 71 
be foreign companies. Resource rents become dissipated and the 
benefits of domestic tuna development are not maximised from Papua 
New Guinea's point of view. 
There is need for a detailed industry study to determine the best 
option for Papua New Guinea. Such a study would need to assess all 
costs and benefits in order to determine viable activities. It is interesting 
to note that a number of the Micronesian countries (Federated States 
of Micronesia and the Republic of the Marshall Islands) are investing 
heavily into the development of domestic tuna industries. It is apparent 
that the high risk and high capital requirements of tuna development 
are not a deterrent. This should raise some concern particularly given 
the fact that investment is being financed using public funds. In small 
developing countries where capital is a major constraint, the oppor­
tunity cost for investing in tuna development could be extraordinarily 
high. The same could also be true in Papua New Guinea. 
If the pursuit of domestic tuna development through purse-seining 
is not a viable proposition, it make little sense to phase out under 
Distant Water Fishing Nation arrangements. The policy option then is 
to ensure that maximum rents are paid for the right to harvest tuna 
within the Exclusive Economic Zone. It is estimated that licence fees 
and other payments made by under Distant Water Fishing Nation 
amount to approximately K16 million per annum (Papua New Guinea 
1993). The question then is whether this is sufficient rent relative to 
that which accrues to the foreign company. 
Duncan and Temu (1996) show that if the portion paid by the US 
government is excluded from the total fees paid under the multilateral 
agreement with Foreign Fisheries Agency countries, the access fee 
represents only about 3 per cent of the total value of the catch. This is 
also representative of other bilateral access agreements, although these 
were found to range from 3 to 5 per cent. In the absence of any reliable 
production cost figures, it is difficult to know whether these reflect the 
true resource rent. The other problems undermining these rents are the 
high incidence of under-reporting and illegal fishing. Under these 
circumstances, it would make sense to adopt an access arrangement 
that maximises rents and minimises under-reporting and illegal fishing. 
Duncan and Temu (1996) propose an auction system to maximise 
rents from tuna for with Foreign Fisheries Agency countries either 
collectively or as individuals. Under this system, fishing firms from 
Distant Water Fishing Nations would bid for access rights to fish 
within the Papua New Guinea Exclusive Economic Zone. A fixed 
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number of licences are auctioned and the highest bidder is granted the 
license. The number of licences auctioned would correspond closely 
with sustainable stocks. The licences would also be tradable to allow 
for entry and exit and they would be valid for a specified period of 
time. Under this system, there is no longer any incentive to under­
report and it is in the interest of those licenced to report any illegal 
fishing. Transhipment, which increases the overall  cost of fishing, may 
also not be necessary if under-reporting is minimised . If it remains 
compulsory, the rents obtained under an auction system would be 
lower by the cost of transhipment. 
Concl usion 
The agriculture, forestry and fisheries sectors present a wide array of 
development challenges. The dominance of subsistence I non-monetary 
production in all these sectors presents peculiar development issues 
because market forces are not likely to be effective: people's perception 
and desires for development may not be consistent with those perceived 
by governments. The matching of these desires and perceptions is a 
necessary condition for the successful development of these sectors. 
Failure to do this is likely to delay the development process.  
Resource ownership issues introduce what could be the greatest 
development challenge for these and other resources in Papua New 
Guinea. Communal land ownership appears to have restricted private 
enterprise development, although there are exceptions to this as is 
clearly demonstrated by smallholder coffee development. The argument, 
however, is relevant within the context of the absence of a functioning 
land market which could in turn influence land use and allocation. 
The ownership of forestry resources under similar arrangements 
mean that extensive consultation is compulsory before resource 
development can actually begin. While this may be cumbersome, it 
provides security for developers and grants protection for resource 
owners against unscrupulous rent seekers. For fisheries resources, 
particularly onshore resources, communal ownership in the absence of 
traditional access control mechanisms, leads to common access problems 
such as overuse and the use of unsustainable harvesting techniques. In 
the case of offshore resources, provincial ownership claims could 
introduce additional obstacles to the development of these resources.  
An additional challenge in the development of agriculture, forestry 
and fisheries resources in Papua New Guinea is the introduction of 
new modes of production and technology within an environment with 
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existing modes of production and technology. The fact that these 
resources are already being utilised for subsistence production means 
that additional demands on these resources will create competition 
and sometimes conflict. While this competition is not apparent at this 
stage, it is an issue which must be addressed in the future . 
The promotion of downstream processing for forestry and greater 
domestication for offshore fisheries development are no guarantee that 
the full array of expected benefits will be generated. If viability is not 
possible, then the development of these resources along these lines will 
require significant public subsidies. Under these circumstances, it is 
more logical to maximise resource rents and use these to create jobs, 
establish infrastructure and provide better social services for the 
country as a whole. 
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The h u man resou rce d i lem ma:  
the m iss ing l i n k? 
Lauatu Tautea 
Twenty one years after independence Papua New Guinea is still looking 
for that magic touch which will provide the burst in economic growth 
and enable it to provide an acceptable standard of living for its 
population. Social indicators which provide indications of the strength 
of social and economic policy show Papua New Guinea's track record to 
be very poor in looking after the welfare of its people. Social develop­
ment indicators for Papua New Guinea continue to be poor despite 
phenomenal growth rates at times over the past few years. Life expect­
ancy at birth presently stands at 55 years compared to 65 and 62 for low 
middle-income countries and low-income countries. The infant 
mortality rate stands at 57 compared to 51 and 69 for lower middle­
income countries and low-income countries .  The adult literacy rate is 
an appalling 52 per cent compared to 75 and 60 per cent for lower 
middle-income and low-income countries .  
The government is in the process of implementing political and 
administrative reforms to the provincial government system aimed at 
improving the delivery of goods and services to the people and reducing 
the costs of such deliveries. The law-and-order situation has proven to 
be a deterrent to investment due to the inability of the economy to 
provide jobs for the products of an education system that is deemed 
inappropriate. Tribal warfare still occurs in the rural hinterland as 
modern medicine and health care leads to improved fertility and 
population pressures. The country is still reeling from the effects of its 
second economic and financial shock after the financial squeeze of early 
1994 when a drop in oil prices negatively impacted on government 
revenue. In 1990 the government implemented its first structural 
adjustment program via a 10 per cent devaluation of the kina, freezing 
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of public service expenditure, credit squeeze and reforms to improve 
public service productivity. The second structural adjustment 
implemented in 1995 fol lowed from a 12 per cent devaluation and 
subsequent floating of the exchange rate in September 1994. The 
structural adjustment package is consequent upon financial assistance 
provided by the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Australia 
and Japan which in turn is dependent upon government implement­
ation of the 27 policy matrix. The present problems exist despite Papua 
New Guinea being blessed with natural resources and currently 
experiencing a mineral and petroleum boom. Economic growth for 
Papua New Guinea is far from impressive reflecting, in part, the shifts 
in development of the mining and petroleum sector and swings in 
prices of both mineral and petroleum products. Real growth, estimated 
at 1 6.6 per cent in 1993, fell to 3.1 per cent in 1994 and a negative 4.8 
per cent in 1995. This year 1996 growth has been forecast at just over 4 
per cent. The uncertainty in economic growth performance is a clear 
indication that the Papua New Guinea economy is yet to enjoy the 
stable and consistent growth rates enjoyed by its ASEAN neighbours 
and those of developed economies. 
The structural rigidities hampering Papua New Guinea's economic 
performance have been identified as due to the lack of basic infra­
structure, high cost nature of the economy, imperfect markets and a 
rigid customary land tenure system. The government announced its 
major development objectives in the 1996 Budget as improved private 
sector development, improved delivery of public services, increased 
employment opportunities, increased rural production and improved 
access to services and income earning opportunities . The government 
is intent on fast-tracking a number of major developmental projects to 
promote economic performance in the months leading up to the 1997 
elections. This includes the Port Moresby Poreporena freeway, Jackson's 
airport redevelopment and the trans-island highway to name a few. 
The push for modernisation and industrialisation of the economy has 
been boosted by the construction of two fish canneries and a cement 
refinery. The development of the Lihir Gold Mine has been fast­
tracked as a means of increasing employment opportunities and 
contribution to government revenue.  The pursuit of economic growth 
through high capital interventions such as canneries, highways and 
mining and petroleum ventures will no doubt increase the Papua New 
Guinea's capital base and once again push growth rates to enviable 
levels with the region. The drawback with this approach is that growth 
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rates present a picture only of the capital base in monetary terms and 
may not translate into improved living standards for the majority of 
Papua New Guineans living in rural areas. A long-standing debate 
continues on the negative aspects of a rigid wages systems on product­
ivity and hence the competitiveness of the economy vis-a-vis its 
competitors. The liberalised wage setting mechanisms which followed 
from the rulings of the 1992 Minimum Wages Board has silenced critics 
of wage fixation. 
As a contribution to the debate and search for the appropriate 
development mode we take the view that the answer to our perplexing 
economic problems stem from an undue emphasis on developing 
Papua New Guinea's natural resources and the failure to recognise 
fully the importance of human resource development in the develop­
ment matrix. 
The case for h u man resource development 
At the firm level human resource development describes those activities 
such as formal and informal education-on-the-job training that 
contributes to the productive capacity of the person receiving them. At 
the macro level, in addition to the above, human resource development 
refers also to the employment and income distribution, poverty allev­
iation and health and nutrition policies. Policies on human resource 
complement population policy because of the impact of improved 
education and health on fertility. Human resource development is said 
to have elements of both education, health and nutrition policy. Due to 
time constraints, this chapter concentrates only on the education aspect 
of human resource development. 
It can be said that recognition of the importance of human contribut­
ion to the production process is as old as economic theory. Adam Smith 
in the Wealth of Nations considered a man's talents to be part of his 
fortune as well as that of the society he belonged. Ricardo's labour 
theory of value assesses the performance of a firm on the basis of the 
contribution from the three traditional productive factors-land, 
labour and capital and used factor prices to measure their relative 
contribution to the production process. It was postulated that the 
relative values of commodities are determined by the comparative 
amounts of labour required to produce them and that the different 
qualities of labour embodied in production value of the good depends 
on the comparative still of the labour and the intensity of the labour 
input. On the other hand Karl Marx argued the supremacy of labour 
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and its exploitation in deriving surplus which was wrongly appropriated 
by the capitalists .  Alfred Marshall argued that the most valuable of all 
capital is that invested in human beings. 
The human capital theory by Theodore Shultz emerged in the 1960s 
to explain the individual's decision to invest in education as based 
solely on an evaluation of the costs and benefits derived from education. 
In this context human resource development is viewed as another 
consumption good which utilises capital goods in the process. The 
Newhousehold Economics theory (Becker 1976) incorporated non­
economic aspects of individual behaviour such as the number of 
children, time allocation and value of time as important determinants 
in the individual's decision-making process on education. 
Growth accounting studies have been used to delineate the 
important contribution of labour or humans to economic development. 
Denison (1962) and Solow (1962) used the traditional production 
function to access the relative contribution of the different factors of 
production to total output growth. These studies indicated that less than 
50 per cent of total output growth could be explained by the conventional 
factors of production. The rest of the changes could be attributed to 
qualitative changes (technological change) which originated from the 
human factor. 
Harbison and Myers (1965) summarise the importance of human 
resource development to economic performance thus 
In the final analysis, the wealth of a country is based upon its power to 
develop and effectively utilize the innate capacities of its people. The 
economic development of nations, therefore, is the result of human 
effort. It takes skilled human agents to discover and exploit natural 
resources, to mobilise capital, develop technology, to produce goods and 
to carry on trade. Indeed, if a country is unable to develop its human 
resources, it cannot build anything else, whether it be a modem political 
system, a sense of national unity, or a prospero-us economy (196 5:ix). 
Comparative experiences of neighbouring countries 
The experience of countries closer to Papua New Guinea-the East 
Asian tigers and other South and East Asian countries-show the 
importance of human resource development to economic performance. 
Countries like Ja pan, Singapore and Hong Kong all share the common 
characteristic of not having access to natural resources and they were 
able to overcome this disadvantage through the effective use of their 
human resource . Most of these countries were also able to achieve full 
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employment in the 1940s-Japan, 1960s and 1970s.  Japan has been 
able to achieve its present status as the second most industrialised 
country in the world without the abundant natural resources.  It was 
able to achieve its present status by instilling Confucion ethics into its 
work force and providing access to at least seven years of education. 
Consequently, improvements to the quality of human labour played a 
strategic role in the selection, adaptation, dissemination and efficient 
operation of technology. Progress in the industrial manufacturing 
sector was also accompanied by an average education profile averaging 
10 years and was further complemented by in-service and on-the-job 
training programs. South Korea benefited from Japanese colonisation. 
The Philippines was not able to take advantage of its elaborate education 
system to emulate the growth performance of the newly industrialising 
countries. Apart from the confusion created by being under two 
different colonial powers, it chose to concentrate its resources on high 
capital investment, ignoring its agricultural base which supports a 
substantial proportion of its population. The Sri Lankan model is 
another case where high human resource investment was not balanced 
by material investment. 
Malaysia and Thailand are two Southeast Asian countries which 
were able to achieve phenomenal growth rates and full employment. 
Malaysia approached or achieved full employment by the 1980s. 
Thailand, which never experienced colonisation, had a very high 
literacy rate by the 1960s provided by Buddhist temple schools. 
It is fair to argue that the consistent and stable growth experienced 
by these economies are in large part due to the contribution of a more 
articulate and imaginative human capital stock. There is a need to 
undertake econometric studies to establish the causal relationship. Any 
deviation from the stable pattern of growth would be the result of the 
flow-on effects of capital and technology which raises the productivity 
of labour from intermittent fluctuations of commodity prices on the 
world market. 
Ed ucation pol icy 
The prospects for Papua New Guinea 's human resource development 
depend on major initiatives taken in the education and health sectors, 
including elements of population and poverty alleviation policies. The 
current education reforms to the education sector, based on the Education 
Sector Review of 1991, are aimed at providing easy access for all seven 
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year olds, providing nine years of primary education from prep to 
Grade 8 and improving access at high school and national high school 
through top-ups at existing schools. 
The education dilemma confronting Papua New Guinea is 
presented by Gannicott as one where 
• fewer than one-third of population aged 15  and over can 
read or write 
• 86 per cent of the adult population have not received any 
formal schooling 
• of the 15  per cent of adults who have attended school, 80 per 
cent have gone no further than primary school 
• only two-thirds of the relevant age group are currently 
enrolled in primary school (Gannicott 1987). 
A more startling picture on educational characteristics shows that 
of the 53.3 who received no education, 46.6 per cent were male and 
63.6 per cent were female (Table 9.1 ) .  Furthermore, 69.7 per cent of 
males in subsistence agriculture had no education, compared to 59.7  
per cent in cash cropping (see Table 9.4) .  Education attainment where 
52.3 per cent of Papua New Guineans 10 years old and over in 1 990 
Table 9. 1 .  Educational characteristics of the citizen population employed 
in monetary activities, 1 971-90 (per cent) 
Male Female Total 
No education 
1971 53.6 62.1 55.7 
1980 60.6 79.2 68.0 
1990 46.6 63.6 53.3 
Less than six years school ing 
1971 33.0 29.2 32.0 
1980 60.6 79.2 68.0 
1990 11.6 9.7 10.8 
More than ten years school ing 
1971 1.7 0.9 1.5 
1980 7.6 2.9 5.6 
1990 14.0 7.0 11.3 
Source: Bi l l ington, H . ,  1 984. Inequality and Income Distribution in PNG: analysis of data 
from the 1 980 National Population Census, National Planning Office, Port Moresby:Table 4. 1 0; 
prel iminary computer tabulations from UNDP/I LO, 1 993 . Papua New Guinea: challenges for 
employment and human resources development, report of UNDP/ILO Employment Strategy and 
Human Resource Development Mission to Papua New Guinea, Port Moresby. 
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Table 9.2. Citizen wage labour force by educational attainment, 1 980 and 
1 990 (per cent) 
1980 
No education 38.6 
Grades 1-5 13.6 
Grade 6 17.7 
Grades 7-9 12.1 
Grades 10-11 15.6 





























Note: In 1 980 those educated to above Grade 1 2  were included with Grade 1 2 . Data for 1 980 
include the North Solomons. 
Source: National Statistics Office cited by UNDP/I LO, 1 993 . Papua New Guinea: challenges 
for employment and human resources development, report of UNDP/ILO Employment Strategy 
and Human Resource Development Mission to Papua New Guinea, Port Moresby. 
had no schooling and the other 34.9 per cent had formal schooling up 
to Grade 6 level (Table 9.2) .  At high school level 5 per cent had Grades 
7 to 9, 3.8 per cent Grades 10 and 11 and 0.6 per cent Grade 1 2. Only 
1 .98 per cent are certificate and diploma holders compared to 0.2 per 
cent with degrees.  
Inefficiencies in the present education system are related to its 
inadequate capacity to meet demand at mainly primary and secondary 
level, the high attrition rate, high cost at the tertiary level, inadequate 
supply capacity to meet demand for skilled and professional labour and 
low quality education. Inadequate capacity at the primary school level 
is responsible for the fact that only two-thirds of the relevant age group 
were able to enrol in primary school and 13 per cent in high schools. In 
1989 only 34 per cent of Grade 6 students were able to proceed to Grade 
7 and the rest either attended the vocational schools or were forced out 
altogether from the system. At the high school level only 10 per cent of 
students who completed Grade 10 went on to do Grade 11 .  The high 
cost nature of education at the upper secondary and tertiary level is on 
account of a low teacher to student ratio of about 1 :8, employment of 
expatriates at about two to three times more than national staff and a 
generous Natschol system. 
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The choice between providing primary education or tertiary education 
is a major one confronting policymakers. If anything the educational 
reforms shows that the government favours the higher marginal 
returns from investment in primary education compared to tertiary 
education. By targeting primary education, the government hopes to 
achieve a fair distribution of income and a more egalitarian society. 
Already the Government's bias has been demonstrated in the cuts to 
the two university budgets and the introduction of the user-pays 
principle to students at the tertiary level . A continued dependence on 
foreign skilled labour should serve as a reminder to the government 
that seeks to downgrade tertiary level education. Government policy 
towards tertiary education will be dictated mainly by Papua New 
Guinea's requirements for skilled professionals. The applications for 
work permits provide a useful guide for the demand tertiary 
education. The demand for skilled expatriate (approved positions and 
work permits issued) stands at 28,724 (Table 9.3) .  About 42.2 per cent 
of these were in the professional and technical category, with 34.4 per 
cent in the administrative and managerial category. 
Health pol icy 
The impact of health policy on human resource development is based 
on the principle that an unhealthy society becomes unproductive. The 
discussion on health issues focuses on the present Health Plan by 
reviewing its probable impact on services provided and health 
indicators. Comparisons between this and the previous health plan 
will be made to take out the rhetoric from what actually took place. 
Pol icy issues and recom mendations 
An appropriate human resource development strategy for Papua New 
Guinea would take into account the existing population education profile 
and the impact of the present educational reforms. The appropriate 
human resource development strategy will take into account government 
population policies, income distribution and poverty alleviation 
policies and manufacturing and policies to promote economic growth . 
The long gestation period for investment in human development to 
bear fruits requires taking medium-term to long-term decisions on the 
appropriate human resource development strategy relevant to Papua 
New Guinea. The immediate human resource question for Papua New 
Guinea is to address the status quo on the present population and 
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labour for education profiles. An estimated 40,000 people leave the 
education system each year (Table 9 .1 ) . This is a conservative estimate 
and the true figure maybe around 50,000 since there is a substantial 
number who cannot make into the education system at all (UNDP I 
ILO 1993). Since it is assumed that the absorptive capacity of the 
economy is 5,000 the appropriate human resource development strategy 
will include strategies to absorb the remaining 45,000 people. Such a 
strategy will also take into account the effect that most of these people 
do not possess any educational qualifications. 
Table 9.3. An esti mate of labour supply, 1 990 
Grade 6 leavers who would not have proceeded to 
further education (G rade 7 and vocational schools) 
Grade 10 leavers who would not have proceeded 
to Grade 11 or other higher levels of education 
Grade 12 leavers who would not have proceeded 
to un iversity 
H igher Education Outputa 
Un iversit ies 
Techn ical Col lege 






Agricu lture Educationc 
Fisheries and Forestry 
Legal education 
Civil Aviation and Culture 
Private Sector Col leges 
Divine Word Institute 
Pacific Adventist Col lege 
Sonoma Adventist Col lege 

















b The output from uni versities in 1 99 1  was only 522 due to student unrest, and consequent 
campus closure. 
c Figures exclude Post Certificate Diploma Courses for H igher Agricultural Training I nstitute. 
Note: Estimates of items 1 ,  2 and 3 are based on enrolments in 1 989 in the last grade and intake 
in the next higher level in 1 990. 
Source: National Stat istics Office cited by U N D P/I LO, 1 993 . Papua New Guinea: challenges 
for employment and human resources development, report of UNDP/ I LO Employment Strategy 
and Human Resource Development Mission to Papua New Guinea, Port Moresby. 
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Table 9.4. Labour force and total population with no schooling, 1 980 and 
1 990 (per cent) 
Subsistence agricu lture 
Cash cropping 
Total labour force 













Sou rce: UNDP/I LO, 1 993.  Papua New Guinea: challenges for employment and human 
resources development, report of UNDP/ILO Employment Strategy and H uman Resource 
Development M ission to Papua New Guinea, Port Moresby. 
About 60 per cent of the labour force over 10  years of age do not 
possess any education (Table 9.4). With a high percentage of the 
population without any form of education or possessing to Grade 6 
education, the appropriate human resource and employment strategies 
will aim for labour-intensive activities. The UNDP / ILO Report on 
Human Resource Development has recommended rural development 
projects encompassing both agricultural and non-agricultural projects. 
The government will need to provide a supportive policy environment 
that will permit both agricultural and non-agricultural components of 
the rural economy. 
The report also recommends community participation in the design 
and execution of rural development projects that are broad-based and 
integrates all areas taking into account the entire population. Labour­
intensive rural public works programs using labour-intensive methods 
should be initiated based on the village services model . The use of 
local materials is advocated in capital works program such as roads 
construction and rural shelter policy wil l  utilise both local materials 
and unskilled labour. 
The Papua New Guinea Government, like any other government, 
takes a special interest in promoting industrialisation and manufacturing 
base of the economy. For Papua New Guinea, this has been demon­
strated by the keenness to establish the cement factories and tuna 
canneries despite increase costs to the consumer. A del iberate policy to 
promote industrialisation requires certain choices to be made about 
the type of education provided. Adrian Wood's model of NO-ED (no 
education or uncompleted schooling at primary) BAS-ED (completed 
primary or lower secondary but no more) SKILL-ED (those with 
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substantial post-basic education) offer the appropriate analytical 
framework on human resource development to achieve these aims. The 
NO-ED model typifies the present situation in Papua New Guinea 
where a substantial proportion of the population are illiterate and the 
economy exports primary commodities. The BAS-ED and SKILL-ED 
path offers the best proposition if Papua New Guinea is to pursue 
modernisation. The SKILL-ED model refers to training under PETT 
programs offered by technical schools. Papua New Guinea would do 
well to phase out PETT type training in favour of industry-based 
training provided on the job as it is superior in imparting industrial 
and technical skills. More emphasis will need to be given to on-the-job 
training programs such as that offered by mining companies. There is 
strong evidence to suggest that development of the Ok Tedi, Porgera, 
Misima and Kutubu ventures benefited immensely from the superior 
technical training offered by Bougainville Copper Mine. 
The BAS-ED mode is consistent with the creation of a l ight 
manufacturing base and will overcome the technological, operational 
and human capital constraints before expanding to large projects. This 
model is consistent with the aims of the present educational reforms to 
allow for nine years of education at the primary school level followed 
by industry and on-the-job training which is far superior to the present 
PETT training at technical schools. 
The attractiveness of programs to increase the manufacturing base of 
the economy by most governments entail the introduction of modes of 
production that are alien to most Papua New Guineans. For Papua New 
Guinea to benefit fully from the transition, the work force will be required 
to adopt a change in values and attitudes consistent with Western 
production practices as opposed to Papua New Guinea's communal 
mode of production. Consequently, the type of education will emphasise 
non-cognitive aspects of learning aimed at changing values of society 
and the development of work ethics . 
Last, but not least, there is a need for human resource development 
strategies to take the lead in not only emphasising the productive aspect 
of the human capital but to take into account the fact that the ultimate 
aim of development policy should be to lead to an improved quality of 
life for Papua New Guineans. 
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Physical resource development­
i nf rastructu re 
Miria Ume 
Physical infrastructure is fundamental to resource development­
without roads, coffee would not reach sea ports for export; without 
water supplies mines would not operate and towns would not function; 
and without electricity most manufacturing industries would collapse. 
Development of Papua New Guinea's economy goes hand-in-hand with 
the development of supporting infrastructure. However, we should not 
forget that Papua New Guinea gained independence in 1975 with very 
little infrastructure in place. In the last two decades of development, 
priority has been placed more on new infrastructure construction than 
maintenance. 
The interrelationship between physical infrastructure and economic 
and social development is by no means limited only to transport 
infrastructure .  However, as Secretary for the Department of Transport 
and Works, most of my time is spent on planning and developing 
transport infrastructure. Land, sea and air transport infrastructure are 
now the combined concern of the new Department which was created 
from the amalgamation of the Departments of Transport, Works and 
Civil Aviation in 1995. 
Because my background and responsibilities are mainly with trans­
port, I will primarily discuss the ways in which transport infrastructure 
can accelerate economic growth and promote social development. 
Why provide transport infrastructu re? 
Transport infrastructure facilitates the movement of vehicles, passengers 
and freight, allowing the widespread marketing of goods and services 
and the concentration and specialisation of activities. Without transport 
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facilities, activity is limited to a confined area dictated by pedestrian 
access and remains largely subsistence in nature. Transport infrastructure 
provides a communication route, allowing ideas and experience to be 
exchanged. It permits the delivery of educational, health and other 
social services. 
So, while the basic function of transport is always the same, the 
choice of projects and their relative priorities can respond to various 
government objectives: to promote export production; to act as a unifying 
influence for unconnected regions of the country; to aid the extension 
of welfare programs; to cater for the latest demand for mobility; or as 
a means of generating employment. 
The present state of development 
Papua New Guinea is a mountainous country and spread over several 
large islands. This ensures a continuing role for sea transport for bulk 
freight and air transport for high value by weight commodities. Because 
of terrain and low population density, there is not yet a fully connected 
road network on the mainland. With the important exception of the 
Highlands Highway, and the Lae-Madang network, roads radiate only 
from the provincial centres into the hinterland. 
Papua New Guinea supports a considerable number of overseas 
ports and numerous minor ports-of-call frequented by coastal shipping 
and small boats. It is penetrated by two large river systems, the Fly and 
the Sepik, both navigable to 3 metres draft up to 500 kilometres from 
their mouths. While the Fly supports considerable shipping, mainly to 
Kiunga for Ok Tedi, there is little commercial use of the Sepik. 
Air transport has played a prominent part in Papua New Guinea's 
transport development-there are several hundred small airstrips as 
well as regular scheduled air services between all  the regional centres. 
Road infrastructu re 
By world standards, Papua New Guinea is a relatively sparsely 
populated country. It is also a country with difficult geographic 
conditions-mountainous and rugged terrain, impenetrable swamps 
and jungle vegetation, and a multitude of dispersed islands. Though 
the country still relies heavily on air and sea transport to move people 
and goods there has been considerable construction of new roads and 
other transport infrastructure over the last two decades. 
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These new developments hide the reality that access to modern 
transport is still not readily available or affordable to many of the 
population. There is also limited access to articulated water, electricity 
and to telecommunications. 
There are some 20,000 kilometres of non-urban roads in Papua New 
Guinea, of which 9,000 kilometres is administered by the national 
government (national roads). The remainder are largely the responsibility 
of provincial and local-level governments. In addition, a significant 
road network is operated by commercia l  interests, predominantly 
forestry companies in the course of their logging activities. 
Though nominally there are 20,000 kilometres of non-urban public 
roading in Papua New Guinea, probably a quarter or more is currently 
impassable or in some other way not useable for everyday purposes. 
Even some sections of the national road network cannot be used during 
the wet season, or can only be used with difficulty in the dry season. 
To construct the country's 9,000 kilometres of national roads today 
would cost some K4 billion to KS .5 billion. The replacement cost of 
provincial roads may be of the order of K3 billion to KS billion. 
Two recent studies administered by the World Bank show that this 
investment is under considerable threat because of lack of adequate 
maintenance. There is also another serious consequence. Deterioration 
in the condition of roads is now loading road users with sizeable 
additional costs in high vehicle operating costs . For example, a set of 
tyres on trucks operating between Porgera and Lae used to last 14 
round trips. Now, with the deteriorating condition of the Highlands 
Highway, a set of tyres now only lasts 8 round trips. 
The Road Inventory I Road Maintenance (RIRM) Study carried out 
by Beca International Consultants conclude that K140 million a year 
(excluding costs for emergencies and bridges) needs to be spent on 
Papua New Guinea's non-urban roads to optimise user and road agency 
(that is, national or provincial government) costs. 
Of this amount, K90 million a year should be spent on national roads 
and KSO million on provincial roads. For the last six years, national 
government has been spending an average of K20 million on actual road 
maintenance. Expenditure by provincial governments has been less. 
In another study undertaken by Works Consultancy Services, the 
consultants estimated that K12 million needs to be spent on bridge 
maintenance each year. This excludes funds for emergency work of 
Kl .2 million and replacement of worn-out bridges at K13 million a 
year. Currently, less than K200,000 a year is allocated to routine bridge 
maintenance. Most expenditure on bridges occurs as the result of 
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bridge failure or some other emergency. K4.3 million a year needs to 
be spent on maintenance of bridges on provincial roads. 
In most developing countries, of which Papua New Guinea is no 
exception, roads are publicly funded and these funds are invariably 
constrained. Road construction and, more particularly, road mainten­
ance has a limited political appeal and the supporters usually have to 
fight hard for its share of the annual budget. 
With infrastructure development heavily dependent on international 
donor funding, the lending policies of donors influence project selection. 
Historically, the preference for dealing with central government has 
tended to concentrate funding on rural trunk roads, and on capital 
works rather than maintenance . While this does seem to be changing, 
we see a lot of funding going into relatively low traffic volume rural 
roads, while the condition of roads in several urban centres and 
important economic roads is very poor despite high vehicle operating 
costs being incurred. 
Infrastructure for civil aviation 
There are 512 airstrips in Papua New Guinea. The Office of Civil 
Aviation is responsible for operating and maintaining 22 major aero­
dromes and 25 small national government aerodromes in Papua New 
Guinea. Provincial governments own and operate about 160 aerodromes; 
the remaining licensed aerodromes and helipads are owned, operated 
and maintained by community and private organisations. 
As well as its responsibility to provide and maintain aerodromes, 
the Office of Civil Aviation provides and maintains aeronautical 
navigational aids and air traffic control and communication systems. 
Some of the equipment used is old and in urgent need for replacement. 
However, in 1996 insufficient funds were allocated for the National 
Airport improvement plan which basically relates to airport develop­
ments, upgrading, specific and routine maintenance. Much of the 
maintenance in aviation will be funded by The Australian Agency for 
International Development (AusAID). The maintenance program will 
cost K30 million over a 3-year period and an additional K30 million 
will be considered after a review of progress during the second year of 
the program. This program will eventually cover 37 national airports 
and will improve-resealing or resheeting of runways, taxiways and 
aprons, and also replacement of navigational, meteorological and 
communication equipment. AusAID will also deliver six new fire 
tenders. 
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Port and mariti me infrastructure 
The main government agencies responsible for the maritime sub-sector 
are the Department of Transport and Works, which is responsible for 
regulation of shipping, provision of navigational aids and maritime 
safety, while Papua New Guinea Harbours Board controls and maintains 
17  'declared ports' (ports of entry) around the country. 
In addition to the 17  declared ports there are several major private 
bulk ports and an estimated 300 small port facilities owned by a variety 
of government agencies and private sector organisations. There is no 
single government agency responsible for providing, maintaining or 
regulating these facilities. Private companies operate a number of 
private ports, wharves and cargo handling facilities throughout the 
country. Most of Papua New Guinea's  log exports are shipped directly 
from logging areas adjacent to the coast or inland waterways. 
The Department of Transport and Works Maritime Division 
maintains maritime navigational aids annually to keep them in good 
working condition at a cost of some KS00,000. There are currently some 
167 lighted maritime navigational aids in Papua New Guinea territorial 
waters, 400 day markers and 6 racons. Eighty-nine unlit beacons are 
proposed to be upgraded to lit beacons under a K30 million program 
funded by Asian Development Bank. Main shipping routes are 
marked by navigational aids to a rudimentary standard, but large 
tracts of coastal and reef areas are totally unmarked. In addition, 
extensive areas of the archipelago are unsurveyed or only partly 
surveyed .  
Maintenance of infrastructure 
If we are to accelerate economic and social development in Papua 
New Guinea the first task to be undertaken is to rectify the often poor 
condition of transport infrastructure. The poor condition of the 
country's roads, for example, is conservatively costing road users at 
least K200 million a year in additional operating costs . In addition, the 
periodic and permanent closure of roads is causing the country to lose 
a large amount in potential production each year. Crops such as coffee 
are not grown or harvested because people cannot physically transport 
their products to market, or can only do so at prohibitive cost. Crops 
rot because it is impossible to get them to markets . High transport cost 
is prohibiting cash cropping and marketing of local produce. 
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Social indicators are not very encouraging; lives are lost, sicknesses 
endured and education impaired because access to health and education 
facilities is difficult, costly or unreliable. 
The effects of poorly maintained infrastructure is more insidious. 
The principal consequence is that safety is compromised. If navigation 
beacons are not working the risks of shipping accidents increase. If 
airport runways deteriorate to an unacceptable condition, airports are 
likely to be closed. Poorly functioning of navigational aids and 
communication systems heighten the risk of air accidents . All this 
increases economic and social costs, and can cost lives as well .  
These observations make it  quite clear that inadequate maintenance 
is a cost to the economy and inhibits economic growth. There is also a 
serious social cost. Successive national and provincial governments 
must take more responsibility and improve this situation. 
New infrastructure 
Construction of new transport infrastructure encourages and supports 
economic growth. It does this in three ways. First, infrastructure is vital 
and necessary for development to occur-construction of access to a 
new mine is a good example. Without it the mine cannot be developed 
and will not operate . Second, new transport infrastructure can provide 
a cheaper alternative to existing transport options. This is often the 
appeal of new road construction, especially where an area only has air 
access. And third, new construction creates employment. There is a 
close relationship between income, investment, construction and growth. 
When national income is high and increasing, a large part of the income 
is devoted to investment on new infrastructure construction, when the 
increase in income (GDP growth) is reduced, the growth of investment 
also decreases. 
The construction of new transport infrastructure and the upgrading 
of existing infrastructure is a major preoccupation in Papua New Guinea. 
This is understandable given the rapid development of the country 
over a very short period of time, especially since World War II .  At the 
national level, the government has concerns for building an inter­
connecting national highway system to promote national integration 
and to foster economic development. 
Each year, much time and energy is spent on constructing new 
transport infrastructure, such as roads, jetties and airstrips, at the local 
level. It is often said that much of this is politically motivated. 
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Unfortunately, this investment is often wasted because the infra­
structure is not maintained and in most cases fails to induce and 
sustain economic development. 
One can ask two questions about new infrastructure developments. 
'How effective are they in promoting economic and social development?', 
and 'are the projects the best ones available?' 
These questions are best answered when we look at the resources 
available to implement them. 
Choices 
Given the need to maintain and expand transport infrastructure in 
Papua New Guinea, funding is extremely limited. The nature of trade­
offs in expenditure are then, particularly important. Perhaps the most 
fundamental trade-off is that between expenditure on maintaining 
existing infrastructure versus expenditure on new infrastructure. 
Currently, national government is spending K400 million on three 
large transport projects . Construction of the Bereina-Malalaua road 
will cost K130 million over a 4-year period, the upgrading of Jacksons 
Airport terminal K150 million over a 3-year period and construction of 
Burns Peak Project over a 3-year period at a cost of some K120 million. 
Other approved expenditure on new or upgraded transport infra­
structure (excluding ports), amounts to K80 million. 
The optimum maintenance expenditure which should be spent on 
Papua New Guinea's roads, requires expenditure of K46 million a year 
on rehabilitation and restoration. K37 million a year is necessary for 
national roads alone. AusAID is currently funding K20 million annually 
for such work. The Asian Development Bank is soon likely to approve 
expenditure of K40 million over the next two years. The European 
Union committed to an expenditure of K40 million commencing in 
October 1996, the World Bank and the national government will spend 
some funds on road rehabilitation and restoration. 
This combined expenditure will go some way towards arresting the 
deteriorating condition of national roads. However, what is missing is 
assurance that sufficient funds will be made available for routine maint­
enance . It is the lack of routine maintenance that causes deterioration 
of infrastructure and high user costs. Inadequate routine maintenance 
results in the need for continual rehabilitation and restoration work, 
which is very expensive. It is far better for the country to spend more on 
routine maintenance and avoid this cost. The same applies to mainten­
ance of civil aviation and maritime facilities. 
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If there is a choice to be made between expenditure on maintenance 
and expenditure on new construction, there are also choices to be made 
between individual projects. 
For most, but not all, new transport infrastructure projects, feasibility 
studies are undertaken to establish net economic and other benefits. 
Theoretically, projects for implementation should be selected in order of 
greatest benefit. This is not always the case, and projects are implement­
ed which eventually have low or even negative economic rates of return. 
Perhaps what is really missing in the selection of new infrastructure 
construction projects is an emphasis on identifying, selecting and 
supporting real winners-projects which are most likely to lead to rapid 
economic development and social improvement. The track record of 
past infrastructure investments, except those specifically for mining and 
forestry, is not encouraging. Growth in agricultural output, for example, 
is only 1 per cent compared to population growth of 2.3 per cent. 
We should be taking a far more integrated approach to investment 
in transport infrastructure. Given the scarcity of resources, far greater 
priority needs to be given to infrastructure projects which are linked to 
specific well-supported development projects or programs. We cannot 
afford the luxury of investing in infrastructure and hoping that 
economic development and social improvement will follow. 
This is not to suggest a government-directed approach to economic 
development-the private sector should largely take the lead in 
promoting resource and other developments. What private enterprise 
needs to do is to be far more coherent in their plans before government 
provides the necessary infrastructure. This has generally happened 
with many specific larger developments like oil palm projects, mining 
and forestry developments. However, wider benefits will be achieved 
if smaller business developments and the efforts of individual rural 
producers are also embraced. The promotion of tourism is an obvious 
example. The Minister for Civil Aviation and Tourism has announced 
his support for the development of international airports. To justify 
these developments there needs to be parallel development of 
businesses to make the most of the new air connections. If this is not 
assured, then the new or upgraded aviation infrastructure should not 
be provided by the government. 
Government departments have a leading role in identifying and 
promoting winning economic developments which deserve public 
investment in transport infrastructure. This must be a joint effort 
alongside provincial and local-level governments and private 
enterprise. 
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Such developments should not just be traditional resource projects, 
but should embrace developments in the wider community, including 
support for individual agricultural producers. 
We must look seriously at the consequences of continuing to disperse 
our investments, whether it be in infrastructure or in productive 
enterprises . 
Establ ishing priorities 
On the grounds of economic return, spending public money on transport 
infrastructure maintenance should be accorded the highest priority. 
The Road Inventory I Road Maintenance Study calculated that 
expenditure of Kl 40 million a year onroad maintenance will reduce 
user costs by K210 million and save K105 million in overseas funds. 
This is a 100 per cent annual economic rate of return. Typically, new 
road projects are calculated to produce an economic rate of return of 
between 10 and 20 per cent. Most actually return 10 per cent or less . 
A saving of KlOO million a year to existing road users means that 
more money will be left for investment in large and small-scale 
productive enterprises. Quite aside from the benefits from these savings, 
improved road reliability and reduced user costs also have the potential 
to significantly encourage increased and new output, particularly for 
agriculture exports . Social benefits are improved access to health and 
education services. 
Though increased road maintenance has the potential to accelerate 
economic growth and improve social development pressures to build 
new transport infrastructure rather than upgrade the existing infra­
structure will continue. 
To accelerate economic growth, we need to consider new approaches 
to how new transport infrastructure projects are prioritised . Priority 
must be given to projects which are economic and social development 
winners. In some cases these will be obvious-such as particular 
resources developments. In other cases, we need to go out of our way 
to package and support potential developments so that when infra­
structure is built there will be concentrated and sustained growth and 
social improvement. 
Adopting this approach implies a radical change from current 
investment in transport infrastructure . In past years, for example, a 
considerable sum has been spent on a large number of small transport 
projects through Members of Parliament. The effects of this expenditure 
have often been very localised, limited in impact and lasting only for a 
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short while. Full marks to the government for its stand on provincial 
reforms-under the new Organic Law, if fully implemented, will see 
all funds channelled through provincial governments through the 
Rural Action Program (RAP). This will enable the Provincial Assembly, 
rather than individuals, to decide on what is best for the province. 
Prioritising not only affects road infrastructure but infrastructure 
for air and maritime transport as well .  Here, there may need to be 
trade-offs between modes. In particular, we need to be careful that we 
do not duplicate between road and air transport. As the road network 
continues to expand, it may no longer be necessary to retain some 
smaller airfields. These issues emphasise the need for systematic 
intermodal transport planning. For example, possible future develop­
ment of inland waterways will require coordination with the land 
transport subsector to ensure that wharves and jetties are constructed 
at locations which are served by road access, and possibly also small 
airstrips where possible. 
Similarly the development of the major ports is associated very 
closely with the development of extended road systems and the 
development of new areas to be served from the port. 
Funding and implementation 
The New Organic Law will result in a substantial shift of resources 
and decision-making to provincial and local-level governments. 
Providing and maintaining transport infrastructure will increasingly 
be their responsibility. The converse is that the national government is 
likely to have less funding and less responsibility. These changes have 
a number of consequences for each level of government. 
Under the New Organic Law, provincial and local-level governments 
will each receive specific infrastructure grants from national govern­
ment. The grants are equivalent to K20 per head of population and 
K20 per square kilometre of area. By law, half of the amount must be 
spent on physical infrastructure, and half on social infrastructure . 
Provincial and local-level governments will also have other funds 
to spend on infrastructure, such as provincial taxes, special support 
grants and aid donor assistance . 
In recent times provincial and local-level governments have not 
had such funding at their disposal, nor responsibility for looking after 
infrastructure. As a result, many provincial and local-level governments 
do not have the capacity for proper planning and implementation at 
more sustained levels. 
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The most likely danger is that availability of extra funds may 
increase misuse of much-needed funds. 
Resulting from the New Organic Law, decreased funding and 
pressure for additional funding for the provinces will be significant 
difficulties for the national government. This is likely to have its greatest 
impact on national government aspirations to provide entirely new 
transport infrastructure. Donor agencies are amenable to providing 
funds for the upgrading of transport infrastructure, but are less amenable 
to funding new infrastructure. The major exception is the Japanese aid 
agency, OECF, which is currently funding construction of the Bereina­
Malalaua road and Jacksons Airport redevelopment projects. 
One of the solutions for the national government is to borrow funds 
commercially, either directly, or via design-and-build project packages. 
Some 90 per cent of funding for the Burns Peak-Waigani Drive Project 
will come from commercial borrowing. However, there is a limit on 
how much the government can or should borrow. 
Government initiatives to expand or upgrade the national road 
system invariably attract a great deal of publicity. Since 1973, it has 
been responsible for the addition of 620 kilometres to the national road 
network However, 130 kilometres of the road construction attributable 
to government efforts was built for a specific resource development and 
ultimately paid for by the developers-in this case by Ok Tedi Mining 
Limited for the road between Kiunga and Tabubil . Over the same 
period, commercial undertakings have conservatively constructed 
new trunk roads. This includes construction of the roads to Kutubu 
and Porgera, and of forestry roads in West New Britain, Sandaun and 
Milne Bay which will eventually become national roads. This is a 
significant contribution to transport infrastructure .  However, roads 
constructed by commercial interests are not always the best quality, 
particularly forestry roads. It is the responsibility of the government to 
ensure that such roads are built according to agreed standards, 
specifications and on agreed timetables. 
National, provincial and local-level governments also need to be 
much more productive in instigating and directing the building of new 
transport infrastructure. Government involvement in building the 
Kiunga-Tabubil road is one model to follow. 
Shortly, Chevron Niugini will begin the upgrading of the existing 
Kutubu pipeline access road from Kikori to Baina a distance of 62 
kilometres. There is an opportunity here for the national government 
and the Gulf and Southern Highlands provincial governments to build 
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on this initiative to access a wider area-perhaps even to provide a 
road connection to the Southern Highlands. 
These examples show that much more could be made of commercial 
developments to add to transport infrastructure without requiring 
public funding. 
Plan n i ng 
Many of these issues are well known at the bureaucratic level . We are 
aware of many of the shortcomings of what we are doing now, and in 
a general sense, we are already aware of much of what needs to be 
done to accelerate economic growth and social development. What we 
seem to be lacking is the ability to successfully present this information 
to our political decision-makers in a way which easily allows them to 
see and assess the available options. The task of doing this is now made 
more complicated by the devolution of responsibility to provincial and 
local-level governments under the New Organic Law. 
The National Planning Office was re-established last year to develop 
more rigorous government planning and to coordinate planning 
activities. Their role is pivotal in making investment in transport and 
other infrastructure more effective-in identifying projects which will 
genuinely accelerate economic growth and social development. The 
National Planning Office can also support increased expenditure on 
maintenance, not only for transport infrastructure, but for mainten­
ance of buildings which is also the responsibility of my Department. 
This year, nothing was directly allocated in the national Budget for 
building maintenance despite the Department having responsibility 
for maintaining in excess of 15,000 houses and other government 
buildings throughout the country. 
In conjunction with the National Planning Office, we are in the 
process of developing a formal National Transport Infrastructure Plan. 
I expect that when this is completed, it will greatly assist in making 
our transport infrastructure program more effective. 
Its formulation should allow national, provincial and local-level 
political decision-makers to evaluate strategic and implementation 
options in a systematic way. With the development of a Transport 
Infrastructure Plan, the opportunity should also be taken to better 
inform the community, particularly the business community, and to 
more directly involve them through National Economic Forums in 
promoting and developing of transport infrastructure. 
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Provincial and local-level governments must also be encouraged to 
develop formal infrastructure plans. The Department of Transport and 
Works and the National Planning Office should be available to advise 
and assist with this task. 
Concl usions 
At the present time, Papua New Guinea has a scarcity of skilled and 
experienced labour. In the short to medium term, Papua New Guinea 
must therefore rely heavily on exploiting its physical resources to 
substantially improve the economy. Effective transport infrastructure 
plays an important part in making this possible. 
Here only transport infrastructure is discussed, which is the respons­
ibility of the Department of Transport and Works and of provincial 
and local-level governments. Decisions about such infrastructure are 
directly governed by the political process. Port infrastructure has been 
hardly referred to. Like telecommunications, electricity, and urban 
water supplies, this is the responsibility of a statutory authority, the 
Papua New Guinea Harbours Board. For these organisations, decisions 
about the infrastructure they manage should largely be made within a 
commercial context. But ignoring statutory authorities does not imply 
that their mandates and operations should not also be examined; they 
certainly should be when considering their contribution to economic 
growth and a social progress. 
However, there are a number of issues relating to the infrastructure 
for which my Department is responsible-three stand out. 
First, how to recognise and prioritise infrastructure projects and 
programs which are most likely to accelerate economic and develop­
ment. Clearly, properly maintaining existing infrastructure is a priority. 
It helps preserve the value of past substantial investment, and for road 
infrastructure, and will produce a sizeable benefit through reducing 
producer costs and promoting economic growth. 
For new or upgrading projects, we need to be more selective in the 
works implemented. Greater priority should be given to transport 
infrastructure projects which are likely to lead to accelerated economic 
growth and social improvement. More effort needs to be made to 
identify where these are, or to package investment in transport 
infrastructure with specific integrated economic and social develop­
ment programs. 
The second issue which stands out is that of funding. Funds for 
investment in infrastructure are always scarce. Under the New Organic 
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Law this will become even more of a problem for the national govern­
ment. It may have to rely more heavily on commercial sources of 
funding and be more innovative in its approach to securing funds. The 
government should also be more proactive in using commercial 
developments to build and upgrade infrastructure .  It must also be 
firmer in ensuring that where commercial interests are required to 
provide infrastructure, they do so to the required standard and in a 
timely manner. 
Last, we need to make a greater commitment to planning. 
Undoubtedly, there are shortcomings in the way transport infrastructure 
is currently selected and implemented. However, it will be difficult to 
make positive changes if we continue to rely on largely ad hoe 
decision-making. As well, devolution of responsibility to provincial 
and local-level governments under the New Organic Law makes 
decision-making that much more complex. The development of formal 
transport infrastructure plans will help to identify and systematically 
evaluate sensible options, and to coordinate between national and 
sub-national aspirations. 
If we are prepared to honestly address these issues, I am sure that 
transport infrastructure will contribute to a much greater economic 
growth and social development than at present. 
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Resource mobi l isation and national 
planning 

Foreign aid in resource mobi l isation 
and national planning 
Murray Proctor 
Aid has an important but only partial role in mobilising resources for the 
development process. Mobilisation of greater international resources, 
beyond aid and additional domestic resources, is necessary to generate 
rates of economic growth sufficient to sustain the development process. 
In this context the role of aid should be seen as a complement to greater 
domestic and international resource mobilisation. 
When we look at the total level of international resources flowing to 
developing countries, the private capital flows element is now almost 
three times the size of the official development assistance element. 
The Director General of AusAID, Trevor Kanaley, recently addressed 
the Australian Institute of International Affairs on the issue of 'aid as a 
catalyst to development' . He pointed out that while it is true that as 
self-sustaining development takes off the need for concessional finance 
declines, aid has usually played a catalytic role in stimulating self­
sustaining development in the first place. Virtually all developing 
countries that have experienced sustained development over the past 
50 years have used aid as a facilitating complement to, not as a 
substitute for, private capital flows. 
The reality is that private capital is generally not attracted to non­
commercially viable ventures. The pressures of competitive markets and 
the necessity to generate acceptable private returns on investor funds 
usually rule non-commercially viable activities, out of consideration for 
private capital investment, no matter how socially meritorious. 
The commercial viability requirement of private capital investment 
leaves a major role for government and non-government organisations 
in developing countries, supported by domestic resources and aid, to 
provide basic social and physical infrastructure and a government 
framework of stable laws and strong public institutions. 
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Many studies show that 'market friendly' policies work best: secure 
property rights; reliable enforcement of contracts, a liberal trade regime; 
low taxes and public spending; and a welcome to foreign investors all 
contribute to an investment-friendly environment. In many developing 
countries the appropriate conditions are absent and that is a major 
reason why those poor countries stay poor-and why they require 
international assistance to create appropriate conditions for development. 
Of course, there is nothing surprising about the complementarity 
between aid and private capital flows. It has long been recognised that 
a role for government in market economies is to supply public goods 
and services which, by their nature, will not be funded through private 
investment. 
The governments of successful developing countries have focused 
on macroeconomic stability, an appropriate business environment and 
basic social and physical infrastructure. In the main, the developing 
countries of Latin America and East Asia have pursued such policies. 
Therefore, it is hardly surprising that when we look at the destination 
of private capital flows we discover that private capital investment does 
not just happen where it is needed. Today only about 20 developing 
countries have access to private markets for bonds, commercial bank 
loans and portfolio equity. And among those with market access, 
borrowing terms vary widely. Around 75 per cent of foreign direct 
investment to developing countries currently goes to fewer than 12 
countries-primarily in Latin America and East Asia; only 6 per cent 
goes to Africa; and a mere 2 per cent goes to the least developed 
countries-10 of which are in the Asia-Pacific region. 
Developing country governments with assistance from overseas 
development agencies need to find ways to entice international resources 
into developing countries, by facilitating an economic environment 
more attractive to a broad range of investment options. For example, 
in circumstances where a large percentage of the population have not 
received even basic levels of education there are few incentives for 
foreign firms to set up in-country operations which employ local staff. 
Where investment does take place it is likely to be confined to low-wage 
labour-int�nsive production and a low savings I investment-low growth 
cycle may be perpetuated. In this scenario, aid can be used to provide 
education and training from basic and primary level education through 
to tertiary education. Such assistance helps to establish not only an 
educated population, but also helps to create a more healthy and 
productive economy as well . 
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And this does happen. Development progress over recent decades 
has been unprecedented in human history. Many developing countries 
have achieved truly dramatic improvement in overall indicators of 
human welfare since 1945: despite high rates of population growth 
infant mortality rates have more than halved and life expectancy in 
developing countries has risen by more than 50 per cent ( from 41 to 62 
years); the percentage of the population with access to clean water has 
doubled (from 35 per cent to 70 per cent); adult literacy has risen from 
less than half the population to around two-thirds; food production and 
consumption have increased at a rate about 20 per cent faster than 
population growth. 
But, as Trevor Kanaley pointed out in his speech, these impressive 
strides have not been uniform. In some countries poverty is increasing 
and in many countries the poor have not shared in positive global 
trends. It is clear that success has been achieved only where the people 
and the institutions of developing countries have made sustained 
efforts to help themselves. At the same time, the record shows that 
international cooperation, including through aid, has contributed 
greatly and increasingly to development results in recent decades. 
This has also entailed a learning process for donors and recipients. 
Effective development cooperation strategies can be put in place only 
where there is a commitment by all parties concerned to make the 
development cooperation relationship successful .  In this context it 
needs to be recognised that there are external partner responsibilities, 
developing country responsibilities and joint responsibilities in the 
delivery of effective aid and the achievement of developmental 
objectives. These are drawn from a document recently issued by the 
OECD' s Development Assistance Committee-Shaping the 21s t  Century 
- which seeks to give a framework for aid in the future . 
Donor partner responsibilities include supporting strengthened 
capacities and increasing participation in the developing country; 
avoiding the creation of aid dependency; supporting coherent policies 
in other aspects of relations; and working for better coordination of the 
international aid system among external partners, in support of 
developing countries' own strategies. 
Developing country responsibilities include adhering to appropriate 
macroeconomic policies; fostering accountable government and the rule 
of law; strengthening human and institutional capacity; and creating a 
climate favourable to enterprise and the mobilisation of savings for 
investment. 
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Of course these responsibilities are by no means exhaustive. They 
are simply examples of the kinds of responsibilities which must be 
recognised and embraced by all parties to the development cooperation 
relationship in order for aid to work. 
Turning to Papua New Guinea and the role of aid in resources and 
planning, it must be stated that over the past 20 years Papua New 
Guinea has clearly reduced its dependence on aid . However there is still 
a role for development assistance in Papua New Guinea's plans. The 
Development Assistance Committee of the OECD recently noted that, 
although Papua New Guinea has a per capita income of a lower-middle 
income developing country (as defined by the World Bank), it has 
many indicators in areas such as health and education which reflect 
needs usually seen in much poorer low-income countries. 
The clearest demonstration of  how resources can be mobilised for 
Papua New Guinea by aid donors comes not from the Australian 
program but rather from Papua New Guinea's own economic reform 
program. Under the auspices of agreements with the IMF and the 
World Bank, nearly US$350 million in financial support has been pledged 
to assist Papua New Guinea, much of which has already been provided. 
The importance of this goes beyond the range of concessional and non­
concessional funding provided, in that this process also provides a 
framework for donors to demonstrate support for Papua New Guinea's 
economic reform objectives. 
Looking at more regular aid flows, Australia provides by far the 
most significant proportion of Papua New Guinea's aid receipts . But 
other donors also provide significant assistance as either grants or loans. 
These include the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, International 
Monetary Fund, UNICEF, UNDP and Japan, the European Union, France, 
Germany and New Zealand. 
For Australia though, Papua New Guinea receives more of our 
bilateral assistance than any other country-in the 1995-96 financial 
year total Australian aid flows to Papua New Guinea were worth A$329 
million or more than 20 per cent of total Australian aid. 
The substantial bilateral aid program is an important part of the 
close overall relationship between our two countries, which is strongly 
influenced by historical ties and Australia's desire to assist its closest 
neighbour achieve its development objectives, including increased 
self-reliance. 
Strengthening the Papua New Guinea economy is fundamental to 
achieving greater development. Each year AusAID publishes an 
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economic report on Papua New Guinea . The latest and ninth report on 
the Papua New Guinea economy provides a survey and general 
assessment of recent economic developments and economic policies. It 
covers various issues including recent macroeconomic developments, 
structural reform, public sector reform and sectoral performance. 
Close attention is paid to issues concerning the implementation of 
provincial and local government reforms and the current economic 
reform program with the International Monetary Fund and World 
Bank. 
A strengthened Papua New Guinea economy is being pursued as an 
essential element in Australia's aid program with Papua New Guinea. 
To this end Australia has strongly supported Papua New Guinea's 
economic stabilisation and economic reform program which has been 
agreed with the IMF and World Bank. Australia has also supported the 
reform program financially, through a non-concessional loan and by 
focusing aid program activities in support of the reforms. An important 
component of the reform program includes increased public and private 
non-mining investment and increased attention to overall resource 
mobilisation. 
Almost all Australian assistance is provided within the framework 
of the Treaty on Development Cooperation with Papua New Guinea. In 
order to provide both countries with confidence in their resource 
planning, financial assistance is specified for a 5-year period. The current 
Treaty period finishes in June 2000, following a review and extension 
of the Treaty commitments in 1995. These reviews occur every 3 years 
(or more often if requested by either party). The next scheduled Review 
is in September 1998, and will consider aid arrangements into the new 
century. At present Australia is committed to providing assistance worth 
some A$300 million each year in nominal terms until the year 2000. 
Within this Treaty structure, Australia's aid program to Papua New 
Guinea is undergoing a fundamental change. This involves the replace­
ment of direct financial 'budgetary' support with jointly-agreed 
programmed aid. This change is aimed at greater aid effectiveness in 
the assistance Australia provides to Papua New Guinea. The current 
financial year sees us at the half way point of this transition-with A$154 
million being provided in the form of programmed aid . This shift is 
allowing Australia to target assistance to meet Papua New Guinea's 
broad development needs, focused on six priority sectors. 
This sectoral program approach aims to mobilise sufficient resources 
to strengthen Papua New Guinea's performance and long-term capacity 
Foreign aid i n  resource mobil isation and national planning I 209 
within the specified sectors and encourage sustainable outcomes. These 
programs emphasise the need to strengthen Papua New Guinea's ability 
to develop and implement sectoral programs which increase investment 
and employment opportunities and improve basic service delivery. 
The Papua New Guinea Government has indicated that the health, 
education and transport sectors should be the primary sectors for 
Australian funding. Australia and Papua New Guinea are working 
towards broad coordinated development and ultimately, the aim is to 
direct 25 per cent of programmed aid to each of these three key sectors. 
The renewable resources, law and justice and private sectors will absorb 
the remainder of our program aid. 
This is a jointly-agreed aid program. Papua New Guinea agencies 
and officials are involved at each key stage in programmed aid delivery. 
Papua New Guinea's economic circumstances, its priorities and policies 
are the starting points for the development of programmed aid. 
The main focus in the health sector program is on improving low­
cost primary and preventative health services in rural communities. 
This reflects the emphasis which Papua New Guinea's National Health 
Plan (1996-2000) places on health management reform and improved 
rural health service delivery. This will complement the major assistance 
already provided by Japan in upgrading hospital facilities and a 
prospective program by the Asian Development Bank in this sector. In 
the medium term, Australia's assistance will focus on children's and 
women's health and the establishment of an efficient and effective 
structure for provincial health service delivery. Long-term training and 
technical assistance is also planned to enhance the institutional and 
implementation capacity of the health sector. 
The scale of investment in the major sectors such as health will be 
prodigious-by the year 2000, some A$75 million annually will be 
provided through programmed assistance to Papua New Guinea's 
health sector by Australia. This will require us to fit very clearly within 
Papua New Guinea's own plans and often to run agreed activities 
through Papua New Guinea agencies.  
The education sector program is principally focusing on assisting 
Papua New Guinea to improve access to elementary, primary and 
secondary education. Priorities include improving teacher training, 
school infrastructure, technical education and female participation. 
The challenge is to assist Papua New Guinea in meeting its objectives 
which include: providing nine years of basic universal education in the 
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context of children's local communities; increasing the transition rate 
from primary to lower secondary grades from the current 36 per cent to 
50 per cent and, over time, to 100 per cent; increasing the transition rate 
from lower secondary to upper secondary grades from the current 10 per 
cent to 50 per cent; and increasing the upper secondary output from 
1,000 to 5,000 by the year 2000. These are substantial objectives needing 
both large internal resources and considerable donor assistance . 
Geography, inadequate provision and maintenance of infrastructure 
and limited transport services, particularly to rural communities, present 
formidable barriers to development. They contribute to poor delivery 
of essential services and unreliable transport of products to markets, 
particularly in rural areas.  Australian support for infrastructure 
maintenance and development aims to underpin economic development 
in Papua New Guinea. The stock of public transport assets is very low 
however and almost all of our assistance is focused on rehabilitating 
and improving existing roads, bridges and airfields. Again other donors 
are substantially involved in this sector. 
In order to keep funds flowing into regional areas and to stimulate 
private sector growth, implementation methods for Australian activities, 
in the transport sector in particular, encourage the maximum involvement 
of Papua New Guinea companies operating in the construction and 
engineering areas. Australian technical expertise will be important in 
overall advisory and design roles but agreement has been reached that 
small contracts and day labour will be used on road works wherever 
possible, funded through trust funds. Program activities emphasise the 
provision of training and staff development opportunities for Department 
of Transport and Works staff, particularly in the Offices of Works and 
Civil Aviation, as well as strengthening Papua New Guinea's capacity 
for ongoing maintenance of existing infrastructure. 
Australia strongly supports Papua New Guinea's efforts to improve 
the delivery of services in rural areas. Provincial reforms will need 
massive changes to the way in which government works and Australia 
is already providing direct support through sectoral assistance in areas 
such as health and education. In addition, however, changes are required 
in finance and accounting support systems. Preliminary discussions 
with the National Planning Office have begun on possible long-term 
assistance to strengthen provincial planning. We have agreed in 
principle to support initiatives of the Department of Finance in areas 
such as development of provincial accounting and financial manage-
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ment systems and the training of staff and will work with the 
Department on the development of a strategic program for upgrading 
national financial management information systems. 
Not all activities can or should relate to public sector capacities. 
The development cooperation program is also assisting the building 
of stronger l inks between Australian and Papua New Guinean civil 
societies. For instance, Australia is planning the introduction of a 
funding mechanism to support Australian and Papua New Guinea's 
non-government organisations. 
As you would expect in a relationship of this size, Australia and 
Papua New Guinea need to be regularly checking that Australian aid is 
meeting Papua New Guinea's needs. In May 1996 the Australian 
Foreign Minister, Mr Downer, met with Prime Minister Sir Julius Chan 
and agreed that, within the context of a shift to programmed aid, 
officials should meet to ensure that Australian aid was working to 
support Papua New Guinea's reform objectives, both in terms of 
economic and provincial government reforms. 
Some of the major measures that have come out of these reviews 
and the experience of the last three years are 
• the use of trust account mechanisms to channel program 
funds through Papua New Guinean implementing agencies. 
This enables funding to be provided directly to agreed program 
activities such as land transport infrastructure projects while 
meeting Australian accountability requirements. It also keeps 
substantial funds flowing directly into the Papua New Guinea 
economy 
• the use of the Commodities Assistance Program to supply high 
priority goods and equipment for development purposes 
which complement sector programs 
• Australian support under limited circumstances for Papua 
New Guinea agencies' operational and maintenance costs 
related to program aid activities 
• a system of performance benchmarks, with achievement 
against these benchmarks taken into consideration when 
setting future priorities and levels of funding for sector 
programs 
• bringing all these aspects together through policy-based 
agreements in major sectors to ensure that our funding is 
directly supporting Papua New Guinea's development plans 
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• increasing use of non-government channels to meet basic 
needs and promote community development, including micro­
enterprise development to assist in private sector growth. 
As a result of the implementation of these approaches the level of 
Papua New Guinea's involvement in the delivery of program aid and 
the value of goods and services sourced from Papua New Guinea are 
expected to continue to increase. This is of course of considerable 
concern to the Government of Papua New Guinea. Already substantial 
levels of programmed aid are being disbursed through Papua New 
Guinea agencies-in 1996-97 around 30 per cent of total programmed 
aid is expected be spent through Papua New Guinea government 
agencies. In 1995-96 over half of Australia's purchases of equipment 
and materials under the Commodities Assistance Program were bought 
from Papua New Guinea suppliers. This included items such as medical 
supplies, building materials for schools and equipment for quarantine 
activities. 
The challenges facing Papua New Guinea in achieving its develop­
ment goals are substantial. Nevertheless, Australia's large and ongoing 
commitment to Papua New Guinea since its independence reflects the 
level of resources Australian taxpayers have been willing to provide to 
Papua New Guinea. The opportunity now exists for us and other 
donors to demonstrate an increasing impact of such significant resource 
flows, in addressing key development constraints. 
Note 
The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author and not 
necessarily those of the Australian Government or the Australian 
Agency for International Development (AusAID). 
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National planning :  past experiences 
and future vision 
Kila Ai 
Planning means many things to many people. In Papua New Guinea 
planning has meant and continues to mean, planning government's 
interventions in the economy and, in particular, expenditure. The creation 
of the National Planning Office does not indicate a desire on the part 
of the government to begin centralised planning of the entire economy. 
Papua New Guinea has never and does not pretend to, determine the 
way the private sector uses resources, although clearly the government 
does attempt to influence the scale and direction of where the private 
sector uses its resources through the policy environment it sets. 
It is clear that if a plan is to be more than a hoped for outcome, 
there must be means for realising the plan. These range from supportive 
policies to physical controls-and the Papua New Guinea government 
has chosen from the entire range. However, the record of delivery on 
these hopes by successive governments has been mixed. 
Having defined terms, let us start at the beginning, independence . 
In the sense that successive governments have set out their aspirations 
and objectives for the country and its economy, Papua New Guinea 
has planned since independence. The Eight Aims, originally formulated 
in 1972 and formally adopted as both goals and yardsticks in the Post­
Independence National Development Strategy in 1976 and the National 
Goals and Directive Principles are all planning statements. They show 
considerable consistency with the objectives of this government-and 
some interesting differences. 
Some of these differences are no more than a reflection of changes in 
thinking about strategies: about how to achieve goals. In many countries 
of the world a belief in the effectiveness of wholesale government inter­
vention in the economy has given way to less ambitious and more 
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practical strategies. All over the world, and in Papua New Guinea more 
unabashedly than most, there is the desire for the development of a 
vibrant private sector-one of the aims of the government-as a means 
to the grander aim of, a more equal distribution of economic benefits 
(Aim 2 of the Eight Aims) .  The message is clear: we need to increase 
the size of the economic pie before worrying too much about how we 
divide it up. 
In Papua New Guinea the importance of planning has always been 
acknowledged but the actual recognition of the discipline of planning 
has been underdeveloped. The planning apparatus has been changed 
many times since independence, hoping for a winning combination. 
The Post-Independence National Development Strategy was developed 
by the Central Planning Office within the Prime Minister's Office. This 
was endorsed by the National Planning Committee, a committee of 
senior Ministers chaired by the Prime Minister. The strategy led, 
beginning in 1977, to National Public Expenditure Plan(s); taken with 
the Development Strategy these could be called a strategic plan. 
The National Public Expenditure Plans, the forerunner of today's 
Public Investment Programmes, allocated funds to new projects. Funds 
came from increases in revenues and by squeezing recurrent expend­
itures; the famous 'wedge' . In 1983, for example, the budget ceiling for 
recurrent expenditures was K9 million ( 4 per cent) lower than recurrent 
expenditure in 1982. By 1983 about one-quarter of government expend­
iture was allocated through the National Public Expenditure Plan. 
The specific targets of the Second Plan were very vague . . .  The 'plan' 
was simply a list of projects on which funds, presumed to be avai lable, 
were to be used . . .  (there was) nothing about how expenditures were to 
be coordinated; . . .  no concern with economic policies of Government, 
nor with the private sector (MOFID, Kamran Development Planning in 
Iran, Middle East and North Africa Press, England 1987:41). 
While this quote is about Iran, the moral is applicable to Papua 
New Guinea. In Papua New Guinea we did not concentrate expend­
itures to achieve our objectives. If you look at actual expenditures by 
sector from 1978 to the present day, there is no clear predictor of how 
much extra will go to a sector in any given year. The planning process 
had no detectable pattern, a clear indicator of its lack of effectiveness. 
In its 1983 review of Public Sector Management, the World Bank said 
There is . . .  little detailed rationale of the public expenditure plan itself. 
Conspicuously missing is the common (to planning documents) 
emphasis on targets for macro aggregates or sectoral outcomes. There 
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is little evidence of arguments of the form 'if we are to achieve X, then 
it will be necessary to do A, B, C', or of the corollary :  the expenditures 
on projects A, B, C are expected to result in X (World Bank 1983:11). 
The Bank's assessment was broadly-if implicitly-accepted . As a 
consequence, the National Planning Office began work in January 1984 
on a new National Development Plan, to be adopted from 1987. From 
the end of 1985 work on the Plan reflected the priorities of the then-new 
government: faster growth through more public and private investment 
leading to more productive work opportunities and the maximum 
participation by Papua New Guineans. 
A change in government, the policy adjustments following the clos­
ure of Panguna and a shift in attention saw the National Planning Office 
lose its autonomy. In July 1992 the National Planning Committee was 
reactivated and a Policy Monitoring and Coordinating Committee 
(PCMC) formed. In 1995 the National Executive Council (NEC) directed 
that the National Planning Office be re-established . It was formally set 
up independently of the Department of Finance in December 1995. 
Conseq uences and lessons 
Good governance requires purposeful government. But the purpose must 
remain consistent. This is where Papua New Guinea has not been so 
successful. We have spent money in one direction after another without 
giving a policy a chance to embed itself. The funds spent in this way 
have been sizeable: in the last 20 years over K8.5 billion in revenues 
were raised, K4 billion in grants received (only those coming through 
the Public Accounts), Kl billion from the Mineral Revenues Stabilisation 
Fund and at least K2.5 billion in loan drawdowns. 
Some of this money has gone into PTC and Elcom, into highways 
and wharves, into airports and Air Niugini, into schools and hospitals. 
It is hard though to find clear links between concentrations of expend­
iture, investments and sustained increases in output. This means that a 
lot of what we call investment was poorly chosen and has not proved 
to be productive. Where we have borrowed to pay for this investment, 
we are left to pay off growing debts without commensurate increases in 
output. We now find that debt service payments claim a growing share 
-now up to nearly 50 per cent-of revenues raised excluding sale of 
assets, which include the Mineral Revenues Stabilisation Fund receipts 
and export taxes on logs. This puts a great strain on the recurrent budget 
-and forces us to devote a great deal of attention to finding money 
for day-to-day activities. 
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This is another aspect of the theme running through assessments of 
planning in Papua New Guinea: planning in Papua New Guinea is 
driven virtually entirely by the annual budget cycle. This is true-we 
have often found ourselves having to deal with a short-term crisis in the 
annual budget. This has severely hampered the ability of the planning 
organisation to implement its strategy. 
The major reasons for this was that goals-whether the Eight Aims or 
those of the government of the day-were never widely entrenched in 
political or bureaucratic decision making. There was no clear recognition 
-by politicians or officials-of the chain: ' if we are to achieve X, then 
it will be necessary to do A, B, C' . Nor was there recognition of the 
corollary: ' if we use resources to do X then we cannot do Y and so on' . 
Rather the thinking has been, not only might we do X but we should 
also do Y and so on, but all in small doses. In other words, everything 
is a priority. The laudable rhetoric of goods and services to the people 
has unfortunately been used to justify virtually any expenditure .  
This is  particularly true when short-term political considerations 
dominate. Kalecki has identified the political business cycle with a 
duration set by the need for elections. If, as in the United Kingdom for 
example, a government must go to the people after 5 years at most, the 
political business cycle runs over 5 years. In Papua New Guinea we 
have had to live with a much shorter cycle, at times months! There has 
been some recognition that this needs to be changed to increase the 
stability of a government and allow time to pursue and implement an 
agenda before it is judged on its achievements. As a planner, I can only 
support initiatives that reduce the uncertainties surrounding the future. 
The reform of the Provincial Government system has made the task 
of planning more complex and challenging. The decisions to implement 
a decentralisation of decision-making to the provinces in the same year 
as the National Planning Office was established have added a new 
dimension to planning in Papua New Guinea . 
Substantial resources must now, by law, be transferred to provinces 
every year. However, the complementary transfer of responsibilities for 
functions has not been formalised speedily-this division of respons­
ibilities is a prerequisite for effective planning. Its absence could mean 
planning remains a process of creating hoped for outcomes rather than 
the realities needed in Papua New Guinea. 
An example may clarify this: central government maintains that, in 
1996 at least, it could not pay the grants and continue to provide other 
vital services such as school fee subsidies. Provincial governments 
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argue that they have no funding to pay the subsidies. In the short term 
a compromise is reached: both governments call some part of the grants 
due school-fee subsidies and the subsidies continue to be paid. 
Effective planning requires this compromise to be formalised so that 
flows of money between levels of government have understandings 
over responsibility associated with them. Until such an agreement is in 
place the Provincial reforms, whatever their merit in promoting 
participation and local democracy, remain an impediment to effective 
fiscal planning. 
In order for the government to be fiscally responsible, to move 
forward confidently, we need four things 
• widespread agreement on where we are going, on what sort 
of national we want to be 
• we must put an end to the periodic crises we face, an end 
that can only be achieved by ending the cause of the crises, 
the ever-widening deficit on the recurrent budget 
• we must accept the reality that we are not going to get to 
where we want to be unless we get out of the cycle of crises 
• we have to accept that the gain in the future is worth some 
pain to be suffered now. 
Future vision 
As Director of the National Planning Office, I want to assure you that 
this is where planning in Papua New Guinea is going; we are going to 
meet these four targets. 
To end the crisis mentality the National Planning Office has started 
work on a fiscal responsibility package in consultation with the 
Department of Finance. There are four components of the package. 
• We will propose that fiscal policy is directed towards balancing 
the recurrent budget with tax revenues, excluding those from 
activities in natural resources. This cannot be achieved 
immediately or, realistically, every year. We propose to achieve 
this balance by the year 2000 and maintaining this position 
over the economic cycle thereafter. 
• We will propose the introduction of accrual accounting. The 
concept is simple. We must stop pretending that the bills of 
last year end with New Year 's day; a practice that has caused 
us trouble in the past. As part of this we will advocate the 
introduction of Generally Accepted Accounting Standards 
and of wide training in accountancy within government. 
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• Finally, we propose amending current practices in order to 
make the budget more transparent. It should be possible to 
see the total activities of the government-including the 'off 
budget' items-from annual budget documents. 
On current projections the 1997 recurrent budget will be greater than 
the entire 1996 budget. This cannot be sustained together with meeting 
the twin aims of greater (and more effective) investment spending and 
fiscal responsibility. The recurrent budget must be reduced from this 
projection, possibly by up to 15 per cent in 1997. This will be difficult, and 
it is just one of the hard choices we acknowledge planning must address. 
Achieving this target requires us to rethink what government does, 
what it funds and who does what it funds. We must ask-and answer 
honestly 
• how much should government be paying for health, education 
and how much of the costs in these areas should be met by 
users? 
• how much of what the Public Service now does must be done 
by Public Servants and how much can be contracted out? 
• how rational is the government machine and can its cost be 
reduced? 
• can we match resources that must go to the provinces with 
responsibilities for expenditures? 
• can we limit numbers in the public service in Waigani and 
the provinces? 
We will work with provinces to get the maximum effectiveness and 
efficiency from the resources transferred to them; this is vital. We will 
work with the provinces to strengthen their planning and budgeting 
capacities. The Madang Model is a useful tool that has been developed 
by the National Planning Office for provinces to adopt: it is a tool 
endorsed by the Prime Minister and the NEC. 
In addition, the National Planning Office has started to build close 
and effective working relationships between the national and provincial 
governments. We do not, however, want the National Planning Office 
to do the work of national departments and provincial governments for 
them. Our task is to help them to build up their capacity to implement 
the policies of the government: the blueprint we are building up now. 
The role of the National Planning Office is to work with the Department 
of Finance to ensure that resource allocation is governed by plans and 
to ensure agencies receive sufficient funding to carry out their tasks. 
We want to be imaginative and innovative in our planning, for 
example, proposing projects that national and provincial governments 
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can work on together. There must not be an artificial ' them and us' 
situation arising from the provincial reforms. The sort of project I have 
in mind is a continuous boat service to service the communities of the 
Fly River from Daru to Kiunga. This will give the villagers on the lower 
Fly access to markets for their timber, their rubber, their fish, their 
vegetables-and traders and government access to them. 
You may think that all of this is still short term; I see it as giving 
ourselves room for the long term. I assure you, in all of this the National 
Planning Office has not forgotten the long view. You will have heard 
the story of the traveller asking a local the way to a destination and 
being told: 'well if I were you, I wouldn't start from here' . As with 
travellers, so with nations and planners; we will go further, faster, if we 
are clear on where we are going, clear on where we are starting from 
and clear on what lies in between. Being clear on these questions is the 
task that the National Planning Office has set the Baloiloi Committee. 
This Committee is planning for the new century. With support from 
the Prime Minister, from NEC, from business and from the public, it will 
set Papua New Guinea on a path that will take perhaps 25 years to walk. 
Clearly, this requires commitment, a commitment that can only come 
from wide involvement in laying out the path .  But having achieved 
this, there will be resistance to deviation from the path. Is it in the Plan? 
How does it get us to where we want to be? Will it become crucial that 
proposals for spending public monies will have to answer positively if 
they are to be funded? This is the essence of long-term planning. 
It is the role of the National Planning Office to see that this attitude 
becomes embedded in the decision-making framework of government. 
When this is done, when the four targets I have set out are met, Papua 
New Guinea will have achieved, indeed far exceeded, the objectives of 
our economic reform program. By following the path I have set out we 
can ensure that we no longer need rescue packages from international 
organisations. Our future is in our hands-but that does not mean we 
do not want the welcome assistance of the donor community in our 
investment program.  
In fact I would like to recognise formally and acknowledge the role 
and the great assistance of aid donors to development in Papua New 
Guinea. I hope this will continue for some time yet, but we must use it 
more wisely in future. The National Planning Office, in its role as co­
ordinator of donor financing, will see that we do. We must plan many 
years ahead, ensure that our development spending, whoever it is 
financed by, meets government priorities .  We cannot continue wasting 
our investment resources on unproductive projects or allow projects in 
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non-priority areas to deprive important programs of funding. It should 
not be forgotten that all of these resources have a cost even if it is only 
an opportunity cost; loans incur interest-our own revenue could be 
earning interest instead.  
Government must take specific steps to improve its capacity to 
plan and implement projects that are of real value to the nation. The 
National Planning Office must set the blueprint within which the 
government, in collaboration with the donor organisations, can 
implement and sustain projects that push us in the directions we have 
settled on. Resources will be committed only when they are focused 
on goals that government and people, are committed to. Our economic 
reforms will ensure that funds are available to do this effectively. 
These reforms, which the government have been pursuing since 1994, 
are vital to the future prosperity of Papua New Guinea. Our small open 
economy will only flourish by becoming internationally competitive. We 
are ideally placed to do this: we have the resources to base our growth 
upon, we have an economic program that gives every opportunity for 
the private sector to flourish and we are situated at the edge of the most 
dynamic economic region in the world. Involvement with organisations 
such as WTO, APEC and ASEAN can only improve our competitiveness. 
This is how I see planning in Papua New Guinea developing over 
the next 20 years. I believe we can improve markedly from the last 20. 
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Resou rce rents : d istr i but ion and 
susta i nab i l i ty 
Colin Filer 
During the twenty years of Papua New Guinea's national independence 
there have been two mutually contradictory conceptions of the role of 
'resource rents' in national economic development. 
In the first conception, they constitute a form of economic surplus 
which can and should be divided between the State and private 
capital according to a rationally calculable and mutually advantageous 
formula. The share appropriated by the is then to be invested in the 
pursuit of long-term economic growth, a progressive reduction in 
'resource dependency', and the realisation of those National Goals set 
out in the preamble to the National Constitution. 
In the second conception, they belong by right to customary 'resource 
owners', whose ultimate ownership of national natural resources has 
been obscured by the legacy of colonial law and elided in the form­
ulation of the National Constitution itself. In this conception, any 
share of resource rent appropriated by the State or private capital is a 
deduction from this natural right of ownership which must be justified 
and accepted by specific communities of customary landlords. 
In the first decade of independence, the first conception triumphed 
over the second. In the second decade, the situation seems to have been 
reversed.  This chapter will consider the extent of this inversion, the 
factors which have contributed to its occurrence, and the implications 
of this reversal for the pursuit of a 'national sustainable development 
strategy' . 
Let me begin my discussion of ' resource rent' with the parable of 
the drowned technocrat. 
Once upon a time Papua New Guinea had a mineral development 
pol icy which was the envy of the world-or so the story goes. This 
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policy was the magical creation of the first Somare government, the 
outcome of its brilliant renegotiation of the Bougainville Copper Agree­
ment, concluded back in 1 974, then guarded steadfastly for many 
years by an elite corps of technocrats lodged in the highest pinnacles 
of the State. The echoes of this instrument can still be heard in the 
wording of the new Mining Act, which is not yet four years old, but by 
the time this Act was certified in 1 992, the ancient wisdom of the 
technocrats was drowning in a sea of discontent. The floodgates of the 
State had been forced open by a horde of special interests and local 
fantasies which sought their Holy Grail by redistributing the 'royalties', 
the 'equities', the 'compensation' and the many other forms of wealth 
which they believed the technocrats had hidden in their dungeons of 
arcane injustice or had simply failed to squeeze from all the wicked 
foreign devils barricaded in the Chamber of Mines and Petroleum (The 
Independent 1 5  March 1 996). 
What I am trying to depict in this story is a feeling for the psychological 
content and impact of a growing national dependency on the sale of 
natural resources. 
Now to match the parable with some serious numbers. An indication 
of the country's economic dependency on the exploitation of mineral 
and timber resources is given in Table 13. 1 .  Here we can see 
• the slow but steady increase in the significance of mineral 
exports in the period since independence, from less than half 
to more like two-thirds of all domestic exports 
• the more dramatic increase in the relative significance of 
timber (that is, raw log) exports since 1992, from less than 10 
per cent to around 20 per cent of a l l  domestic exports 
• the lumpy nature of government revenues from the mining 
and petroleum sector, as shown in the annual receipts of the 
Mineral Revenues Stabilisation Fund 
• the drastic loss of government revenues from this source in 
the two years following the closure of the Bougainville 
copper mine, which prompted the country's first attempt at 
'structural adjustment' 
• the drastic increase in government revenues from both mineral 
and timber exports since 1993, which seems to have facilitated 
the spending spree. This brought about the fiscal crisis and 
another round of finger-wagging from the World Bank. 
It goes without saying that a country which depends on extractive 
industry, almost entirely under the management of foreign capital, for 
around 90 per cent of its export income, is bound to be, in some sense, a 
nation of rent-collectors. Less evident is the corresponding dependency 
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Table 1 3. 1  Actual and projected contribution of minerals and timber to 
domestic export values and non-grant revenues, 1 978-99 
Contribution to domestic Contribution to 
export values non-grant revenues 
(mi l l ion kina and per cent) (mi l l ion kina and per cent) 
Minerals T imber M RSF receipts Log export 
taxes 
1 978 231 .7  (44.8) 1 1 .8 (02.3) 2 1 . 1  (07.7) n . a .  
1 979 369.0 (52 .5) 20.9 (03.0) 39.4 ( 1 3.9) n .a .  
1 980 322 .4 (50.5) 30.0  (04.7) 1 08.7 (31 .6) n .a .  
1 981  300.6 (55.0) 31 .5  (05 .8) 71 .4 ( 1 8.5) n .a. 
1 982 302 . 1  (55 .3) 49.6 (09. 1 )  25.4 (06.6) n .a. 
1 983 373 . 1  (55 .8) 43.2 (06.5) 25.0 (06.0) 4.7 (01 . 1 )  
1 984 328.5 (41 . 1 )  69.9 (08 .7) 55.5 ( 1 1 .9) 1 2.4 (02.6) 
1 985 489.9 (54.5) 58.4 (06.5) 23.7 (04.6) 1 2.6 (02.3) 
1 986 561 .2 (57.5) 68.0  (07.0) 36.0 (06.7) 1 3.7  (02.5) 
1 987 71 4 .9 (64.7) 1 03 .0 (09.3) 50.4 (07.7) 1 6.5 (02.5) 
1 988 861 .5 (70.5) 90.5  (07.4) 91 .8 ( 1 3.9) 1 5.6 (02.3) 
1 989 676 . 1  (64.4) 90.0 (08.6) 1 1 9.7 (1 4.5) 1 1 .4 (01 .4) 
1 990 757 .5 (72 . 1 )  65.2 (06.2) 5.6 (00.7) 1 2.2 (01 .6) 
1 991 1 005 .3  (76.7) 81 .2  (06.2) 1 3.2 (01 .6) 1 7. 7  (02.2) 
1 992 1 37 1 .5 (78.3) 1 40.0 (08.0) 82.7 (08.9) 25.0 (02 .7) 
1 993 1 767.8 (72.0) 400.2  ( 1 6 .3) 267 .8 (23.8) 70.9 (06.3) 
1 994 1 782 .7  (67 .0) 483 . 1 ( 1 8. 1 )  276.8 (21 .5) 1 31 .3 ( 1 0 .2)  
1 995 2435.4 (71 .6) 436 .7  ( 1 2 .8) 281 .7 ( 1 8.9) 1 27.6 (08.6) 
1 996 2206.3 (66.2) 564.0 ( 1 6 .9) 245.0 (1 6.4) 1 44.0 (09.6) 
1 997 1 939.6 (61 .7) 605. 6  ( 1 9 .3) 226.2 ( 1 5.0) 1 46.9 (09.7) 
1 998 2222.2 (63.3) 648. 7  ( 1 8 .5) 2 1 2 .2 ( 1 3.9) 1 49.9 (09.9) 
1 999 21 31 .5 (60.5) 695.4 ( 1 9 .8) 2 1 5.2 (1 3 .4) 1 52.8 (09.5) 
Note: I t  is  assumed that log export taxes const i tute 96 per cent of a l l  export taxes throughout. 
Sources: B an k  of Papua New Gu inea, Quarterly Economic Bulletin for all figures to 1 995;  
Papua New Guinea, 1 996 Budget Papers ( Tables 2 .3,  4 . 1 ,  4 .6)  for 1 996-99 projections. 
of the State apparatus on revenues derived from the same source, since 
there are several forms of taxation whose sectoral origins are not 
readily inferred from the government's own statistics. So it might not be 
unreasonable to assume that the business of extracting and exporting 
minerals and timber now accounts for roughly half of the government's 
non-grant revenue. In which case we are bound to conclude, even at this 
early stage in the argument, that if there is something inherently 'un­
sustainable' about the way that this kind of business is being conducted, 
then every facet of the nation's 'political economy' is in serious jeopardy. 
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Although my general argument applies to both the mining and 
forestry sectors, there are very substantial differences in the technical and 
political conditions of industrial development and in the constellation 
of social and economic relationships which constitute the policy process. 
For this reason, it is not possible to make a step-by-step comparison of 
the way in which these two forms of development policy have evolved 
over the last two decades; it is necessary to tell two entirely different 
stories and then to ask whether and why they might seem to have 
similar endings. The same problem arises when we embark on the 
business of defining 'sustainable development' and speculating on the 
prospect of achieving this goal in each of these sectors. Furthermore, the 
relationship between the immediate past and the immediate future in 
the evolution of the national forest policy process is currently obscured 
by a cloud of uncertainty. Since Table 13 .  l demonstrates the extent to 
which the mining and petroleum sector continues to function as the 
backbone or undercarriage of the national economy, this discussion will 
focus on the distribution of resource rent and the problem of sustainable 
development within this sector. 
The technocratic consensus 
Not being an economist, I suppose that 'resource rent' is that particular 
form of 'economic rent' which is collected from the 'resource sectors' 
of the economy. Ross Garnaut, one of the original architects of Papua 
New Guinea's mineral development policy, defines 'economic rent' as 
'the surplus generated from sales after paying the supply prices of all 
goods and services for production' ( 1995:61 ) .  According to Garnaut, 
this is what gets distributed between the various stakeholders who have 
some kind of veto power over the process of resource development, but 
it is also liable to be reduced by the impact of stakeholder conflict on 
what he calls the 'supply price of investment' . I am somewhat mystified 
by this latter turn of phrase, so I shall instead address the social costs 
of doing business, recognising that these are costs to business itself, as 
well as to 'society', and that they do reflect the incidence of political 
conflict over the distribution of an economic surplus. 
Unlike an economist, I shall also allow myself the luxury of believing 
that the distinctions drawn between those transactions which count as 
'distribution of an economic rent' and those which count as the 'purchase 
of essential services' or the 'payment of social costs' are not simply a 
matter for academic debate but also the subject of stakeholder conflict. 
We are not dealing here with facts as obvious as the difference between 
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a piece of cake and the effort of wielding a knife; we are dealing with 
questions as delicate as the choice of a label for BHP' s payment of 
Slater and Gordon's expenses in the latest Ok Tedi 'settlement' . And my 
own interest, as a social scientist, does not lie with the definition or 
measurement of various forms of monetary income, much less with the 
construction of mathematical models of relationships between them, 
but with the nature, direction and impact of political conflict over the 
distribution of the 'economic surplus' generated by extractive industry 
in Papua New Guinea. 
It is not difficult to make lists and tables which display the most 
transparent or explicit forms in which this surplus has been distributed 
between the various stakeholders engaged in the business of extracting 
Papua New Guinea's natural resources. But these transparencies are 
themselves the product of that ' technocratic consensus' whose validity 
has been constantly challenged and seriously wounded during the 
second decade of Papua New Guinea's own national policy process. In 
order to illustrate and discuss the technocratic consensus on the 
distribution of resource rent, I shall therefore begin with its greatest 
triumph and its greatest disaster-the Bougainville copper project. 
The distribution of Bougainville Copper Ltd' s (BCL' s) 'net revenues' 
in its last full year of operation is shown in Table 13.2. From the techno­
cratic point of view, the first thing to be noticed in this table is the 
division of these revenues between national and foreign stakeholders. 
By securing just over 70 per cent of BCL' s surplus in that year, Papua 
New Guinea got what most orthodox economists would regard as 
something very close to the maximum national share which is 
compatible with the maintenance of a constant incentive for further 
foreign investment in the mining sector. From a strictly financial point of 
view, 1988 was a good year for BCL. In other years, or with other 
projects, when there is less of a surplus to go round, the maintenance 
of a constant investment incentive may require some reduction in the 
national share of the cake. But we are told that, in the hard-rock mining 
sector, the optimum national share should average something between 
60 per cent and 70 per cent of the total, while in the petroleum sector, 
it should average something between 70 per cent and 80 per cent. 
The technocratic consensus also tells us that the most efficient way 
to collect this optimum national share of the surplus on a regular basis 
is by taking most of it in the form of taxes which are sensitive to the 
rate of profit. Two such forms of taxation-corporate income tax and 
dividend withholding tax-accounted for more than 62 per cent of the 
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Table 1 3.2. Distribution of BCL net revenues in 1 988 (mi l l ion kina) 
Dividends to foreign shareholders 
Dividends to Papua New Guinea shareholders 
State 
Other 
Tax payments to national government 
Corporate income tax 
Group tax (P.A.Y. E.) 
Customs duties 
Dividend witholding tax 
Other 
Payments to provincial government 
Royalties 
Taxes 









































national share of BCL's surplus in 1988 (Table 13 .2). In Papua New 
Guinea's fiscal regime, the dividend withholding tax has normally been 
levied at the fixed rate of 17  per cent on all dividends paid to foreign 
shareholders, but the basic rate of corporate income tax has been set at 
different levels for petroleum projects (50 per cent), large-scale mining 
projects (35 per cent) and medium or small-scale mining projects (25 
per cent). Much has also been made of the 'additional profits tax' which 
companies are liable to pay, in addition to their corporate income tax, 
on any profits which exceed a 20 per cent annually compounded return 
on their total investment, but it seems that company accountants have 
done a reasonably good job of minimising the incidence of such excess. 
Furthermore, the government itself has allowed the companies to 
depreciate various forms of capital expenditure for taxation purposes, 
thus providing further fiscal incentives for the creation of a stable, 
'normal' rate of profit. 
The third element of the technocratic consensus is the level of central 
government control over the distribution of the national share of the 
surplus (Table 13.2). It looks as if the central government took more 
than 90 per cent, and the State as a whole more than 95 per cent, of 
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this national income from BCL in 1988. In one respect, this appearance 
is somewhat misleading, since we know that the formula used to 
deter-mine the level of 'minimum unconditional grants' from national 
to provincial governments was one which allowed the North 
Solomons Provincial Government to capture a substantial additional 
slice of this particular cake . Nevertheless, the technocratic consensus 
contains a number of arguments which have been used to justify a 
very high level of central government control over the distribution of 
mineral resource rents. These may be summarised as follows. 
• The economic benefits of the mining and oil industries are 
not to be found in the creation of new national business and 
employment opportunities, in which respect they may well 
do more harm than good, but rather in their contribution to a 
national investment fund for the creation of physical and 
social infrastructure. The proper management of such a fund 
is the proper task of central government. 
• The money from these mineral cash cows flows in uneven 
quantities, depending as it does on the violent fluctuations of 
world commodity prices. Only central government has the 
institutional capacity to ' sterilise' this stream of money by 
filtering the greater part of it through the Mineral Revenues 
Stabilisation Fund, thus avoiding the temptation to spend 
more than it can afford. 
• The State has an honourable constitutional commitment to 
promote an 'equitable distribution of incomes' between 
different parts of the country. While it may be true that 
mineral resources have a strange habit of being developed in 
some of the most remote and backward parts, a small number 
of scattered mining enclaves will still tend to widen the gap 
between rich regions and poor regions unless central govern­
ment uses a significant portion of mineral revenues to achieve 
the opposite effect. 
Taken together, these three arguments have an obvious corollary, 
which is that other national and local stakeholders lack the capacity of 
central government to absorb and invest the mineral windfall for what 
the Constitution describes as 'the benefit of future generations' . From 
which it seems to follow that these other stakeholders should receive 
only as much of the surplus as it takes to create the conviction that all 
have gained more than they have lost from the development of their 
national resources. But on this last score, it looks as if someone made a 
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serious miscalculation of the amounts required to achieve this aim on 
Bougainville, and that is why the country's first and foremost cash­
cow kicked the bucket. 
Table 13.2 already contains a couple of 'structural faults' which 
betray the prior need for compromise with less enlightened points of 
view. The technocrat has argued that mineral resources should remain 
the property of the Crown because the State alone has the right and 
the capacity to regulate their exploitation for the benefit of the nation 
as a whole. But this worthy principle has long since been diluted by 
the concession already made in the Bougainvillean case, that mineral 
royalties should not only accrue to the government of the province in 
which the resources were located, but that 5 per cent of them should be 
passed back to the customary owners of the land which covered these 
resources, as if to say that they owned 5 per cent (no more, no less) of 
what was underneath the ground. Likewise, the technocrat has argued 
that State equity in mining projects does not help to maximise govern­
ment revenues from mineral exploitation, nor does it help to achieve 
the parallel aim of maintaining effective government control over the 
behaviour of mining companies. But the government of Papua New 
Guinea has constantly maintained, and has normally exercised, the 
option of becoming a minority shareholder in successive mining projects 
in order to maintain the symbolic role of State property as a symbol of 
national pride, wealth and power. It is true that the government 
secured a substantial stream of dividends from its 20 per cent equity 
stake in BCL, but there were also significant opportunity costs in the 
purchase of these shares, and their value has declined considerably in 
the period since 1988. 
If, in light of recent changes in national mineral development policy, 
we were to construct a version of Table 13 .2 to show the prospective 
distribution of net revenues from a new mining project of similar 
dimensions to the one which is no longer operating on Bougainville, it 
might appear that there has not been too much change at all . The most 
striking difference would probably be seen in the payment of all 
mineral royalties to local landowners, which, in light of the recent 
decision to raise the royalty rate itself, would raise their share from 
less than 1 per cent to more than 4 per cent of the total surplus. If 
dividends were being paid, the table would probably also show that 
some of these were being paid to landowners and provincial govern­
ments in respect of the equity which they are now being offered at 
rather tempting prices, and this might even raise landowner incomes 
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to something more like 1 0  per cent of the total. But we would not be 
able to detect any significant difference in the forms and amounts of 
taxation levied by central government, and if the tax regime continues 
to serve the purpose for which it was designed, then the total national 
share of the surplus would still be much the same. 
On the other hand, there are three reasons to doubt whether tables 
of this kind provide an adequate reflection of the actual dynamics of 
the mineral policy process. 
• First, they are constructed from the standpoint of the ' first 
receiver ' in the ball game, and thus conceal the significance 
of 'second-phase play' between the various stakeholders. 
• Second, they do not tell us whether the rules governing the 
distribution and redistribution of mineral resource rent are 
having any impact on the levels of capital investment in the 
mining and petroleum sectors . 
• Third, they fail to tell us anything about the less transparent 
'social costs' of doing this kind of business-or, if you like, 
the number and price of those 'special services' which are 
essential to the reproduction of capital in this peculiar 
political environment. 
Now if we find evidence of a long-term decline in the level of capital 
investment in Papua New Guinea's mining and petroleum sector, and 
if we also find that changes in the fiscal regime are insufficient to 
explain the extent of this decline, then we should maybe take a closer 
look at the 'second-phase play' and the 'hidden social costs' before we 
find the rest of our explanation in the ebb and flow of the world market. 
Before proceeding further with this kind of analysis, we should look 
more closely at the roles, characters and costumes which actors assume 
when they engage in their dramatic struggle over the distribution of 
mineral resource rent. To use the more fashionable terminology, we 
need to consider the way that different groups of stakeholders have 
come to determine their separate interests and mutual relationships in 
the resource development policy process in Papua New Guinea. 
Stakeholder relationships 
One possible picture of stakeholder relationships is presupposed and 
reproduced by one particular instrument of mineral development policy, 
the Development Forum (Figure 13 .1  ) . In this case, the interests of each 
collective stakeholder group are defined by their participation in a series 
of contractual relationships with each other, where the contracts them-
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selves are all designed and organised by government officials. In this 
respect, Figure 13 .1  represents the technocratic picture of stakeholder 
relationships in the mining and petroleum sector, and thus helps us to 
see that the technocratic consensus is not just an agreement about how 
to divide up a pile of money, but is also an agreement about the 
identity-and perhaps the motivation-of the recipients, which goes 
on to entail certain strategies for the management and control of 
stakeholder conflict. 
Yet there are several ways in which this picture of the 'forum concept' 
tends to misrepresent the actuality of stakeholder relationships. First, 
it shows that the State is literally 'on top of the game', but that is only 
because I have deliberately drawn the diagram from the point of view 
of a public servant, and even from that point of view, I might just as well 
have located the provincial government box beneath, and not alongside, 
that of the national government. 
Second, the national government represents the interest of all 
national stakeholders insofar as these are distinct from the local stake­
holders who are either residents of a specific province or members of a 
particular landowning community. Of course, local stakeholders are 
also national stakeholders, and therefore have as much right as anyone 
else to claim that they represent Papua New Guinea's national interest, 
even if their own interests are not represented by the national govern­
ment, but there are also many other national stakeholders who do not 
think that their own interests are represented by the national government, 
Figure 1 3.1 . Stakeholder relations in the 'development forum' 
Provincial government National government 
MDC or PDA 
Landowning community Resource developer 
Note: MOU-Memorandum of Understanding; M DC-Mining 
Development Contract; PDA-Petroleum Development Agreement 
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and many stakeholders within the ranks of national government whose 
own contributions to the national policy process are based in the pursuit 
of purely local interests . 
It would therefore be more accurate to say that the boxes which 
seem, at first sight, to contain the representatives of the national govern­
ment, the provincial government, and the landowning community, in 
what seems to be a four-way process of negotiation with a particular 
foreign company over the development of a specific mineral resource, 
are each actually occupied by a number of individuals (for example, 
national or provincial politicians) and organisations (for example, 
national or provincial government departments) whose own interests 
are by no means identical (see Filer 1990). This means, amongst other 
things, that the government's interest in a mining project is a very 
difficult thing to pin down, and so likewise is the idea of a 'government 
strategy' for dealing with either landowning communities on the one 
side or mining companies on the other side of the negotiating table. 
Since mining and petroleum projects are, by their very nature, 
grounded in particular physical locations, the local interests of all 
national stakeholders who take part in the negotiation of any particular 
project cannot be reduced to the simple distinction between three 'levels' 
of government or three 'scales' of policy formation, but depend on the 
relative proximity of each stakeholder group to the project in question. 
On the other hand, since people are not tied to particular physical 
locations, their claims to belong to the area in which each project is 
located are themselves subject to manipulation and contestation, as 
evidenced by recurring disputes over the definition of ' landowning 
communities' and 'areas of preference' in the mineral policy process. 
The final problem with Figure 13.1 is that it conceals the existence and 
significance of several stakeholder groups who exercise a distinctive 
influence on the policy process, at one level or another, without 
necessarily claiming to represent the interests of the companies, the 
governments, or the communities which have an official role to play in 
negotiating the development of a particular project. The sense of 
frustration which such 'unofficial' stakeholders arouse in the mind of 
the true technocrat is nicely exemplified by the complaint of a former 
Secretary of the Mining and Petroleum Department in a 1992 conference 
paper, that ' foreign carpetbaggers' and 'environmental fanatics' were 
the two main threats to the stability of the local industry (Post-Cou rier 
1 September 1992). 
The Development Forum should therefore be compared to a single 
act or scene in a larger drama whose cast is not confined to the four 
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characters whose roles are recognised in Figure 13. 1, and there is no 
reason to assume that this is the last act or scene in the play. 
An alternative picture of stakeholder relations in the national policy 
process is presented in Figure 13.2, where the central contest between 
'technocrats' and 'landowners' over the distribution of a pile of national 
natural resources is the name of the game in which a wide variety of 
more specific groups of social actors are invited (or invite themselves) 
to play some role and gain some benefit. During the first decade of 
national independence, when the technocratic consensus really did 
seem to regulate the process of mineral resource development, some 
commentators were inclined to regard this central contest as a form of 
class struggle. Peter Fitzpatrick, for example, in his keynote speech to 
the 1982 Waigani Seminar, argued that 
The State occupies a central position which the technocracy uses to 
consolidate its class power. In this, it blocks any challenging advance 
of the national petty bourgeoisie, even at the price of tolerating and 
encouraging foreign domination (1985:2 9). 
My own preference, with the benefit of hindsight on the vagaries of 
the national policy process in the second decade of independence, 
would be to construe the struggle between technocrats and landowners 
as an opposition of voices or perspectives which may be articulated or 
adopted by all manner of people-including politicians, businessmen 
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and public servants-whose interests may draw them to one side or 
the other, depending on the context or the issue which engages them. 
Let me illustrate the technocratic voice, the voice of ' rationality', 
with part of a statement made in the National Parliament by the Minister 
for Minerals and Energy, John Kaputin, back in November 1987 
The Government's policy towards the mineral sector has been 
formulated so as to encourage the development of those natural 
resources by ensuring investors receive an appropriate return while 
the State secures optimum benefits. It is recognised that most mining 
developments individually are neither extensive employers nor can 
they support large infrastructure. However, development of a mineral 
deposit is viewed in the wider context of social and economic develop­
ment objectives. These include, as far as possible, the creation of 
employment opportunities for Papua New Guineans, the encourage­
ment of greater participation in ventures by Papua New Guineans, the 
growth of a PNG service industry, the decentralisation of infrastructure 
development, and the generation of tax revenues (Nuigini Nuis 14 
November 1987). 
As with most ministerial statements, it seems quite likely that these 
are not the minister's own words, but the ritual product of a senior public 
servant. There have been other occasions over the last decade when the 
former minister has sounded much less like the typical technocrat in 
his public comments on mineral development policy. On the other hand, 
he has normally eschewed the kind of 'grassroots landowner ' 
perspective which is illustrated by the following excerpt from a news­
paper feature article on the vexed question of resource compensation. 
When landowners stand with their compensation claims, it is not done 
in a vacuum. They stand opposed to the cunning, the smart, the 
educated and the exploiters. They stand, used and abused, and their 
land so often taken from them. It is in this light that we must look at 
compensation demands. Only then can we begin to understand why 
the people in the outlying areas of our country seem to have the urge 
to create problems for the Government, to provide challenges to their 
authority. The complicated bureaucratic bungling, the ineffective 
administration of resources, the unequal distribution of national 
income, an economy making a few rich and many poor, unequal 
distribution of services ... you want reasons for 'unreasonable' 
compensation demands? There you have them ... All these factors play 
a part in urging the rural people to get benefits any way they can. It 
allows the powerless to grab a li ttle power in this unequal world that 
is Papua New Guinea (Post-Courier 31 January 1992). 
I do not know the author of this article, Mr Koreken Levi, but I 
should not be surprised if I were to find him, one day, sitting in an office 
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in the Department of Mining and Petroleum writing a 1technocratic' 
speech for his minister. 
My point is not that Papua New Guineans are hypocrites, or that 
they have a constitutional incapacity to sustain an internally consistent 
political position. My point is that many national stakeholders do not 
have the kind of interest in mineral development policy which would 
necessarily place them on one side or the other in this 'dialogue of the 
deaf ' .  And that is partly because the ' landowner' is a person to whom 
the 'distribution of resource rent' is itself a foreign concept. I made this 
point some years ago, when analysing the origins of the Bougainville 
rebellion. 
Central government departments (and their ministers) may be talking 
primarily about the distribution of quantifiable economic benefits, 
including compensation for quantifiable environmental costs, while 
other participants often appear to be talking about the distribution of 
'rights' or 'powers' (to say 'yes-or-no'), or about costs (and even 
benefits perhaps) which cannot be quantified or priced. In addition, 
much of this debate has a David-and-Goliath quality, in which the 
' customary landowner ' is counterposed to the wicked multinational 
corporation and its political or bureaucratic allies, and emotional 
identification with the underdog or the 'grassroot' simply fails to 
engage with an economic discussion of costs and benefits (Filer 1 990:100). 
We should not be surprised to hear some tremor of indignation in 
the technocratic voice whose owner is obliged to listen to the motley 
crowd of stakeholders or stallholders who are constantly trying to 
squeeze themselves into the space reserved for ' true landowners' in the 
national policy process. Here speaks a former academic and sometime 
public servant now employed as a 'landowner expert' in the oil industry. 
Usually some landowners whom their own group refused to nominate 
as representatives will seek support from advisors, politicians, former 
politicians, lawyers or former lawyers in order to try all kinds of means 
to destabilise the true landowners and get some form of involvement 
for themselves personally. As a rule, the louder the noise the weaker 
the claim (Power 1 993:3). 
And here speaks Professor Ross Garnaut, sometime diplomat and long­
time academic, noted for his contributions to the resource rent concept. 
Like blowflies to a wound, lawyers and consultants swarm to aid any 
party that might conceivably be able to disrupt the development of a 
mine, and therefore claim a part of the rent. This ensures that distribution 
of mineral rent is rarely a simple technocratic process embodying a 
sovereign authority's preferences in the national interest, but rather 
the resultant of complex political forces (Garnaut 1 995:62). 
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There are three aspects of this complexity which seem to me to be 
worthy of mention at this juncture . 
• Although the contest between landowners and technocrats 
can be, and often has been, portrayed as a sort of struggle 
between national and foreign interests, l ike the Melanesian 
Way of subverting the World Bank, there is a growing cast of 
both national and foreign stakeholders who, like Professor 
Garnaut' s blowflies, are liable to turn up on either side of the 
country's resource development discourse. 
• Even those stakeholders, national or foreign, who conceive 
their own function to be the maintenance and defence of the 
' technocratic consensus' on mineral development policy do 
not thereby exclude themselves from the right and the 
obligation to represent what they conceive to be the real 
interests of the ' true landowners'; and there are even some 
' true landowners' who are keen to repay the compliment. 
• Finally, just because we are dealing with a game whose 
object seems to be the distribution of a pile of money, this 
does not mean that the participants all share the same 
conception of material wealth, or that all regard the pursuit 
of material wealth as the main motive for their participation. 
Which points having been made, I shall now try to illustrate in greater 
detail the general argument with which I began this chapter, by telling 
the story of what I call the 'decomposition of mineral policy', meaning 
the decline of the technocratic policy regime, over the course of the 
last decade. 
The decomposition of mi neral  development pol icy 
My task here is to review the 'progress' of the mineral policy process 
since 1985 in order to establish the sequence of policy decisions which 
have affected the distribution of resource rent, the 'hidden social costs' 
of doing business, and the political relationships between those stake­
holders who have a significant stake in the mineral policy debate. There 
are several ways this story could be told. A distinction might be drawn 
at the outset between a sequence of decisions or events which serve, like 
so many signposts, to mark the unravelling of the technocratic consensus 
on mineral development policy, and a number of relatively permanent 
threats or pressures, like the endless debate on the question of mineral 
rights, which constantly affect the question of ' sovereign risk assessment' 
or the 'legitimacy of the state' and the effectiveness of its power. 
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Another distinction could be drawn between those policy debates 
and decisions which are truly 'national' in their coverage and impact, 
and those which have primarily been concerned with the development 
of specific projects. Since the national policy process in Papua New 
Guinea does not allow either of these distinctions to be made with 
clarity and consistency over any substantial period of time, I have chosen 
instead to tell a single story which starts in 1985 and ends, for the time 
being, in 1996. I have therefore been tempted to portray the policy 
process as one to which each of four successive coalition governments 
has made its own particular contribution. 
On the other hand, I have also tried to make some allowance for the 
fact that 'national government policy' in Papua New Guinea has rarely 
been more than the sum of specific ministerial or sectoral policies, 
whose formation owes much more to the fluctuating balance of power 
in an enduring contest of sectional interests than it does to the general 
concept of development espoused by the government of the day. 
If it is true that the technocrats retained effective control over the 
formulation of mineral development policy throughout the first decade 
of national independence, then it is only with the benefit of hindsight 
that we can see the first cracks appearing in this edifice during the years 
of the first Wingti-Chan coalition government, from the end of 1985 to 
the middle of 1988. John Kaputin, who held the Minerals and Energy 
portfolio for most of this period, was normally content to follow the 
advice of his departmental officials, and these latter had good reason 
to believe that they were presiding over a mineral exploration boom 
which proved the wisdom of existing technocratic regulation . Such 
wisdom was perhaps less evident in the Sixth Supplemental Agree­
ment between the State and Ok Tedi Mining Limited, in which the 
benefits of copper mining to the national economy were allowed to 
override the natural justice of compensation claims by downstream 
landowners. And of course, we can now say that this government went 
on to make an even greater mistake in its failure to heed and deal with 
the first signs of devastating conflict over the distribution of national 
income from the Panguna copper mine-a failure which might have 
been partly due to the feelings of pride and complacency with which 
the technocrats regarded the provisions of the renegotiated Bougainville 
Copper Agreement of 197 4. 
But if we are looking for the causes of local outrage over the national 
management of mineral revenues in the period from 1985 to 1988, some 
emphasis must also be placed on the Placer Pacific share issue-the 
share float which was meant to broaden the base of national support for 
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Placer's  investments in Papua New Guinea, but which almost had the 
opposite effect when a buoyant share market created a quick windfall 
profit for those citizens and residents who had the wherewithal to take 
advantage of the opportunity. The question which occupied so much 
space in the national newspapers during the last three months of 1986 
was whether the many politicians and senior public servants who had 
taken advantage of this opportunity, and most especially Sir Julius 
Chan in his capacity as Minister for Finance, had thereby breached the 
conditions of the country's Leadership Code. Technicalities aside, the 
point at issue here was not the validity of any specific government 
policy, but the economic morality of a national political elite . Some 
commentators have seen the Placer Pacific share issue as an illustration 
of the 'parasitic and dependent' relationship between this national 
elite and the foreign mining companies with whom they do business 
(Banks 1990:114). But it was surely more than this. Given the widespread 
evidence of an upsurge in mineral exploration, it also signalled a new 
climate of opinion, a sort of 'mental mineral boom' in which the 
popular expectation of great wealth was linked to the popular conviction 
that there was no such thing as a 'national interest' in the distribution 
of mineral resource rent. 
The significance of such beliefs in the conduct of the 1987 national 
election campaign may well have been underestimated because the 
election failed to yield a change of government, but the appearance of 
political continuity did nothing to conceal, and may even have 
exacerbated, the sound and fury of local stakeholders demanding an 
end to the 'parasitic and dependent' relationship whose image was 
now firmly entrenched in the national consciousness. No national 
politician did more to promote this populist cause than the leader of the 
Melanesian Alliance, Father John Momis, whose own election campaign 
featured the so-called 'Bougainville initiative', demanding a radical 
redistribution of BCL' s economic surplus in favour of his own 
constituents in North Solomons Province, and possibly encouraging 
the far more radical demands which were soon to be made by Francis 
Ona and his militant supporters. 
These expressions of dissent could not induce a fundamental 
reorientation of mineral development policy precisely because they 
could not accommodate an alternative conception of the national interest. 
Indeed, the Namaliu-Diro coalition which took over the reins of 
government in the middle of 1988 did rather more than its predecessor 
to maintain the strength of the technocratic consensus, despite the fact 
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that its Minister for Minerals and Energy, Patterson Lowa, was himself 
a member of the Melanesian Alliance. This was the government which 
ratified the Seventh Supplemental Agreement for the Ok Tedi project in 
1989 and went on to secure the passage of a new Mining Act in 1992-
both pieces of legislation which embodied the basic principles of 
technocratic regulation. Nevertheless, it was now quite clear that these 
principles would have to be amended in order to accommodate a 
variety of local and personal interests united by an ' ideology of land­
ownership' which was largely impervious to the logic of an orthodox 
economist. 
It soon became clear that the Bougainvillean rebels had passed beyond 
the point at which their own interests could be accommodated by a 
modified version of the technocratic consensus on the distribution of 
mineral revenues. The armed struggle which engulfed North Solomons 
Province was undoubtedly taken as a warning of what might happen 
if public servants and company executives failed to forge a new deal 
with local stakeholders in the mining sector, but once the Panguna 
copper mine had been forced to close down its operations in 1989, the 
task of articulating this new deal was largely detached from the business 
of ending the Bougainville rebellion. Both before and after the outbreak 
of that conflict, the search for compromise was not primarily directed 
to those projects whose mode of operation had already been agreed 
between the government and the developers, but to those two provinces, 
Enga and Southern Highlands, within which the future development 
of the Porgera gold mine and the Kutubu oil field was already the 
subject of a noisy dialogue between the putative stakeholders, and 
between which a great deal of additional noise was generated by the 
Mount Kare gold rush. 
Politicians from these two highland provinces persuaded the 
National (that is, Provincial) Premiers Council to establish its own 
Working Committee to review the relationship between national, 
provincial and local stakeholders under existing mineral development 
policies. According to Thompson and Macwilliam, this was 'a crafty 
political attempt to shift the site of class struggle to the regional level 
where provincial class interests would have more control over the 
outcomes of productive and distributive policies' ( 1992:172). Amongst 
the various instances of conflict between national, provincial and local 
'class interests', if such they can be called, I would say that this was an 
unusually transparent attempt to secure some modification of the 
technocratic consensus, and the actual recommendations of the Working 
Resource rents I 239 
Committee, presented in September 1988, were remarkable mainly for 
their moderation. While some provincial politicians had been demand­
ing an increase in the mineral royalty rate from 1 .25 per cent to 10 per 
cent of the value of production, the Committee recognised the validity 
of the technocratic critique of this particular form of taxation, and 
therefore presented the national government with a choice between 
• raising the royalty rate to 2.5 per cent of the value of production 
and granting 20 per cent of the corporate income tax collected 
from each project to the provincial government of the province 
in which the project was located 
• leaving the royalty rate at 1 .25 per cent of the value of 
production, and transferring 30 per cent of the corporate 
income tax to the provincial government. 
The Committee also recommended that the area of immediate project 
impact should receive special consideration in the spending of these 
larger provincial revenues, but it stuck to the technocratic argument 
against any increase in the size of direct payments to local landowners. 
The national government's response to these recommendations was 
to recognise the right of provincial governments and landowning 
communities to bargain for their share of the economic surplus 
generated by large-scale mining and petroleum projects developed in 
their respective domains, but not to concede anything of the national 
government's sovereign right to negotiate the development contract 
directly with the developers. The Porgera gold mine was the first project 
to be subject to the tripartite process of negotiation between national, 
provincial and local stakeholders which soon came to be known as the 
'Development Forum' (see West 1992). The outcome was a set of agree­
ments which made three main concessions to the financial demands of 
the Enga Provincial Government and the customary landowners of the 
Special Mining Lease. 
• Royalties were still to be collected at the rate of 1 .25 per cent 
of the value of mine output, but the landowners were now to 
receive 20 per cent, rather than 5 per cent, of the total, while 
the provincial government's share would be correspondingly 
reduced from 95 per cent to 80 per cent. 
• The provincial government would be more than compensated 
for this loss by receipt of a 'special support grant' from the 
national government valued at 1 per cent of the value of mine 
output, and thus equivalent to the royalty share which it would 
retain, rather than the smaller share which it would lose. 
240 I Papua New G u i nea: a 20/20 vision 
• The provincial government and the landowners would share 
49 per cent of the state's 10 per cent equity stake in the 
Porgera Joint Venture, with an option to purchase the 
remaining 51 per cent after five years. 
Once these agreements had been concluded in April 1989, the 
technocrats in the Department of Minerals and Energy lost no time in 
turning their provisions into a 'Basic Mining Package' which could be 
sold to provincial and local stakeholders in all other mining and 
petroleum projects in order to restore some semblance of stability to 
the mineral policy environment. In this endeavour they were only 
partially successful .  There was nothing in the package which could 
save the Panguna copper mine from the clutches of the Bougainville 
Revolutionary Army. The ' forum concept' was successfully applied to 
the Ok Tedi and Misima mining projects, whose development contracts 
were already in place, though not without a good deal of aggravation in 
the process and several variations in the detail of the outcome. It proved 
even more difficult for the national government to balance the 
demands of the two provincial governments and various landowning 
communities with a stake in the development of the Kutubu oil field 
and its export pipeline, and some issues were still subject to dispute 
when the development licence was issued in December 1990. 
By this time, the chance of securing a standard and durable arrange­
ment for the redistribution of national mineral revenues along the lines 
pioneered by the Porgera forum agreements was already being 
diminished by the inability of the Enga Provincial Government to spend 
its greater share of these revenues in accordance with the letter of these 
agreements . As this reduced the flow of funds from the national 
government, the result was a rapidly widening credibility gap in the 
relationship between both levels of government and the local land­
owning community, whose own access to mineral revenues had already 
attracted a substantial influx of secondary claimants from near and far. 
The same credibility gap was soon to become a routine feature of the 
Development Forum, and one which has posed an additional hazard 
for developers because their own facilities and personnel are obvious 
and immediate targets for local frustrations generated by the failings of 
a distant State. Placer Niugini' s executives decided that the best way to 
deal with this problem at Porgera was to raise the company's own 
spending on social infrastructure in various parts of Enga Province and 
seek a corresponding reduction in its liability to corporate income tax. 
In this way, the company would have a financial incentive to use its 
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own engineering capacities to reduce the financial incentive for people 
in other parts of the province to come and settle in the immediate 
vicinity of the mine . 
The national government was duly persuaded to introduce its 
Infrastructure Tax Credit Scheme in the 1992 Budget, allowing the 
developers of mining and petroleum projects to deduct 0 .75 per cent of 
their assessable income for such expenditures. Since there were no 
corresponding reductions in the national government's financial 
commitments to the provinces hosting these projects, this fiscal 
innovation entailed a further reduction in the national government's 
own share of the resource rent. 
Concessions of this sort could be justified as part of the political 
price which now had to be paid for maintenance of the institutional 
framework within which the technocratic consensus had been formed. 
But they could not so readily accommodate the lessons which certain 
sections of the national business and political elite thought they had 
learnt from the impact of the Mount Kare gold rush and the outbreak 
of the Bougainville rebellion. Chief amongst these was the belief-or 
at least the pretence-that ' landowners' would no longer be satisfied 
with the crumbs or peanuts cast in their direction from the distant 
tables of the State. When this belief was combined with the assumption 
that every automatic citizen was an actual or potential ' landowner' 
with a legitimate desire for 'meaningful participation' in the process of 
resource development, it soon led to the claim-and sometimes even 
the threat-that eruptions of popular resentment against the forces of 
multinational capital could no longer be contained without some 
fundamental redistribution of mineral resource rights and resource 
project equity between those national stakeholders whose own sense 
of national identity and unity had been sacrificed on the altars of the 
technocratic regime. The questions raised in this way could not be 
answered by the construction of a new formula for the distribution of 
resource rent or by the offer of occasional participation in the new 
form of State ritual known as the Development Forum. 
The actual distribution of resource rent from the Mount Kare gold 
rush in 1988 was far less significant for the maintenance of the techno­
cratic regime than the signal inability of government to regulate the 
social and economic process by which it was initially generated and 
through which it very rapidly evaporated . Since the government had 
already granted CRA the mineral prospecting rights in this area, and 
CRA' s own geologists had made the discovery which triggered the gold 
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rush, the removal of free gold by an evanescent horde of small-scale 
miners was arguably an illegal act, yet one which enjoyed such obvious 
and widespread popular support that it was widely seen to deny the 
legitimacy of the government's claim to ownership of mineral resources 
located in or under customary land . 
The result was three years of inconclusive debate in which various 
attempts were made to dilute or challenge the strength of this claim. 
During this time, the technocrats in the national government decided 
to ' compensate' CRA for its earlier losses by granting the company a 
Special Mining Lease over the area from which the free gold had 
already been removed, and in which the economic feasibility of large­
scale mining was still questionable. This decision had the unfortunate 
effect of exaggerating the expectations and demands of the many local 
stakeholders whose earlier participation in the gold rush had under­
standably served to whet their appetite for another slice of this rich 
cake . In this way, the debate about the ultimate ownership of mineral 
resources was translated into an argument about the allocation of 
rights to explore and develop those resources which could not simply 
be 'stolen' from the State. While some commentators (for example, 
Larmour 1989) were pointing out that the State could still exercise 
effective control over the distribution of mineral revenues even if it 
conceded the ultimate ownership of mineral resources to customary 
landowners, the ownership of Mount Kare was becoming a battle­
ground in which the political conflict between local stakeholders was 
threatening to undermine the government's ability to regulate the 
process of production. 
From the technocratic point of view, the critical factor here was the 
government's capacity to sustain a version of the 'finders-keepers' rule, 
by which foreign investors who risked their capital in the hazardous 
business of mineral exploration could be assured of the right to develop 
whatever resources they discovered, under conditions which would 
guarantee them a predictable and reasonable share of the economic 
surplus arising from the development. The greatest threat to this 
capacity during the period of the Namaliu government came not from 
the bickering over an unproven mineral resource at Mount Kare but 
from a series of concerted efforts to establish a new kind of 'national 
control' over the proven reserves in the Kutubu oil field .  
Towards the end of 1989, five prominent national capitalists gathered 
under the title of Monticello Enterprises and set out to persuade other 
stakeholders in the Kutubu project that the Kutubu Joint Venture' s right 
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to extract and sell the oil which it had discovered should not entail the 
right to build and own the pipeline and other export facilities. Instead 
they proposed that this latter right should be vested in a separate 
corporate vehicle, to be known as the Papua New Guinea Pipeline 
Company, in which PNG citizens and national institutions would hold 
at least 51 per cent, and foreign oil companies no more than 20 per cent, 
of the shares. Needless to say, this proposal was none too popular with 
the oil companies themselves, or with some senior government officials, 
first because it was inconsistent with the Petroleum Act, and second 
because it would prevent the Kutubu Joint Venture from depreciating 
the cost of pipeline construction against its liability to corporate income 
tax (Brunton 1992). Between April and July 1990, the proposal was 
subject to intense debate in the local press and the national parliament, 
and government ministers were also divided on its merits. The techno­
crats won this argument because the proponents were unable to 
convince a majority of national stakeholders that their own personal 
interest in the outcome was secondary to a conception of the national 
interest which appeared to entail a further transfer of wealth from the 
public purse to several private pockets. But they had to fight the same 
battle all over again during the final months of the Namaliu government, 
when Cabinet was persuaded to consider the formation of a National 
Oil and Gas Company which would collect its own share of Kutubu' s 
resource rent through the local monopoly or 'coordination' of various 
forward and backward linkages created by the process of extraction. 
The installation of the second Wingti-Chan coalition government 
after the 1992 national election effectively put an end to this particular 
battle, and the Kutubu Joint Venture was left to conduct its business in 
relative peace and quiet until the Development Forum caught up with 
it again in 1994. But this did not mean that the new government was 
content to accept the technocratic definition of the national interest. 
On the contrary, the new Prime Minister and his Minister for Mining 
and Petroleum, Masket Iangalio, lost little time in turning the battle of 
Mount Kare into a general assault on the multinational bastions of the 
hard-rock mining industry, and simultaneously turning a deaf ear to 
the sounds of technocratic advice emanating from the senior echelons 
of the public service. As a result, CRA was finally persuaded to tum its 
back on Mount Kare, though this brought little material comfort to its 
opponents, PJV was told to hand over a larger slice of its equity to the 
State, though the State could not find the money to pay for it, and RTZ 
was told to develop the Lihir project in a joint venture designed by 
ministerial advisers, and simply refused. There is no doubt that this 
244 I Papua New Guinea: a 20/20 vision 
situation of stalemate caused a further loss of confidence in the ranks of 
major investors, and if this was seen in some quarters as the price 
which had to be paid for the consolidation of a new form of economic 
nationalism, there is little evidence to show that it has served to reduce 
the intensity of conflict between national and local stakeholders over 
the distribution of an economic surplus whose absolute size now seems 
bound to diminish with the further passage of time. 
The vote of no-confidence which brought about another change of 
government at the end of 1994 may have reflected a wider vote of no 
confidence in the financial situation of the State, but it also repaired 
some of the broken lines of communication which serviced the techno­
cratic regulation of the mining and petroleum sector. Although the new 
Minister for Mining and Petroleum, John Giheno, was thought to have 
backed the Monticello proposal in his occupation of another ministry in 
the Namaliu government, senior public servants and industry executives 
saw him as a pragmatist who was more interested in scoring goals 
through ' constructive teamwork' than in moving the goalposts around 
an increasingly muddy playing field. The first test of his skills was the 
conduct and conclusion of the Lihir Development Forum, and the main 
obstacle to his success was the intransigence of Lihir community 
representatives whose own sense of alienation from the State had led 
them to demand a much more substantial share of the projected resource 
rent than had hitherto been won by their counterparts in other parts of 
the country (see Filer 1995). This problem was magnified by the fact 
that Lihir was located within the electorate of the new Prime Minister, 
whose own reputation in the landowning community had been 
considerably damaged by his membership of the previous coalition 
government, and while John Giheno was not a member of the Prime 
Minister's own political party, he was still expected to negotiate a set 
of agreements to which the Prime Minister would be the ultimate 
signatory. There were two main innovations in the deal which was 
concluded in March 1995. 
• First, the community's own local government body, the 
Nimamar Development Authority, would receive at least 30 
per cent of the Special Support Grant allocated to the New 
Ireland Provincial Government, plus 30 per cent of the total 
royalties collected from the mining company, not counting 
the 20 per cent which was already due to the landowners of 
the Special Mining Lease. 
• Second, the overall royalty rate would be raised from 1 .25 
per cent to 2 per cent of the value of the mine's output, thus 
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increasing the value of the community's 50 per cent share of 
the total royalties, in exchange for the community's agreement 
to accept a 15  per cent equity stake in the project instead of 
the 20 per cent stake which its leaders had been demanding 
ever since the Wingti-Chan government threatened to reserve 
a 50 per cent stake for the nation as a whole. 
In effect, the price of local support for a major mining project whose 
development was now seen to be an essential precondition of the 
nation's economic recovery would now have to be some combination 
of reforms to the fiscal regime governing the whole mining sector and 
revisions to the set of forum agreements already made in respect of 
other projects. 
The new royalty rate was indeed mentioned during parliamentary 
debate on the belated 1995 budget, and then announced again at the 
Mining and Petroleum Investment Conference in Sydney, where Minister 
Giheno himself conceded that it had been introduced as a 'safety valve' 
to ' let off pent-up expectation' . It had now been bundled up in a 
package of mineral policy amendments, whose other main ingredients 
were 
• the promise to provide landowners with a certain amount of 
' free equity' in new mining and petroleum projects 
• an undertaking to extend the scope of the Infrastructure Tax 
Credit Scheme to cover 2 per cent (instead of the present 0 .75 
per cent) of a developer ' s  assessable income. 
It is interesting to note that this package of novelties, introduced in 
the midst of a major fiscal crisis, would have the obvious and immediate 
effect of reducing national government revenue from the mining and 
petroleum sector, either by making tax concessions to the developers or 
else by meeting the 'pent-up expectations' of landowners and provincial 
governments. The new royalty regime was actually designed to do both 
these things, since developers were assured that the extra royalty would 
be treated as tax already paid to (and then to be given away by) the 
national government. This did not prevent industry representatives 
from complaining that the new royalty rate, like the promised transfer 
of ' free' project equity to resource owners, would create more local 
jealousies and conflicts without necessarily reducing anyone's expect­
ations or demands. And they had even more cause for complaint when 
the government brought down the 1996 Budget, because the one item in 
the package which would have been most favourable to themselves, the 
promised extension of the Tax Credit Scheme, was passed over in silence. 
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The new Organic Law on Provincial Government and Local-level 
Governments promises to continue the existing trend to redistribute 
mineral revenues from the national government to a small elite of 
'lucky-strike' communities. Under Section 98, which deals with 'Benefits 
Derived from Natural Resources', the share of mineral royalties 
disbursed to project landowners is raised from its presently variable 
but constantly increasing level to 1 00 per cent of the total collected by 
the government. This measure does have the advantage of restoring 
an element of consistency between the new projects to which the new 
formula will apply, but this gain is arguably outweighed by other costs 
and risks. In particular, we are bound to wonder how long the land­
owners of existing projects will be persuaded by the force of Subsection 
98(7), which points out that the provisions of Section 98 'do not affect 
existing agreements relating to natural resources which are in force 
before the coming into operation of this Organic Law' . For example, 
some of the Lihirians who thought they had done well to secure 50 per 
cent of the Lihir project royalties for the Lihir community through 
agreements signed in April 1995 might now be wondering whether they 
should have waited until the Organic Law was certified in July and 
then claimed the whole lot. On the other hand, the manner in which the 
Lihirians agreed to distribute royalty receipts amongst themselves-20 
per cent to the landowners of the Special Mining Lease (SML ), 30 per 
cent to their own 'interim local-level government'-is one which would 
not be allowed under the terms of the new Organic Law. And that is 
another reason why the mining industry has been so vociferous in its 
complaints that this particular provision will create a much wider and 
more socially disruptive gulf between 'project landowners' (meaning 
SML landowners) and their neighbours. 
Complaints about the new royalty regime seem to have fallen on 
deaf ears. Although the raft of amendments gazetted in September 
1995 does contain some significant alterations to Section 98, a critical 
observer might well be forgiven for concluding that these are designed 
to intensify, rather than reduce, the level of conflict and confusion 
arising from the distribution of mineral royalties. For those subsections 
which specified that developers were to follow the existing practice of 
paying royalties to the national government in the first instance, and 
then required the national government to pass the whole lot back to 
the landowners, have now been replaced by subsections which 
include royalties in a general package of 'landowner benefits', along 
with 'premiums, compensation and other assistance', and require the 
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contents of this package to be given either to the national government, 
or to the relevant provincial government, or to the relevant local-level 
government, before they can be handed back to their rightful owners. 
While Lands and Community Relations officers around the country 
scratch their heads and wonder which type of benefit should be paid 
to which level of government, they will find no answer to this question 
in the wording of the new Organic Law. And the time it takes for the 
various benefits to make their way through the various levels of 
government will be extra time for landowners to imagine that their 
dues are being misappropriated along the way. If the law says that 
these benefits belong entirely to the landowners and originate with no­
one but the developers, it is hard to see why the government should 
seek to do more than supervise or certify the transaction between the 
two parties . It might make sense for the government to do more than 
this if the government had left itself with the option of imposing a tax 
on the royalties to which it had once laid more substantial claim as the 
legal owner of the mineral resource from which the royalties derive. But 
this option seems to have been ruled out by the wording of Section 98, 
which says that government agencies involved in handling ' landowner 
benefits' shall not subject them to anything more than handling charges 
and a 'nominal tax' . Papua New Guinea must surely be the only country 
in the world in which the State insists on its own legal ownership of all 
mineral resources, and then excludes itself by law from any share in 
mineral royalties, even by way of a royalty tax. 
Supporters of the new Organic Law may now say that the State has 
taken steps to compensate itself for the loss of all royalty revenues by 
the imposition of an entirely new set of 'development levies' which the 
developers of new projects will henceforth be obliged to pay ' to the 
Provincial Governments and Local-level Governments of the province 
or area in which the development is situated' . Subsection 98(2) goes 
on to list these as 'infrastructural development levies', 'economic 
development and land use follow-up levies', ' community and social 
development levies', and 'any other levies as are from time to time 
determined by national law or by agreement' . Needless to say, the mining 
and petroleum companies have been even more alarmed by the prospect 
of paying an indefinite number of additional taxes than they have been 
by the prospect of local conflict over the distribution of royalties which 
are already lost to their accounts. Furthermore, the amendments 
gazetted in September 1995 look as if they were designed to rub salt 
into these wounds, since Subsection 98(4) now adds an obligation on 
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the developer to provide 'expertise and professional advice' on the use 
of these development levies to all three levels of government. 
Some mining company executives believe that they have received 
an assurance from government officials that the new levies should be 
seen as a substitute for the Special Support Grant (SSG), and that this 
substitution somehow removes the threat of an additional tax burden. 
The levies certainly do bear comparison with the SSG to the extent 
that they are payments due to provincial and local-level governments, 
rather than the national government. The crucial difference is that the 
SSG comes from the national government's own consolidated revenue, 
even though it is calculated as a percentage of the value of some specific 
project output, and is therefore not a form of taxation at all but a transfer 
from one level of government to another. Since the wording of Section 
98 leaves no doubt at all that the new levies are to be drawn directly 
from the developers' own pockets, it might make more sense for the 
mining companies to try and offset the value of these levies against the 
balance of their tax liabilities to the national government through an 
extension of the Tax Credit Scheme like that which they almost 
persuaded the government to grant them in 1995. 
In that case, what would become of the Special Support Grant? 
Interestingly enough, it receives no explicit mention in the new Organic 
Law, though it seems that some allowance has been made for the 
continuation of this arrangement in Subsection 99(1 ), which declares 
that the National Government 'may, in accordance with an Act of 
Parliament or by contract, share with Provincial Governments and 
Local-level Governments the revenues of the National Government 
generated from the sources within a province and a local-level govern­
ment area' . On the other hand, the amendments gazetted in September 
1995 contain an interesting reminder of the recent failures of provincial 
governments to make good use of the SSG. Subsection 98(3), which 
originally stated that the development levies would be 'managed and 
controlled jointly by the Provincial Governments and the Local-level 
Governments', now states that they shall be 'controlled through a trust 
fund which shall be managed and administered in accordance with an 
Act of the Parliament' . This turn of phrase offers one glimmer of hope 
to those corporate accountants who have bothered to study the Eighth 
Supplemental Agreement for the Ok Tedi project. In light of the proven 
inability of the provincial government to make effective use of its own 
revenues in the development of Western Province, the national govern­
ment now proposes to transfer the responsibility for actually spending 
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the SSG to OTML' s Lower Ok Tedi Fly River Development Trust-a 
sort of 'taxation in reverse' which will enable (or oblige) the mining 
company to greatly extend its range of activities in the field of 'contract 
administration', and perhaps make up for the fact that it has not 
previously been able to take full advantage of the Tax Credit Scheme 
because it has not been making a big enough profit. If  the mining and 
petroleum companies were to pay their development levies to trust 
funds administered by themselves, and then provide the various levels 
of government with 'expertise and advice as to the use of the develop­
ment levies' in the shape of a record of what they had done with them, 
they would only be doing what OTML has already done, and they might 
even have a chance to convince the government to use the provisions 
of the Tax Credit Scheme to embrace the expenditures of the Trust. 
Unfortunately, government has not done very much of late to 
clarify the options or their costs and benefits to each of the major 
stakeholders. The developers are certainly worried about this state of 
affairs, but their concern is currently modified by two considerations: 
those companies which are not involved in developing the Nena or 
Gobe projects can comfort themselves with the thought that Section 98 
will not apply to them anyway, while those who are involved with 
these new ventures can seek alternative remedies in Subsection 98( 6 ), 
which says that ' the rates, management, sharing arrangement, and 
application of the development levies' is yet another matter to be 
determined by a separate Act of Parliament. As I understand it, the Acts 
in question will have to be amendments to the Mining and Petroleum 
Acts which are currently in force. In March 1996 the Prime Minister 
went back to Sydney with what appeared to be a promise not to amend 
these pieces of legislation for another four years, though one must 
presumably wonder whether he has the power, even if he has the 
intent, to sustain this constitutional anomaly for such a period of time. 
These considerations should serve to remind us that lawyers have 
now achieved a more prominent place in the long line of stakeholders 
queuing up for a share of the resource rent generated by the mining 
and petroleum sector. The recent settlement of the legal contest between 
BHP and recalcitrant landowners of Western Province provides the 
most striking illustration of this point. As part of this settlement, BHP 
has agreed to pay about K7.5 million to the lawyers representing the 
landowners, and this is said to be half the amount which the company 
has already spent on its own team of lawyers and public relations 
experts while defending the case. The other main ingredients of this 
settlement, including the relevant provisions of the Mining (Ok Tedi 
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Restated Eighth Supplemental Agreement) Act of 1995, are as follows 
• Under the 'general compensation system' specified in that 
Act, OTML has already paid K14 million into a trust fund to 
provide compensation to local landowners for damage done 
to the Ok Tedi and Fly river systems during the first ten 
years of mining operations to the end of 1994, and further 
index-linked payments of at least K4 million per annum are 
to be paid into the trust for the remaining life of the project. 
• Individual landowners may continue to claim compensation 
for specific damage under the terms of the Mining Act, and if 
they succeed in doing so, OTML has the right to deduct the 
value of such compensation, up to a maximum of K20 million, 
from the amounts due to the general compensation trust fund, 
but it has recently agreed that such deductions would be 
matched by top-up payments to the Lower Ok Tedi Fly River 
Development Trust, which is simply the general compensation 
mechanism established before the litigation began. 
• OTML has now agreed that the general compensation fund 
will also be immune from deductions which it might 
otherwise have claimed, under the Eighth Supplemental 
Agreement, to meet the cost of implementing a new waste 
disposal scheme in accordance with the recommendations of 
an independent study of the available options. 
• OTML has also undertaken, as part of the latest settlement, to 
construct a special ' lower Ok Tedi additional benefits package', 
with an estimated value of K40 million, in recognition of the 
unusual level of environmental damage incurred by 
landowning communities along the lower Ok Tedi River. 
• As previously noted, the Lower Ok Tedi Fly River Develop­
ment Trust will assume responsibility for the implementation 
of development projects identified by the Fly River Provincial 
Government for funding under the Special Support Grant. 
• Following the precedents set by the latest round of forum 
agreements for other projects and general revisions to the 
fiscal regime, the people of Western Province will now 
receive the benefit of one-third of the government's 30 per 
cent equity stake in OTML, which may not be very great, 
and the royalties levied on the mine will be raised from 1 .25 
per cent to 2 per cent of the value of output, thus providing 
some additional comfort to provincial and local stakeholders 
who have not been involved in the recent litigation. 
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• And finally, the cost of compensation payments to the down­
stream landowners, including the cost of the litigation itself, 
will be deducted from OTML' s liability to corporate income tax. 
This last provision is the one which really strikes at the heart of the 
technocratic regime, because it almost certainly means that the national 
government will never be able to recoup its own investment in this 
project, and that is why the national government has, if anything, been 
more reluctant than BHP to settle the litigation at such a cost. 
Of course, Ok Tedi is a special case. So was Bougainville. The second 
of Papua New Guinea's large-scale mining projects continues to operate 
at a new price, while the first remains permanently shut. But one thing 
they do have in common is the probability that neither will henceforth 
make a positive net contribution to national government revenues. If 
the same fate were to befall the other large-scale mining and petroleum 
projects by which the government sets such store, then a very large 
question mark would be raised over the sustainability of the technocratic 
recipe for development in this sector. As matters stand, we can only 
note the continued accumulation of several smaller question marks. In 
the latest review of the Kutubu forum agreements, for example, we find 
that the national government has taken another pair of steps beyond 
the precedents set by the outcome of the Lihir Development Forum, 
firstly by granting the local landowner company a 7 per cent share of 
the state's equity stake at no cost, and secondly by raising the level of 
the Special Support Grant from 1 per cent to 2 per cent of the value of 
output. These concessions fell considerably short of what some local 
stakeholders had been demanding, but there is no reason to assume 
that the government will be able to resist the pressure to turn these into 
general features of its development policy, and no reason to assume 
that the forum process will not continue to generate an indefinite 
number of new concessions in specific project negotiations which will 
then undergo the same transformation, each one representing a net 
deduction from the national government's share of the nation's mineral 
resource rent. 
Ind ustry, state and society 
The recent history of the Development Forum gives no ground for us 
to believe that the national government has either the political will or 
the institutional capacity to halt or reverse its own inclination to transfer 
an ever-increasing share of mineral resource rents to local stakeholders. 
Even the most ardent technocrats concede that this instrument of 
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mineral development policy was and remains an essential and rational 
method of accommodating and incorporating the wide variety of local 
pressures and demands which have been accumulating in this sector. 
And indeed, over the last seven years, the forum process has contributed 
a good deal to the national government's stated aim of securing the 
greater participation of local stakeholders in negotiating the conditions 
of resource development. Yet this seems, almost inevitably, to have been 
achieved at the cost of encouraging a zero-sum, short-term, adversarial 
pattern of relationships between government agencies and local 
communities as they continually struggle over the distribution of 
mineral royalties, project equity, special support grant (SSG) expend­
itures, and a variety of other benefits which can be debited to project 
revenues. Each new forum has increased the share of these benefits 
which accrue from a specific project to its own 'landowning community', 
and has correspondingly reduced the share which is retained by the 
national government. 
This means that each new mining and petroleum project is liable to 
be developed under terms and conditions which immediately threaten 
the deals already done to facilitate the development of all existing 
projects. In this context, the government is unable to exercise its 
legitimate role as an agency of effective development planning in 
project impact areas, but normally stands condemned for its own failure 
to keep whatever promises it has made in some previous round of 
negotiations. This kind of failure provokes a corresponding resentment 
on the part of local communities, whose leaders are thus encouraged 
to make additional demands on the developers who have increasingly 
become the surrogate for government itself. And so the wealth, power 
and authority of the State appears to be trapped in a permanent crisis 
of governance. 
If the technocrat now sees the Development Forum as an unavoid­
able institution with an unsustainable outcome, we should remember 
that the forum concept itself represents a technocratic understanding 
of relationships between stakeholders in the mineral policy process . If 
we ask how the changing distribution of mineral resource rent reflects 
the shifting balance of power between these stakeholders, our answer 
needs to recognise the diversity of creatures which now invade the body 
of the State to consume 'their share' of the economic surplus or else feed 
directly from the stomach of the Wicked Multinational Corporation. 
The victims of this process have recently sought to diagnose and limit 
their affliction by refusing to talk about ' landowners' in public, and 
talking about 'project impact area people' instead. In this way, they 
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both confirm and deny the extent to which an ideology of landowner­
ship now serves to contain and encourage what Ross Garnaut calls 
'the emergence of a rent-seeking society, in which individuals and 
groups see opportunities for advancement principally in terms of the 
claims that they can lay on government and the resource industries' 
( 1995:66 ). At the same time, we should be wary of assuming that we 
are merely dealing here with some peculiar property of Melanesian 
national culture (see McGavin 1994). Although there are sound economic 
reasons to believe that Papua New Guinea is the prisoner of a 'resource 
dependency syndrome' which affects the attitudes and behaviour of 
many national participants in the mineral policy process (Filer 1995), 
the recent history of the Ok Tedi compensation litigation reveals that 
the rise of the unofficial stakeholder is a global, as well as a local, 
phenomenon. And the State is the meat in the sandwich. 
If the official construction of the Development Forum (Figure 13. 1 )  
conceals the political dynamics of this process, its economic aspects are 
likewise hidden by the technocratic definition of the economic surplus 
and its component parts (Table 13.2). While technocrats like to complain 
about goalposts being moved by unofficial stakeholders, they may not 
notice that the same characters are also getting an increasing share of 
the ball-primarily by 'selling dummies' to the government and the 
developers. In other words, the government's own methods of measur­
ing the provincial and local shares of the resource rent generated by 
each mining and petroleum project is one which increasingly under­
estimates the proportion which is finally diverted from investment to 
consumption. On the one hand, the present fiscal crisis of the State 
reveals a deep-seated institutional incapacity to invest the proceeds of 
a transient mineral boom ' for the benefit of future generations' . On the 
other hand, the likely transience of the boom is partly due to the State's 
failure to regulate the 'hidden social costs' which keep eating into the 
bottom line of company accounts-the landowner compensation 
packages, area development trusts, local business monopolies, educat­
ional sponsorships and training programmes, provision of social services, 
environmental monitoring and mitigation programs, sovereign risk 
insurance, legal fees, security measures, public relations campaigns, 
and so on. 
Should we therefore conclude that the current system of production 
and distribution in the mining and petroleum sector, under what remains 
of the technocratic regime of accumulation, is inherently unsustainable? 
The trouble with this question is that the definition and measurement 
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of ' sustainable development' is yet another bone of contention between 
the stakeholders in the mineral policy process. For example, popular 
wisdom-the wisdom of 'the landowner'-tends to assume that 'non­
renewable' resources exist in finite quantities, so that a certain rate of 
extraction must lead, over a certain period of time, to a situation in 
which they have literally 'run out' . The technocrat replies that 'known 
reserves' of any mineral resource are liable, if anything, to increase 
faster than the rate at which it is extracted and consumed, because the 
current value of the resource is the factor that decides which known 
reserves are worth exploiting and how much money should be spent 
on finding more (see Beckerman 1995). From this point of view, the 
business of extracting mineral resources from a particular country will 
not cease to be 'sustainable' because it is undertaken too rapidly, or 
because it damages the physical environment, but because of some 
deficiency in the social and political institutions which are meant to 
'sustain' the economic process of exploration and development. But the 
social and political scientists will then observe the need to distinguish 
between the sustainability of a certain form of ' economic development' 
and the sustainability of these supporting institutions, which must 
presumably be defined and measured by entirely different standards. 
In which case, what remains to be said about the relationship 
whose existence is apparently highlighted in the title of this chapter­
between the distribution of mineral resource rent and the sustainability 
of mineral resource development in Papua New Guinea? Is one pattern 
of distribution more or less sustainable than another, or are there 
several ways of distributing resource rent which would all be equally 
sustainable if only they were stable over time? Can we avoid the risk 
of a circular argument by finding an indicator of sustainability which 
neither measures the actual distribution of resource rent nor turns out 
to depend on the fallible concept of finite resources? Not being an 
economist, I hesitate to answer questions like this, but it looks as if the 
technocrats in the Department of Mining and Petroleum are using 
mineral exploration expenditures as their main indicator of sustain­
ability, and this is perfectly understandable once we acknowledge that 
exploration is the activity which ' creates' new mineral resources. By 
this criterion the future does not look too bright. For example, the 
Department's own figures tell us that hard-rock exploration expenditures 
have declined from almost K69 million in 1988 to just over K36 million 
in 1995, which means, in real terms (and in US dollars), a fall of more 
than 60 per cent over that period. If the government wished to reverse 
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this trend, then it might be well advised to reduce the tax burden on 
the mining industry, and in this sense to redistribute current resource 
rents between the developers and the other stakeholders (see Tilton et 
al. 1986:57). But if the recent transformations of the fiscal regime were 
ever intended to achieve this effect, there is little evidence that they 
have so far been successful. 
Of course, the Department of Mining and Petroleum has a vested 
interest in sustaining the industry for which it is responsible. Some 
economists will say that policy measures which help to sustain this 
industry may still have a neutral or negative impact on the overall 
pattern of economic development, because countries like Papua New 
Guinea, which depend so heavily on the exploitation of their mineral 
resources, suffer as a consequence from strange afflictions like the 'Dutch 
Disease' or 'Resource Curse' (Auty 1993). In that case, the general cause 
of 'sustainable development' might best be served by policies or 
activities which have the effect of reducing the extent of this dependence. 
The technocrat may point out that it is not necessary to reduce the 
overall level of investment in the mining and petroleum sector to 
achieve this goat provided that the government is able to ensure that a 
reasonable share of the mineral resource rent is being sensibly invested 
in other sectors of the national economy. But if this condition cannot be 
met, it might make more sense to slow down or discourage the growth 
of investment in the mining and petroleum sector, provided that the 
other sectors can compensate for the resulting fall in national income. 
The figures in Table 13 . 1  suggest that the forestry sector has an 
especially important role to play in making up for the projected 
deficiency in mineral exports and revenues. They might also help to 
explain the present government's apparent determination to speed up 
the allocation of new timber concessions to foreign logging companies, 
even at the cost of losing the financial support of the World Bank. Can 
it therefore be argued that the production and distribution of timber 
resource rent represents a viable alternative to the production and 
distribution of mineral resource rent as a method of keeping Papua New 
Guinea's government and society in the style to which it has become 
accustomed? The simple answer to this question is a negative one, 
because the current levels of timber harvest are already close to the 
levels which can be sustained in the long term, the national share of the 
resource rent is already close to the level at which it will begin to dis­
courage further investment in the timber industry, and there are no 
grounds for special optimism about the average price of Papua New 
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Guinea's timber on the world market. Nor does it seem likely that the 
negative economic effects of mineral resource dependency will be greatly 
alleviated if the main alternative to mining rocks is mining forests. 
Nevertheless, there are some institutional factors which help to 
explain the preference for logging projects over mining and petroleum 
projects. In hard-rock mining circles, Papua New Guinea is sometimes 
known as 'elephant country' -the sort of place where you take big risks, 
spend big bucks, and end up with a few big projects. Nowadays, some 
wags might say that it is more like an elephant's graveyard-where 
everyone's favourite sport is to shoot the corporate monsters lumbering 
around a national park whose gamekeepers are all landowners in 
disguise. The bureaucratic construction of mineral resource development 
in this country bestows a high level of visibility, inflexibility and 
vulnerability on the large-scale, long-term investments to which it has 
hitherto been committed. By these criteria the logging companies and 
their investments are more like tree pythons which drop on unsuspecting 
landowners wandering in the overgrown grass on the edge of the 
bumpy playing field with the moving goalposts, squeeze the life out of 
them, coat them with saliva and swallow them whole, while the rest of 
the players have their mind fixed on the main game-hunting elephants. 
This metaphorical contrast is not meant to support the popular 
belief that there is something especially 'corrupt' about the logging 
industry, but rather to gloss the difference between the technical, 
economic, political and ethical character of these two forms of resource 
development. After all, Papua New Guinea's political landscape is 
remarkable even to its own native inhabitants as a place which is 
crawling with 'snakes in the grass', so one should hardly be surprised if 
it provides a welcome habitat for larger snakes which live in trees. And 
while it may be true that the typical logging project is more flexible, less 
visible, and less vulnerable than the typical mining or petroleum 
project, the same distinction can be drawn between large and small 
projects (or large and small companies) within each of these two sectors. 
Within the mining and petroleum sector, it is sometimes argued that 
the gamekeeper-State should recognise its own incapacity to manage a 
herd of elephants and do more to encourage the development of 
medium-scale, medium-term investments of the type now represented 
by the new mines at Tolukuma and Wapolu . Some years ago Richard 
Jackson came to the conclusion that 
a slowing down of the mining boom would not be a bad thing for 
everyone, including the miners, if it enabled the emergence of an 
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integrated programme of mining development of a size capable of 
being more readily digested by Papua New Guinea's bureaucracy and 
of a volume which did not force the pace of change in rural areas to a 
speed and extent which no-one can handle (1 992:88-9). 
If Papua New Guinea had a government which thought along these 
lines, the deliberate but seemingly accidental excavation of mineral 
policy potholes (or the use of sand and mud to fill them in) might 
actually be the most effective way of achieving a restricted form of 
development, precisely because the rural population has such great 
expectations of ' salvation by resources' .  But if this means that national 
politicians cannot stand up and announce to the world (and the World 
Bank) that they want to slow down the rate of mineral extraction, it 
also means that they probably have expectations which are very similar 
to those of their constituents. 
Indeed, this version of the argument that 'small is beautiful' has a 
number of drawbacks. 
• First, it may lead us to assume that the current preference for 
'downsizing' has been, or could be, the effect of a deliberate 
and concerted national policy when it may have rather more 
to do with the laws of the jungle. Many orthodox economists 
would certainly argue that 'the rate of development should 
be left to the commercial judgement of the developer' 
(Parsons and Vincent 1 991 : 14) .  
• Second, the pythons would have to breed very rapidly indeed 
to compensate for the volume of mineral revenues which 
national stakeholders stand to lose from the extinction of the 
elephants. There is some doubt whether the policies of the 
government or the laws of the jungle can achieve this 
substitution. 
• Third, the 'new wave' of medium-scale mining projects is 
largely directed towards the exploitation of resources 
previously explored by the larger mining companies which 
are now leaving the field. In this sense, they are more like 
vultures than pythons, and their presence is unlikely to 
outlast the bodies of the elephants on which they prey. 
If the State in its present form depends for its survival on a 
constant flow of mineral resource rent, but is unable to maintain or 
recreate the kind of policy regime which will encourage or ensure a 
constant flow of new investment in the mining and petroleum sector, 
and is unable to resist or dilute the multiple claims of unofficial 
stakeholders to a constantly growing share of the rent which it still 
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manages to collect, then we are surely led to the conclusion that this 
form of State is also like an elephant-perhaps even a dinosaur­
whose day of reckoning is not too far away. And unlike the elephants 
in the private sector, this one cannot move to another part of the jungle. 
Even our orthodox economists might agree that a form of government 
which tends to consume rather than invest its own share of the nation's 
natural capital is one which does not deserve to survive. Some might 
even say that this is why there ought to be a greater share of mineral 
resource rent going to the private pockets and the corporate bodies of a 
'landowning' civil society. The question then is whether the recipients 
gain more from the opportunity to invest, squander, or squabble over 
their own pile of elephant droppings than the nation as a whole loses 
from the deterioration of ' government services' which are funded from 
the same source. Some might argue that the resilience of the Melanesian 
' landowning community', with or without its share of mineral resource 
rent, is what explains the policy failures of national government and 
the prospective decline of foreign investment in the mining and 
petroleum sector. But one still wonders how far the institutions of the 
State can be allowed to deteriorate, or how extensively they must be 
reconstructed, if thousands of these landowning communities are not 
to lose the economic foundations of their national integrity. 
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Restructu ri ng decentral i sat ion : 
po l i t ica l  and econom ic issues 
Desh Gupta and Henry lvarature 
Papua New Guinea is a unitary state with some decentralising features 
(Chelliah 1981 ) .  Essentially this means that the national parliament has 
the legal authority to withdraw or change such powers for provincial 
govememnts. In 1995 the national parliament abolished the 1977 OLPG 
and introduced the Organic Law on Provincial Governments and Local­
level Governments (hereafter referred to as OLPGLLG). 
At the time of self-government in 1972, there was a sentiment among 
Papua New Guinea politicians, and more specifically among members 
of the Constitutional Planning Committee, that the system in Papua 
New Guinea was highly centralised . Pressures for greater autonomy 
were very strong in Bougainville. In parts of Papua (mostly around 
Port Moresby and Central Province) as well as parts of East New Britain 
(Gazelle Peninsula), there were similar pressures. But in the rest of the 
country, the sentiment for greater autonomy, especially in the populous 
Highlands region was absent. The Highlands region lagged behind in 
education and health services and depended on the Australian 
government and the administration in Waigani to rectify the situation. 
In general the Highlands' politicians were not in support of early 
independence, let alone in favour of greater provincial autonomy 
because equalisation in the provision of health and education services 
required Waigani and Canberra to provide funds and skilled labour to 
the lagging provinces and, as Canberra withdrew its authority, it 
initially reduced the rate of growth in its aid flows to Papua New 
Guinea. Subsequently as authority was passed on fully to the Papua 
New Guinea government, such aid began to be reduced in absolute 
(real ) terms as well. Greater provincial autonomy by tying down the 
disbursement of funds to the established levels of education and 
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health services meant that, unless national government revenue 
expanded or expenditure on central functions was cut back, additional 
revenues for the lagging provinces would be difficult to find. In 
addition, the more developed provinces (such as North Solomons), 
with more economic activity would be able to raise more internal 
revenue, thus moving ahead of other provinces lacking such an economic 
base. Lagging provinces also lacked skilled labour to manage the 
decentralised functions. Consequently the new bureaucracy added to 
operating costs of decentralisation without necessarily improving 
resource allocation for such provinces. 
Nevertheless, in response to the recommendations of the Constit­
utional Planning Committee and secessionist threats from Bougainville, 
the national government agreed to create provincial governments. The 
August 1976 'Bougainville Agreement' signed between the North 
Solomons Provincial Government and the national government resolved 
the impasse between the two and formed the basis of the 1977 OLPG, 
which spelt out transfers of certain national taxes on a net basis, the 
basis for the payment of derivation grants, provincial taxing powers 
and of provincial non-tax revenue.  Though there were no similar 
pressures from elsewhere for the creation of provincial governments, 
provincial status on the same basis as North Solomons was granted to 
all former districts in 1977 and 1978 following the recommendations of 
the 1977 McKinsey Report. 
In practice the ability to plan and implement decentralised activity 
required skills in project design and implementation, which were 
lacking at the provincial and local level-more so in some than others 
(Bird 1983). According to Axline (1986: 170) ' local-level government is 
operating poorly even in many provinces which score well on perform­
ance at the level of district administration' . In addition, agricultural 
development, village industry and better internal trade required 
mobilisation of local resources for the construction and maintenance of 
roads and bridges. There was a lack of any political strategy to mobilise 
such resources. The local hut I poll tax, which was a means of mobilising 
such resources during the colonial period, steadily fell into disuse in 
the post-colonial period. Essentially, the PNC state was too soft to 
enforce obligations on its citizens. 
A sense of fa i l u re 
Though there was some reduction in inter-provincial educational 
inequality, more so at the community level than at high school level 
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(Gupta 1992), there was the sentiment that the benefits of decentralisation 
had failed to make any impact outside the provincial centres. In general, 
it was felt that 
• the performance of provincial governments with a few 
exceptions ranged from poor to fair 
• strong political rivalry between the national government and 
provincial governments led to disruptive intervention by 
national politicians and provincial politicians 
• skills shortages and lack of staff development programs led 
to poor financial administration and financial control; there 
was lack of any proper inventory of assets and inadequate 
maintenance of physical assets by the provincial 
governments 
• local-level governments with very few exceptions were in a 
very bad state, 'characterised by poor administration, misuse 
of funds by staff, and neglect by provincial government' 
(Axline 1986:162-1 70) . 
This analysis was confirmed from time to time by the reports of the 
Auditor-General . For instance the Auditor-General's 1992 audit report 
of fourteen provincial governments found that 
• most provincial governments had performed poorly and 
many had failed to deliver goods and services to the people 
• most provincial governments had experienced deterioration 
in matters relating to the control of accounts as well as in the 
maintenance of financial records and also in their presentations 
of financial statements 
• most provincial governments also displayed a lack of proper 
management as well as lack of financial discipline. Further­
more, many provincial public servants were said to have 
contributed to some of the delays experienced with the 
implementation of various government policies and projects. 
The overall negative consequences of these failures was the 
impact which was experienced by the national government's 
general macroeconomic policies. 
• a number of schemes which some provincial governments 
undertook (for example constituency or electoral develop­
ment funds) either failed to produce the desired results or 
suffered from lack of proper accountability 
Lack of accounting and management skills as well as lack of 
commitment to the tasks at hand meant that the decentralisation 
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process operated with serious handicaps. It is not surprising then that 
it did not produce the desired outcomes. Provincial governments and 
supporters of the system blamed the National Government for lack of 
commitment to the decentralisation process and for inadequate funding 
and training for these poor outcomes. But there were some provincial 
governments where it could be argued that decentralisation had 
worked, with improved services at the local level; probably the Islands 
provinces were more successful in this respect. 
The OLPG versus OLPG LLG : opponents and proponents 
Even though the sentiment for the creation of provincial governments 
in most of Papua New Guinea (outside Bougainville, Gazelle and 
Central) in the early 1970s was unclear and probably not strong, once 
the provincial governments were in place, they assumed a life of their 
own. Support for the provincial government system, with each of the 
19 provinces having an elected Legislative Assembly, Premier, ministers 
and provincial executive council, strengthened .  At the same time 
support within the National Parliament waned. Those elected to the 
provincial assemblies were seen to compete with the national 
parliamentarians for resources to disperse and were seen by the 
national parliamentarians (and as reflected in a high turnover of such) 
as undermining the position of the latter. Consequently there was the 
private interest of the national parliamentarians, which drove the 
provincial government reform agenda (initially through amendments to 
the 1977 Organic Law to increase the powers of the National Executive 
Council to suspend provincial governments and to give it the sole 
power to appoint the provincial secretaries and then to create and 
expand the 'slush fund' for use by MPs in their electorates), culminating 
in the 1995 OLPGLLG. Similarly there was the private interest of 
provincial governments in opposing such reform proposals. 
The public interest arguments for reform were that competition 
between the national parliamentarians and provincial assembly members 
detracted from the objective of improving the delivery of goods and 
services to the villagers and therefore what was needed was a model 
of cooperative decentralisation-to be achieved by abolishing separate 
provincial assembly elections and with national parliamentarians 
taking over the running of the provincial governments and assemblies 
supported by representatives of local-level governments (Deklin 1995). 
Those who supported the reforms argued that the system under the 
OLPG had failed to deliver improved goods and services to the 
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villagers and in particular the local level had suffered and that the 1995 
OLPGLLG would improve cooperation between the national, provincial 
and local level of governments and that abolition of separate provincial 
politicians and elections would save the country resources, which 
would be made available at the local government level. 
Those who opposed the reforms argued that the failure was in 
implementation of reforms and that inadequacy of financial and 
training resources had prevented improvements in delivery. But the 
financial situation in 1995 when the reforms were introduced was much 
tighter than it was when the OLPG was introduced and 19 provincial 
assemblies created. Overall resources as compared to 1993 had become 
tighter in 1994, 1995 and 1996 because of the 1994 financial crisis. 
Without the reforms, it is possible that even less resources would have 
been made available to lower-level governments in 1996 and 1997-the 
OLPGLLG has required minimum grants which are larger (especially 
for the more populous provinces) than the ones which were being made 
available under OLPG. The Minimum Unconditional Grant (MUG) 
under the OLPG, which formed the basis of bulk of the transfers from 
the national to the provincial government did not cater for the expand­
ing needs of the provinces, but was rather aimed at stabilising the levels 
of services as at the 1976 I 77 level (Final Report of the Committee of Review 
on Financial Provisions of the Organic Law on Provincial Government 1982). 
Some constrai nts and lessons 
In some ways the skills constraint in 1995, though serious, was less 
serious than in 1977; given the slow but steady increase in education at 
all levels of the education system, there has been an increase in the 
supply of the educated, which has been more rapid than the expansion 
of employment in the formal sector (Gupta 1991 ) .  Nevertheless, skills 
constraint continues to pose problems for the decentralisation process, 
especially at the district and local levels. But the more serious constraint 
has been in infrastructure deterioration due to lack of maintenance-the 
consequence of the tightening of the budgets over 1982-85, 1990 and 
especially over the 1994-96 (inclusive period) period; budgetary tight­
ening invariably means that the maintenance expenditure is the first to 
be reduced. In addition, subsidies to the more efficiently-run health 
and education services provided by church organisations are cut back. 
Consequently, there is some lack of understanding as to why 
decentralisation under 1977 the OLPG failed to improve delivery of 
goods and services and why the changes introduced through the 1995 
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OLPGLLG superseding the OLPG are likely to make only a marginal 
difference to the overall outcome. Through the 1995 OLPGLLG a 
belated attempt is being made to wind back the demands at the national 
level and to transfer more resources to the provinces and local level .  
Essentially, the reasons for the failure lay in the inability of the national 
government to cut back on its demand for resources in order to transfer 
resources to the provinces; the inability of the provincial governments 
to mobilise resources (such as land and labour) protect the share of 
resources going into maintenance of assets and to increase the share 
going into infrastructure improvement by improving the efficiency in 
the use of resources in the delivery of services. The more efficient 
delivery of health services and even of education services was by non­
government church-run organisations, but funding for these was 
squeezed much more than for government services every time the 
government's budgetary difficulties increased. This has been much 
more the case during the 1994, 1995 and 1996 fiscal restraint. 
Efficiency in the use of existing assets, mobilisation of resources and 
protection of maintenance of existing assets does not feature in any 
discussion of decentralisation, so it is not surprising that decentralisation 
has failed to deliver. In addition and equally important has been the 
need to expand the economic base of the provinces, even as the adverse 
impact of the Bougainville crisis and of falling budgetary support from 
Australia continue to impact on the ability of the national government 
to increase funding to the provincial governments. 
The provinces' dependence on the national government for funding 
is high. In 1980 over 90 per cent of all provincial financing came from 
the national government (Chelliah 1981 ) .  In 1982 provincially-raised 
revenue comprised around 5 per cent of all national government 
funding (Table 14. 1 ); only for Morobe and North Solomons did this 
revenue exceed 15 per cent. The Committee Draft Report (p.18, quoting 
Ron May) points out that there is nothing unusual in the provinces 
being dependent on the national government, except that the degree 
of dependence on the national government was exceedingly high and 
such dependence by making the provinces dependent on the national 
government irked the provincial governments.  By 1989, the degree of 
dependence had been reduced for most of the provinces, mainly as a 
result of the introduction of sales taxes, particularly on beverages and 
tobacco (Table 14 .1  ) .  It is likely that the 1 990 Budget reduced the 
dependence of the provinces further, but mainly because of reduced 
allocations flowing from the national government, because of the 
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Bougainville crisis and the reduced revenue flows to the national 
government. 
Cooperative decentralisation, which was the expected outcome of 
the 1995 OLPGLLG, has failed to materialise to date, reflecting partly 
the misunderstanding with regard to the resources to be transferred to 
the provinces. Provincial Governors expected much larger amounts 
than they actually received. The net fiscal situation for the provinces, 
after their new expenditure responsibilities were taken into account, 
was worse in a number of instances in 1996 than before the 
introduction of the OLPGLLG; Central Province is an example (see 
Table 14.4). In addition the Governors expected a greater degree of 
Table 1 4.1 . Provincial ly-raised revenue as a percentage of National 
Goverment Funding, 1 982-96 
Province 1982 1989 1996 (Budget) 
Western 1.6 1.2 
Gu lf 1.3 6.1 8.4 
Central 1.8 5.0 
Mi lne Bay 3.1 5.7 
Oro 5.4 11.3 
Southern High lands 1.1 4.7 40.5 
Enga 1.1 5.6 
Western High lands 2.5 18.6 
Simbu 2.6 9.4 
Easterm High lands 9.0 21.0 11.8 
Moro be 16.1 28.1 58.9 
Madang 2.6 16.7 
East Sepik 10.7 8.9 
Sandaun 0.1 8.2 
Manus 4.0 6.1 
New I reland 3.0 12 .1 
East New Britain 9.7 17.3 18.3 
West New Britain 7.6 16.3 
North Solomons 15.9 n .a. 
Mean 5.2 11.2 
Source: Provincial ly Raised Revenue taken from Statements of Accounts of individual 
provinces. Total National Government Funding Taken from National Government Budget 
estimates and includes Net MUG, A l locations to individual provinces for maintenance of minor 
power houses, capital works, urban counci ls, under Divisions 27 1 -290, Publ ic Service and 
Teaching Services Commission salaries, Secretariat Staff Grants, Derivation Grant, Min ing 
Royalties, Bookmaker Revenue, Tobacco Tax, Timber and Mining Royalty Grants, towns 
services, air charter and marine hire. differential grants, teaching awards and special support 
grants. 1 996 figures are taken from provincial budgets. 
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discretion over the spending of moneys; but in practice the Finance 
Department and Provincial Affairs have kept a tight rein. 
The issue of inter-provincial i nequal ity 
Under the 1977 OLPG the 19 provinces received national government 
funds under the Minimum Unconditional Grant (MUG) aimed at 
stabilising and maintaining the transferred activities to the provinces 
at the level of spending in 1976 / 77. The calculation of the base (1976 /  
77) MUG figure and the formula used in its subsequent adjustment 
had implications for the delivery of services to the provinces. 
MUG being the principal source of funding for the provincial 
governments was then also implicitly instrumental in perpetuating the 
gap in social indicators between the provinces; this was contrary to the 
second of the Eight Aims 
More equal distribution of economic benefits, including movement 
toward equalisation of incomes among people and towards 
equalisation of services among different areas of the country. 
Those provinces which delivered more services (assuming that the 
cost of services was the same across the country) as at 1976 / 77 
received larger funding. Thus provinces with historical advantages in 
terms of outlays in education, health, primary industry, business 
development, information and administration, that is, in the 
transferred activities, were in a position to maintain these advantages. 
In addition, provinces which had a historical advantage in education 
and therefore in skills were better placed to bid for provincial projects 
under the National Public Expenditure Plan (NPEP), thus increasing 
the tendency towards a widening gap. 
Nevertheless there were two or three arrangements through which 
the national government attempted to reduce these inequalities . 
The rate of increase of transfers under MUG was faster to the 
provinces, which were less developed and which did not seek and 
obtain full financial responsibility (FFR) (Axline 1986:Table 24; also 
Axline 1986:99-100). Against this in the budgetary cuts which occurred 
over the 1994-96 (inclusive), non-FFR provinces suffered the severest 
cuts . This is partly because the FFR were somewhat better equipped to 
protect their grants, but also because the introduction of free eduction 
or ' school subsidy' benefited the provinces with the highest educational 
enrolment ratios as they received proportionately the most subsidy for 
1994 and 1995, before the responsibility for the payment of this subsidy 
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was transferred to the provinces in 1996. Since there was no national 
government top-up of this subsidy in 1 996 for the provinces its 
disequalising impact was eliminated. 
The other arrangement was through national projects under NPEP, 
which under the strategic objective of helping less developed areas 
could be designed for the lagging provinces. In practice, since NPEP 
was allocated under 9 strategic objectives (and helping less-developed 
provinces was only one of them), this objective became difficult to 
achieve in the broader framework of NPEP. Moreover, given the wide 
range of strategic objectives, both the formulation of annual NPEP and 
project selection required larger and larger amounts of outlays for 
administration and led to thinner and thinner distribution of funds 
over space through NPEP (Axline 1986: 137); implementation capacity 
remained weak. There was some concern with planning being based 
on piecemeal projects, so in March 1978 NPEP 'sectoral programs' for 
implementation in the 1979 and 1980 Budgets were established. The 
sectoral programs in 1979 were in the areas of rural health, community 
schools and provincial high schools and in 1980 in the areas of 
agriculture, commerce, rural transport and non-formal education. 
Geographical distribution of these funds favoured the less-developed 
provinces and projects under these programs were jointly put together 
by provincial and national officials. But from 1981 the effectiveness of 
these sectoral programs was undermined by national parliamentarians 
(MPs) capturing control over the rural transport and rural agricultural 
sectoral programs-this was the beginning of the 'slush fund' arrange­
ments which the MPs have sought in the subsequent period . This 
brought into focus the conflict between MPs and provincial legislature 
in the allocation process as a means to getting elected. Where the 
historical lag in inception of modern health and education services was 
the greatest, such conflict was the most intense and support at the 
national level for the provincial government system was the weakest. 
This conflict was to be the catalyst for the support from most MPs for the 
1995 OLPGLLG. 
The third arrangement was the creation of the National Fiscal 
Commission (NFC) under the 1977 OLPG with the objective of providing 
grants on a per capita basis, unless other priorities required it to do 
otherwise. In 1978-84 the NFC had funds ranging annually from K3 
million to K7 million for distribution. Even if NFC had distributed 
these funds on a per capita basis, thus injecting some equality in the 
transfers of funds from the national government, given the paltry sums 
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involved, this would have made only a marginal difference to the 
provinces. In practice the NFC was further limited by the need to 
provide additional resources for the rising cost of maintenance of capital 
assets transferred in 1977 as well as the cost of maintaining the basic 
infrastructure of provincial government (Axline 1986:85) .  From 1986, 
the NFC increasingly fell into disuse and in the nineties, there were no 
funds made available to convene it. 
Changes in economic conditions by changing the revenue base could 
improve or worsen the relative position of a province. In recognition of 
this, there has been in place a Less Developed Areas Program, which 
has provided support for large-scale development projects in these 
areas. National Government support took the form of funding studies 
designed to attract external financing for integrated rural development 
projects from international multilateral donor agencies (Axline 1986:144). 
Such projects were seen from the second half of the 1980s to be expensive 
and beneficial to only a small number of people directly involved in the 
projects. The spread effects apart from the oil-palm projects of West 
New Britain were rather weak. Consequently support for such projects 
at the national level weakened in the subsequent period. The derivation 
grant (which was 1 .25 per cent of the value of exports less payments for 
royalties) has formed an important source of revenue for the important 
coffee-exporting provinces of Western Highlands and Eastern Highlands 
and to a more limited extent for Chimbu, as well as the cocoa and 
copra-exporting provinces of East New Britain and until 1989 for 
Bougainville, and oil palm in the case of West New Britain. 
The major changes in the revenue base of the provinces have come 
with the introduction of mining projects and, to a limited extent, timber 
projects . For instance the Panguna mine, until the emergence of the 
Bougainville crisis from the late 1980s, created the basis for heightened 
economic activity in North Solomons (or Bougainville as it is called 
now), with the province (excluding the National Capital District, which 
had the advantages of agglomeration economies) leading the others 
substantially in both economic and social indicators (Gupta and 
Polume 1982). From the late 1980s the revenue base of Bougainville 
has collapsed. Meanwhile the revenue base first of Western or Fly 
River (with the onset of the Ok Tedi mine), then of Milne Bay (with the 
introduction of the Misima mine, though to a far less significant extent 
than Fly River), followed by Enga (with the opening of the Porgera 
mine) and then of Southern Highlands and of Gulf (with Kutubu Oil 
and related pipeline) has increased; the latest province to become a 
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major mining province is New Ireland (Lihir Gold). Part of the revenue 
increase has come from royalty payments (of 1 per cent of the value of 
production / exports of mining or timber royalties, shared with the 
communities in the areas in which the resource is based, with the share 
of the provincial governments declining) plus from 1990 through 1 per 
cent of the f.o.b. revenues as Special Support Grants from the mining 
project located in that province. In Enga and Southern Highlands there 
are revenue flows from the provincial government equity in Porgera and 
Kutubu Oil, respectively. Although the mining projects in general have 
very limited spread effects (given the enclave nature of the projects), 
increased employment and business opportunities and sales by locally­
based businesses to the mines have created increased commercialisation. 
Social indicators have also improved in these provinces, particularly 
in the areas surrounding the mine site; as has commercial activity, with 
increased income flows from royalties and businesses associated with 
the mines. Forestry projects have had a more limited effect; these had 
more effect in West New Britain, where there has been a high 
concentration of forestry projects. West New Britain has also gained 
from successful oil palm projects . 
Provinces such as the National Capital District and, to some extent 
Morobe, with their large urban centres have been able to raise 
substantial internal revenue through taxation on economic activity. 
The 1995 OLPGLLG, by basing the minimum unconditional grants 
on formulas, which (excluding the maritime provinces) increase in 
direct proportion to the population and which also have an equality 
factor (though this has still to be determined by the National Economic 
and Fiscal Commission ) is more equalising than was the case with the 
1977 OLPG. The shift towards this equality though is tempered by 
Staffing and Teaching Services Grants, which continue to favour 
provinces with more developed educational and administrative services. 
In addition the mining provinces continue to enjoy the advantages of 
having grants related to these projects. The 1996 total grants compared 
to those in 1989 are presented in Table 14.2. Internally raised provincial 
revenue is dependent on the level of urbanisation. 
Given that grants have a relationship to the population base and 
that there is requirement for the National Statistical Office to conduct a 
census every 5 years (compared to the previous 10) some developments 
may follow. First, there is a danger that the population census figures 
may become more questioned than has been the case in the past. 
Second, there will be an incentive for provinces to incorporate more of 
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Table 1 4.2. Popu lation size, national government grants to provinces in  
1 989 under OLPG and in  1 995 under OLPGLLG ; and internal provincial 
revenues in  1 989 
Province Population size National government Provincial ly 
grants raised revenue 
1990 1989 1996 1989 
(census) (Estimated) Budget (actual) 
Nu mber K 'OOO K'OOO Ki na 
Fly R iver 110,420 17,880.1 27,501.1 214,561 
Gu lf 68,737 8 ,659.8 20,042.2 528,250 
Central 141, 195 12,958.7 17,034.6 647,935 
Mi l ne Bay 158,780 11 ,912.7 21 ,408.1 679,023 
Oro 96,491 8,362.8 18,739.6 945,400 
Southern Highlands 317,437 18,180.8 39,779.9 854,500 
Enga 235,561 14,374.0 28,853.5 804,943 
Western H igh lands 336,178 18,973.7 30,845.7 3,529, 100 
Simbu 183,849 14,043.1 18,395.9 1 ,320,049 
Eastern High lands 300,648 21,110.4 32,248.8 4,433,190 
Mo robe 380,117 25,084.0 39,995.7 7,676,150 
Madang 253, 195 18,945.8 27,226.9 3 ,163,945 
East Sepik 254,371 20,337.1 27,707.5 1,810,000 
Sandaun 139,917 13,487.8 16,344.9 1,  106,000 
Manus 32,840 6,204.5 12,318.7 378,476 
New I reland 86 ,999 13,498.2 20,847.0 1,633,280 
East New Britain 185,459 20,245.2 21,833.4 3,502,422 
West New Britain 130,190 12,519.8 18,999.3 2,040,728 
Northern Solomons 154,000 n .a .  14,436.9 n.a. 
Source: National Statistical Office, 1 994. Report on the National Population and Housing Census 
in Papua New Guinea, Statement 5, Port Moresby:44. Government Budget Papers, various. 
the adjoining rural areas into their urban centres, and perhaps for 
communities to inflate their population figures during the future 
censuses. Third, the resources needed by the National Statistical Office 
for conducting censuses and processing census data will increase. Given 
the budgetary constraint, some of NSO's other functions are likely to 
suffer. Similar constraints are likely to apply to the operation of the 
NEFC and given the history and fate of the NFC, the question for debate 
is how effective is the NEFC is likely to be. 
The fiscal constraint 
In general a fiscal constraint operated in Papua New Guinea. This was 
because total revenue flows for the national government peaked in 1974 
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for two reasons: real aid flows from Australia began to be wound back 
after that date; and BCL made the highest profits in 1974 (other than in 
1988) in its history and under a renegotiated agreement paid the highest 
company tax (including additional profits tax) in real terms-in money 
terms the amount of such tax was higher in 1979 and 1988. Consequently 
the trend in government revenues in real terms from BCL was down­
wards after 197 4. With the onset of the Bougainville crisis, this fiscal 
constraint tightened further. But in anticipation of revenue flows from 
Porgera and from Kutubu Oil, the governments in Papua New Guinea 
overcommitted themselves in the early 1990s, leading to the financial 
crisis in 1994 and 1995 (Duncan and Temu 1995; Gupta 1995). 
Starting from 1994, the shift in Australia's aid to Papua New Guinea 
towards project / program aid, which had begun in 1986, accelerated­
even if revenues from the mining sector picked up, the total amount 
available for disbursement from the national budget may not rise. The 
budgetary situation has tightened since 1993, following the blowouts of 
1990-93. Total expenditure in money terms after public debt servicing 
in 1995 was more than 10 per cent lower in 1994 in real terms and more 
than 20 per cent less than in 1993 in real terms. Estimates in the 1996 
budget suggest that the total amount available to the national govern­
ment for outlays in real terms is likely to continue to fall  in real terms 
in 1996 and in 1997 (Table 14.3). 
Preliminary data (Bank of Papua New Guinea 1995, Table 3) suggests 
that for 1994 whereas the burden of budgetary adjustment cuts fell 
disproportionately on economic and infrastructure outlays, in 1995 they 
fell disproportionately on provincial government's recurrent outlays 
(Table 14.4). 
The 1995 Budget failed to reduce national wages and salaries costs to 
the extent planned. At the same time the Public Investment Programme 
Table 1 4.3. Overal l  budget constraint, 1 993-99 (mil l ion kina) 
1 993 1 994 1 995 1 996 1 997 1 998 1 999 
Actual Actual P re I .  Budget P roj . P roj . Proj . 
Total Expenditu re 1 751 .0 1 722.4 1 854.5  1 924.3 1 972.3 2092.4 2207.6 
Publ ic Debt Service 297.7 383.6  429.4 478.0 536.9 575.8  643.8 
Balance 1 453.3 1 338 .8  1 425. 1 1 446.3 1 435.4 1 51 6.6 1 563.8 
I nflation 2.9  1 7.3  5 .0 
Source: Papua New Guinea 1 996 Budget, Vol .  l ,  Economic and Development polic ies, Table 
4.3(a); in flation data from Bank of Papua New Guinea. 
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Table 1 4.4. Ratio of appropriation between sectors (per cent) 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1995p 1996 
Budget 
Cu rrent expenditu re 
at national level 57.7 62.9 64.8 69.2 61.4 67.7 
Economic and infrastructurea15.7 12.2 13 .4 9.7 21.6 14.8 
Provi ncial governmentb 26.6 24.9 21.8 21.1 17 .1 17.5 
" From 1 994 this is equivalent to the Government Development Budget and the Capital 
component of recurrent expenditure. 
b From 1 994, Provi ncial Government expenditure refers to the recurrent expenditure not 






Source: Bank of Papua New Guinea, Quarterly Economic Bulletin, December l 995 : Table 3 .  
was in practice considerably below that budgeted and debt service costs 
were much higher than planned . Though the 1996 Budget at first glance 
plans to cut substantially the share going on national recurrent expend­
iture, in practice this is, like the 1995 Budget, unlikely to be realised. This 
is because of rising debt service costs (Table 14.3) .  In addition, the 
government's decision in 1996 to award large pay increases to 
expatriates through exchange rate protection of their pay packet as well 
as 10 per cent salary increases for local public servants will tend to 
inflate the share going on national and provincial recurrent expenditure 
and reduce that available for the economic and infrastructure sector. 
Moreover the defence and law and order expenditure associated with 
the continuation (and in some ways the worsening) of the Bougainville 
crisis is likely to dampen resources available for the this sector. 
Transfer of monies to Provincial, District and Local Governments 
Breaches of the 1995 OLPGLLG 
The 1995 OLPGLLG has been breached in two respects: in the transfer 
of Development Grants; and in the transfer of Derivation Grants. 
The Minister for Finance's Budget Speech had K200 million being 
transferred from the national to the provincial levels . In practice only 
K133 million of the funds are being added to the budgets for the 
provinces. This is mainly because only 75 per cent (or K50 million less) 
of the minimum grants that the provinces are entitled to under the 
1995 OLPGLLG in the context of the Development Budget is being 
transferred in 1996. In 1997, this is planned to rise to 90 per cent and in 
1998 to 100 per cent. Financial constraint at the national level (see 
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Table 14.3) and the lack of capacity development at the district and 
local level are the reasons for breaching the OLPGLLG. 
The Development Budget for the provinces is comprised of the 
minimum provincial infrastructure grant plus local-level government 
and village services grants plus (to a considerably less important extent 
for most provinces other than National Capital District and Moro be) 
town and urban services grant. Being conditional grants, the Develop­
ment Budget under OLPGLLG is protected from being raided by 
administrative and salaries' costs . The national government has 
budgeted to reduce the administrative and salaries' grants in 1996 
(Table 14.4). Consequently the objective of the OLPGLLG has been to 
redirect resources away from administration at both the national and 
provincial levels towards infrastructure and development. But this shift 
is not as dramatic as at first appears to be the case (see Table 14.3): 
around K60 million (or K550,000 per MP) is comprised of funds for 
Rural Action Program (which includes K33 million of what was formerly 
known as the EDF or 'slush fund' and which was formerly administer­
ed and spent by the MPs in their constituencies and on projects of their 
choice). If we remove this K33 million as simply a rearrangement of 
the budget rather than as a net transfer; then the net transfer drops to 
KlOO million. In addition, there are functions, which were previously 
the responsibility of the national government, which have been trans­
ferred to the provincial governments. These functions include 
'education subsidies' (which were in lieu of the so-called ' free 
education' and which have increased as such subsidies have spread to 
all schooling grades) 'expansion of grades 7 and 8' (top-up of 
community schools), payment of village courts, church health services 
and maintenance of health services. Though we do not have the total 
cost for all provinces, for Central Province these added functions were 
seen to cost around K3 million (Table 14.5) .  For Central Province after 
adjusting for these additional functions, there was no net increase in 
transfer (even in money terms) from the National Government to that 
provincial government in 1996 over 1995. Compared with the actual 
amounts dispersed in 1993, the allocated amounts in 1996 for Central 
were 87 per cent in money terms and 66 per cent in real terms. For the 
other provinces, the story is not likely to be different. 
In 1997 and 1998 as the Development Budget moves to 90 per cent 
and 100 per cent of the minimum grants under the OLPGLLG, there 
will be added funds of K30 million and K50 million, respectively, trans­
ferred to the provinces. This will require adjustments at the national 
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Table 1 4.5. Central government funding from national government, 1 993-96 
('OOO k ina) 
1 994 1 995 1 996 1 993 
Actual Appropriation Appropriation Appropriation 
Funding to Central 
Province 1 6,089.8 
Less cost of add itional 
functions in  1 996 
Total 
n .a. 
1 6 , 1 1 3.3 
n.a. 
a Includes K2.75 m i l l ion of Rural Action Program. 
1 4, 1 51 .0 
n.a. 
1 7 ,034.8a 
3,034.4b 
1 4,004.4 
b Does not include K500,000 which Central Province pays for the use of Port Moresby General 
Hospital as a part of cost-sharing arrangement with the National Capital District. 
Source: Calculated by the authors from Papua New Guinea, 1 994 . 1 99 5 Estimates of Revenue 
and Expenditure, Government Printer, Port Moresby; Papua New Guinea, 1 995.  1 996 
Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure, Government Printer, Port Moresby; information 
suppl ied by the Provincial Administrator, Vari Fore. 
level, but given the high inflationary environment of 1995 and 1996 
(for which inflation is likely to exceed the budget forecast of 5 per cent), 
the real value of such transfers is likely to be less (and, in the case of 
Central Province, considerably less) than was the case in 1993. 
There is another area in which the OLPGLLG was breached . This 
was in the payment of Derivation Grant. Under the 1977 OLPG this 
grant was equal to only 1 .5 per cent of the exports (excluding for timber 
and metals where royalties were being paid), but the 1995 OLPGLLG 
required a payment of 5 per cent of the value of such exports . In the 
1996 budget, there was no change in payment of the Derivation Grant 
(certainly there was none for Central Province). The problem here is 
that it is not easy to identify exports by province. It appears that once 
the new formula for the payment of Derivation Grants is implemented, 
Western Highlands as the largest coffee exporting province will have 
the most to gain; other provinces likely to gain between 1 .5 and 2.0 
million kina are West New Britain and Eastern Highlands-these 
figures are rough calculations based on the 1996 Derivation Grants 
(Table 14.6) .  Using the 1996 Derivation Grant data, and assuming that 
they are reliable and that 1 .5 per cent of exports were being paid in that 
year, a 5 per cent Derivation Grant will require another K12 million to 
be paid to the provinces. This, will require a further adjustment at the 
national level. This coming on top of the added payments for Develop­
ment Grants and with budgetary aid from Australia being wound back, 
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requires substantial tightening at the national level. Given the wage 
increases of 1996, it means that such tightening will fall again on the 
maintenance and capital expenditure outlays; it is also likely that the 
National Government may pass on some more expenditure functions to 
the provinces; thus reducing the need for adjustment at the National 
level . If  the adjustment burden of such transfers as well as salary and 
wage increases is borne at the national level only, then public service 
employment cuts will need to be larger and continue into 1997 and 1998. 
The budget allocations for 1997 and beyond are likely to be affected 
by the recommendations of the National Economic and Fiscal 
Commission (NEFC), which is now responsible for the calculation of the 
equitable factor in the four grants (Provincial Government and Local­
level Government Administration Grant, Provincial Infrastructure 
Development Grant, Town and Urban Services Grant and Local-level 
Government and Village Services Grant). The NEFC was not in place 
Table 1 4.6. Derivation grants 1 996 and adjusted to 5 per cent ( 'OOO kina) 
Province 1996 Budgeted Adjusted 
Fly R iver 
Gu lf 
Central 
M i lne Bay 
Ora 
Southern High lands 
Enga 
Western High lands 
Simbu 






New I reland 
East New Britain 
West New Britain 
Total 




















Source: Papua New Guinea, 1 995.  1 996 Budget Papers, Vol. 1, Port Moresby : 8 3 ;  authors' 
calculations. 
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at the time of the 1996 Budget. The NEFC will need research resources 
to determine relevant social and economic indicators in order to calculate 
such an equitable factor. If such resources are not made available, then 
the NEFC is unlikely to be effective. Data for income and social 
inequalities at provincial, district and local levels is likely to be 
unreliable in the case of Papua New Guinea . In addition, the new 
formulas for transfers to provinces and local-level governments are 
much more equalitarian than were the transfers under the MUG. The 
new formulas are based on population, land area and, in the case of 
maritime provinces, on sea area. They therefore take into account the 
added costs of providing services and population based formulas are 
much more equalitarian. Moreover the experience of National Fiscal 
Commission, the predecessor of the NEFC, in promoting equality was 
rather poor. Given the budgetary constraint, therefore, it is better if the 
NEFC attempts to promote economic activity through the appropriate 
application of conditional supplementary support grant to stimulate 
economic activity. 
Skil ls constraint 
In some ways the skills constraint is not as serious as it was 20 years ago. 
This is simply because the slow but steady expansion of the education 
system at all levels has expanded the skills base. But productive life of 
skilled personnel is shorter in Papua New Guinea than it is in other 
countries in the region. Consequently some of skills' base is being 
continuously depleted through early mortality. 'Brain drain' to date has 
not been as serious a matter for Papua New Guinea as for some other 
Pacific Island economies, but it is likely to assume greater preponderance 
in the future as opportunities in the core public service dry up. At the 
same time, with the implementation of the OLPGLLG, the demand for 
skilled personnel at local government and district level is likely to 
increase. Relatively poor salaries and poorer infrastructure, health and 
schooling facilities have not, to date, attracted skilled personnel to 
these levels of administration. Increases in salaries at these levels as 
well as improvements in facilities may attract some of the skilled 
personnel being made redundant at the national government level. 
A related issue, which has tended in the past to increase recurrent 
costs, is the inability of the staff at the provincial level to forecast 
revenue accurately from internal sources. Often forecasts about revenue 
from land taxes, retail sales taxes have been exaggerated . This has led 
some provinces to overcommit on new staff and salaries; thus reducing 
278 I Papua New G u i nea: a 20/20 vision 
the amount available for infrastructure and development. 
OLPGLLG will increase the demand for staff with accounting skills. 
This is because there are expected to be three local-level governments 
(and treasuries) per district or national electoral constituency and these 
will be required under the OLPGLLG to submit annual reports and 
statement of accounts to the national parliament. Most provinces and 
institutions have regularly been unable to meet these requirements in the 
past. The problems are likely to worsen, unless part of the Australian 
aid is diverted towards training. 
The issue of the integration of Australian project I program aid into 
the new planning structure will also have to be worked out; it will also 
be demanding of more skills at the local and provincial levels. 
The banking sector 
One of the other problems facing the provinces has been the withdrawal 
of banking services from some of the districts. This has been caused 
partly by the perception of a worsening law and order situation in the 
districts. But it has made it difficult for district cash offices to function . 
If this process cannot be reversed, it is difficult to see how district 
treasuries, let alone local-level treasuries, will be able to function. 
Centralisation or decentral isation 
OLPGLLG is more decentralist in purpose-this is because relatively 
more of the resources are being transferred to the local level than was 
the case before. This is being done specifically through the Local-level 
and Village Services Grant. But the overall control of the outlays at the 
provincial level lies with the (yet to be appointed) provincial treasurer, 
who is responsible to the Secretary of Finance. Financial controls are 
being (and have been) tightened in response to the budget blowouts of 
the 1990-94 period. Nevertheless in the past slow bureaucratic processes 
led to lack of initiatives at the provincial level and it generated the 
pressures for the creation of ' slush-funds' . Given the reduced bureaucratic 
capacity at the national level, there is a danger that centralised processes 
may delay, in a number of cases indefinitely, some of the local initiatives. 
The new planning processes are to be both top-down and bottom-up. 
Given the resource constraint and therefore the inability of the 
National Planning Office charged with training district and local-level 
planners as well as coordinating plans at the various levels, there are 
likely to be either poorly designed plans and projects or there will be 
delays in bringing new projects on the design list. Slow or poor 
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implementation has been the problem in the past and it is not clear 
how this problem is likely to be overcome in the future. 
Some concl uding com ments and pol icy suggestions 
Basically the objective of transferring resources from national and 
provincial recurrent to economic and infrastructure development 
appears to be appropriate in the context of Papua New Guinea's 
development needs. The problem is likely to be the constraints posed 
by the fiscal situation as well as inadequacies of skills, particularly at 
the district and local levels. In addition, there has been the problem in 
the past in protecting the maintenance outlays and thus preventing the 
deterioration of existing infrastructure. Given the continued pressures 
from the salaries budget, it is likely that maintenance outlays will 
continue to be sacrificed. In this context, the tendency for provincial 
governments to assume the ability to raise unrealistic levels of internal 
revenues and to determine provincial government employment on 
that basis has to be monitored by the provincial governments as well 
as the national government Departments of Finance and of Village 
Services and Local-level Government (provincial affairs ). 
The new formulas for the distribution of grants to the provinces and 
local-level governments are more equalitarian than were the grants 
distributed under MUG. In addition the OLPGLLG ensures that monies 
will be available at the local level. This was not the case under the 1977 
OLPG. In this sense the OLPGLLG is more decentralising than the OLPG. 
The OLPGLLG requires more resources to be transferred to the 
provinces and the local-level governments. This has meant, in the 
context of a tightening budget situation, pressure to restructure and 
reduce outlays at the National Level. In 1996, the national government 
by not transferring the full amounts of the Development Grants and by 
transferring additional expenditure functions to the provinces, reduced 
the burden of adjustment on itself. But in 1997 and 1998 approximately 
another K42 million and K62 million will have to be transferred to the 
provinces and local-level governments. In addition as the Australian 
budgetary grant in 1998 is reduced by another K70 million (assumes 
one kina equals one Australian dollar and compares to the present), 
there will be added pressures for adjustment; more so given the 
increases in salaries in 1996. Tensions between the different level of 
governments will heighten; it is highly likely that as in the past the 
maintenance and capital outlays will be reduced and will come out 
considerably below those planned. 
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Skills constraint, particularly accounting, planning and implement­
ation skills will continue to constraint the performance of the provinces 
and more so of the local-level governments. It is unlikely that the 
expanding accounting and auditing requirements, as specified in the 
OLPGLLG for 267 local-level governments, 89 districts and 20 provincial 
governments as well as the more resource constrained national 
departments will be appropriately satisfied. Though necessary, such 
requirements consume resources without generating income. A 
simplification of the accounting and auditing systems is necessary, if 
Papua New Guinea is not to get mired in the controversies similar to 
those of the past, but now multifold, because of the inadequacies of 
skills and management. At the level of current development, it is more 
important to encourage mobilisation of resources at the local and 
provincial level, than to demand stringent record-keeping arrangements, 
which in any case cannot be adequately monitored. 
There is also the issue of how, given the skills and financial constraints, 
the rapidly expanding Australian project I program aid will be integrated 
into the planning processes at the local and district levels. Obviously, if 
it is now diverted towards the maintenance of and expansion of 
infrastructure relating to schools, clinics, roads, airstrips, bridges and 
wharves, then this would stimulate an improvement in social and 
economic indicators. But it is important that as far as possible local 
materials and skills are used and there is the incorporation of training of 
local personnel, so that local capacity for such maintenance is developed. 
Similarly for reasons of fiscal constraint, how effective will the 
NEFC be? What will the National Statistical Office sacrifice in order to 
conduct a 5-yearly census? To help the NEFC develop appropriate 
social and economic indicators, the next Australian aid consultancy for 
Papua New Guinea could be designed to carry out this function. Given 
that a number of grants under the OLPGLLG are population based, 
such social and economic indicators should not be used to determine 
the equality factor, which is an arduous task and which, as the historical 
experience of the operations of the National Fiscal Commission suggests, 
is likely to make only a small difference in the longer run.  Instead they 
should be used to provide for conditional complimentary support grant 
to stimulate economic activity in the lagging district(s). For the conduct 
of 5-yearly censuses more financial and skills support should be sought 
from multilateral donors. For the census the NSO should redesign its 
questionnaire to obtain income and expenditure data, in addition to 
education and health data so reliable trends in social and economic indic­
ators are available to provinces, districts and local-level governments. 
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Given the budgetary constraint at the national level and therefore 
at the provincial level, what the provinces and the district governments 
need is a strategy which will mobilise resources. This means the 
mobil isation of labour resources at the district and local level for the 
addition to and the maintenance of assets. By shifting resources and 
decision making to the local level this may be achieved .  Local-level 
governments may now begin to collect hut I poll taxes, given that they 
have use of such taxes under the OLPGLLG. But only time will tell, if 
such mobilisation is taking place or not. To date this has not happened. 
The withdrawal of banking facilities at the district level and their 
absence at the local level has made cash offices non-operational at these 
levels. An innovative way would be to appoint either a retail grocery 
store or a petrol station in the district(s) and local level as commissioned 
agents of the bank. 
There is also a need for a strategy to generate income-producing 
projects in all provinces, but more so in provinces which are lagging 
behind economically and socially. Such projects are likely to generate 
urban-based activities to service the projects as well as to process the 
resources, which initially attract the projects . There is a relationship 
between urbanisation and internally generated provincial revenue and 
if properly managed this can set in process a virtuous relationship 
between the two. In addition, under OLPGLLG there is a population 
based Town and Urban Services Grant, which may encourage strategies, 
which will expand the urban base in the provinces.  
Bougainville drove the decentralisation changes in the early post­
colonial period. Given that the Bougainville situation remains unresolved, 
will the decentralisation arrangements which are brought into being in 
that province to resolve the impasse be the same or different from those 
for the rest of the country? Will they have an impact on the decentral­
isation process for the other provinces? We pose these questions for 
discussion without having an answer to them. 
Essentially, the OLPGLLG is likely to increase rather than decrease the 
demand for scarce accounting, administrative, planning and implement­
ation skills. If the new decentralisation process gets trapped in complex 
accounting and auditing arrangements and their fulfilment, then it will 
achieve even less than the OLPG, which it replaced and which was seen 
to have failed Papua New Guinea. If it leads to the mobilisation of 
resources, increased local government revenues, increased income­
generating projects and activities, urbanisation and employment, 
increased internally-generated provincial revenues and expansion of 
education and health services, then it will have succeeded. 
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Papua New Guinea came to independence 20 years 
ago with huge promise and a wealth of natural 
resources. But this abundance has often brought with it 
more problems than benefits, witnessed in the recent 
upheavals 
• the national disposable income has tripled in the last 
20 years with little, if any, improvement in the 
standard of living 
• employment opportunities lag behind the numbers 
entering the workforce 
• services and infrastructure are in disrepair 
• rural-urban migration has often led to frustration and 
not the expected new opportunities 
• the stable economic environment of the 1980s has 
been abandoned following the Bougainville crisis in 
1989. 
This collection of papers examines the many 
aspects of Papua New Guinea's resource base­
human, mineral, oil and petroleum, forestry and 
fisheries-and the government policies that oversee 
these resources. The role of foreign aid is also 
discussed. 
The collection highlights Papua New Guinea's 
strengths, weaknesses and achievements, identifying 
structural problems and evaluating policy directions, 
trends and impacts. 
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